

韩钢：粉碎“四人帮”细节考证 Han Gang: Detailed Research on the Crushing of the ‘Gang of Four’

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FN 007 – Han Gang on Detailed Research into Smashing the GOF

韩钢

粉碎“四人帮”已经过去 35 年。35 年来，事情的真相和细节一直为人关注，为人乐道。当年惟妙惟肖的传说，后来变成绘声绘色的戏说。关键在于，官方几乎没有公布任何相关的档案文献。这未必是有意保密，因为那是一次政治风险极高的高层权力变更，所以很可能当年就没有多少文字记载。由于缺乏文字资料，相关当事人的叙述便显得颇富价值。20 世纪 90 年代以来，随着相关当事人回忆、传记、年谱的公开和出版，以及媒体的采访，以往的传说和戏说很多得以纠误，事情的真相不少也得以澄清，但也留下了一些模糊不清或相互龃龉的疑点。

究竟是谁最早提出解决“四人帮”问题的？过去一般说是叶剑英。主要当事人的回忆表明，事情可能要分为酝酿和正式提议两个阶段。还在毛泽东生前，叶剑英已经与一些当时被边缘化的党政军元老交流过对时局的看法，聂荣臻、王震、杨成武、粟裕等人曾先后以不同方式，向叶表示了对“四人帮”可能控制局面的担忧，希望解决他们的问题。叶则以自己的方式表明了对应的态度和决心。这可以说是最早的酝酿。

但酝酿是一回事，正式提出又是一回事。近些年研究的一大进展，就是弄清楚了正式提议的经过。华国锋、李先念和吴德等人的谈话和回忆，都说明是华国锋最先提议，经由李先念向叶剑英转达，得到早有此意的叶剑英赞同的。除了叶剑英事先的酝酿、华国锋正式提出动议外，一些知情人近些年还提到，李鑫在毛泽东追悼大会（9 月 18 日）后，也曾直接向华国锋进言，建议采取断然措施解决问题。

目前的疑点在于，第一，华国锋是什么时候提议的？据华本人的记忆，是毛泽东去世后的第二天，即 9 月 10 日；而李先念、吴德的回忆，是 9 月 11 日。时间相差一天。第二，李

先念是哪天去北京西山向叶剑英转达华的提议的？华国锋、吴德的记忆，都是9月13日；而李先念本人说是9月14日；《叶剑英年谱》则说是9月24日。三个说法，前两个相差一天，后一个则差了十来天。第三，李先念转达华国锋的提议后，叶剑英如何反馈的？这是一个相当关键的环节。据华的回忆，9月21日叶去他家商议此事；《叶剑英年谱》记载9月中旬、9月25日和10月2日华叶有三次密谈。也就是说，李带话之后，华叶的第一次面谈，应该是9月中旬或21日。看起来，两者似乎差不太多，但细究会发现《叶剑英年谱》自相矛盾：既然李先念24日才转达华的提议，怎么会9月中旬华叶已经秘密商议？至于华叶密谈的具体内容，由于两位都已故去，已无法向人们披露了。

解决“四人帮”问题是如何谋划的？以往的说法，出于保密，政治局成员也极少知晓此事。从当事人的回忆看，这种说法并不属实。据吴德口述，除了江青等四人和被疑为追随“四人帮”的吴桂贤、有恙在身的刘伯承不知情外，其余在京政治局成员事先都程度不同地参与或了解此事。吴德还称，其中汪东兴、陈锡联、苏振华、纪登奎都是华国锋本人亲自约谈的，只有倪志福是吴德受华的委托打的招呼。

汪东兴是整个事件的关键人物之一。20世纪80年代以来，对汪在事件中的作用有意淡化，与事实不符，也不公道。虽然汪迄今从未公开忆述此事，但从其他当事人的回忆看，汪起了无可替代的作用。华国锋回忆，他除了同叶直接商谈外，还找了汪东兴谈话，汪与他的想法完全一致。华没有透露与汪商谈的时间，但吴德口述称，华曾告诉他9月11日找了汪商量此事，汪的态度很明确，表示坚决支持华的意见。《叶剑英年谱》则记载，毛泽东生前叶就曾同汪交换过彼此看法。果真如此，汪就是分别从华、叶处得知这个动议的。至于详情如何，目前仍然不得而知，有待汪本人的披露。

以往人们都以为一开始就准备对“四人帮”采取抓捕的办法，近些年当事人的回忆，透露出一个情况：在达成解决“四人帮”问题的共识后，曾经有过另一种考虑，即通过召开政治局会议或中央全会的办法解决。华国锋、李先念回忆，9月16日，也就是毛泽东追悼大会的前两天，华和李先念、吴德、陈锡联、纪登奎、陈永贵等几位政治局委员，在国务院会议室碰过一次头。吴德建议，用开会的办法解决。李先念表示质疑，还举了赫鲁晓夫上台的例子说明。华、李、吴权衡再三，考虑中央委员会有不少是“四人帮”拉进来的造反派成员，用开会的办法恐怕要冒风险，采取隔离审查的办法才是上策，故开会之策弃而不用。不过，关于这次会议的时间仍有不同记忆，华、李说是9月16日，而吴的记忆是9月26日或27日，两者相差了十来天。

据华国锋说，他不只是找了上述几位政治局成员商议解决的办法，更重要的还同叶剑英多次商量过此事。遗憾的是，华没有透露他同叶商谈的详情，因此华叶之谈仍是未解之谜。

抓捕“四人帮”的行动是如何准备的？过去的说法一直比较含糊或者片面。当事人的回忆逐渐相对全面地复原了历史。据华国锋、吴德的谈话或口述，准备工作主要是由华、汪、李三人分别商谈，由汪、吴组织实施的。整个行动班子分为准备文件的写作班子和实施抓捕的行动班子，前者由李鑫负责；后者又分为三个部分，中南海内抓捕江青、张春桥、姚文元、王洪文、毛远新的行动由汪东兴负责，中南海外抓捕迟群、谢静宜、金祖敏的行动由吴德负责，控制中央人民广播电台和《人民日报》等新闻舆论单位的行动由耿飚负责。为此，汪东兴指挥张耀祠（中央办公厅副主任）、武健华（中央警卫局副局长）挑选了直接参与行动的八三四一部队五十来名官兵，吴德则与北京卫戍区司令员吴忠沟通，并与当时主持军委日常工作的陈锡联联系，取得了对北京卫戍区部队的直接指挥权。

关于准备工作，实际上还有一条线被人们忽视了，就是高层经由叶剑英同一些军方人士和党政军元老打了招呼，如李德生、张廷发和聂荣臻、陈云、邓颖超等。从某个角度说，这些也是一种准备，特别是同李德生（时任沈阳军区司令员）、张廷发（空军司令员）打招呼，更是对可能发生的不测做好预设。

至于具体行动的经过，当事人的披露比较详细。这是近些年研究一个比较突出的进展。张耀祠、耿飚的回忆录，特别是香港凤凰卫视对武健华、周启才、陈长江、杨正泉、保育钧等人的访谈，都相当细致地叙述了10月6日晚间在中南海怀仁堂抓捕王洪文、张春桥、姚文元，在丰泽园内抓捕江青、毛远新，控制中央人民广播电台和10月7日进驻人民日报社的经过。

中南海外抓捕迟群、谢静宜、金祖敏的经过，过去一直不清楚。吴德在口述中作了叙述，但仍嫌笼统，远不及对中南海内行动叙述详尽。

抓捕“四人帮”当晚，中央政治局在玉泉山召开紧急会议，过去人们只知道会议结果，如今当事人的回忆提供了新史料

抓捕“四人帮”当晚，中央政治局在北京西郊玉泉山召开紧急会议。非程序的强力行动需要得到程序性追认，毛泽东逝世后最高权力核心的真空需要尽快填补，事件过后的中国政

局需要稳定，这些都必须由最高决策层作出部署和安排。因此，作为一个完整的历史事件，应该说这是最后一环。

过去人们只知道这次会议的结果，至于经过，则不知其详。吴德口述最早作了比较详细的忆述，周启才的口述则更为详尽。参加会议的政治局成员是华国锋、叶剑英、李先念、汪东兴、吴德、陈锡联、纪登奎、陈永贵、苏振华、倪志福、吴桂贤等 11 人，作为工作人员旁听会议的是李鑫和周启才。会议从 6 日晚上十点开到 7 日凌晨四点，时长六个小时，主要是由华国锋、叶剑英通报抓捕“四人帮”的经过，然后作出了关于隔离审查“四人帮”和推举华国锋为中共中央主席、中央军委主席的决定。之后，就当前和今后一段时间的工作作出了安排。值得注意的是，会上华国锋曾提议推举叶剑英为中共中央主席，叶则坚持谦辞；政治局委员（纪登奎）建议按照毛泽东“三七开”的基调，指出“文化大革命”的错误所在，叶认为这时的文件不可能解决“文革”的问题。

不过，无论是吴德的口述还是周启才的回忆，对会议安排当前和今后工作的情况均寥寥数句，语焉不详。那次会议的参加者（包括旁听者），仅有四位尚健在。更进一步的情况，还待当事人披露。

Han Gang: A Detailed Examination of the Crushing of the Gang of Four

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Han Gang

Thirty-five years have passed since the crushing of the Gang of Four, and for 35 years the truth and details of the incident have been a source of concern and delight. The legends of the past have turned into colorful dramas. The key lies in the fact that the officials have hardly released any relevant archival documents. This may not necessarily be an intentional secrecy, because it was a high-level power change with extremely high political risks, so it is likely that there were not many written records back then. Due to the lack of written information, the narratives of the parties involved have become quite valuable, and since the 1990s, with the disclosure and publication of the memories, biographies, and chronicles of the parties involved, as well as interviews with the media, many of the legends and jokes in the past have been corrected, and many of the truths of the matter have been clarified, but some ambiguities and disagreements have also been left behind.

Who first proposed to solve the "Gang of Four" problem? In the past, it was generally said to be Ye Jianying. The recollections of the main parties involved suggest that the matter may have to be divided into two stages: the conception and the formal proposal. Before Mao Zedong's death, Ye Jianying had already exchanged views on the current situation with some of the then marginalized party, government and military leaders, including Nie Rongzhen, Wang Zhen, Yang Chengwu and Suyu, who had successively, in different ways, expressed their concern to Ye about the possibility of the Gang of Four taking control of the situation, and hoped that their problems could be solved. Ye, on the other hand, expressed his attitude and determination in his own way. This can be considered the earliest gestation.

But it is one thing to conceive and another to formalize. One of the major advances in research in recent years has been the clarification of how the formal proposal was made. The conversations and recollections of Hua Guofeng, Li Xiannian and Wu De all indicate that Hua Guofeng was the first to propose the idea, which was conveyed to Ye Jianying by Li Xiannian, and was endorsed by Ye Jianying, who had long had the same idea. In addition to Ye Jianying's prior conception and Hua Guofeng's formal presentation of the motion, some knowledgeable people have also mentioned in recent years that Li Xin, after Mao Zedong's memorial conference (September 18), had also directly addressed Hua Guofeng, suggesting that categorical measures be taken to solve the problem.

The current doubts are, first, when did Hua Guofeng propose this? According to Hua's own memory, it was September 10, the day after Mao's death; while Li Xiannian's and Wu De's recollections put it on September 11th. The time difference was one day. Second, on what date did Li Xiannian go to Xishan Mountain in Beijing to convey Hua's proposal to Ye Jianying? Hua Guofeng's and Wu De's memories are of September 13th; while Li Xiannian himself said it was September 14th; and Ye Jianying's Chronicle says it was September 24th. Of the three accounts, the first two differed by one day, while the latter differed by about ten days. Third, after Li Xiannian conveyed Hua Guofeng's proposal, how did Ye Jianying give his feedback? This is a rather crucial aspect. According to Hua's recollection, on September 21, Ye went to his home to discuss the matter; Ye Jianying's Annals records three close talks between Hua and Ye in mid-September, September 25, and October 2, respectively. In other words, after Li brought the message, Hua Ye's first interview would have been in mid-September or on the 21st. It seems that the two do not seem to be too far apart, but a closer look will find that "Ye Jianying's chronicle" contradicts itself: since Li Xiannian 24 only conveyed Hua's proposal, how could it be in mid-September, Hua Ye has been

secretly negotiated? As for the specific content of the secret talks of Hua Ye, due to the two have died, has not been able to disclose to the people.

How was the "Gang of Four" problem solved? In the past, it was said that, for reasons of secrecy, very few members of the Politburo were aware of this matter. From the recollections of the people involved, this statement is not true. According to Wu De, in addition to Jiang Qing and other four people, Wu Guixian, who was suspected of following the Gang of Four, and Liu Bocheng, who was ill, did not know about it, the rest of the members of the Politburo in Beijing were involved in this matter to varying degrees or knew about it beforehand. Wu De also said that Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian, Su Zhenhua, Ji Dengkui are Hua Guofeng personally interviewed, only Ni Zhifu is Wu De was commissioned by Hua greetings.

Wang Dongxing was one of the key figures in the whole affair, and the intentional downplaying of Wang's role in the affair since the 1980s has been inconsistent with the facts and unfair. Although Wang has so far never publicly recalled the incident, it is clear from the recollections of other parties involved that Wang played an irreplaceable role. Hua Guofeng recalled that in addition to direct discussions with Ye, he also talked to Wang Dongxing, who was in complete agreement with him. Hua did not disclose the time of the discussion with Wang, but Wu De stated that Hua had told him that he had approached Wang on September 11 to discuss the matter, and that Wang's attitude was very clear, indicating that he strongly supported Hua's views. According to Ye Jianying's Annals, Ye had exchanged views with Wang during Mao's lifetime. If this is true, Wang learned of the motion from Hua and Ye respectively. The details are still unknown, and await disclosure by Wang himself.

In the past, people thought that they were prepared to arrest the Gang of Four from the very beginning, but the recollections of the people involved in recent years have revealed that after reaching a consensus on solving the problem of the Gang of Four, there was once another way to consider it, i.e., to solve the problem by convening a meeting of the Politburo or a plenary session of the Central Committee. or a plenum of the Central Committee to solve the problem. Hua Guofeng and Li Xiannian recalled that on September 16, two days before the memorial meeting for Mao Zedong, Hua and Li Xiannian, Wu De, Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui, Chen Yonggui and other members of the Politburo met in the State Council conference room. Wu De suggested that a meeting be used to solve the problem. Li Xiannian questioned this and cited the example of Khrushchev's rise to power as an illustration. Hua, Li and Wu weighed the matter and considered that many members of the Central Committee were members of the "Gang of Four" rebels, so they were afraid that they

would take risks by holding a meeting, and that isolation and censorship would be the best solution, so they discarded the idea of holding a meeting. However, there are still different memories about the time of this meeting, Hua and Li said it was September 16th, while Wu's memory is September 26th or 27th, a difference of about ten days.

According to Hua Guofeng, he not only approached the above-mentioned Politburo members to discuss a solution, but more importantly also discussed the matter with Ye Jianying on several occasions. Unfortunately, Hua did not disclose the details of his discussion with Ye, so the discussion between Hua and Ye remains an unsolved mystery.

How was the operation to arrest the Gang of Four prepared? In the past, accounts have been vague or one-sided. Recollections of the parties involved have gradually restored the history in a relatively comprehensive manner. According to the conversations or oral accounts of Hua Guofeng and Wu De, the preparatory work was mainly discussed by Hua, Wang and Li, and organized and implemented by Wang and Wu. The whole operation team was divided into a writing team to prepare documents and an operation team to carry out the arrests, with Li Xin in charge of the former; the latter was further divided into three parts, with Wang Dongxing in charge of the arrests of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen, and Mao Yuanxin inside Zhongnanhai, Wu De in charge of the arrests of Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Jin Zuomin outside Zhongnanhai, and Geng Biao in charge of the operations of controlling the news and public opinion outlets such as the Central People's Radio Station (CPRS) and the People's Daily (PR). Geng Biao was in charge of the operation to control the Central People's Broadcasting Station and the People's Daily. For this purpose, Wang Dongxing commanded Zhang Yaozhi (Deputy Director of the General Office of the Central Committee) and Wu Jianhua (Deputy Director of the Central Security Bureau) to select some 50 officers and soldiers of the 831st Unit who were directly involved in the operation, while Wu De communicated with Wu Zhong, the commander of the Beijing Garrison, and contacted Chen Xilian, who was presiding over the day-to-day work of the Military Commission at that time, and gained the right to directly command the Beijing Garrison units.

Regarding the preparations, there was actually another line that has been overlooked, which is that the top brass, through Ye Jianying, greeted some military figures and Party, government and military patriarchs, such as Li Desheng, Zhang Tingfa, and Nie Rongzhen, Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, and so on. From a certain point of view, these are also a kind of preparation, especially with Li Desheng

(then commander of the Shenyang Military Region), Zhang Tingfa (commander of the Air Force) to greet, but also for the possible unpredictability to prepare.

As for the specific course of action, the disclosure of the parties involved is more detailed. This is one of the more prominent developments in the research in recent years. The memoirs of Zhang Yaozhi and Geng Biao, especially the interviews of Wu Jianhua, Zhou Qicai, Chen Changjiang, Yang Zhengquan, and Conservation Jun by Hong Kong's Phoenix Satellite Television, recounted in considerable detail the arrests of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyan in the evening of October 6 at Huairan Hall of Zhongnanhai, the arrests of Jiang Qing and Mao Yuanxin inside the Fengzeyuan, the control of the CPB, and the move into the People's Daily on October 7, and so on.

The arrest of Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi and Jin Zumin outside Zhongnanhai has been unclear in the past. Wu De recounted it in his dictation, but it was still too general and far less detailed than the account of the operation inside Zhongnanhai.

On the night of the arrest of the Gang of Four, the Politburo of the Central Committee held an emergency meeting at Yuquanshan Mountain. In the past, people only knew the results of the meeting, but now the recollections of the people involved have provided new historical information.

On the night of the arrest of the Gang of Four, the Politburo of the Central Committee held an emergency meeting at Mount Yuquan in the western suburbs of Beijing. The need for procedural acknowledgement of non-procedural forceful actions, the need to fill the vacuum in the core of supreme power as soon as possible after Mao's death, and the need to stabilize China's political situation in the aftermath of the incident all had to be deployed and arranged at the highest level of decision-making. Therefore, as a complete historical event, it should be said that this is the last link.

In the past, people only knew the results of this meeting, but not the details as to what happened. Wu De's dictation was the first to give a more detailed recollection, and Zhou Qicai's dictation was even more detailed. The members of the Politburo who attended the meeting were Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui, Chen Yonggui, Su Zhenhua, Ni Zhifu, Wu Guixian, and other eleven people, and those who sat in on the meeting as staff members were Li Xin and Zhou Qicai. The meeting was held from 10:00 p.m. on the 6th to 4:00 a.m. on the 7th, six hours long, mainly by Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying briefing on the capture of the "Gang of Four", and then made a decision on the isolation review of the "Gang of Four" and

the selection of Hua Guofeng as Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. After that, arrangements were made for the current and future work. It is worth noting that at the meeting, Hua Guofeng proposed to elect Ye Jianying as the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, but Ye insisted on resigning humbly; a member of the Politburo (Ji Dengkui) proposed to point out the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution in accordance with the tone of Mao Zedong's "thirty to seventy percent split," but Ye thought that the document could not possibly solve the problem of the "Cultural Revolution," but Ye thought that the document could not possibly solve the problem of the "Cultural Revolution. Ye thinks that it is impossible to solve the problems of the Cultural Revolution in this document.

However, both Wu De's dictation and Zhou Qicai's recollection of the meeting's organization of current and future work are scanty. Only four of the participants in that meeting (including the observers) are still alive. Further information is yet to be disclosed by the parties concerned.