

韩钢：“九一三”事件考疑——以《林豆豆口述》为中心 Han Gang Doubts About 9-13 – Lin Doudou’s Testimony

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FN 080 - Han Gang Doubts About LB Incident

关于“九一三”事件，官方著述基本沿袭了事发之后不久下发的一系列中共中央文件的说法，这些文件包括：1971年9月18日中发【1971】57号，关于林彪出逃的《中共中央通知》；1971年10月6日中发【1971】65号，《中共中央通知》；1971年11月14日中发【1971】74号，《中共中央通知》（印发《“571工程”纪要》和影印件至相关级别）；1971年12月21日，中发【1971】77号，《中共中央通知》【《粉碎林陈反党集团反革命政变的斗争》（材料之一）】，等等。

海内外研究者则众说纷纭，莫衷一是。迄今为止，各种说法的依据大多是直接或间接当事人的回忆，鲜少原始文字资料的支撑。笔者推测，除了亲历者个人存留的某些零星文字资料（如笔记、日记、字条、电话记录之类），“九一三”事件很可能没有多少人们通常熟悉的那种系列原始文献档案；非要说有，恐怕主要是事发之后官方专案机构的大量原始审讯记录、交代材料、证人证言等。目前也不大可能寄望披露这些材料。一个相当的时期内，亲历者的回忆和口述仍会是还原这一事件最重要的史料。

在诸多回忆和口述里，来自健在的林彪家人的回忆无疑是最值得重视的材料之一。健在的林彪家人，有林彪的女儿林豆豆和她的丈夫张清林（事发时尚是未婚夫），还有就是林立果的未婚妻张宁。就与事件的关系而言，林豆豆又是最重要的亲历者。众所周知，林豆豆的说法自事发始即与官方结论相异，因鲜见于正式文本，多属坊间传言。2004年台北出版李晨著《世纪风铃》，披露了《林立衡“九一三”后写给中央的材料》，很快在网上流

传。材料并非典型的回忆，而是林豆豆 1980 年 3 月写的申诉材料，材料寄至郑州市委负责人转河南省委负责人，转呈中共中央纪律检查委员会。据研究者核实，林豆豆承认材料为她本人所写，但她并不认识李晨，也未将材料提供给李晨。去年香港出版的《林豆豆口述》（舒云整理），再次收录了这份申诉材料，题为《我所知道的“九一三”事件》。遗憾的是，该书并非林豆豆所编，甚至“未经林豆豆本人审阅”，且“有删节”。据研究者考证，《世纪风铃》和《林豆豆口述》的编著者都对这份材料作了改写。两个修改稿和原稿的差异，已有研究者做了仔细对比和甄别，此处不赘。无论如何，这都不能不减损其史料价值。

话说回来，这份材料（以下简称“林豆豆材料”或“材料”）毕竟是公开发表的林豆豆关于此事的唯一文本，人们格外关注。严格说来，申诉材料还是属于记忆性质的史料，虽然也算第一手资料，但不宜简单采信，而需要与其他史料比对和参照，或证实，或证伪，或存疑。“林豆豆材料”披露了“九一三”事件的若干细节，不少是他人未能也不能提供的情节，但也与其他亲历者的记忆有一些龃龉，留下不少疑点。本文将以此为对象，结合其他一些亲历者的回忆或口述，对若干史实叙述的疑点作一讨论。

林立果同林豆豆谈了些什么

“材料”是从 1971 年 9 月 7 日讲起的。现有回忆和口述都证明，林豆豆、张清林还有张宁正是这一天到北戴河的。（参见《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》，《中华儿女》1999 年第 2 期；刘吉纯口述、丁丑整理《难忘的“九一三”前夜--一个警卫人员的回忆》，《历史学家茶座》第一辑，山东人民出版社 2005 年版）

林彪卫士长李文普、警卫参谋刘吉纯（据李文普说，刘吉纯是从总政治部保卫部调到八三四一部队挂名为警卫科副科长的，担负林彪的警卫工作。参见《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》）都回忆，林豆豆这天一到北戴河，就被林立果找去密谈。李文普说，林豆豆、张清林、张宁和空军政治部保卫部的杨森 9 月 7 日上午十一点多钟从北京到达北戴河；到了不久，林立果就把林豆豆接到 57 号楼林立果住处密谈。刘吉纯说，9 月 7 日上午，林立果、林立衡等从北京飞到北戴河，午后张清林和杨森找到他，说不知林豆豆被老虎弄到哪

里去了，要刘赶快把主任、老虎抓起来。（《难忘的“九一三”前夜》）刘吉纯所说有的恐怕不实，据李文普文章，林立果此前已在北戴河（《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》），不可能与林豆豆等人同行；但刘听说的“林豆豆被老虎弄到哪里去了”，算是对李文普所说的林立果、林豆豆“密谈”的一个佐证。

密谈的内容，李文普、刘吉纯当然不会知道。但林豆豆随后向李、刘等人打招呼，告诉他们林立果要“挟持”首长，多少透露出一点“密谈”的信息。刘吉纯说，9月7日晚上林豆豆要他去她那里，“她说，主任（即叶群--引者注）、老虎（即林立果--引者注）在外面做了坏事，被上边知道了。他们怕挨整，在北京待不住了，想挟持首长（林彪）到外地去。”刘还说，9月12日晚上十点半左右，林豆豆又一次告诉他和李文普：“主任、老虎要挟持首长到广州去，在广州呆不住就去香港”。（《难忘的“九一三”前夜》）林彪的秘书宋德金可以佐证刘吉纯的说法：“大约9月10日，八三四一部队警卫科副科长刘吉纯把我拉到僻静处，悄悄对我说：‘豆豆（林立衡）说，主任（叶群）与林立果要挟持首长（林彪）外逃，怎么办？’我听了之后，大吃一惊，继之又平静下来……”（宋德金《真实的林彪--林彪秘书最后的回忆》）李文普也回忆，9月12日“这天下午，我在平台上乘凉，林豆豆突然对我说：‘林立果尽干坏事，要害毛主席，他们还要去广州。万一不行就让首长去香港，你不能让首长上飞机走。’”（《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》）林豆豆对刘、李两人所说，很可能就是林立果同她“密谈”的内容。

这是一个十分关键的历史情节，甚至可以说是“九一三”事件的第一个信号。林立果正是第二天就回到北京，与“小舰队”的人具体密商杀害毛泽东、“南逃”广州和香港的计划的。令人不解的是，“材料”对这次“密谈”却没有只言片语，人们只能从“材料”的其他叙述中判断。林豆豆在“材料”里说，从9月7日开始，她就逐个分别找刘吉纯、李文普及林彪身边的卫生员陈占照、张恒昌（据李文普的文章，张恒昌、陈占照的身份是内勤公务员。参见《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》）“反复谈话”。谈些什么，“材料”没有直接说，只能从这段叙述了解：“开始，李文普并不相信我说的林立果要带首长（林彪）去广州，万一不行就让首长去香港以及林立果还要害毛主席的事，后来他也感到事情有些不对头，向我说了叶群和林立果瞒着林彪所干的一些事情。”（《林豆豆口述》）

如果可以判断林豆豆、刘吉纯、李文普所说就是“密谈”内容的话，那么，“密谈”内容不会只是这么简单。林立果、叶群为什么要杀害毛泽东，要“南逃”广州和香港，这些都会在“密谈”中涉及。遗憾的是，“林豆豆材料”不仅未能详述，甚至几无交待，留下的只是悬疑。

十多年前，张宁出版的书称，“九一三”事件过去多年以后，林立衡亲口向她讲述了那天林立果找她谈话的情况：（9月7日）下午三点前，林立果接林立衡到57号楼单独谈话。林立果对林立衡说：“自从庐山会议以后，一组（毛泽东代号）揪住主任不放，几次检讨通不过，现在又趁首长到北戴河休养，跑到南方巡视，到处公开接见讲话，放风，最终目的是要打倒首长。首长身体差，一旦有什么事，怎么吃得消？刘少奇、彭德怀的例子摆着。首长又不肯服个软、认个错。一组已经摆开阵势，绝不会放过首长。与其等死，不如孤注一掷，做一次拼搏。”“她问：‘你准备怎么拼搏？主席威信高，稍有不慎，首长更被动。’立果说：‘反正形势对首长非常不利，坐着等死不如主动出击，说不定有一线希望！我想再看看形势发展，实在不行就跟一组硬干！或者到广州另立中央，再不行就上山打游击。’”“林立衡急于摸清叶群和林立果的真实底细，问林立果：‘形势真的那么糟？首长的态度怎么样？他知道吗？’林立果说：‘首长还不知道，事情没考虑成熟前，不能跟他说。’”（张宁《自己写自己》，作家出版社1998年版）这段叙述第一次详细披露了林立果与林豆豆密谈的情况。张宁还提到，9月8日晚上7点多钟，林立果去56号楼又与林豆豆单独谈话20多分钟。她说这也是林立衡多年后告诉她的，这次谈话是林立衡要求的，是最后一次争取阻止林立果回北京，但林立果始终不开口，神情上却流露一点犹豫。（《自己写自己》）然而，张宁不是直接当事人，这段转述有待林豆豆确认。

前些年，原空军政委高厚良口述说，（9月）7、8号两天，林立果把谋杀毛泽东不成就去广州另立中央，再不成就去苏联吃洋面包、当“寓公”的计划，告诉了林豆豆，谈了两个多小时，林豆豆自己说“当时怕林立果对自己下毒手，都曾向林立果表示‘跟你们走’”。高厚良还说，林立果向林豆豆说过“首长也同意”。（高厚良口述、高德明整理《“9·13”之后的林立衡--暨说给林豆豆的知心话》，《中华儿女》2000年第9期）高厚良披露的情况相当重要，这说明林豆豆不仅知道林立果要去广州，而且知道他们还可能去苏联。高厚良口述在“去广州另立中央”这一点上，与张宁的转述吻合；不同的是，张宁转述中提到的“孤注一掷”、“做一次拼搏”，在高的口述中具体化为“谋杀毛泽东”；

而高所说林立果要去苏联吃洋面包、当“寓公”的计划、林豆豆出于担心表示跟林立果走、林彪也同意等情节，张宁的转述完全没有涉及。高厚良同样不是直接当事人，高又没有说明材料的出处，其口述目前很难作为参考的依据。

林彪对毛泽东南巡谈话有何反应

林立果、叶群要去广州甚至香港，还要谋害毛泽东，直接原因是得知了毛泽东的南巡谈话。1971年八九月间，毛泽东出京南下，先后到了武汉、长沙、南昌、杭州、上海，沿途同地方党政和大军区主要负责人谈话，严词点名指责林彪，多次使用“突然袭击”、“分裂党”、“急于夺权”等政治斗争惯用的词语，发出“庐山这件事，还没有完，还没有解决”的告诫，实质上预警了新一轮“路线斗争”。官方著述断定，林彪、叶群得悉毛泽东南巡谈话后终于作出杀害毛泽东、武装政变的“疯狂的决定”。（参见中共中央文献研究室编《毛泽东传（一九四九--一九七六）》下，中央文献出版社2003年版；中共中央党史研究室编著《中国共产党历史》第二卷，中共党史出版社2011年版）

据李文普回忆：“9月6日，周宇驰带着毛泽东巡视南方接见湖南、广东、广西等地党政军领导干部批评林彪的讲话材料来到北戴河见了林彪、叶群、林立果，谈话内容，我不清楚。”（《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》）这个叙述值得追问。李文普是卫士长，按规矩不可能看到这个讲话材料，周宇驰、林立果、叶群也不大可能给他看，那么，李文普怎么知道周宇驰带来的是毛泽东的南巡谈话材料？反过来问，如果李文普得知，那么，当林豆豆告诉他林立果、叶群要杀害毛泽东、“南逃”广州和香港时，一开始他为什么不相信？这些细节，李文普的文章都未交代清楚。

退一步说，假如林彪得知毛的南巡谈话，熟稔毛泽东性格的林彪不会不了解事情的严重性。问题是，林彪有什么反应？他准备如何应对？这是解读林彪在“九一三”事件中的心理和行为的又一个关键性问题。然而，迄今为止，几乎没有亲历者披露任何相关史实，包括林豆豆。没有披露，可能的原因是：第一，完全不知情；第二，虽然知情，但碍于种种原因不愿意披露；第三，林彪没有态度或有态度但深藏不露；第四，根本不知道毛的南巡

谈话。无论是何原因，只要史料不充分，很难确认林彪主谋或参与了杀害毛和“南逃”的策划。

高德明的一篇文章称：9月7日上午，周宇驰驾驶直升机将顾同舟15页纸的情报送到北戴河。林立果领着他去见了林彪、叶群。拟定了三套方案：一是动员江腾蛟去上海、杭州组织王维国、陈励耘杀害毛泽东，让于新野先去上海、杭州侦察毛泽东的动向并观察王、陈二人态度；二是如谋害不成，就带黄、吴、李、邱到广州另立中央，实行地区割据；三是作最坏打算，为北去苏联作准备。事后，周宇驰曾向舰队成员说：“林副主席很动感情，抱着我的双肩说‘宇驰同志，我把一切都交给你们了！’”高文还说，林立衡当时曾问林立果：“首长知道暗杀主席的事吗？”林立果肯定地说：“他也同意。”（高德明《林立果在“9·13”前的六个昼夜》，《中华儿女》2000年第12期）以高文的说法，林彪不仅知道毛的南巡谈话，而且参与了策划，至少知晓杀毛、南逃、北叛三个方案。问题是，高文没有出处，无法为据。

一直随卫林彪、最为林彪信任的李文普，倒是提供了从9月7日到12日的6天里林彪一些令人费解的零星动态：

（9月7日）林彪看到张宁、张清林，很高兴。叶群问他满意不满意时，他表示：“满意，很满意，一个老红军的女儿，一个劳动人民的儿子，很好！”

（9月8日）这一天，林彪一切如常，96号楼很平静，林彪也没有问我林立果到哪里去了。到了晚上，林立果从北京打来电话，说已安全到达北京，要我报告首长，我马上报告林彪、叶群，林彪点头说：“好！”

（9月）9日，北戴河96楼比较平静。海里有人游泳，山上警卫森严，“林办”的人却像平常一样各忙各的。

（9月10日）当天下午，林立衡带了张清林、张宁、杨森去山海关游玩，买了一些送给林彪、叶群的小礼品，林彪见了礼物很高兴，叶群叫我给他们照了相。

（9月12日）上午，林彪叫我收拾一下东西，准备去大连……晚饭前，林彪也没有说要走，而是和叶群一起为林立衡、张清林举办婚礼，要我准备照相。叶群领着林立衡、张清林到林彪面前，说“张清林求婚，豆豆同意了，今天晚上就举办一个‘订婚仪式’。”林彪说：“很好嘛！祝贺你们订婚啦！”叶群把我叫进客厅，给林彪、叶群、林立衡、张清林照了合照；又强拉着林立衡、张清林接吻，拍了照，又让女儿女婿出去同工作人员一起合影留念。（《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》）

见准女婿、准儿媳，拍照合影，高兴收到小礼品……用李文普的话说，林彪这几天“平静”、“如常”。难道这就是林彪知悉南巡谈话后的反应？到底是知晓南巡谈话，但表面“一切如常”而暗中密谋；还是虽然知晓南巡谈话，但打算以不变应万变；抑或干脆蒙在鼓里，不知道南巡谈话？这些都还是未知数，林豆豆的“材料”没有任何说明。

林彪到底要去哪里

林彪对毛的南巡谈话有何反应，不得而知；但那几天他打算去大连，却是几位亲历者都肯定的。

林豆豆的“材料”说：“9月7日，首长对我们说的是去大连，叶群为了不让首长去大连，就叫李文普和刘吉纯对首长撒谎，说大连的水，首长不能喝。”（《林豆豆口述》）李文普证实了林豆豆的说法：“（9月12日）上午，林彪叫我收拾一下东西，准备去大连。大连是林彪常去的地方……我以为林彪真是去大连，按惯例给大连市交际处打电话，要他们检查一下房间，调控好林彪住房的温度，并对其他注意事项提出了要求。我又收拾了林彪随身带的东西。”（《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》）刘吉纯也说：“9月10日，我和林立衡碰了一次头，两人都未发现新情况，只听说准备去大连。”（《难忘的“九一三”前夜》）

众所周知，同在北戴河的叶群、林立果另有打算，准备去广州、香港。这个情况大概是林豆豆最早知道的。从“林豆豆材料”看，她最先跟刘吉纯、李文普打了招呼，一开始李文普不大相信林豆豆所说。（《林豆豆口述》）李文普自己也说，对林立衡这番话，他感到突然，不相信。不相信的原因，是林彪让他准备去大连，并没说去广州；另外，林立衡和叶群感情不好，林立衡和林立果也有矛盾，感情平淡。他说长期在“林办”，对林家真真假假的事见多了，听多了，也遇多了。（《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》）

叶群、林立果要去广州、香港，必须说服林彪改变主意。怎么说服林彪的？“林豆豆材料”谈到9月12日晚上的一個情况：李文普告诉她，“主任叫我明早六点安排去广州，并叫我先不要通知八三四一部队。我问过首长，首长说广州太热，不利于他治病，不去广州了，还是说一定要去大连。主任就问我广州的房子有没有冷气设备，我说广州的住楼有冷气，不热。所以首长又对我说，去广州也行。”（《林豆豆口述》）李文普的说法是，9月11日“这一天，叶群试探性地向我讲了一下想去广州。我当时回答说，‘现在天气这样热，去广州干什么？’”（《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》）李文普所说，证实了林豆豆说的叶群亲口告诉了李文普去广州的打算，但没有提到叶群询问冷气设备、让李文普去做林彪的工作、林彪同意去广州等情节。

宋德金曾回忆：“大约是9月上旬，在林办人员中就有传言说，近日要换住地。然而，究竟去哪里？何时动身？在北戴河的人员是否全都随行？大家始终没有得到正式的说法。这里的规矩是‘不该问的不问，不该听的不听，不该说的不说’。我来此（指北戴河--笔者注）时间不长，更是严守‘三不’原则。又有内勤战士跟我说，听说去广州，又听说去大连。我说不知道。”（《真实的林彪》）宋德金所忆，是否表明原来打算去大连的林彪，经过劝说，改了主意，所以传出大连、广州两个去向的说法，也有待考证。

不过，几位亲历者都说过同一个情况。“林豆豆材料”说：

（9月12日）晚九点多，应我的请求帮助我掌握情况的林彪卫生员张恒昌告诉我，他听见了主任跟首长说：“去广州不行，去香港也行呀？！”小张说他始终没听见首长的任何声音。（《林豆豆口述》）

这一情节，李文普有大致相同的记忆：

（9月12日）二十一点左右，林立果回到96号楼，马上和叶群钻进林彪卧室三人一起密谈。林立衡逼着内勤公务员张恒昌、陈占照去门外偷听。张恒昌来告她：“刚才，在卫生间里，隔着门隐约听到里边两句谈话，一句是叶群说的：‘就是到香港也行嘛！’一句是林立果说的：‘到这时候，你还不把黄、吴、李、邱都交给我。’”（《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》）

这个情节透露出两个信息：第一，间接表明林彪又改了主意，还是不愿意去广州，不然，叶群不会说“去广州不行”这句话；第二，林彪这时得知了叶群要去香港的想法。至于林立果说的把黄、吴、李、邱都交给他，是否指把黄永胜、吴法宪、李作鹏、邱会作交给“小舰队”挟持到广州去，不得而知。不过，这个情节，林豆豆和李文普都是间接当事人，而直接当事人张恒昌、陈占照没有关于这一情节的任何回忆。所以，此事有待直接当事人证实。

如果叶群跟林彪说要去香港、林立果说要挟持黄、吴、李、邱去广州，那么叶群、林立果一定向林彪透露了相当严重的消息。因为，很显然，1970年代中共中央副主席出境到香港，只能是亡命之举，而绝非正常的政府行为。这一点，林彪不会不知。问题是，叶群用什么理由来劝说呢？是否就是毛的南巡谈话？也不得而知。一个更重要的问题是，林彪得知叶群想去香港的打算，有什么反应？据“林豆豆材料”披露的张恒昌的说法，是“没听见首长的任何声音”。“没听见”有两种可能，一是林彪有回应，但张恒昌听不到；一是林彪根本没有回应。倘若是没有回应，那么，林彪是默许还是犹豫，抑或根本不考虑？没有史料，很难判断。

蹊跷的是，陈占照回忆，当晚“十一点五十分左右，林彪又打铃，对我说马上夜航去大连，不休息了，有些东西可以不带，够用就行了。到大连一个星期就回来，回北京过国庆节。”（《林彪内勤公务员陈占照关于“九一三”事件的揭发材料》，引自舒云《林彪事件完整调查》下册）陈占照的材料来自舒云的书，未见公开发表，可靠性还待确认，至少时间有疑。但公开发表的刘吉纯的口述说：9月12日那天晚上，“叶群给秘书办公室打来电话，是李秘书接的，她派我去大连看房子。我问，怎么去？叶群说，坐火车去。我说，夜里没有开往大连的火车。叶群改口说，机场不是有架小飞机吗？我想了一下，说我不想去。她说不去就算了。”（《难忘的“九一三”前夜》）李文普也说，那天晚上“叶群在十点多钟向张恒昌说‘明天早上六点去大连’”。宋德金回忆：9月12日晚上“大约十一点--十一点半，林彪的警卫李文普匆匆回到办公室，一边忙着办别的事情，一边让我立即给大连打电话，通知那边做好准备。”（《真实的林彪》）四位当事人的说法细节各异，时间、情节、对象都不一样，但有一个共同的情节：去大连。这说明，临到动身，目的地又改回了大连，至少几位工作人员听到的是如此。叶群说去大连，很可能是为掩人耳目；但林彪要去大连，是同样掩人耳目还是仍旧坚持原意呢？又是一个悬念。

林彪是如何从 96 号楼出走的

林彪离开北戴河 96 号楼时，林豆豆已经第二次去八三四一部队大队部求助，张清林则留在 56 号楼（林豆豆、张清林住地）观察，两人都不在现场，不是直接目击者。关于这一点，“林豆豆材料”里的叙述并不多，仅有一段：

（9月12日晚），在 56 号楼的张清林接到林彪的卫生员小张按我的要求打来的电话，小张说：“他们（叶群、林立果）正在床上拽首长，情况十分紧急！首长马上就要被拽走了！汽车再过十分钟就要开动了！你们快，快，快呀……”（《林豆豆口述》）

林豆豆特别说，其时是晚上十一点半钟左右。不久，她和张清林在八三四一部队大队部“眼睁睁”看着一辆红旗车从门口开过去，接着便听到了一声枪响，再听到几声枪响。（《林豆豆口述》）

这段叙述的重点，在于林彪是被从床上“拽起来”的。坊间因此流传林彪服用了安眠药，是被人从床上生拉硬拽拖起来的，根本不像有“逃跑”打算的说法。见诸文字的，是张宁的书：“小陈和校长在叶群母子走后，一起进去服侍林彪吃安眠药，替他脱衣服，扶他上床睡觉，时间约十一点半左右。”“周恩来亲自下令封锁机场，林立果得报后丢下电话报叶群，叶群带上林立果直奔林彪卧室，小陈和小张见状跟进，见叶群扑向床头一把拉起进入睡眠状态的林彪，大声喊道：‘快起来吧！有人来抓你来啦！快穿衣服走吧！’”

（《自己写自己》）张宁的描述除了林彪被从床上“拽起来”这一点与“林豆豆材料”近似，其余的都是“林豆豆材料”未曾提到的，而且绘声绘色，生动细腻，如现场目击一般。可是，无论林豆豆还是张宁都不是直接当事人，她们的说法有赖直接当事人证实。

但直接当事人是另一种说法。张恒昌回忆：

（9月12日）约二十二点三十分，我和陈占照商量，准备让林彪休息。这时叶群来到林彪客厅，同林彪说话。陈占照先去吃晚餐，准备吃完晚餐再让林彪休息。等陈占照回来后我去吃晚餐，还没吃完，陈占照打电话让我马上回去，这时大约二十三点三十分。林彪叫我通知叶群，空军疗养院的两个护士（在96楼照顾林彪）不带了，让人把她们送回去……然后我回到内勤值班室，陈占照说，首长马上要走，叫赶快收拾东西。陈占照要我报告林豆豆，我找了一会儿，没找到。大约二十三点四十分到五十分左右，叶群、林立果，还有刘沛丰，一起到林彪客厅。刘沛丰手里提着三、四个皮包。（《林彪内勤公务员张恒昌关于“九一三”事件的揭发材料》，引自《林彪事件完整调查》下册）

陈占照的记忆是：

（9月12日）二十三点左右，林彪打铃，我到了客厅，林彪要找小张，我去叫张恒昌。不一会儿，小张从林彪客厅出来，告诉我，林彪马上要走，要我去告诉叶群，走的时候不要带空军疗养院的两个护士。二十三点五十分左右，林立果、叶群、刘沛丰一起到林彪客厅。过了一会儿，叶群和林立果走出来。林彪又打铃，对我说马上夜航去大连，不休息了，有些东西可以不带，够用就行了。到大连住一个星期就回来，回北京过国庆节。这时，刘沛丰站在客厅门口，一言不发，我还看到沙发上放着三、四个黑色手提包。（《林

彪内勤公务员陈占照关于“九一三”事件的揭发材料》，引自《林彪事件完整调查》下册)

李文普的文章说：

(9月12日)大约十一点多钟，叶群拉我到林彪卧室门外叫我等着，她先进去和林彪说了几句话然后叫我进去。这时，林彪早已从床上起来穿好衣服。林彪对我说：“今晚反正睡不着了，你准备一下，现在就走。”我说：“等要了飞机再走。”(《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》)

张、陈的记忆时间不一，张说晚上十一点半，陈说晚上十一点左右；但情节相同，都是说林彪主动叫他们，没有提到林彪被从床上“拽起来”的情节。李文普虽是叶群叫去的，但其时林彪“早已”从床上起来穿好衣服，也没有说到“拽起来”这个细节。作为间接当事人，“林豆豆材料”的说法是个孤证，也有待证实；而张宁的说法，更让人生疑。

林彪想外逃苏联吗

不管林彪是改了主意去广州，还是坚持原意去大连，最终的结果是坠毁在了异邦。官方将事件定性为“叛党叛国”。构成林彪“叛国”罪名的主要依据，是李文普提供的证词。人们无法看到证词原件，但李文普的文章提供了他的说法：

当时已是深夜，天很黑，车开动了。叶群对林彪说：“李文普和老杨对首长的阶级感情很深。”我和杨振刚都没有说话。车到56楼时，我突然听林彪问林立果：“到伊尔库茨克多远，要飞多长时间？”林立果说：“不远，很快就到。”汽车开到58楼时，姜作寿大队长站在路边扬手示意停车。

叶群说：“八三四一部队对首长不忠，冲！”

杨振刚加快车速，过了 58 楼。

听林彪说要去伊尔库茨克，我才知道不是去大连，是要到苏联去，当时一听去苏联的地方，脑子里第一个反映就是叛逃，所以，在这一瞬间，我思想上产生了激烈的斗争。跟着跑，这不是当叛徒了吗？自己的老婆、孩子不成了叛徒的家属了吗？便决心下车。

我本能地大喊了一声“停车！”

杨振刚把车停下来，我立即开门下车。

叶群气冲冲地说：“李文普！你想干什么？”

我说：“你们究竟要到哪里去？当叛徒我不去！”

我转身朝 58 楼喊了一声：“来人哪！”与此同时，我听到了车门响声和枪栓声，林立果就向我开枪。

林彪询问“到伊尔库茨克多远，要飞多长时间”，这是整个“九一三”事件里最关键的细节。如果林彪说过这句话，那就表明林不是要去大连，而是准备去苏联。也就是说，“出国”是林彪在登上飞机之前就已确定至少是确知的打算，“叛国”罪名自然铁板钉钉。然而，正是对这个最关键的细节，不少人表示质疑；最极端者甚至认为李文普是高层安排在林彪身边的“内线”、“卧底”，事后按照高层意图提供了假口供，作了“伪证”。持“挟持”说的林豆豆就一直否认李文普的说法。不过，林豆豆的这份材料无一字涉及李文普提供的这个细节。当然，李文普本人坚决否认“内线”说和“伪证”说。（《林彪卫士长李文普不得不说》）

张宁在自己的书里描述过一个情况：9月12日晚上十一点左右，叶群和林立果不断往林彪办公室跑，有时围着林彪嘀嘀咕咕，有时站在林彪身旁一句话不说，林彪始终不开口。林立衡推搡内勤小陈进去听听，小陈出来后说：“我刚进去的时候，听到首长哭（呜咽）着说‘我至死是民族主义者’，听到这句话，就被立果发现我了，立果推我的时候，首长回头望了一眼，我看见首长正淌着眼泪。”（《自己写自己》）一些人以此推测，叶群、林立果很可能跟林彪和盘托出了逃往苏联的打算，而林彪不愿意去苏联，所以才说自己“至死是民族主义者”，也因此林彪不可能问“到伊尔库茨克多远，要飞多长时间”。然而，这只是假想，是模拟出来的一种语境。更关键的问题是，“林豆豆材料”没有提到这件事，张宁又不是现场目击者，张宁的描述依据何在？何况，作为直接当事人，前引陈占照、张恒昌的材料都未提到这个情节，张宁的说法无法被证实。

到底林彪问没问过这句话，因为当晚在车内的六位直接当事人只有李文普健在，李的口供成了孤证，确认也好，否定也罢，考证起来已极为困难。但笔者对李文普的说法仍有疑问。几天前李文普听林豆豆说叶群、林立果要“挟持”林彪去香港，还不大相信，疑惑林豆豆为什么自己不去向林彪报告；这时他自己亲耳听到了林彪问话，而且确认林彪等人要“叛逃”，反倒在跳车之后不去立即报告。是这位有二十余年军龄、长期做警卫工作的卫士长不了解事情的严重性，还是来不及报告？从林彪等人离开北戴河96号楼，到256号专机12点32分起飞，有40分钟左右的时间；（据256号专机第二副驾驶员康庭梓说，256号座机是9月13日零点三十二分起飞的。见康庭梓《林彪座机强行起飞之后》，《中华儿女》2000年第2期）即使起飞后，仍有向上级报告的时间。但直到这时，唯一知道林彪等人要“叛逃”苏联的李文普却没有报告。究竟是怎么回事呢？

对“林豆豆材料”以及其他当事人的回忆或口述提出的这些疑问，笔者并没有确定的结论。事实上，这份材料还有该书的其他文章留下的疑问远不止这些。解开这些疑问，仍待时日。

（作者系文史学者、华东师范大学教授）

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Regarding the "September 13th" incident, the official writings basically followed a series of documents issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China shortly after the incident, these documents include: September 18, 1971 Zhongfa [1971] No. "Notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China"; Zhongfa [1971] No. 65 on October 6, 1971, "Notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China"; Zhongfa [1971] No. 74 on November 14, 1971, "Notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" "Project" Minutes" and photocopies to the relevant level); December 21, 1971, Zhongfa [1971] No. 77, "Notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" ["The Struggle to Smash the Counter-Revolutionary Coup of the Lin Chen Anti-Party Group" (one of the materials) 】, etc.

Researchers at home and abroad have different opinions and cannot agree. So far, the basis of various statements is mostly the memories of the parties directly or indirectly, with little support from original written materials. The author speculates that, except for some scattered written materials (such as notes, diaries, notes, telephone records, etc.) kept by the witnesses, the "September 13" incident probably did not have many series of original documents that people are usually familiar with; very If there is, I am afraid that it is mainly due to the large amount of original interrogation records, confession materials, witness testimony, etc. of the official special agency after the incident. Disclosure of such material is also unlikely at this time. For a considerable period of time, the memories and oral accounts of those who witnessed it will still be the most important historical materials for restoring this event.

Among the many memories and dictations, the memories from the living family of Lin Biao are undoubtedly one of the materials worthy of attention. The surviving Lin Biao family includes Lin Biao's daughter Lin Doudou and her husband Zhang Qinglin (who was fiancé at the time of the incident), and Lin Ligu's fiancée Zhang Ning. As far as the relationship with the incident is concerned, Lin Doudou is the most important witness. As we all know, Lin Doudou's statement has been different from the official conclusion since the beginning of the incident. Because it is rarely seen in official texts, it is mostly rumors. In 2004, Li Chen's "Century Wind Chime" was published in Taipei, which disclosed "Materials Lin Liheng wrote to the Central Committee after September 13th", which was quickly circulated on the Internet. The material is not a typical recollection, but the complaint material written by Lin Doudou in March 1980. The material was sent to the head of the Zhengzhou Municipal Party Committee, transferred to the head of the Henan Provincial Party Committee, and forwarded to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Disciplinary Inspection. According to the researcher's verification, Lin Doudou admitted that the material was written by herself, but she did not know Li Chen and did not provide the material to Li Chen. "Lin Doudou's Oral Statement" (edited by Shu Yun) published in Hong Kong last year included this appeal material again, entitled "What I Know about the September 13th Incident". Regrettably, the book was not edited by Lin Doudou, and even "has not been reviewed by Lin Doudou himself" and "has been abridged". According to the researchers' research, the editors of "Century Wind Chimes" and "Lin Doudou's Oral Statements" have rewritten this material. The difference between the two revised manuscripts and the original manuscript has been carefully compared and screened by researchers, so I won't go into details here. In any case, this cannot but detract from its historical value.

Having said that, this material (hereinafter referred to as "Lin Doudou's material" or "material") is the only text of Lin Doudou's about this matter that has been published publicly, and people pay special attention to it. Strictly speaking, the complaint materials are still historical materials of the nature of memory. Although they are also considered as first-hand materials, they should not be simply accepted, but need to be compared and referred to with other historical materials, or confirmed, or falsified, or doubted. "Lin Doudou Materials" disclosed some details of the "September 13th" incident, many of which were not and could not be provided by others, but there

were also some discrepancies with the memories of other witnesses, leaving many doubts. This article will take this as the main object, combined with the memories or oral accounts of some other witnesses, to discuss some doubts about the historical facts.

What did Lin Liguao and Lin Doudou talk about?

"Material" is from September 7, 1971. Existing memories and oral accounts prove that Lin Doudou, Zhang Qinglin and Zhang Ning arrived in Beidaihe on this day. (See "What Lin Biao's Chief Guard Li Wenpu Has to Say", "Children of China", No. 2, 1999; Liu Jichun's dictation and Ding Chou's "Unforgettable Eve of "September 13"-Memories of a Security Guard", "The Historian Tea House, the first series, Shandong People's Publishing House, 2005 edition)

Lin Biao's chief guard Li Wenpu, and guard staff officer Liu Jichun (according to Li Wenpu, Liu Jichun was transferred from the Security Department of the General Political Department to the 8341 Unit as the deputy chief of the security section, and was responsible for Lin Biao's security work. See "Lin Biao's Chief of Guard Li Wenpu Can't Not to mention") recalled that as soon as Lin Doudou arrived in Beidaihe that day, Lin Liguao asked him to have a secret talk. Li Wenpu said that Lin Doudou, Zhang Qinglin, Zhang Ning, and Yang Sen from the Security Department of the Political Department of the Air Force arrived in Beidaihe from Beijing at around 11:00 am on September 7. Soon after arriving, Lin Liguao took Lin Doudou to Lin Liguao's residence in Building 57 for a secret meeting. Liu Jichun said that on the morning of September 7, Lin Liguao and Lin Liheng flew from Beijing to Beidaihe. Zhang Qinglin and Yang Sen found him in the afternoon and said they didn't know where Lin Doudou had been taken by the tiger, and asked Liu to arrest the director and the tiger quickly. ("Unforgettable "September 13" Eve") Some of what Liu Jichun said may not be true. According to Li Wenpu's article, Lin Liguao had already been in Beidaihe ("Lin Biao's Chief Guard Li Wenpu Has to Say"), and it was impossible to go with Lin Doudou and others. But what Liu heard about "Where did Lin Doudou get taken by the tiger" can be regarded as evidence for Li Wenpu's "secret talk" between Lin Liguao and Lin Doudou.

Of course, Li Wenpu and Liu Jichun would not know the content of the secret conversation. However, Lin Doudou then greeted Li, Liu and others, telling them that Lin Liguao was going to "hold hostage" the chief, revealing some information about "secret talks". Liu Jichun said that Lin Doudou asked him to go to her place on the night of September 7th, "She said that the director (that is, Ye Qun--quote's note) and the tiger (that is, Lin Liguao--quote's note) did bad things outside and were known by the higher-ups 'They are afraid of being punished, they can't stay in Beijing anymore, and want to take the head (Lin Biao) hostage to other places.'" Liu also said that at around 10:30 p.m. on September 12, Lin Doudou told him and Li Wenpu again: "Director, The tiger wants to kidnap the chief to go to Guangzhou, and if he can't stay in Guangzhou, he will go to Hong Kong." ("Unforgettable "September 13" Eve") Lin Biao's secretary Song Dejin can corroborate Liu Jichun's statement: "About September 10, Liu Jichun, deputy chief of the security department of the 8341 Army, took me to a secluded place and whispered to me : "Doudou (Lin Liheng) said that the director (Ye Qun) and Lin Liguao are going to kidnap the chief (Lin Biao) and flee, what should I do?" --The Last Memories of Secretary Lin Biao") Li Wenpu also recalled that on September 12th, "I was enjoying the cool air on the platform that afternoon, and Lin Doudou suddenly said to me: 'Lin Liguao has done all kinds of bad things to harm Chairman Mao, and they still have to go to Guangzhou If it doesn't work, let the chief go to Hong Kong. You can't let the chief get on the plane.'" ("Lin Biao's Chief of Guard Li Wenpu Has to Say") What Lin Doudou told Liu and Li was probably Lin Liguao's "secret talk" with her "Content.

This is a very critical historical plot, and it can even be said to be the first signal of the "September 13th" incident. It was Lin Liguao who returned to Beijing the next day and secretly negotiated with the "Small Fleet" about the plan to kill Mao Zedong and "flee south" to Guangzhou and Hong Kong. What is puzzling is that the "material" did not say a single word about this "secret talk", and people can only judge from other narrations of the "material". Lin Doudou said in the "Materials" that since September 7, she has been looking for Liu Jichun, Li Wenpu and Lin Biao's health workers Chen Zhanzhao and Zhang Hengchang (according to Li Wenpu's article, Zhang Hengchang and Chen Zhanzhao are internal office officials. Li Wenpu, the head of the guard, had to say") "repeated conversation". What to talk about, the "material" did not directly say, but can only be understood from this passage: "At the beginning, Li Wenpu did not believe what I said that Lin Liguao wanted to take the chief (Lin Biao) to Guangzhou. If he wanted to harm Chairman Mao, he

also felt something was wrong later, and told me some things that Ye Qun and Lin Liguao had done without telling Lin Biao." ("Lin Doudou Oral Statement")

If it can be judged that what Lin Doudou, Liu Jichun, and Li Wenpu said is the content of the "secret talk", then the content of the "secret talk" will not be so simple. Why did Lin Liguao and Ye Qun kill Mao Zedong and "flee south" to Guangzhou and Hong Kong? These will all be covered in the "secret talks". It is a pity that "Lin Doudou's material" not only fails to elaborate, but even has almost no explanation, leaving only suspense.

More than ten years ago, Zhang Ning published a book stating that many years after the "September 13" incident, Lin Liheng personally told her about the situation when Lin Liguao talked to her that day: (September 7) Before three o'clock in the afternoon, Lin Liheng As a result, Lin Liheng went to Building 57 for a private talk. Lin Liguao said to Lin Liheng: "Since the Lushan meeting, a group (Mao Zedong's code name) has held on to the director and failed to pass several inspections. Now, taking advantage of the leader's recuperation in Beidaihe, he went to the south to inspect, publicly interviewed and gave speeches everywhere. , The ultimate goal is to defeat the chief. The chief is in poor health. Once something happens, how can he bear it? The examples of Liu Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai are presented. The chief is unwilling to be soft and admit his mistakes. Let the chief go. Instead of waiting for death, it is better to put all your eggs in one basket and make a fight." "She asked: 'How are you going to fight? The chairman has high prestige, and if he is a little careless, the chief will be more passive.' Li Guo said: "Anyway, the situation is very difficult for the chief. Unfavorable, sitting and waiting for death is better than taking the initiative to attack, maybe there is a glimmer of hope! I want to see the development of the situation again, if it doesn't work, I will work with a group of hard workers! Or go to Guangzhou to establish another central government, or go to the mountains to fight guerrillas."" Lin Liheng was eager to find out the real details of Ye Qun and Lin Liguao, and asked Lin Liguao: "Is the situation really that bad? How is the chief's attitude? Does he know?" , I can't tell him.' " (Zhang Ning, "Writing About Myself", Writer's Publishing House, 1998 edition) This narrative for the first time disclosed in detail the secret conversation between Lin Liguao and Lin Doudou. Zhang Ning also mentioned that at around 7:00 p.m. on September 8, Lin Liguao went to Building 56 and had a private conversation with Lin

Doudou for more than 20 minutes. She said that this was also what Lin Liheng told her many years later. This conversation was requested by Lin Liheng, and it was the last time he tried to prevent Lin Ligu from returning to Beijing. ("Writing About Yourself") However, Zhang Ning is not directly involved, and this narration is yet to be confirmed by Lin Doudou.

A few years ago, Gao Houliang, the former political commissar of the Air Force, stated that on the 7th and 8th (September), Lin Ligu decided that the murder of Mao Zedong would not make it possible to go to Guangzhou to establish a new central government, and that he would go to the Soviet Union to eat foreign bread and become an "apartment". I told Lin Doudou, and after talking for more than two hours, Lin Doudou himself said, "At that time, I was afraid that Lin Ligu would kill me, so I told Lin Ligu to 'go with you'". Gao Houliang also said that Lin Ligu told Lin Doudou that "the chief also agrees." (Gao Houliang's dictation, Gao Deming's collation of "Lin Liheng after '9013" -- Intimate Words to Lin Doudou", "Children of China" No. 9, 2000) The situation disclosed by Gao Houliang is very important, which shows that Lin Doudou not only knew that Lin Ligu wanted to Go to Guangzhou, and know that they may also go to the Soviet Union. Gao Houliang' s dictation agrees with Zhang Ning' s narration on the point of "going to Guangzhou to establish a new central government" ; the difference is that the "putting all one' s eggs in one basket" and "doing a hard work" mentioned in Zhang Ning' s narration are embodied in Gao' s dictation as "Murder of Mao Zedong"; Gao said that Lin Ligu would go to the Soviet Union to eat foreign bread and become an "apartment" plan, Lin Doudou said out of fear that he would go with Lin Ligu, and Lin Biao agreed, etc. Zhang Ning's report did not involve it at all. Gao Houliang is also not directly involved, and Gao did not explain the source of the materials, and his oral statements are currently difficult to use as a reference.

What was Lin Biao's reaction to Mao Zedong's speech on his southern tour?

Lin Ligu and Ye Qun were going to Guangzhou or even Hong Kong, and wanted to murder Mao Zedong. The direct reason was that they learned about Mao Zedong's southern tour talks. In August and September of 1971, Mao Zedong left Beijing and went south. He went to Wuhan, Changsha, Nanchang, Hangzhou, and Shanghai successively. Words commonly used in political struggles such

as "split the party" and "eager to seize power" issued a warning that "the Lushan matter is not over and has not been resolved", which essentially forewarned a new round of "line struggle." Official writings concluded that Lin Biao and Ye Qun finally made the "crazy decision" to kill Mao Zedong and carry out an armed coup after learning of Mao Zedong's remarks during his southern tour. (See "The Biography of Mao Zedong (1949-1976)" edited by the Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Central Literature Publishing House, 2003 edition; Party History Publishing House 2011 Edition)

According to Li Wenpu's recollection: "On September 6, Zhou Yuchi took Mao Zedong on a tour of the south to meet party, government and military leaders in Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi and other places who criticized Lin Biao's speech materials and came to Beidaihe to meet Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Lin Ligu. I don't know." ("What Li Wenpu, Chief of Lin Biao's Guard, Has to Say") This statement deserves to be questioned. Li Wenpu was the head of the guard, and according to the rules, it was impossible for him to see this speech material, and Zhou Yuchi, Lin Ligu, and Ye Qun were unlikely to show it to him. So, how did Li Wenpu know that Zhou Yuchi brought Mao Zedong's southern tour speech materials? On the other hand, if Li Wenpu knew, why didn't he believe it at first when Lin Doudou told him that Lin Ligu and Ye Qun were going to kill Mao Zedong and "flee south" to Guangzhou and Hong Kong? These details are not clearly explained in Li Wenpu's article.

Taking a step back, if Lin Biao learned about Mao's southern tour talks, Lin Biao, who is familiar with Mao Zedong's character, would not fail to understand the seriousness of the matter. The question is, how did Lin Biao react? How is he going to deal with it? This is another key issue in interpreting Lin Biao's psychology and behavior during the "September 13th" incident. However, so far, almost no witnesses have disclosed any relevant historical facts, including Lin Doudou. The possible reasons for not disclosing are: first, not knowing at all; second, although knowing, but unwilling to disclose due to various reasons; third, Lin Biao has no attitude or has an attitude but hides it deeply; Know Mao's southern tour talks. No matter what the reason is, as long as the historical materials are insufficient, it is difficult to confirm that Lin Biao was the mastermind or participated in the plan to kill Mao and "flee south".

An article by Gao Deming stated: On the morning of September 7, Zhou Yuchi drove a helicopter to send 15 pages of information about Gu Tongzhou to Beidaihe. Lin Ligu led him to meet Lin Biao and Ye Qun. Three sets of plans were drawn up: one was to mobilize Jiang Tengjiao to go to Shanghai and Hangzhou to organize Wang Weiguo and Chen Liyun to kill Mao Zedong, and let Yu Xinye go to Shanghai and Hangzhou to scout Mao Zedong's movements and observe the attitudes of Wang and Chen; Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu went to Guangzhou to establish a separate central government and implement regional separatism; the third was to prepare for the worst and go north to the Soviet Union. Afterwards, Zhou Yuchi once said to the fleet members: "Vice Chairman Lin was very emotional. He hugged my shoulders and said, 'Comrade Yuchi, I leave everything to you!'" Gao Wen also said that Lin Liheng asked Lin Liheng Guo: "Does the chief know about the assassination of the chairman?" Lin Ligu said affirmatively: "He also agrees." (Gao Deming, "Lin

(September 7) Lin Biao was very happy to see Zhang Ning and Zhang Qinglin. When Ye Qun asked him if he was satisfied, he said: "Satisfied, very satisfied, a daughter of an old Red Army, a son of a working people, very good!"

(September 8) On this day, Lin Biao went as usual. Building 96 was very quiet, and Lin Biao didn't ask me where Lin Ligu was. In the evening, Lin Ligu called from Beijing, saying that he had arrived in Beijing safely, and asked me to report to the chief. I would immediately report to Lin Biao and Ye Qun. Lin Biao nodded and said, "OK!"

(September) On the 9th, the 96th floor of Beidaihe was relatively calm. There were people swimming in the sea, and the mountains were heavily guarded, but the people in the "Lin Ban" were busy with their own business as usual.

(September 10) That afternoon, Lin Liheng took Zhang Qinglin, Zhang Ning, and Yang Sen to Shanhaiguan to play, and bought some small gifts for Lin Biao and Ye Qun. Lin Biao was very happy to see the gifts, and Ye Qun asked me to take pictures of them .

(September 12) In the morning, Lin Biao asked me to pack my things and prepare to go to Dalian... Before dinner, Lin Biao did not say that he would leave, but held a wedding with Ye Qun for Lin Liheng and Zhang Qinglin, and asked me to prepare to take pictures. Ye Qun led Lin Liheng and Zhang Qinglin to Lin Biao, and said, "Zhang Qinglin proposed, and Doudou agreed, and an 'engagement ceremony' will be held tonight." Lin Biao said, "Very good! Congratulations on your engagement!" Ye Qun called me He entered the living room and took a group photo of Lin Biao, Ye Qun, Lin Liheng, and Zhang Qinglin; he forced Lin Liheng and Zhang Qinglin to kiss, took a photo, and asked his daughter and son-in-law to take a group photo with the staff. ("What Li Wenpu, Chief of Lin Biao's Guard, Has to Say")

Meeting the prospective son-in-law and prospective daughter-in-law, taking pictures, and being happy to receive small gifts... In Li Wenpu's words, Lin Biao has been "calm" and "as usual" these days. Could this be Lin Biao's reaction after learning about the Southern Tour talk? Did they know about the conversations of the Southern Tour, but secretly conspired because "everything was business as usual" on the surface; These are still unknown, and Lin Doudou's "materials" have not been explained.

Where is Lin Biao going?

It is not known how Lin Biao reacted to Mao's southern tour talks; but he planned to go to Dalian in those few days, but it was affirmed by several witnesses.

Lin Doudou's "material" said: "On September 7, the chief told us to go to Dalian. In order to prevent the chief from going to Dalian, Ye Qun asked Li Wenpu and Liu Jichun to lie to the chief, saying that the water in Dalian should not be drunk by the chief." ("Lin Doudou's Oral Statement") Li Wenpu confirmed Lin Doudou's statement: "On the morning (September 12), Lin Biao asked me to pack up and prepare to go to Dalian. Dalian is a place where Lin Biao often goes... I thought Lin Biao really went to Dalian, according to the usual practice I called the Dalian Communication Office

and asked them to check the room, adjust the temperature of Lin Biao's house, and asked for other precautions. I packed up the things that Lin Biao brought with him." ("Lin Biao's Guard Chief Li Wenpu Had to Say ") Liu Jichun also said: "On September 10, Lin Liheng and I met. Neither of us found out anything new. We only heard that we were planning to go to Dalian." ("Unforgettable Eve of September 13")

As we all know, Ye Qun and Lin Ligu, who are also in Beidaihe, have other plans, planning to go to Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Lin Doudou was probably the first to know about this situation. According to "Lin Doudou's materials", she first greeted Liu Jichun and Li Wenpu. At first, Li Wenpu didn't quite believe what Lin Doudou said. ("Lin Doudou Oral Narrative") Li Wenpu himself said that he was surprised by Lin Liheng's words and did not believe them. The reason why he didn't believe it was that Lin Biao told him to prepare to go to Dalian, but he didn't say he was going to Guangzhou; in addition, Lin Liheng and Ye Qun had a bad relationship, and Lin Liheng and Lin Ligu also had conflicts, and their relationship was flat. He said that he has been in the "Lin Office" for a long time, and he has seen, heard and encountered a lot of true and false things about the Lin family. ("What Li Wenpu, Chief of Lin Biao's Guard, Has to Say")

Ye Qun and Lin Ligu were going to Guangzhou and Hong Kong, and Lin Biao had to be persuaded to change his mind. How did you convince Lin Biao? "Lin Doudou Materials" talked about a situation on the night of September 12: Li Wenpu told her, "The director told me to arrange to go to Guangzhou at 6 o'clock tomorrow morning, and told me not to notify the 8341 troops. I asked the chief, and the chief said that Guangzhou It was too hot, which was not conducive to his treatment. He would not go to Guangzhou, but he still said that he must go to Dalian. The director asked me if the house in Guangzhou had air-conditioning equipment, and I said that the building in Guangzhou had air-conditioning, but it was not hot. Said, you can also go to Guangzhou." ("Lin Doudou Oral Statement") Li Wenpu said that on September 11, "On this day, Ye Qun tentatively told me that he wanted to go to Guangzhou. I replied at the time, "The weather is so hot now. What are you going to Guangzhou for?" ("Lin Biao's Chief Guard Li Wenpu has to say") what Li Wenpu said confirmed Lin Doudou's statement that Ye Qun personally told Li Wenpu of his plan to go to

Guangzhou, but did not mention that Ye Qun asked about air-conditioning equipment and asked Li Wenpu to do it Lin Biao's work, Lin Biao's agreement to go to Guangzhou, etc.

Song Dejin once recalled: "About the first ten days of September, there were rumors among the staff of the Forestry Office that they were going to change their residence in the near future. However, where exactly are they going? When are they leaving? Are all the staff in Beidaihe accompanying them? No one has been formally informed. The rule here is 'don't ask what you shouldn't ask, don't listen to what you shouldn't listen to, and don't speak what you shouldn't say'. I haven't been here (referring to Beidaihe - the author's note) for a short time, and I strictly abide by the 'three don'ts' Principle. Another internal service soldier told me that he heard that he was going to Guangzhou, and then that he was going to Dalian. I said I didn't know." ("The Real Lin Biao") Song Dejin recalled whether Lin Biao, who had indicated his original intention to go to Dalian, was persuaded, Changed his mind, so the statement of Dalian and Guangzhou's two destinations has yet to be verified.

However, several witnesses have said the same situation. "Lin Doudou Material" says:

(September 12) After nine o'clock in the evening, Zhang Hengchang, a health worker from Lin Biao who helped me understand the situation at my request, told me that he heard the director tell the head: "It's okay to go to Guangzhou, can I go to Hong Kong?!" Xiao Zhang said He never heard any voice from the chief. ("Lin Doudou Oral Narrative")

In this episode, Li Wenpu has roughly the same memory:

(September 12) Around 21:00, Lin Liguang returned to Building No. 96, and immediately got into Lin Biao's bedroom with Ye Qun and the three of them had a secret talk. Lin Liheng forced the civil servants Zhang Hengchang and Chen Zhanzhao to eavesdrop outside the door. Zhang Hengchang came to tell her: "Just now, in the bathroom, I vaguely heard two conversations through the door.

One was said by Ye Qun: 'It's okay to go to Hong Kong!' The other was said by Lin Liguo: 'By now, You still haven't handed over Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu to me.' ("Lin Biao's Chief of Guard Li Wenpu Have to Say")

This plot reveals two pieces of information: first, it indirectly shows that Lin Biao has changed his mind again and is still unwilling to go to Guangzhou, otherwise, Ye Qun would not have said "Going to Guangzhou is not possible"; second, Lin Biao learned about Ye Qun at this time The idea of going to Hong Kong. As for whether Lin Liguo said that Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu were all handed over to him, he meant that Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo were handed over to the "small fleet" and taken to Guangzhou as hostages. However, in this plot, Lin Doudou and Li Wenpu are both indirect parties, while the direct parties Zhang Hengchang and Chen Zhanzhao have no memories of this plot. Therefore, this matter needs to be confirmed by the direct parties.

If Ye Qun told Lin Biao that he was going to Hong Kong, and Lin Liguo said that he would kidnap Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu to go to Guangzhou, then Ye Qun and Lin Liguo must have revealed serious news to Lin Biao. Because, obviously, the vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China went abroad to Hong Kong in the 1970s, which could only be an act of desperation, not a normal government behavior. Lin Biao was not ignorant of this. The question is, what reason does Ye Qun use to persuade? Is it Mao's southern tour talk? It is also unknown. A more important question is, what was Lin Biao's reaction when he learned of Ye Qun's plan to go to Hong Kong? According to Zhang Hengchang disclosed by "Lin Doudou Materials", he "did not hear any voice from the chief." There are two possibilities for "not hearing". One is that Lin Biao responded, but Zhang Hengchang could not hear it; the other is that Lin Biao did not respond at all. If there was no response, did Lin Biao acquiesce or hesitate, or did he not consider it at all? Without historical data, it is difficult to judge.

The strange thing is that Chen Zhanzhao recalled that at about 11:50 that night, Lin Biao rang the bell again, and told me that he would fly to Dalian immediately at night, and that he would not rest, and that there were some things that he didn't have to bring, as long as he had enough. To Dalian

for a week Just come back and go back to Beijing to celebrate the National Day." ("Lin Biao's Internal Service Civil Servant Chen Zhanzhao's Exposure Materials on the September 13th Incident", quoted from Shu Yun's "Complete Investigation of the Lin Biao Incident" Volume 2) Chen Zhanzhao's materials come from Shu Yun's book, It has not been published publicly, and its reliability has yet to be confirmed, at least the time is doubtful. However, Liu Jichun's oral statement published publicly said: On the night of September 12, "Ye Qun called the secretary's office, and Secretary Li answered the phone. She sent me to Dalian to look at the house. I asked, how to get there?" Ye Qun said, take the train Go. I said that there was no train to Dalian at night. Ye Qun changed his mind and said, isn't there a small plane at the airport? I thought about it and said I didn't want to go. Three "Eve Before") Li Wenpu also said that that night "Ye Qun told Zhang Hengchang at 10:00 o'clock, 'go to Dalian at 6 o'clock tomorrow morning'". Song Dejin recalled: On the night of September 12th, "About 11:00-11:30, Lin Biao's guard Li Wenpu hurried back to the office. Get ready." ("The Real Lin Biao") The details of the four parties involved are different, the time, plot, and object are different, but they have a common plot: to go to Dalian. This shows that when it was time to leave, the destination was changed back to Dalian, at least what several staff members heard. When Ye Qun said that he was going to Dalian, he was probably trying to deceive others; but was Lin Biao going to Dalian to deceive others, or did he stick to his original intention? Another suspense.

How Lin Biao escaped from Building 96

When Lin Biao left Building 96 in Beidaihe, Lin Doudou had already gone to the 8341 Brigade for help for the second time, while Zhang Qinglin stayed in Building 56 (where Lin Doudou and Zhang Qinglin lived) to observe. Neither of them was at the scene and they were not direct witnesses. Regarding this point, there are not many descriptions in "Lin Doudou Materials", only one paragraph:

(On the evening of September 12), Zhang Qinglin in Building 56 received a call from Xiao Zhang, Lin Biao's hygienist, at my request. Xiao Zhang said: "They (Ye Qun and Lin Liguo) are dragging the

chief on the bed. The chief will be dragged away soon! The car will start moving in ten minutes! Hurry up, hurry up, hurry up..." ("Lin Doudou Oral Narrative")

Lin Doudou specifically said that it was around eleven thirty in the evening. Soon, she and Zhang Qinglin watched a red-flag car drive past the gate at the 8341 Brigade Headquarters, and then heard a gunshot, and then heard several more gunshots. ("Lin Doudou Oral Narrative")

The point of this narrative is that Lin Biao was "dragged" from the bed. As a result, it was rumored that Lin Biao took sleeping pills and was dragged up from the bed by force, and there was no such thing as a plan to "escape". It was Zhang Ning's book that appeared in the text: "After Ye Qun's mother and son left, Xiao Chen and the principal went in together to serve Lin Biao to take sleeping pills, undress him, and help him to bed. The time was about half past eleven." Zhou Enlai personally ordered the airport to be sealed off. After Lin Liguang got the report, he dropped the phone and reported to Ye Qun. Ye Qun took Lin Liguang and went straight to Lin Biao's bedroom. Xiao Chen and Xiao Zhang followed up after seeing this, and saw Ye Qun throw himself on the head of the bed and pull him up to sleep. Lin Biao shouted: 'Get up quickly! Someone is coming to arrest you! Put on your clothes and go away!'" ("Writing About Yourself") Zhang Ning's description was similar to Lin Biao's being "dragged up" from the bed. The "Lin Doudou material" is similar, and the rest are not mentioned in the "Lin Doudou material", and they are lifelike, vivid and delicate, as if they were witnessed on the spot. However, neither Lin Doudou nor Zhang Ning were directly involved, and their claims depended on the direct parties to confirm.

But direct parties are another way of saying it. Zhang Hengchang recalled:

(September 12) At about 22:30, I discussed with Chen Zhanzhao and planned to let Lin Biao rest. At this time, Ye Qun came to Lin Biao's living room and talked with Lin Biao. Chen Zhanzhao went to eat dinner first, and was going to let Lin Biao rest after dinner. After Chen Zhanzhao came back, I went to have dinner. Before I finished eating, Chen Zhanzhao called me and asked me to go back immediately. It was about 23:30. Lin Biao asked me to inform Ye Qun that the two nurses in the Air

Force Sanatorium (who took care of Lin Biao on the 96th floor) were gone, and asked to send them back... Then I went back to the internal duty room. thing. Chen Zhanzhao asked me to report to Lin Doudou, but I couldn't find it after searching for a while. Around 23:40 to 50, Ye Qun, Lin Ligu, and Liu Peifeng went to Lin Biao's living room together. Liu Peifeng was carrying three or four leather bags. ("Lin Biao's Internal Service Civil Servant Zhang Hengchang's Exposure Materials on the "September 13th" Incident", quoted from "Complete Investigation of the Lin Biao Incident" Volume 2)

Chen Zhanzhao's memory is:

(September 12) At about twenty-three o'clock, Lin Biao rang the bell, and I went to the living room. Lin Biao wanted to find Xiao Zhang, so I called Zhang Hengchang. After a while, Xiao Zhang came out of Lin Biao's living room and told me that Lin Biao was leaving soon, and asked me to tell Ye Qun not to take the two nurses from the Air Force Sanatorium with him when he left. At around 23:50, Lin Ligu, Ye Qun, and Liu Peifeng went to Lin Biao's living room together. After a while, Ye Qun and Lin Ligu came out. Lin Biao rang the bell again, and told me that I would fly to Dalian immediately at night, without rest, and that I could not take some things with me, as long as we had enough. After staying in Dalian for a week, I will return to Beijing for the National Day. At this time, Liu Peifeng stood at the door of the living room without saying a word. I also saw three or four black handbags on the sofa. ("Lin Biao's Internal Service Civil Servant Chen Zhanzhao's Exposure Materials on the "September 13th" Incident", quoted from "Complete Investigation of the Lin Biao Incident" Volume 2)

Li Wenpu's article said:

(September 12) Around eleven o'clock, Ye Qun took me outside Lin Biao's bedroom door and told me to wait. She went in first and said a few words to Lin Biao before telling me to go in. At this time, Lin Biao had already got up from the bed and put on his clothes. Lin Biao said to me, "I won't

be able to sleep tonight anyway, so prepare yourself and leave now." I said, "I'll leave when I get the plane."

Zhang and Chen's recollection time is different, Zhang said it was 11:30 in the evening, Chen said it was around 11:00 in the evening; but the plots were the same, they all said that Lin Biao took the initiative to call them, and there was no mention of Lin Biao being "dragged up" from the bed . Although Ye Qun called Li Wenpu, at that time Lin Biao "already" got up from the bed and got dressed, and he didn't mention the details of "pulling him up". As an indirect party, the statement of "Lin Doudou's material" is an isolated evidence and needs to be confirmed; while Zhang Ning's statement is even more suspicious.

Did Lin Biao want to flee to the Soviet Union?

Regardless of whether Lin Biao changed his mind to go to Guangzhou or insisted on going to Dalian, the final result was that he crashed in a foreign country. Officials characterized the incident as "treason to the party and the country." The main basis for Lin Biao's charge of "treason" was the testimony provided by Li Wenpu. The original testimony was not available, but Li Wenpu's article provides his account:

It was late at night, very dark, and the car moved. Ye Qun said to Lin Biao: "Li Wenpu and Lao Yang have a deep class affection for the chief." Neither Yang Zhengang nor I spoke. When the car reached the 56th floor, I suddenly heard Lin Biao ask Lin Ligu: "How far is it to Irkutsk and how long will it take to fly?" Lin Ligu said: "Not far, we will arrive soon." The car drove to the 58th floor At that time, Captain Jiang Zuoshou stood on the side of the road and waved his hand to signal to stop.

Ye Qun said: "Team 8341 is disloyal to the chief, go!"

Yang Zhengang speeded up the car and passed the 58th floor.

When I heard Lin Biao say that I was going to Irkutsk, I realized that I was going to the Soviet Union instead of Dalian. When I heard that I was going to the Soviet Union, the first thought in my mind was to defect. So, at this moment, I thought A fierce struggle ensued. Follow along, isn't this a traitor? Wouldn't his wife and children become family members of the traitor? He decided to get off.

I instinctively yelled "Stop!"

Yang Zhengang stopped the car, and I immediately opened the door and got out of the car.

Ye Qun said angrily: "Li Wenpu! What do you want to do?"

I said, "Where are you going? I won't be a traitor!"

I turned around and shouted towards the 58th floor: "Come here!" At the same time, I heard the sound of the car door and the bolt of the gun, and Lin Liguang shot at me.

Lin Biao asked "how far is it to Irkutsk and how long will it take to fly", which is the most critical detail in the entire "September 13th" incident. If Lin Biao had said this, it would have shown that Lin was not going to Dalian, but was planning to go to the Soviet Union. In other words, "going abroad" was Lin Biao's determined or at least definite plan before boarding the plane, and the charge of "treason" was naturally firmly established. However, it is precisely this most critical detail that many people questioned; the most extreme people even believed that Li Wenpu was an "insider" and "undercover agent" arranged by the high-level officials next to Lin Biao. perjury". Lin Doudou, who held the theory of "hijacking", has always denied Li Wenpu's statement. However, Lin Doudou's material does not contain a single word of this detail provided by Li Wenpu. Of course, Li

Wenpu himself firmly denies the theory of "insider information" and the theory of "perjury". ("What Li Wenpu, Chief of Lin Biao's Guard, Has to Say")

Zhang Ning described a situation in his book: at about eleven o'clock in the evening on September 12, Ye Qun and Lin Ligu kept running to Lin Biao's office, sometimes muttering around Lin Biao, sometimes standing beside Lin Biao without saying a word, Lin Biao never spoke. Lin Liheng pushed Xiao Chen in the internal office to listen. After Xiao Chen came out, he said: "When I first went in, I heard the chief crying (sobbing) and saying, 'I am a nationalist until I die'. I was discovered by Ligu, and when Ligu pushed me, the chief looked back, and I saw that the chief was crying." ("Writing About Myself") Some people speculate that Ye Qun and Lin Ligu are likely to be with Lin Biao. He confessed his plan to flee to the Soviet Union, but Lin Biao did not want to go to the Soviet Union, so he said that he was "a nationalist until his death". Therefore, it was impossible for Lin Biao to ask "how far is it to Irkutsk and how long will it take to fly?". However, this is only a hypothesis, a simulated context. The more critical question is that "Lin Doudou Materials" did not mention this incident, and Zhang Ning was not an eyewitness at the scene. What is the basis for Zhang Ning's description? What's more, as the direct parties, the previously quoted materials of Chen Zhanzhao and Zhang Hengchang did not mention this plot, and Zhang Ning's statement cannot be verified.

Did Lin Biao ask whether he had asked this question, because only Li Wenpu was alive among the six people directly involved in the car that night, and Li's confession became an isolated evidence, whether it is confirmed or denied, it is extremely difficult to verify. But the author still has doubts about Li Wenpu's statement. A few days ago, Li Wenpu heard Lin Doudou say that Ye Qun and Lin Ligu were going to "hijack" Lin Biao to go to Hong Kong. To "defect", instead of reporting immediately after jumping off the car. Is it because the chief guard, who has more than 20 years of military experience and has been doing security work for a long time, doesn't understand the seriousness of the matter, or is it too late to report? It took about 40 minutes from when Lin Biao and others left Building 96 in Beidaihe to when special plane 256 took off at 12:32. It took off at 32 minutes. See Kang Tingzi's "After Lin Biao's Plane Takes Off Forcedly", "Children of China" No. 2, 2000) Even after taking off, there is still time to report to the superior. But until this time, Li

Wenpu, the only one who knew that Lin Biao and others were going to "defect" to the Soviet Union, did not report it. What the hell is going on?

The author has not reached a definite conclusion on the questions raised by the "Lin Doudou material" and the memories or dictation of other parties involved. In fact, this material, as well as other passages in the book, leave much more than that. It will take time to unravel these questions.

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