

# “七千人大会”五十周年的思考 Thoughts on the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the ‘7000-Person Meeting’

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FN 025 – Wang Jianmin on the 7000 Person Meeting (YHCQ)



1958 年 8 月 18 日，《人民日报》以《人民公社好》为题，报道了河南信阳的先进典型经验。

1958 年各地以虚假高指标、高纪录争相夸耀。

1962 年 9 月 24 日至 27 日，中共八届十中全会在北京举行。会上，毛泽东接受刘少奇等的建议，提出：“不要因强调阶级斗争放松了经济工作，要把经济调整工作放在第一位。 September 24-27, 1962, the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee was held in Beijing. At the meeting, Mao Zedong accepted Liu Shaoqi and others suggestion, and put forward: "We must not because of emphasizing the class struggle relax economic work, we must put economic adjustment work in the first place.

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1962 年 1 月至 2 月举行的中央工作会议（史称“七千人大会”）对其后中国政治形势所产生的复杂影响，一直是人们着力探讨的问题。比如，“七千人大会取得了在历史条件下所能取得的重要成果，对推动国民经济全面调整起到了积极作用。会议发扬党内民主，实际上是党内关系的一次调整”。（中共中央党史研究室，《中国共产党历史》第二卷，中央党史出版社，2011 年，第 596 页）此种论述基调的前身是 1991 年的官修党史：“这次大会在当时历史条件下取得了重要的成果。会议对错误缺点的比较实事求是的态度，会议的民主精神和自我批评的精神，给全党以鼓舞，使广大党员心情比较舒畅，在动员全党为战胜困难而团结奋斗方面起了积极作用”。（胡绳主编《中国共产党的七十年》，中共党史出版社，1991 年，第 380 页）“当时历史条件”到底是什么，“党内关系”到底指的是什么，语焉不详。同类的论述还有张树华 [sic should be 张素华] 的专著《变局——七千人大会始末》。另有学者在 1989 年的论述是：“七千人大会在当时的历史条件下，取得很大成功，起到了团结和动员全党齐心协力为战胜严重困难而斗争的巨大作用。由此之后，国民经济的调整逐步全面展开，政治关系上的调整也进入了一个新阶段。”（丛进，《曲折发展的岁月》，河南人民出版社，1989 年，第 412 页）此处又提出了“当时历史条件”而不加论述，倒是对“政治关系”何谓做出了具体解释，该作者指出，“党中央领导核心即政治局和中央常委内政治生活上存在的缺点错误，却没有得到检查改正”。（丛进，《曲折发展的岁月》，河南人民出版社，1989 年，第 413 页）这段 1989 年的论述显然比 2011 年出版物的论述要符合实际更为精当，但是，因为缺少具体深入的分析，其对“七千人大会”的总体评价，还是没有摆脱旧框框。 The complex impact of the central work conference held in January-February 1962 (known as the "7000-person meeting") on the subsequent political situation in China has been a problem that people have focused on. For example, the "7000-person meeting" has made important achievements in historical conditions, and has played a positive role in promoting the overall adjustment of the national economy, and the meeting has carried forward the inner-party democracy and is actually an adjustment within the party." (History of the Communist Party of China, "History of the Communist Party of China, Vol. 2, Central Party History Publishing House, 2011, p. 596). The predecessor of this discourse was the official history of the 1991: At the time of historical conditions, the important achievements were achieved. The meeting's attitude of seeking truth from facts, the democratic spirit of the meeting and the spirit of self-criticism, to the whole party to encourage the majority of party members feel more comfortable, in mobilizing the whole party to overcome difficulties And unity and struggle played a positive role. " (70 years), "what is the historical conditions" in the end, what is the "inner-party relationship" in the end refers to what, the language is not elaborate, the Chinese Communist Party, the Communist Party of China, Similar to the discussion there Zhang Shuhua monograph "Changing Situation – The 7000-person meeting from Beginning to End." Another scholar in 1989 discussed: "The 7000-person meeting in the historical conditions of the time, made great success, played a solidarity and mobilize the whole party to work together to overcome the serious difficulties and the great role of the struggle. Therefore, The adjustment of the national economy gradually in full swing, the political relations on the adjustment has entered a new stage. "(Cong Jin," twists and turns of the development of the years ", Henan People's Publishing House, 1989, p. 412) The author pointed out that "the core of the leadership of the Party Central Committee is the political and the Standing Committee of the political life of the existence of the shortcomings of the error, but did not get the inspection, but also to the" political relations " correct". (1989), p. 413) This 1989 discussion is clearly more realistic than the discussion of the 2011 publication, but because of the lack of specific depth Analysis of its "7000-person meeting," the overall evaluation, or did not get rid of the old frame.

“七千人大会”的根本意义从毛泽东在会议以后的行踪描述中可以初见端倪。“七千人大会”后至北戴河会议前，毛泽东曾两次离开北京外出视察。先后经过上海、杭州、南昌、长沙、武汉、郑州等主要城市，一共在外地停留了近四个月时间。在同当地党政军领导人的接触中，他把很大精力放在了了解调整中的政治经济形势特别是农业生产和农村所有制方面，几个月下来，他逐渐形成了自己对形势的看法。而这些看法，同北京的中央一线领导人之间是有分歧的。7月8日，在毛泽东住处召开的小型会议上，毛泽东介绍了河南、山东两省的夏收情况，说形势并不那样坏，建议刘少奇等找河南、山东、江西的同志谈谈，了解一下农村的形势。”（中共中央党史研究室，《中国共产党历史》第二卷，中央党史出版社，2011年，第708页）根据这一史实记述，从1962年2月“七千人大会”闭幕到八届十中全会，毛泽东提出阶级斗争“年年讲，月月讲，天天讲”并对克服经济困难而实施的许多政策方针进行政治上的批判，其酝酿期有6个月，其中2/3的时间毛泽东是远离北京政治中心的，少参与当时的第一线工作的。“七千人大会”实际上是毛泽东与中央其他领导人之间政治分歧在党内更趋公开化和更趋升级的起点，也是毛泽东针对有损于他的个人权威的种种批评进行政治反击的酝酿起点。一些史书或一些学者认定这次会议在“起到了团结和动员……巨大作用”，是不符合实际的，恰恰相反，这次会议甚至是第一代中央领导集体在四五年之后走向完全分崩离析的起点。The fundamental meaning of the "7000-person meeting assembly" can be seen from an account of Mao Zedong's whereabouts after the meeting. From the end of the "7000-person meeting" to before the Beidaihe meeting, Mao Zedong had twice left Beijing to inspect. Successively after Shanghai, Hangzhou, Nanchang, Changsha, Wuhan, Zhengzhou and other major cities, a total of nearly four months in the field to stay. In contact with the leaders of the local party and government, he devoted a great deal of time to understanding the political and economic situation in the adjustment, especially in agricultural production and rural ownership. For months, he gradually formed his own views on the situation. And these views, with Beijing's central line between the leaders was divided. July 8, Mao Zedong held in a small meeting held, Mao Zedong introduced the Henan and Shandong provinces of the summer situation, said the situation is not so bad, it is recommended Liu Shaoqi and other Henan, Shandong, Jiangxi comrades talk about, to understand the rural the situation. "(CPC Central Committee History," the history of the Communist Party of China, Vol. 2, Central Party History Publishing House, 2011, p. 708) According to this historical account, from February 1962 "7000-person meeting" to the 10<sup>th</sup> Plenum of the Eighth Congress, Mao Zedong proposed that the class struggle "speak every year, speak every day and speak every day" and criticize many policy policies to overcome economic difficulties. The brewing period was six months, 2/3 of which Mao Zedong was far from the Beijing political center, less involved in the first line of work. "7000-person meeting" is actually Mao Zedong and other leaders of the central political differences between the party more open and more the starting point of the upgrade is also the starting point for Mao Zedong's political counterattack against criticism of his personal authority. Some history books or some scholars have determined that this meeting is "played a solid role in solidarity and mobilization," but on the contrary, the meeting was the starting point from even the first generation of central collective leadership in four or five years after the beginning to fall apart.

原本要“统一全党认识，增强团结”（中共中央党史研究室，《中国共产党历史》第二卷，中央党史出版社，2011年，第593页）的大会何以导致上述如此严重的政治分裂结局，是一个应该认真研究的问题。从史实看，大会从筹备开始阶段就不可避免地触及了当时党中央面临的最核心矛盾，而这一矛盾正是有关各方面竭力要掩盖的或着力要解决的。会议有许多具体议题，其中两个最关键，一是反对分散主义，加强集中统一领导；一是“大跃进”以来经济严重困难的政治责任。大量事实表明，刘少奇、周恩来、陈云、邓小平等中央领导人仅仅是从深化“调整、巩

固、充实、提高”八字方针落实角度来确定会议宗旨 的，即便他们对经济困难的直接成因心知肚明，也偶有公开半公开的言辞表达。固然，他们在“大跃进”期间以及 1959 年 庐山会议上再充分不过地感受到毛泽东至上的个人权威对中央的工作部署以及整个国民经济秩序的扰乱性影响，也身处党内缺少最基本民主机制的压制性氛围之中， 所以，他们并没有企图或没有能力从一开始就将“七千人大会”设计成为一次进行政治清算的大会。但是，要开好这次规模空前的大会，为落实“八字方针”，又不得不涉及一些具体问题。通过党组织系统收集的党内外各种意见，这些中央领导人对各级干部和民众的所思所想，也不完全是懵懂无知的。他们又不甘于完全漠视各种严峻的困难和社会各方面的意见。1961 年 11 月 22 日， 刘少奇对会议文件起草小组成员提出了四点意见，以作为对以刘少奇名义发表的大会讲话稿的修改补充。结果，这引发随后政治冲突的导火索。毛泽东并没有看完全 部讲话稿，一反党内重要会议文件起草的惯例，下令，无须经过政治局讨论，直接发给会议代表讨论。这就回避了对讲话稿基本观点的事先表态，也为日后对讲话稿 进行政治否定埋下了伏笔。可见，会议还没有召开，火药味已经在党内高层散发出来。在会议筹备阶段，未见有恰当的机制来对高层的意见分歧进行必要协调。关键 是刘少奇的四条意见中专门提到，中央要为过去几年出现的问题担负责任，以及各省市自治区在过去几年中存在着严重的分散主义现象。事后看，这些意见恰恰击中 了毛泽东当时的政治软肋。 To go from the original intent of the Meeting of “unifying the party’s understanding and strengthening unity” (The Communist Party of China History of the Communist Party of China, "the history of the Communist Party of China, Vol. 2, Central Party History Publishing House, 2011, p. 593) to lead to such a serious political splitting the outcome is a question that should be studied seriously. From the historical point of view, the Meeting from the beginning of the preparatory stage will inevitably touched the party Central Committee was facing the core contradiction, and this contradiction is concerned about all aspects of efforts to cover or focus on solving. **The meeting has many specific issues, two of which are the most critical, one is opposing splittism (decentralism?) and strengthening the centralized and unified leadership; second was political responsibility for the great economic difficulties of the "Great Leap Forward."** A large number of facts show that the central leaders of Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping and so on only from the deepening of the "adjustment, consolidation, enrichment, improve" eight-character approach to determine the purpose of the meeting, even if they are aware of the direct causes of economic difficulties, And occasionally openly semi-public expression of words. Of course, during the Great Leap Forward and the Lushan Conference in 1959, they felt the disruptive influence of Mao Zedong's supreme personal authority on the central work and the entire national economic order and in the lack of the most basic democracy Mechanism of the repressive atmosphere, so they did not attempt or have the ability from the beginning will be "7000-person meeting" designed to become a political clearing of the Meeting. However, to open the unprecedented scale of the Meeting, in order to implement the "eight-character", but also had to involve some specific issues. Through the party organization system to collect various opinions inside and outside the party, these central leaders of cadres at all levels and the people's thoughts and thoughts, is not entirely ignorant. They are unwilling to completely ignore all kinds of serious difficulties and social aspects of the views. On November 22, 1961, Liu Shaoqi made four points to the members of the drafting group of the meeting documents as a supplement to the amendments to the speeches of the Meeting published in the name of Liu Shaoqi. As a result, this triggers a fuse of subsequent political conflict. Mao Zedong did not read all the speeches, an anti-party important meeting documents drafted the practice, ordered, without going through the Politburo discussion, directly to the meeting delegates to discuss. This has evaded the advancement of the basic view of the manuscript and has foreshadowed the political negation of the speeches in the future. Visible, the meeting has not yet held, gunpowder flavor has been distributed in the high-level party. At the preparatory stage of the meeting, there was no proper mechanism to coordinate the divergence of views at high levels. The key is Liu Shaoqi's four comments specifically mentioned that the central authorities to take responsibility for the past few years, as well as the provinces and

autonomous regions in the past few years there is a serious decentralization phenomenon. Afterwards, these views just hit the political weakness of Mao Zedong at that time.

分散主义的政治帽子实际上就是指责过去几年时间里各省市自治区领导人随意违反中央的集中统一领导原则，在经济建设中借助“大跃进”运动各搞一套，破坏了国民经济的综合平衡，造成了严重的经济困难。在 1962 年 1 月 19 日的第 3 次讨论中，周恩来也指责说，“一个省搞几个独立的工业体系，理论上站不住”。在刘周陈邓的引导下，大会一开始就把讨论的焦点集中在“反对分散主义，加强集中统一”问题上。这些中央领导人在会议讨论中言辞空前一致，陈云的话说得更直白：“什么叫计划经济，就是要集中统一。”这样的政治指责落在地方领导人身上，但矛头直指“大跃进”动员时期和高潮时期毛泽东对地方领导人的巨大政治激励。本来，从 1961 年开始实施的“八字方针”已经明令废除毛泽东在“大跃进”时期下放给地方的各种权力（用周恩来的话说就是“指标”、“下放”、“独立体系”）。地方领导人在初尝空前放权带来的经济跃进上的自主权甜果以后又要受制于加倍严苛的中央计划及中央机关的种种管束，已经心生不满。“七千人大会”以反对分散主义为突破口，令他们又受到政治上的指责，更激起他们的情绪反弹。问题的核心是，他们在“大跃进”期间所获得的自主权都直接受惠于毛泽东的直接决断，主要省市自治区领导人都受到毛泽东的直接而具体的跃进激励。此时却以分散主义来对此下政治定论，必然引起复杂的政治后果。刘少奇等领导人未必事先不清楚这一点，但他们别无选择。问题是，地方领导人也未必是反对国民经济的综合平衡原则，而是要奋起捍卫自己的政治颜面和政治业绩，况且，他们有充分的理由期待获得毛泽东的支持。所以，他们并不赞成对分散主义的指责，努力寻找各种客观理由来为经济困难局面卸脱责任，他们认为，如此反分散主义，是在泄气泄劲，而不是在鼓气鼓劲。在大会第一阶段的政治争锋中，背后有不同力量支持的地方领导人的立场之间是有明显差别的。中共华东局第一书记兼上海市委第一书记柯庆施公开指责刘少奇讲话草稿把形势说得一团糟，“越看越没劲”。他在 1958 年 5 月中共八大二次会议上受到毛泽东直接支持而晋升为中央政治局委员的，成为建政以来直接晋升为中央领导人的第一位省市自治区党政一把手。他的发言自然是在为毛泽东的“大跃进”主张张目，兼有为自己地方的“大跃进”举措进行主张辩护的功能；而建政以后一直受到刘少奇控制的华北地区地方领导人则在许多问题上持有与刘少奇一致的立场。实际上，毛泽东与刘少奇的政治分歧日渐生成与公开化的过程中，地方领导人也有相应的分化趋向。这表明，在以毛泽东为基础的中央集权制度框架里，地方领导人的政治依附是一种必然的附属现象。因为这种依附关系，一些地方领导人的政治影响力有所上升或权力有所扩大，本来就不是地方自主权扩大意义上的扩权，相反，倒是地方领导人更深地卷入中央的思想政策及权力纷争的标志，实质上是地方自主权进一步丧失的标志。1954 年以前的地区中央局存续时期是如此，在 1960 年地区中央局重建之前的省市自治区领导人直接受制于中央领导时期，也是如此。 Decentralization political label is actually accused of the past few years in the provinces and autonomous regions leaders at random to violate the central principle of centralized and unified leadership in the economic construction with the "Great Leap Forward" movement to engage in a set, undermine the comprehensive balance of the national economy , Causing serious economic difficulties. In the third discussion of January 19, 1962, Zhou Enlai also accused, "a province to engage in a number of independent industrial system, theoretically cannot stand." Under the guidance of Liu Zhou Chen Deng, the Meeting began to focus on the discussion focused on "opposing decentralization, strengthening the unity" issue. These central leaders were unanimous in the discussion of the meeting, and Chen Yun's words were more straightforward: "What is the planned economy, that is, it is necessary to focus on unity." Such political accusations fall on the local leaders, but directed at the "Great Leap Forward" Mao Zedong's great political incentives for local leaders during the period of mobilization and the climax. Originally, the "eight-character principle" that had been implemented since 1961 had already

abolished the various powers that Mao had left in the "Great Leap Forward" period (with Zhou Enlai's words "indicators", "decentralized" and "independent systems"). Local leaders in the early emptiness of decentralization of the economic leap on the autonomy of the sweet fruit after being subject to more severe central plan and the central authorities of the various control, has been dissatisfied. "7000-person meeting" to oppose decentralism was a breakthrough, so that they are subject to political accusations, but also aroused their emotional rebound. The core of the problem is that their autonomy during the Great Leap Forward directly benefited from Mao's direct decision, and the leaders of the major provinces and autonomous regions were inspired by Mao's direct and concrete leap forward. At this time to decentralism to this political conclusion, will inevitably lead to complex political consequences. Liu Shaoqi and other leaders may not have known this in advance, but they had no choice. The problem is that local leaders may not be the principle of a comprehensive balance against the national economy, but rather to rise up to defend their political face and political performance, and that they have good reason to expect support from Mao Zedong. Therefore, they were not in favor of decentralized accusations, trying to find a variety of objective reasons for the economic difficulties to lift the responsibility, they think that so anti-distraction, is in the vent, rather than in the drums. There is a clear difference between the positions of the local leaders who have different forces in the political battle of the first stage of the Meeting. The first secretary of the CPC East China Bureau and the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the first secretary Ke Qingshi publicly accused Liu Shaoqi speech draft put the situation a mess, "look more and more boring." He had been promoted to a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which was directly promoted by Mao Zedong at the Second Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in May 1958, and became the first provincial and municipal autonomous region party leader who had been promoted directly to the central government since the establishment of the CPC Central Committee. His speech is naturally in Mao Zedong's "Great Leap Forward" advocate head, both for their own place "Great Leap Forward" initiative to defend the function of the idea; and after the construction has been subject to Liu Shaoqi control of the local leaders in North China Many issues hold a position consistent with Liu Shaoqi. In fact, the political differences between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi are increasingly generated and open in the process of local leaders also have a corresponding differentiation trend. This shows that in the framework of the centralized system based on Mao Zedong, the political attachment of the local leaders is an inevitable subsidiary phenomenon. Because of this dependency, some local leaders political influence had increased or their power has expanded, is not the expansion of local autonomy in the sense of expansion, on the contrary, it touches on the local leaders involved in the central policy of the greater policy And the symbol of power disputes, in essence, is a sign of further loss of local autonomy. This was the case when the central bureau of the region prior to 1954 was the same, and the leaders of the provinces and autonomous regions prior to the reconstruction of the central bureau in 1960 were directly subject to the central leadership.

刘周陈邓等中央领导人对地方领导人的分散主义的指责，引起后者的不满是必然的，也引起了毛泽东的高度政治警觉。毛泽东也不是完全为地方领导人鸣不平，而是要为自己在过去几年时间里大力借助地方领导人的政治依附和政治热情来冲破中央机关的阻碍来推进“大跃进”的政治举措进行辩护。在“大跃进”动员阶段的“以地方促中央”过程中，许多地方领导人显示出对毛泽东的高度政治忠诚，是毛泽东的主要政治资源之一，是不容轻易受到否定的。毛泽东何尝不是最坚定的中央集中统一原则的主张人物，关键是，刘周陈邓的加强集中统一的主张并不是他所希冀的全党全国的权力集中于他一人之手的集中统一，而是要集中统一于那些经常被 他指责为右倾保守且离民众切身关注越来越远的中央机关及其领导人。即便这样的集中统一对实现国民经济的协调发展可能具有一定的技术合理性（在经济调整时期更为显著），也因为 它违背毛泽东的政治意愿，威胁到毛泽东的地位，所以，必然受到毛泽东的政治反击。“七千人大会”注定要成为毛泽东与中央其他领导人之间政治分歧升级 而不是任何意义上的促进团结的大会，是因为建立政

权以后在中共党内反分散主义从来就不是一个中央不断收权以强化对地方控制的纯行政性问题。Liu Zhou Chen Deng and other central leaders of the local leaders of the decentralized accusations, causing the latter's dissatisfaction is inevitable, also caused a high degree of political warning for Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong is not entirely crying out for justice for the local leaders, but for their own over the past few years to vigorously with local leaders of political dependence and political enthusiasm to break through the obstacles of the central authorities to promote the "Great Leap Forward" political initiatives to defend The Many local leaders showed a high degree of political loyalty to Mao Zedong and one of the main political resources of Mao Zedong in the process of "promoting the local government" in the "Great Leap Forward" mobilization stage, which can not be easily denied. Mao Zedong is not the most determined principle of central unity and unity of the people, the key is, Liu Zhou Chen Deng's emphasis on strengthening the unity of the idea is not what he hoped that the power of the whole party and the country focused on the unity of one hand, but to Centralized and unified in those who are often accused of his right to keep conservative and from the people concerned about the farther and farther the central authorities and their leaders. Even if such a centralized and unified to achieve the coordination and development of the national economy may have a certain degree of technical rationality (in the economic adjustment period is more significant), but also because it violates Mao Zedong's political will, threatened the status of Mao Zedong, it had to receive Mao Zedong's political counterattack. "7000-person meeting " is destined to become Mao Zedong and the other leaders of the political differences between the escalation of the differences rather than any sense of the promotion of unity of the Meeting, because the establishment of the regime after the anti-decentralism in the Communist Party has never been a central to strengthen the purely administrative issue of local control.

在大会发言中，毛泽东大讲民主集中制问题，对各级第一书记“独裁”大加抨击，但一点也不涉及“大跃进”所奉行的政治路线问题，将关于地方领导人的批评严格局限在工作作风范围内。这是名为批评实为辩解的政治招数。可以肯定的是，毛泽东为地方领导人辩护之举，也不是（从来也不是）为地方自主权的合理诉求张目，反观他在“大跃进”动员时期连连指责中央机关集权过多束缚地方手脚的言辞，也可以看出，这仅仅是一种“大跃进”的政治动员之策略而已，并没有对大幅度放权的技术合理性有基本的理性分析为依据。而在刘周陈邓等中央领导人为缓解经济危困局面而提出加强中央的集中统一领导主张之时，毛泽东也置此举措的技术合理性于不顾，一味从政治上指责和阻挠。这样的政治决策显然是缺少基本的政治伦理之举，起码是缺少执政者对形势及政策取向的理性判断。从这个意义上，可以说，以毛泽东个人专断为基础的中央集权制度已经具备了引致社会经济秩序失衡乃至严重内乱的基本特性，这种制度之下，对毛泽东个人权力的制衡机制无从建立或运行起来，而中央其他领导人出于维护大局、维护基本秩序、维护中央集权制度而提出个技术性政策措施被毛泽东看成是对他个人专断地位的威胁。从根本上说，至少早在 1959 年庐山会议之时，毛泽东的政治意愿与政治选择对那些为管理国家所必需的技术合理性就已经形成严重的排斥。刘周陈邓等中央领导人为恢复国民经济正常秩序所作的种种努力日后在文化大革命期间被指责为“资产阶级反动路线”，成为更为严重的政治指责对象，在 1962 年“七千人大会”上就已经注定的了。 In his speech to the Meeting, Mao Zedong spoke of the issue of democratic centralism and criticized the "dictatorship" of the first secretary at all levels, but did not deal with the political line pursued by the "Great Leap Forward", and made strict criticism of local leaders was confined to the work style range. This is a political trick by which criticism is actually justifying. To be sure, Mao Zedong's defense of the local leaders, nor is it (never) for the rational demands of local autonomy, in contrast, he was in the "Great Leap Forward" mobilization period repeatedly accused the central authorities too much restraint local hands and feet, It can be seen that this is only a "big leap forward" political mobilization strategy only, and not a substantial decentralization of the technical rationality of the basic rational analysis as a basis. In the middle of Liu Zhongxu Deng and other central

leaders to alleviate the economic crisis and put forward to strengthen the central focus of the unified leadership of the idea, Mao Zedong also set the technical rationality of this initiative regardless, blindly from the political accusations and obstruction. Such political decision-making is clearly the lack of basic political ethics move, at least is the lack of the rulers of the situation and policy orientation of rational judgments. In this sense, it can be said that the centralized system based on Mao Zedong's personal arbitrary system already has the basic characteristics that lead to the imbalance of social and economic order and even serious civil strife. Under this system, the checks and balances of Mao Zedong's personal power can not be established or run And the other leaders of the central government put forward a technical policy measure for maintaining the overall situation, maintaining the basic order and maintaining the centralization system. Mao Zedong regarded this as a threat to his personal arbitrary status. Fundamentally, **Mao's political will and political choices had, at least as early as the Lushan Conference in 1959, had been a serious rejected the technical rationality necessary for the administration of the country.** Liu Zhou Chen Deng and other central leaders to restore the normal order of the national economy made efforts in the future during the Cultural Revolution was accused of "bourgeois reactionary line" to become a more serious object of political accusations, in 1962, "7000-person meeting" had already been destined.

## TWO 二

导致“七千人大会”产生严重政治后果的，恰恰是“大跃进”以后经济困难的政治责任追究问题，这一问题显然与反分散主义有关。在大会的第二阶段，责任追究上升为会议的主题，成为毛泽东与刘等其他中央领导人之间重大政治分歧公开化并升级的直接缘由。另一方面看，1949年10月中共建政以来毛泽东成为全党最高权力拥有者，在党内以全局性困难为由所进行的政治追责活动，此为首次。在中央集权制度框架下，政治决策及其执行方面的政治 责任分配与权力分布格局之间是严重不对等的，这一点毛泽东及其中央其他领导人未必有清醒的认识，或者，他们有意地加以回避。“毛泽东总是正确的”的观念 与“党中央总是正确的”的观念总是混同在一起的，共同成为支撑中央集权制度运行与强化的理念基础。政治责任如果被认为是存在且应该加以追究的话，那么，追 究的矛头从来都是向下的，即毛泽东及党中央以下的各级党政领导人是当然的政治责任追究对象，因为他们先验地被认定为“不总是正确的。”当时，在“七千人大会”上，这样的政治惯例却遭到了疑问，经济困难显然是全局性的，其政治责任理当由对全局负有责任的毛泽东及党中央来担负，因为任何地方或部门的党政领导人 都没有资格来担负全局性的政治责任。于是，这一问题变得难以绕过去了。 Leading to the "7000-person meeting" have serious political consequences, it is precisely the "Great Leap Forward" after the economic difficulties of political accountability issues, this issue is clearly related to anti-decentralism. In the second phase of the conference, the responsibility to pursue the theme of the meeting, as Mao and other major leaders of Liu and other major political differences between the open and upgrade the direct cause. On the other hand, it was the first time that Mao Zedong became the supreme power owner of the whole party since the communist administration in October 1949, and the political chase activities carried out on the basis of overall difficulties in the Party. In the framework of the centralization system, there was a serious and unequal relationship between the political responsibility distribution and the distribution of power in political decision-making and its implementation. Mao Zedong and other central leaders may not have a clear understanding, or they are consciously avoid. "Mao Zedong always correct" concept and "the party is always correct" concept is always mixed together, together to support the centralized system to run and strengthen the concept of the foundation. If the political responsibility is considered to exist and should be pursued, then the prosecution of the spearhead is always down, that Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee at all levels of party and government leaders are of course the political responsibility

of the object, because they are a priori were considered "not always correct." At that time, in the "7000-person meeting", such political practice has been questioned, economic difficulties are clearly global, and its political responsibility should be responsible for the overall Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, because any local or departmental party and government leaders are not qualified to bear the overall political responsibility. So, this problem becomes difficult to get around.

在会议准备时期刘少奇讲话报告起草阶段，最早破题提出政治责任问题的是彭真，他也未必意识到他在起草委员会上的发言触及最核心的党内政治责任追究机制问题。彭真直截了当地提出了经济困难的责任由谁来承担的问题，这涉及党中央及毛泽东应有的责任并应该公开承认的问题，实际上打击了毛泽东及党中央自武装夺权胜利以后不断膨胀的自信和激进的社会改造设想。刘周陈邓在会议期间都发表了有关政治责任应该如何承担的意见，从其后的党内高层政治斗争局势以及“文革”进程看，当时毛泽东就将这些表述统统看成是对他的个人权威权力地位的政治攻击。 During the drafting of Liu Shaoqi's speech report during the preparation of the meeting, Peng Zhen, who first raised the question of political responsibility, did not necessarily realize that his speech at the Drafting Committee touched upon the core political accountability mechanism. Peng really put forward the responsibility of the economic difficulties who will bear the problem, which involves the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong should be responsible and should be publicly recognized issues, in fact, against the Mao Zedong and the Central Committee since the victory of the armed forces after the continuous expansion of the victory Self - confidence and radical social transformation. Liu Zhou Chen Deng during the meeting have published on the political responsibility should be how to bear the views of the political situation since the party's high-level political struggle and the "Cultural Revolution" process, when Mao Zedong will all these statements as his personal Authority of the political status of the political attack.

毛泽东形成这种判断也是有根据的。建政以后，毛泽东带领中共发动并全面组织了对中国社会的改造，各种激烈的政治运动不间断地席卷中国社会的所有层面，中共党员及党员干部、知识分子、市民、农民、工商业者、学生、资本家，手工业者、军人，没有一个社会阶层或群体的人士能够躲闪于这些政治运动之外，及至 1962 年 1 月“七千人大会”召开之际，毛泽东及中共总是在利用舆论工具和党的组织系统大力肯定与宣扬这些政治运动的政治成果，从来就没有对这些运动所造成的严重的人身权利被侵害后果以及对社会经济秩序、思想文化的毁损有过清醒的认识，也没有承认过这种侵害或损毁是一种在政治上伦理上应该加以否定的行为。既然不认为是一种过失或偏差，就谈不上承担什么政治责任及其追究问题。仅就常见的党内政治斗争来说，目标多为反“保守”、“右倾”，唯恐这样的斗争之力度强度不够。此类运动对社会政治秩序以及社会公平公正原则的冲击性破坏，也从来不在毛泽东及党中央的政治评价视野之内，而每次运动的动员与总结均以政治胜利、思想胜利这样的抽象言论为基调。也就是说，任由激进的社会改造设想恣意横行而漠视社会公众基本权利的各种批判性运动在政治伦理方面是大有疑问的，对此，又不进行起码的政治究责，确属政治伦理的再丧失。在政治、思想、意识形态、文化以及社会领域里的运动之成败得失的评价，一开始就由毛泽东及中共所控制，既然毛泽东及党中央一开始就以一贯正确的政治优越感和自信来确认所施行路线方针政策的正确性，既然已经确立起来的中央集权制度能够有效地控制各种社会资源来推进这些运动，既然所有的地方领导人和各中央部门领导人都以依从毛泽东及党中央集中统一领导为最高的个人政治行为守则，那么，就难有有关上述运动的客观后果的冷静、公正而理性的评价，压倒性的政治赞赏是在运动部署阶段就已经确定的，它排斥一切不同的观察性结论。这样就无须建立起基本的政治责任追究机制。“伟大的胜利”、“辉煌的成就”以及“巨大的进步”之类表述所需要的是归功于毛泽东及党中央英明正确的领

导。 Mao Zedong forming this judgment also had a basis. After the establishment of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong led the CCP to launch and fully organized the transformation of Chinese society. All kinds of fierce political movements uninterruptedly affected all aspects of Chinese society, members of the Communist Party of China and party members and cadres, intellectuals, citizens, farmers, students, capitalists, handicraftsmen, soldiers, people without a social class or group can dodge in addition to these political movements, and to the occasion of the convening of the "7000-person meeting in January 1962", Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists were always using public opinion tools. And the party's organizational system strongly affirmed and propagated the political results of these political movements, and had never had a clear awareness of the consequences of the serious personal rights caused by these movements and the damage to the socio-economic order, ideology and culture, and no admitting that such infringement or damage is an act that should be negated politically. Since it is not considered a fault or deviation, it is not to mention what political responsibility and accountability. Only in the common political struggle within the party, the goal is more anti-conservative, "right", lest the strength of such a struggle is not enough strength. The impact of such a movement on social and political order and the principle of social fairness and impartiality has never been within the field of political evaluation of Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, and the mobilization and summary of each movement are abstract speeches such as political victory and ideological victory For the tone. In other words, it is doubtful that there is a lot of critical movement in the political ethic that the radical social transformation envisages arbitrary behavior and ignores the fundamental rights of the public. In this regard, it does not carry out at least political responsibility. The loss of ethics. The evaluation of the success or failure of the movement in politics, ideology, ideology, culture, and society began with the control of Mao Zedong and the CCP. Since Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee began to confirm with the correct political superiority and self-confidence The correctness of the line policy, since the established centralization system can effectively control the various social resources to promote these movements, since all local leaders and central government leaders are in compliance with Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee Unified leadership for the highest individual political code of conduct, then it is difficult to have the objective consequences of the above-mentioned movement of calm, fair and rational evaluation, overwhelming political appreciation is in the movement deployment stage has been determined, it excludes all different Observer conclusions. So that there was no need to establish a basic political accountability mechanism. The "great victories", "glorious achievements" and "great progress" are required to be attributed to Mao Zedong and the party's wise leadership.

“大跃进”以后的经济困难局面却具有另一重大的大政治意义，即毛泽东及党中央第一次意识到无法用传统的压倒性赞扬之辞来掩盖因为将大规模群众运动引入经济建设所造成的灾难性后果。全面的物质匮乏和上千万人口损失所带来的混乱，比之于历次政治运动构成的冤案、残酷斗争和公众权利丧失以及思想活力的丧失，绝对是难以用“胜利”、“成就”、“进步”之类惯常言辞来掩盖的。经济困难临头，就将失败的政治责任问题赤裸裸地摆了出来。这是难以回避的基本政治伦理的拷问。毛泽东也是建国以来第一次面临这样的问题，从维护个人至上权威权力角度，他一开始就认定刘周陈邓等其他中央领导人是在利用“七千人大会”有计划有预谋地置他于政治上难堪境地，进而威胁他的政治地位。尤其在 1959 年 7 月庐山会议彭德怀上书事件以后，毛泽东对于他的任何政治上的疑问都怀有十分警觉。这可能就是官修党史中提到的“当时的历史条件”的具体含义之一。之所以不明确阐述这一含义，显然是无意对这种个人专断为基础的中央集权制度进行认真反思。 The economic downturn after the "Great Leap Forward" has another major political significance, that is, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee for the first time realized that the traditional overwhelming compliments could not be concealed because of the introduction of mass movements into economic construction, with disastrous consequences. The lack of comprehensive material deprivation and the loss of millions of people is absolutely hard to use "victory", "achievement"

compared to the injustice caused by the political movement, the cruel struggle and the loss of public rights and the loss of thought. "Progressive" like the usual words to cover up. Economic difficulties, the failure of the political responsibility will be naked out of the problem. It is difficult to evade the torture of basic political ethics. **Mao Zedong was also the first time since the founding of the country to face such a problem, from the perspective of maintaining the authority of the supremacy of authority, he initially found that Liu Zhou Chen Deng and other central leaders are using the "7000-person meeting" plan to premeditatedly embarrass him politically, and thus threaten his political status.** Especially in July 1959 Lushan meeting Peng Dehuai after the incident, Mao Zedong against any of his political doubts are very alert. This may be one of the specific meanings of the "historical conditions of the time" mentioned in the history of official order. It is clear that there is no intention to seriously reflect on the centralized system based on this individual arbitrariness.

于是，“七千人大会”就演变成为一场政治责任推卸的活生生的政治标本，党内政治伦理准则的底线如水中石头般，通过会议的进展逐渐显露了出来。 Thus the "7000-person meeting" has evolved into a living political model to shirk political responsibility, the party's political ethical guidelines at the bottom line, were like a stone going through water, through the progress of the meeting gradually revealed.

在会议初期的起草委员会进行内部讨论时，围绕着经济困难的责任问题，就出现了不同的意见，甚至发生了争论。与会者未必都清楚地意识到他们正在接近一个涉及制度和体制核心的敏感问题。他们发言的口吻似乎是在认真地讨论某一项具体工作失误的具体责任如何确认的一般性问题，最后的结果是，“七千人大会”还是绕开了政治责任追究及其机制如何建立的问题。但是，“大跃进”决策与执行中失误的主要责任或最终责任由谁来承担的问题，还是绕不过去的，这同样是一个根本性问题。这两个根本性问题组合在一起，共同构成了那一时期党内政治伦理准则检测的主要尺度。 During the internal discussion of the drafting committee at the beginning of the meeting, there were divergent views and even debates around the question of responsibility for economic hardships. Participants were not necessarily aware of their proximity to a sensitive issues involving the core of systems and institutions. The tone of their speeches seems to be a general question of how to determine the specific responsibility of a particular job error. The final result was that the "7000-person meeting" still bypassed problem of how political accountability and its mechanisms are established. However, the "Great Leap Forward" decision-making and the implementation of the main responsibility for failure or the ultimate responsibility by who to bear the problem, or around the past, this is also a fundamental problem. These two fundamental issues together, together constitute the period of the party within the political ethics of the main criteria for the detection.

主持中央书记处常务工作的彭真有相当的政治勇气，他认为，过去几年工作重大失误的责任应该由中央领导人来承担。彭真是一个兼有中央领导人和地方最高党政领导人身份的双重角色承担者，他非常清楚，在 1958 年 初期“大跃进”动员阶段，各省市自治区领导人头脑发热、变本加厉的跃进做法以及欺上瞒下的浮夸虚报行为的来由以及严重的政治经济后果。但是，和柯庆施、李井泉这样兼有中央与地方领导职位的双重角色承担者不一样的是，彭真一直是中央的主要领导人之一，建政以后一直在中央机关工作，他更明白“上有好者，下必甚焉”的道理，更清楚，此“上”并不是泛泛意义上的中央领导人，而是“大跃进”运动的直接发动者组织者和指挥者毛泽东。因此，在 1962 年 1 月 18 日 起草委员会讨论时，正是彭真第一个提出来，责任承担者包括不包括“主席，少奇和中央常委”的问题。他这是在用设问的方式既明确又委婉地表达他的肯定答案，他是主张毛泽东应该承担责任的，他提出的理由却是一些与全局性失误相比属于具体而微的事实：“三五年过渡和办食堂都是毛主席批的”，同时也给出了一个浅显 但没有人如此公开讲出来

的道理：“毛主席也不是什么错误也没有”。从事后看，彭真的这番讲话成为最后迫使毛泽东在大会上公开承担责任的主要压力之一。尽管在这之前，毛泽东在党内会议上原则性地谈到过自己要对一些失误承担责任的话（在1961年6月12日中央工作会议上，在1962年12月21日中央工作会议上），但是，在彭真以及其他中央领导人的公开或非公开压力下面对七千各级党政干部说出自己要为经济困难承担责任的话，并不是毛泽东的意愿。其实，当时的一个重要“历史条件”是，在党内，是非问题并不是根据实践标准可以确定出结论或答案，而是需要看党内权力权威大小高下的格局，尤其是在庐山会议以后。这样的政党自然就难以面对困难、难以说真话、难以形成合乎基本政治伦理准则的治党理政的决策。 Peng Zhen, who presided over the executive work of the Central Secretariat, had some political courage. He believes that the responsibility for major mistakes in the past few years should be borne by the central leaders. Peng Zhen is a dual role holder who has both central leaders and local top political and political leaders. He is very clear that in the early stage of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, leaders of provincial and municipal autonomous regions were heated and intense, And the serious political and economic consequences. However, and Ke Qingshi, Li Jingquan, both the central and local leadership positions of the dual role of the bearer is not the same, Peng Zhen has always been one of the central leaders, after the construction of the central government has been working, he knows more It is clear that this "upper" is not a central leader in the general sense, but the direct promoter of the "Great Leap Forward" movement and its conductor Mao Zedong. Therefore, in the January 18, 1962 drafting committee discussion, it is Peng first proposed, the responsibility should or should not include "the Chairman, Shaoqi and the Standing Committee members" issue. He is in the way to ask both clear and euphemistically express his affirmative answer, he is advocating Mao Zedong should bear the responsibility, he put forward the reason is that some of the overall errors compared with the fact that is a specific fact: "three five Year transition and canteen are approved by Chairman Mao, "but also gives a simple but no one so openly out of the truth:" Chairman Mao is not one without error. " After that, Peng's speech became one of the main pressures to force Mao to take responsibility in public at the conference. Despite this, Mao Zedong spoke of the principle of responsibility for some mistakes at the party meeting (at the Central Working Conference on June 12, 1961, at the Central Working Conference on December 21, 1962) However, it is not the will of Mao Zedong to face seven thousand party and government cadres at the level of openness or non-public pressure of Peng Zhen and other central leaders to say that they are responsible for economic difficulties. In fact, at that time an important "historical conditions" is that in the party, the non-problem is not based on the practice of standards can determine the conclusion or answer, but need to look at the authority of the authority of the size of the pattern, especially after the Lushan meeting The Such a political party naturally difficult to face difficulties, it is difficult to tell the truth, it is difficult to form a basic political and ethical principles of the party's decision-making.

从1959年夏到1962年初的两年半时间里，党内并没有发生或出现能够促使毛泽东转而主动承担政治责任的事件或趋势。所以，**彭真说：“如果毛主席百分之一、千分之一的错误不检讨，将给我们党留下恶劣影响”**。这被看成是前所未有的逼宫之举。实际结果也是如此，在这之前，党内还没有这样的先例。彭真发表这样看法的时候，“七千人大会”就前些年重大失误的责任问题在私下里和公开场合下的议论已经沸腾于堂了。反分散主义的主张似乎有将那种责任推卸给各省市自治区领导人和基层干部身上的趋势。这让与会者感到十分不满意，感到压抑，有苦难言。会议的既定议程受到严重的影响。彭真的这段话似乎在暗示，如果中央不公开站出来表态承担政治责任，就难以做通各级干部的思想工作，而中央的表态担责取决于毛泽东作为中央主席的担责表态。这等于一下子引火于毛泽东本身。 From the summer of 1959 to the beginning of 1962 in the two and a half years, the party did not happen or there can lead to Mao Zedong to take the initiative to assume political responsibility for events or trends. So, Peng Zhen said: "If Chairman Mao one

percent, one thousandth of the error does not review, will give our party a bad influence." This is seen as an unprecedented abdication move. The same is true of the actual results, before the party has no such precedent. Peng really made such a view, the "7000-person meeting" on the previous years, the responsibility of major mistakes in private and public discussion of the discussion has been boiling in the halls. Anti-decentralism seems to have the responsibility to shirk that responsibility to provincial and municipal leaders and grassroots cadres. This makes the participants feel very dissatisfied, feel depressed, have misery. The established agenda of the meeting was seriously affected. Peng Zhen's words seem to suggest that if the central government does not stand out to stand the political responsibility, it is difficult to do all the ideological work of cadres at all levels, and the central position depends on the responsibility of Mao Zedong as the central chairman of the position. This is equal to all of a sudden fire in Mao Zedong itself.

与党中央及毛泽东是否应该担责相对应的是，彭真还提出了各省市自治区领导人是否应该担责的问题。他说：“省市委要不要把责任担起来？担起来对下面没有好处，得不到教训。”这又与毛泽东在前些天中央工作会议上讲到责任在中央和省这两级的说法相冲突。这与毛泽东对地方领导人的辩护在政治上是大相径庭的。如果彭真的主张被接纳的话，在“大跃进”失误的政治责任分担方面，就出现了巨大断裂。上有毛泽东及中央常委和中央书记处，下有狂热执行“大跃进”各项政策的城乡基层干部，而无积极传达、部署和大力推进“大跃进”指令的省、市、自治区领导人的责任。这显然有失于政治责任的全面追究。也是对中央集权制度框架下省、市、自治区领导人作为中央路线方针政策在各地第一级代理人的巨大政治作用的忽视。彭真如此袒护省、市、自治区领导人究竟有何政治意图，至今没有资料来透彻地加以说明。但是，他这番主张客观上凸显了党中央及毛泽东应该承担的政治责任之重大。于是，先有周恩来出面对此表示异议。Correspondingly whether the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong should be responsible, Peng Zhen also raised the question of whether the leaders of the provinces and autonomous regions should be held accountable. He said: "If the provincial and municipal governments should not take responsibility to bear the burden of the following no good, no lessons." This and Mao Zedong in the previous days of the central work conference on the responsibility of the central and provincial levels of the argument Conflict. This is politically different from Mao's defense of local leaders. If Peng really advocated the words, in the "Great Leap Forward" mistakes in the political responsibility to share, there has been a huge break. Mao Zedong and the Central Committee and the Central Committee, under the fanatical implementation of the "Great Leap Forward" policies of urban and rural grassroots cadres, and no positive communication, deployment and vigorously promote the "Great Leap Forward" directive provinces and municipalities leaders responsibility. This is clearly a matter of political accountability. But also the central government under the framework of the centralization system under the central government leaders as the central line policy and policy in the local first-level agents of the huge political role of neglect. Peng Zhen so shield the provinces and autonomous regions leaders have any political intentions, so far no information to be thoroughly explained. However, he advocated objectively highlight that the party and central government and Mao Zedong should bear the major political responsibility. So, Zhou Enlai was first to come out to express his dissent.

早在这之前，周恩来就对政治责任问题的敏感性很有觉察，他在谴责各种分散主义现象时已经有揽责任于自身的发言。周恩来的此刻表态具有十分重大的意义，却长期以来在官方历史书里不被提及。作为政府最高领导人，周恩来甚至比彭真更清楚“大跃进”的缘起、过程和严重后果。但是，他更明白毛泽东的个人权威权力的不可动摇性和不可挑战性。如果说是彭真破题首次提出了党中央及毛泽东是否要承担经济困难局面的政治责任这一问题的话，那么，周恩来的发言却意外地表明了中共建政以后政治责任追究机制为什么难以建立起来的问题。其实，在中央书记处会前给毛泽东的报告中，已经有意识地回避了党中央及毛泽东的责任问题。如今的史书上都无

一例外地载明并指责 1962 年 1 月 29 日 林彪在大会上的讲话，他的讲话是：“事实证明，这些困难在某些方面，恰恰是由于我们没有按毛主席的指示、毛主席的警告、毛主席思想去做。如果听毛主席的话，体会毛主席的精神，那么，弯路就会走得少，今天的困难就会少得多。”其实，这种为毛泽东直接而绝对地开脱政治责任的说法，最早是在 1 月 18 日的大会文件起草委员会上由周恩来说出来的，比林彪的讲话要早 11 天。周恩来明确质疑彭真的政治责任追究立场。他说：“主观上的错误，要着重讲违反毛泽东思想，个别问题是我们供给材料、情况有问题，应当由我们负责，不能叫毛主席负责。如果不违反‘三面红旗’思想、毛泽东思想，的确成绩会大一些。”“主席早发现问题，早有准备，是我们的错误。”陈伯达对周恩来的说法完全附和，他提出的反问是：“我们做了许多乱七八糟的事情，是不是要毛主席负责？”这是一种将毛泽东的最高决策作用与中央其他领导人和各级党政领导人的执行作用作政治上的区分的特殊思想方法。照此思路，毛泽东不但完全无需为“大跃进”的失误承担任何政治责任，而且，毛泽东可以凭借既有的至上权威来要求或迫使其他中央领导人和各级领导人来担责。周恩来、林彪和陈伯达似乎在勾勒一种以毛泽东为最高裁决者角色的党内政治责任追究机制，赋予毛泽东更绝对的权力。其前提是，全党干部和党员必须确信毛泽东是一贯正确的、事事正确的。毛泽东手里自然就握有对党内任何其他领导人进行政治责任追究的权力，而这种追究本身也是正确到无可置疑的。对此，周恩来的表述是：“现在要全党一心一德，加强集中统一，听‘舂公’的话，听中央的话，中央听毛主席的话这是当前工作中的主要的问题。”陈伯达的感叹是：“现在中央不能集权”。其含义与周恩来的话的含义是高度一致的：为调整国民经济、度过经济困难时期而厉行集中统一的领导，不是将权力集中到中央机关或其他中央领导人手里，而是要集中在毛泽东的手里。刘少奇、陈云等人为控制局势恶化而提出的集中统一的技术性措施，在这里衍变为集权于毛泽东的政治主张。林彪在 1 月 29 日的发言则从历史角度强化周恩来和陈伯达的立场，他说：“我深深感到，我们的工作搞得更好一些的时候，是毛主席的思想能够顺利贯彻的时候，是毛主席的思想不受干扰的时候。如果毛主席的意见受不到尊重，或者受到很大干扰的时候，事情就要出毛病。我们党的几十年历史，就是这么一个历史。”

As early as this, Zhou Enlai was very sensitive to the sensitivity of political issues, he condemned the phenomenon of decentralization has been responsible for their own statements. Zhou Enlai's statement at the moment is of great significance, but for a long time in the official history of the book is not mentioned. As the supreme leader of the government, Zhou Enlai even more than Peng Zhen more clear "Great Leap Forward" origin, process and serious consequences. However, he was more aware of the power of Mao Zedong's personal authority being unshakable and unchallengeable. If it was for the first time that the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong had to bear the political responsibility of the economic difficulties, then Zhou Enlai's speech unexpectedly showed that the problem was it was difficult to establish the political accountability mechanism after the establishment of the CPC. In fact, in the Central Committee before the report to Mao Zedong, has been consciously avoided the party Central Committee and Mao Zedong's responsibility. In today's history books, without exception, stated and accused Lin Biao on January 29, 1962, the speech at the conference, his speech is: "Facts have proved that these difficulties in some respects, precisely because we did not follow Chairman Mao directions, listen to Chairman Mao's words and experience the spirit of Chairman Mao, then the detour will go less, today's difficulties will be much less. "In fact, this is the Mao Zedong directly and absolutely out of political responsibility, the earliest in the January 18 meeting of the Meeting document drafting committee by Zhou Enlai out, than Lin Biao's speech to 11 days earlier. Zhou Enlai clearly questioned Peng's stand to hold political responsibility. He said: "Subjective mistakes, to focus on violating Mao Zedong Thought, the individual problem is that we supply materials, the situation is problematic, we should be responsible for, can not be called Chairman Mao is responsible for. If you do not violate the 'three red flag' "The chairman's early discovery of the problem is early and prepared, and it is our mistake." Chen Boda was completely echoing Zhou Enlai's

statement, and he asked: "We have done a lot of messy things, "This is a special way of thinking that will make Mao's greatest decision-making role politically differentiate with the other leaders of the central government and the executive roles of party and government leaders at all levels." According to this idea, Mao Zedong not only do not have to bear any political responsibility for the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward, and Mao Zedong can rely on the supremacy of authority to demand or force other central leaders and leaders at all levels to take responsibility. Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao and Chen Boda seem to outline Mao Zedong as the highest ruler role of the party within the political accountability mechanism, giving Mao Zedong more absolute power. The premise is that the party cadres and party members must be sure that Mao Zedong is always correct, everything is correct. Mao Zedong's hand naturally holds the power to pursue political responsibility for any other leader of the party, and this investigation itself is correct to no doubt. In this regard, Zhou Enlai's statement is: "Now the whole party is as one in heart and soul, to strengthen the centralized and unified, listen to 'Gong Gong' words, listen to the central words, the Central Committee Chairman Mao's words This is the main problem in the current work." Chen Boda's sigh is: "now the central can not be centralized." The meaning of Zhou Enlai's words is highly consistent: in order to adjust the national economy, through the difficult times and the implementation of centralized leadership, not to focus on the central authorities or other central leaders in the hands, but to focus on Mao Zedong's hands. Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun and other people to control the situation deteriorated and put forward the centralized and unified technical measures, here evolved into a political point of concentration in Mao Zedong. Lin Biao in the January 29 speech from a historical perspective to strengthen the position of Zhou Enlai and Chen Boda, he said: "I deeply feel that our work done better, when Chairman Mao's thinking can be carried out smoothly, is if Chairman Mao 's thoughts are not disturbed, or if the views of Chairman Mao 's opinions are not respected, or when they are greatly disturbed, things will go wrong, and the decades' history of our Party is such a history.

这样，建政以后党内少有的政治究责的努力，被周恩来、陈伯达和林彪等人转化为强化毛泽东个人权威的新一轮浪潮。毛泽东在这之后俨然成为一个永远无涉于任何政治责任的超级正确立场持有者。这对以他个人专断为基础的中央集权制度的运行和强化产生了巨大影响，而不是官方史上所言的那样林彪的 1 月 29 日的讲话对大会起到了“消极作用”。四五年以后，周恩来、陈伯达、林彪在毛泽东执意发动无产阶级文化大革命运动问题上的立场本不是一日就形成的，完全可以从 1962 年“七千人大会”上的言论中看出来。客观的事实是，“七千人大会”上中央领导层就已经分裂了，未来若干年的政治格局已经在这个大会上确定了下来，党内高层根本就没有在这次会议上达成团结，不仅仅是思想上没有纠正“左倾”错误，在体制建设上也毫无进展。此为“七千人大会”的主要政治意义。 **In this way, after the establishment of the regime, there was little effort to pursue political responsibility within the party, by Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda and Lin Biao and others into a new wave of personal authority to strengthen Mao Zedong.** Mao Zedong after this seems to have never been involved in any political responsibility of a super correct position holders. This has had a tremendous impact on the operation and strengthening of the centralized system based on his personal excuse, rather than the remarks made in the official history books that Lin Biao's January 29 speech played a "negative effect" towards the conference. Four or five years later, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda and Lin Biao's position on Mao Zedong's deliberate campaign against the proletarian cultural revolution was not formed on a day-to-day basis, and it could be seen from the remarks of the "7000-person meeting" in 1962. The objective fact is that the "7000-person meeting" on the central leadership has been split, the future of several years of political pattern has been identified in this conference down, the party is not high in this meeting reached a solidarity, not only did it not correct the "leftist" error in the ideological realm, there was no progress in institutional construction. This is the main political significance of the "7000-person meeting".

### THREE 三

彭真的究责努力得到的支持来自刘少奇。邓小平只是巧妙地引用毛泽东本人讲过的话来委婉地表明毛泽东并不是不犯错误的圣人：“错误缺点都有”。而刘少奇则利用代表中央在大会上作正式报告的便利，公开道出了他在政治究责问题上的立场。在1月27日下午，他发表了长达三个小时的讲话，其中提到了“大跃进”时期失误的政治责任问题，他对彭真与周恩来等人的观点进行了综合，尽管他只字不提毛泽东个人的政治责任，但是，他采纳了彭真关于中央要负责的看法，公开承认中央要对经济困难局面的出现首先要担负责任，并进行了细化的论述。他说：“关于我们这几年工作中发生的错误和缺点的责任，我们在书面报告中讲过，首先要负责的是中央，其次要负责的是省、市、自治区一级党委，再其次，才是省以下的各级党委。一些事情是经过中央政治局的，中央政治局应当负起责任。”这样的说法是建政以来空前的，尤其直接点到了中央政治局层级的政治责任。这是政治究责意识萌发的标志。但是，刘少奇的讲话得出的是责任分散的结论：中央、省市自治区以及地方单位各有责任。他把首要的责任归为中央、中央政治局。他没有应和彭真提出的“书记处负责”的说法，而是直指中央政治局应该承担责任。人们自然以为“大跃进”时期的许多决策是政治局制定和决定的。刘少奇没有公开说明的是，实际上，许多重大决策并没有经过政治局的讨论，而是由中央的某一个人即兴制定的，比如，大办人民公社是毛泽东在山东视察时公开讲话在先，中央政治局接纳并做出决定于后。这类事情理所当然应该由毛泽东个人来承担责任。在这一方面，刘少奇完全不接受周恩来、陈伯达和林彪为毛泽东解脱责任的立场。刘少奇与周恩来、陈伯达、林彪的立场表面上是对立的，但实际上有明显的共同之处。他认为，经济困难的责任不在于下面或基层乱办事，首先在于中央的决策错误，他未必敢于直接赋责任于毛泽东个人身上。所以，在刘少奇这番讲话之后，也不可能建立起政治责任追究机制，所谓“大会充分发扬了党内民主”的历史结论，实际上是一种肤浅的政治饰语，因为事实是，从会后党内政治生态未有任何改善反而越来越恶劣。也就是说，刘少奇提出的各有各的政治责任的说法，仅仅是一种说法而已，是一种政治责任虚悬的表现，因为没有任何具体的机制和规章能够保证这种政治追究能够落在实处，既没有相应的标准，也没有保障体制，更没有基本的独立监察手段。

Peng Zhen's efforts to get the support from Liu Shaoqi. Deng Xiaoping only cleverly quoted Mao Zedong himself said the words to euphemistically show that Mao Zedong is not the wrong saints: "wrong shortcomings are". And Liu Shaoqi is the use of representatives of the central government in the Meeting for the formal report of the convenience, publicly put his political responsibility on the issue of the position. In the afternoon of January 27, he delivered a three-hour speech, which referred to the "Great Leap Forward" period of political responsibility, he Peng Zhen and Zhou Enlai's views were integrated, although he only Not to mention Mao Zedong's personal political responsibility, but he adopted Peng Zhen on the central to be responsible to openly admit that the central authorities to the emergence of economic difficulties first to take responsibility, and a detailed discussion. He said: "On the mistakes and shortcomings of our work in the past few years, we have written in the written report, first of all to be responsible for the central, and secondly to be responsible for the provincial, municipal and autonomous regional party committees, Second, the provincial party committees at all levels, some of which are through the Central Political Bureau, the Central Political Bureau should take responsibility. "This argument is unprecedented since the construction, especially directly to the central political bureau level of politics responsibility. This is a sign of the germination of political responsibility. However, Liu Shaoqi's speech is derived from the conclusion of the responsibility: the central, provincial and municipal autonomous regions and local units have their own responsibility. He attributed the primary responsibility to the central, central Politburo. He did not and Peng really put forward the "Secretariat responsible" argument, but directed at the Central Political Bureau should bear the responsibility. People naturally think that many of the decisions of the "Great Leap Forward" period were formulated and decided by the Politburo. Liu Shaoqi did not publicly state

that, in fact, many major decisions have not been discussed by the Politburo, but by the central one of the individual improvisation, such as the large people's commune is Mao Zedong in Shandong inspection open speech first, The Central Political Bureau accepted and made a decision. Such things should of course be borne by Mao Zedong personal responsibility. In this respect, Liu Shaoqi did not accept the position of Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda and Lin Biao for the dissolution of Mao Zedong. Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Lin Biao's position on the surface is opposed, but in fact there is a clear common ground. He believes that the responsibility of economic difficulties is not the following or grass-roots chaos, the first is the central decision-making error, he may not dare to direct responsibility for Mao Zedong's personal body. Therefore, after Liu Shaoqi's speech, it is impossible to establish a political accountability mechanism, the so-called "Congress fully carry forward the inner-party democracy," the historical conclusion, in fact, is a superficial political ornamentation, because the fact is that After the party political ecology without any improvement but more and more bad. In other words, Liu Shaoqi's own political responsibility is only a kind of argument, is a political responsibility of the performance of suspense, because there is no specific mechanisms and regulations to ensure that this political investigation can be implemented , There is no corresponding standard, there is no guarantee system, but no basic independent monitoring means.

1962 年 1 月 30 日，毛泽东在大会上发表讲话，他无法回避责任问题，他说：“凡是中央犯的错误，直接的归我负责，间接的我也有份，因为我是中央主席。我不是要别人推卸责任，其他一些同志也有责任，但是，第一负责的应当是我。”（《在扩大的中央工作会议上的讲话》，1962 年 1 月 30 日，《毛泽东文集》，第八卷，人民出版社，1999 年，第 296 页）他还说：“既然做了第一书记，对于工作中的缺点错误，就要担起责任”。（《党史》二卷，第 595 页）这是毛泽东建政以后少有的公开表态承担责任的讲话。在这之前，他提出，既然与会者都憋着气，就开一个出气会。于是，代表组“动员大家打消一切顾虑，趁热打铁，发扬民主，向上级并重点向省委的缺点错误开展批评。”（丛进，《曲折发展的岁月》，河南人民出版社，1989 年，第 404 页）毛泽东讲话以后，邓小平、周恩来分别代表中央书记处和国务院进行了自我批评，带动了之后从 1 月 31 日到 2 月 6 日会议各大组对大区中央局和省市自治区党委以及中央国家机关及其负责人的批评，“主要是地方来的同志向中央特别是各省、市、自治区党委提意见”。（中共中央党史研究室，《中国共产党历史》第二卷，中央党史出版社，2011 年，第 595 页）所有省市自治区第一书记都在会议上进行了工作检讨。大区中央局和国家机关的一些领导人也进行了自我批评。似乎毛泽东的担责与自我批评带动了省市级、大区中央局级这两级的领导人站出来担责，承认错误缺点。“会议上洋溢着几年来少有的宽松气氛”。（中共中央党史研究室，《中国共产党历史》第二卷，中央党史出版社，2011 年，第 598 页）而那些省市自治区和中央部委领导人的检查无一涉及对党中央和毛泽东的政治责任追究，他们无一例外地检讨自己在执行中央各种正确决策过程中所犯的 error，由此担起工作失误的责任。比如山西省委第一书记陶鲁笏检讨说，他们在过去的四年期间有过两次头脑发热。他承认在 1958 年冬向毛泽东汇报石楼县粮食高产时欺骗了毛泽东，当时报告说是全县平均亩产为 1000 斤，实际上只有 170 斤。湖北省委第一书记王任重则承认湖北省这几年“自以为是，盲目乐观，左倾蛮干”，他说他向毛泽东“反映了一些不合实际的情况，岂不就是干扰了毛主席的思想。”他还对林彪的讲话做出积极应和，说：“林总批评有人打扰毛主席的思想向左拉，我就是其中的一个。” **January 30, 1962, Mao Zedong made a speech at the Meeting, he can not avoid the question of responsibility, he said: "All the mistakes made by the Central Committee, I am directly responsible for or have an indirect share for, because I am the Chairman of the Center. Some other comrades are also responsible, but the first responsible should be me."** ("Speech at the enlarged Central Work Conference ", January 30, 1962," Mao Zedong Collection ", vol. 8 , People's Publishing House, 1999, p. 296) He also said: "Since the first secretary, for

the work of the shortcomings of the error, we must take responsibility." ("History of the Party", vol. 595) This is the speech of Mao Zedong's rare public statements after assuming responsibility. Prior to this, he suggested that since the participants are simmering, need to vent some anger. So, the representative group "to mobilize everyone to dispel all concerns, while the blacksmith, carry forward the democracy, to the higher level and focus on the mistakes of the provincial party committee to criticize." (Cong Jin, "twists and turns of the development of the year", Henan People's Publishing House, 404) **After Mao Zedong's speech, Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai, respectively, on behalf of the Central Secretariat and the State Council conducted self-criticism, led from the January 31 to February 6 meeting of the major groups of regional central and provincial and municipal governments and The central state organs and their responsible person's criticism,** "mainly local comrades to the central, especially the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions party committee to take the views." (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, "History of the Communist Party of China, Vol. 2, Central Party History Press, 2011, p. 595) The first secretary of all provinces and autonomous regions undertook a work review at the meeting. Some of the leaders of the central bureau and state authorities have also conducted self-criticism. It seems that Mao Zedong's responsibility and self-criticism led the provincial and municipal, regional central bureau level of these leaders stand out to bear the responsibility to admit the errors and shortcomings. "The meeting was filled with a few years of loose atmosphere." (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, "History of the Communist Party of China, Vol. 2, Central Party History Publishing House, 2011, p. 598) and those provinces, autonomous regions and central ministries and leaders of the inspection no one related to the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong Of the political responsibility to pursue, they without exception, to review their own in the implementation of the central decision-making process of the correct mistakes, which bear the responsibility of work errors. For example, the first secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee, Tao Lujia, reviewed that they had had two brains during the past four years. He admitted that in the winter of 1958 to Mao Zedong reported that the high yield of Shili County, Mao Zedong deceived, was reported that the county average yield of 1,000 pounds per mu, in fact, only 170 pounds. Hubei Provincial Party Committee, the first secretary of the re-admitted that Hubei Province in recent years, "self-righteous, blind optimism, left reckless", he said he to Mao Zedong "reflects some unreasonable situation, would not interfere with Chairman Mao's thinking. "He also made a positive response to Lin Biao's speech," said Lin, who criticized some people to disturb Chairman Mao's thoughts to the left, and I was one of them.

总之，毛泽东公开承担责任以后，也迫使各省市自治区领导人进行检讨、承担责任。当时，其中的基本倾向是很明显的：这些层级的领导人无人对“大跃进”中央 的全局性失误来向中央进行政治问责，更何谈向毛泽东问责。而毛泽东在会议上有关民主集中制的精彩表述，对各级第一书记的专断大肆抨击，说听他们大搞“一言 堂”。这是典型的双重政治标准的说法，因为它并不拿民主集中制来衡量他自己在中共中央的个人专断情况。毛的讲话还获得了大会的喝彩，只能表明，毛泽东个人 专断已经达到了一个十分严重的程度：可以不为明显属于他的失误来担负应该担负起来的责任。所以，毛泽东在大会上的担责，实际上是虚悬起真正的政治责任，是 将责任推卸给各级领导人，尤其是基层党政干部（随后的“四清”运动的“历史必然性”已经在“七千人大会”上显示出来了）， 而党内不存在兼有觉悟眼光和政治勇气的领导人来对毛的推卸责任的做法进行抵制或反驳。他们痛陈自己的失误，甚至是误导毛泽东的失误，他们不但承担执行政策 过程中的失误之责，还要替毛泽东背起决策失误的责任来。其实，他们未必不明白，如此严重的经济困难局面的责任并不是一省一市一区或一部一委能够承担得起来 的，所以，他们的检讨和担责，实际上也是在仿效毛泽东的责任虚悬的做法。比如，湖北省委的一些干部针对王任重的检讨做出的反应是：“省委担担子，是担的空 担子”。这是“七千人大会”第二阶段的政治责任虚悬的真正面目所在。如果说“大跃进”中的“上有好者，下必甚焉”遗风从来没有消散过的话，“七千人大会”

上，在政治责任承担方面，毛泽东之下的各级干部所做的事情，与“大跃进”时并无差别。 In short, Mao Zedong openly admission of responsibility, caused the provinces and municipalities and autonomous regions leaders to review and take responsibility. At that time, the basic tendency was obvious: these leaders no one on the "Great Leap Forward" central failure to the central political accountability, but also about Mao Zedong accountability. And Mao Zedong at the meeting on the wonderful expression of democratic centralism, the first secretary of the monopoly at all levels wantonly criticized, saying that they engage in "one word rule". This is a typical dual political standard because it does not take democratic centralism to measure his own personal circumstances in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. **Mao's speech also won the applause of the Meeting, can only show that Mao Zedong's personal arbitrary has reached a very serious level: can not be clearly for his mistakes to bear the responsibility should bear.** Therefore, the responsibility of Mao Zedong in the Meeting, in fact, is a virtual political responsibility, is to shirk responsibility to all levels of leaders, especially grass-roots party and government cadres (in the subsequent "four cleanups" movement "historical inevitability" was already evident in the "7000-person meeting"), and the party does not exist both the vision and political courage of the leaders to Mao's shirking responsibility to resist or refute the practice. They have misled their mistakes and even misled Mao's mistakes. **They not only assumed responsibility for the mistakes in the implementation of the policy, but also took responsibility for Mao's decision-making mistakes.** In fact, they may not understand that such a serious economic difficulties in the situation is not a province or a city or a committee can afford, so their review and responsibility, in fact, is also in the follow Mao Zedong's The practice of liability. For example, some of the cadres of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee for Wang Renzhong review of the response is: "the provincial party committee to bear the burden of the burden of the burden." This is the "7000-person meeting" the second phase of the political responsibility of the true face of the virtual hanging. If the "Great Leap Forward" in the "good people, the next must be Yan" legacy has never disappeared, "7000-person meeting", in terms of political responsibility, Mao Zedong under the cadres at all levels do Things, and the "Great Leap Forward" when there is no difference.

除了几个省级领导人（如安徽省委第一书记曾希圣等）因为被揭露出严重的瞒报经济困难实情压制说真话的基层干部而被调职另外任用之外，首先应该担负政治责任的中央（包括中央书记处、中央政治局、政治局常委会、国务院以及各中央机关）没有遭到任何组织处罚。毛泽东在会议上承认自己负主要责任，却没有任何相应的组织措施跟进，也没有其他中央领导人提出这个问题。“大跃进”造成的严重经济困难这样全局性的失误的政治责任，就这样被推卸责任在先、虚悬责任于后，化为无形。这属于最严重的政治伦理缺失。 In addition to several provincial leaders (such as the first secretary of Anhui Provincial Party Committee Zeng Xisheng, etc.) because it was exposed to a serious concealment of economic difficulties to suppress the truth of the grassroots cadres were transferred to the other appointment, the first should bear the political responsibility The central government (including the Central Secretariat, the Central Political Bureau, the Politburo Standing Committee, the State Council and the central authorities) have not been punished by any organization. Mao Zedong admitted at the meeting that he was the primary responsibility, but did not have any corresponding organizational measures to follow up, and no other central leaders raised the issue. "Great Leap Forward" caused by the serious economic difficulties of such a global fault of the political responsibility, it was shirk responsibility first, virtual hanging responsibility, after the invisible. This is the most serious lack of political ethics.

仔细分析起来，刘少奇所说的中央承担责任是不是另有含义呢？是不是暗示，既然中央首先要承担起经济困难局面的主要责任来，就意味着对中央以下的各级党政干部不进行大规模的政治批判和组织处理呢？事实是，从 1962 年下半年开始，毛泽东、刘少奇便开始整治城乡基层干部，把他们在“大跃进”时期的过失连同为经济恢复进行的探索性尝试（如在农村里恢复单干）统统看成

是修正主义之举，是为了复辟资本主义，走资本主义道路，从而开始了新一轮政治斗争，这场斗争最后名为“四清”，时间长达三年，也就是说，日后各级干部未能免遭政治斗争的打击。

Carefully analyzed, Liu Shaoqi said the central responsibility is not another meaning? Is not hinted that since the central authorities have to bear the main responsibility of the economic difficulties, it means that the party cadres at all levels below the central level do not carry out large-scale political criticism and organizational treatment? **The fact is that from the second half of 1962, Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi began to rectify the grassroots cadres in urban and rural areas, and took their explorations in the "Great Leap Forward" period together with exploratory attempts for economic recovery (as in the rural areas) as the revisionist move, is to restore capitalism, take the capitalist road, which began a new round of political struggle,** the struggle at last was called "four cleanups", and went on for up to three years, that is, the cadres were not protected from the political struggle.

这种政治责任虚悬的情况至少延续到了 1991 年。在这一年，《中国共产党的七十年》一书正式出版，该书如此表述：“林彪离开实事求是、实践检验的原则，用个人崇拜的精神来总结经验教训，对于纠正缺点错误和发扬党内民主，起了消极作用”。（胡绳主编，《中国共产党的七十年》，中共中央党史出版社，1991 年，第 380 页）且不说这种说法违背了当时林彪在党内并无这么大政治影响这一事实，违背了其他一些中央领导人也持有相同立场这一事实，单就“七千人大会”的主要失误归咎到林彪一个人的一次讲话上，这本身就是缺乏实事求是和实践检验原则精神的。及至到 2011 年《中国共产党历史》第二卷出版，依然采用这种定论，而在“当时的具体历史条件”内涵上语焉不详。足见，数十年过去，依然缺乏以实事求是立场来认真探讨和反思执政党内政治责任，追究制度之长期缺乏以及所造成的严重后果。 This political responsibility was at least until 1991. In this year, "the Communist Party of China seventy years," a book published, the book so stated: "Lin Biao departed from the principle of seeking truth from facts, the practice of testing, with the spirit of personal worship to sum up the lessons learned, Within the democracy, played a negative role. " (Edited by Hu Sheng, "The Seventy Years of the Communist Party of China", Communist Party of China Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1991, p. 380) does not say that this argument violates the fact that Lin Biao did not have such a big political influence in the party , Contrary to the fact that some other central leaders also held the same position, the main mistake of the "7000-person meeting" was attributed to Lin Biao's one-man speech, which in itself was lacking in the spirit of seeking truth from facts and practicing the principle of inspection. And to the 2011 "History of the Communist Party of China," Volume II published, still using this conclusion, and in the "specific historical conditions at that time" connotation of the language is not elaborate. It is seen that the past few decades still lacks a realistic position to seriously explore and reflect on the political responsibility of the ruling party, with serious consequences for the long-term lack of accountability.