

黄克诚：我所知道的庐山会议 Huang Kecheng: What I know of the Lushan Meeting

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进入专题：庐山会议

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FN 113 – Huang Kecheng on his role in Lushan Meeting of 1959

1959年的庐山会议已成为我党、我国历史上著名的重大事件，载入史册，影响深远。

彭德怀于6月底收到庐山开会的通知。在此以前，他在上海会议上受过毛主席的批评，心中不快。当大跃进刚刚开始时，他也曾兴高采烈，积极得很。但他在接触实际以后，几个月就改变了看法。而我则是从一开始就持保守态度，对大跃进有怀疑、有保留。

后来彭出国访问，回国后非常认真地看了内部参考消息，把自己认为严重的情况都圈出来，送给主席看，数量颇多。他在会前去了一趟湖南，和周小舟、周惠谈了不少话，评。但我对有关党和国家命运的重大问题，确有很多意见，和彭德怀的看法基本相同，很希望有机会向党中央提出。彭真打电话给我，让我和他一起去。

我记得是7月17日到达庐山。上山后刚进住房，彭德怀就拿着他写给毛主席的信给我看。我仔仔细细看了一遍，说：这封信提的意见我赞成，但信的写法不好，语言中有些提法有刺激性，你那样干什么？他说：实际情况那么严重，会上没有人敢说尖锐的话，我就是提得引起重视。我说：你总是感情用事，你和主席共事多年，应该互相了解较深，这些话何不与主席当面交谈，何必写信。

当天晚上或第二天早晨，周小舟、周惠、李锐三人到我住处看我。谈起来，他们意见一致，都认为：不改变“左”的方针不行，而且感到会议有压力，不能畅所欲言。我因刚来，不了解情况，就说：不要急，先看一看。随后我又和李先念谈了谈，先念也认为当时的做法太过分了，一定要改变才行。

接着，我又和谭震林谈，他是激进派，意见就完全相反了。而且他还问我：你为什么先去看先念，不先来找我，你受先念影响了。我说：我和先念有些看法相同，不能说是受他影响。我就阐述了自己的意见，因而和谭震林吵起来。我和谭一向关系很好，知道他性格直爽、态度鲜明，有话当面争吵，不会存在心里，所以丝毫没有顾虑，和他争论得非常激烈。谭发火说：你是不是吃了狗肉，发热了，这样来劲！你要知道，我们找你上山来，是搬救兵，想你支持我们的。我说：那你就想错了，我不是你的救兵，是反兵。这“反兵”二字，是针对谭震林说的“搬救兵”而言，说明我和他意见相反，后来却被人引为我“蓄意反党”的证明。

18日到19日开小组会，讨论彭德怀的那封信，不少人发言同意彭的意见。我也在19日发言，比较全面地阐述了自己的观点，支持了彭德怀的意见。当时组里除罗瑞卿、谭震林二人外，其他同志似乎都对我表示有同感。谭、罗发言批评我，我又反驳他们，争论了一通。这篇发言本应有详细记录在简报上印发，但因我乡音太重、说得太快，记录同志记不下来，整理时感到为难，就要求我自己整一个书面发言给他们。但形势变化很快，几天就形成了斗争局面，我已无时间和精力来整理这个材料。所以简报中就只有一个简单的发言记录。致使有些同志后来感到诧异，怎么庐山会议被斗争的主要角色之一，连个较全面的发言都没有呢？

我最担心的是粮食问题，几亿人民缺粮吃可不得了。会议上把粮食产量数字调整为7000亿斤，说是：6亿人口，人均产量超过千斤，粮食过了关。我说：不对，这个数字不符合实际情况。有人质问：这话是谁说的？我说：是我说的，而且你也说过。我那时态度还是很强硬。

7月23日，毛主席召开大会讲话，这个讲话造成极大的震动，扭转了会议的方向。

我记得主席讲话的内容主要是：一、现在党内外都在刮风。有些人发言讲话，无非是说：现在搞得一塌糊涂。好呵！越讲得一塌糊涂越好！我们要硬着头皮顶住；天不会塌下来，神州不会陆沉。因为有多数人的支持，腰杆子硬；我们多数派同志，腰杆子就是要硬起来。

二、说有"小资产阶级狂热性"。我有两条罪状：一是大炼钢铁，1070万吨是我下的决心；一条是搞人民公社，我无发明权，但有推广权。1070万吨钢，九千万人上阵，乱子大了，自己负责。其他一些大炮，别人也要分担一点。各人的责任都要分析一下，第一个责任者是我。出了些差错，付了代价，大家受了教育。对群众想早点搞共产主义的热情，不能说全是小资产阶级狂热性，不能泼冷水。对"刮共产风"、"一平二调三提款"也要分析，其中有小资产阶级狂热性，主要是县、社两级，特别是公社干部。但我们说服了他们，坚决纠正。今年3、4月间就把风压下去，几个月就说通了，不办了。

三、我劝另一部分同志，在紧急关头，不要动摇。做工作总会有错误，几十万个生产队的错误，都拿来说，都登报，一年到头也登不完。这样，国家必定垮台，帝国主义不来，我们也要被打倒。我劝一些同志，要注意讲话的"方向"，要坚定，别动摇。现在，有的同志动摇了，他们不是右派，却滑到右派边缘了，离右派只有30公里了。

主席的讲话，支持了左派，劝告了中间派，警告了"右派"，表明主席已经把会上意见的争论，作为党内路线斗争来看待了。

主席这样做不是偶然的。当时党内外确实是意见很多，甚至很激烈。主席在讲话中就曾提到：江西党校的反应是一个集中表现。7月26日批发的《李云仲的意见书》，更是直言不讳地批评了党的错误。李是搞计划工作的司局级干部，熟悉情况，信中列举了许多事实和数字材料，说明问题的严重性。这信是在6月上旬直接寄给主席的。主席对这封信写了长达两三千字的批示。批示中肯定了他敢于直言，对计划工作的缺点，批评得很中肯；但又说，李云仲认为从1958年第四季度以来，……党犯了"左倾冒险主义"、"机会主义"的错误，这一基本观点是错误的，几乎否定了一切。

这些在毛主席心里留下了阴影。由于党中央在这个时期一直和主席一致，从第一次郑州会议以来，开了许多会议，不断纠正错误，情况有所好转；主席颇有信心，认为照这样做下

去，不要很长时间就能够解决问题。所以庐山会议前半个月被称为神仙会，提了十几个问题来讨论研究，发言虽有分歧，却无重大交锋，气氛并不紧张。但在表面的平静下，却隐藏着"左"、"右"之争。"左"的方面气势高，不愿听人谈问题严重，有人甚至在会上打断别人的发言。"右"的方面则想把缺点、错误谈够，要求对情况的严重性有充分认识，认为不如此不能真正解决问题，同时对会上不能畅所欲言，感到压抑。这种情况主席是知道的，但也认为是正常的。这时，讨论已近结束，《会议纪要》已在起草讨论，准备通过《议定记录》，会议就结束了。

就在此时，彭德怀写了他的意见书，于14日送给主席。他正是因为会议即将结束，而又感觉并未真正解决问题，自己的意见亦未能畅述而写的。这封信对毛主席起了强刺激作用，免不掉又要亢奋失眠。主席自己在会上说，吃了三次安眠药睡不着。在神经过度兴奋的状态下，仔细琢磨的结果，就把这封信和党内外各种尖锐的反对意见，都联系起来；把彭总当作了代表人物，而且是在中央政治局里的代表人物。认为他的矛头是指向中央政治局和主席的，于是认为路线斗争不可避免。7月23日的讲话宣告了会议的性质已经改变，会议将扩大延长。

主席的讲话对我们是当头一棒，大家都十分震惊。彭德怀会后还曾向主席说，他的信是供主席参考，不应印发。但事已至此，彭的解释还能有什么用？我对主席的讲话，思想不通，心情沉重；彭德怀负担更重，我们两人都吃不下晚饭；虽然住在同一栋房子里，但却避免交谈。我不明白主席为什么忽然来一个大转弯，把"纠左"的会议，变成了"反右"；反复思索，不得其解。

当晚，周小舟打电话来说：他们想和我谈谈。我觉得这时应谨慎一些，不同意他们来，但小舟很坚持，我也就让步了，来就来吧。三人中，小舟最激动，李锐已意识到在这个时间来我处不好，可是未能阻住小舟。谁想得到，这次谈话竟成了"反党集团"活动的罪证呢？

小舟、周惠、李锐到来后，表现非常激动，说：我们都快成了右派了。我劝他们说：别着急，主席支持左的，也不会不要右的。小舟问：主席这样突变，有没有经过政治局常委讨论？又问：主席有没有斯大林晚年的危险？我说：我认为不会。又说：有意见还是应直接向

主席提出，我们现在这样谈论，不好。小舟才平静下来，又谈了些湖南的情况。他们正准备走时，彭德怀拿一份军事电报走过来，小舟又说：老总，我们离右派只 30 公里了。彭说：着急有什么用。李锐催着小舟走，说太晚了。实际上，他大概是觉得，这些人还是早点离开这里为好。周惠一向比较谨慎，没说什么话，他们就走了。他们出门时，正巧碰见罗瑞卿，罗持反"右"的观点，自然就注意了这件事。后来，这天晚上的谈话就成了逼我们交代的一个重要问题。

23 日主席讲话后，各小组下午就开始讨论主席讲话。那时发言尚较缓和，对彭信的批判虽轻重不同，均未离开信的内容，有人说得厉害些，有人则还作些自我检讨。

7 月 26 日传达了主席的指示：要对事，也要对人。这成了会议的另一个转折点。批评的火力大大加强，而且目标集中在人了。除了对彭总外，所谓"军事俱乐部"、"湖南集团"的提法也都出来了。"左"派柯庆施等人气势很凶，温和派也被迫提高了调子。彭德怀和我们这些人就只有作检讨的份。我在 26 日作了检讨，谈到 19 日的发言是嗅觉不灵，谈到自己思想方法上有多考虑困难和不利因素的老毛病；也谈到自己只认为彭信有些地方用词不妥，而认识不到问题的严重性等等。这当然也有违心之论，但还不算太过。

7 月 26 日除传达了主席说的"对事也要对人"的指示外，还印发了主席对李云仲信的批示，说的就更严重了：党内外出现了右倾思想，右倾活动，大有猖狂进攻之势。这样一说，谁还敢当中间派呢？自此，批判、斗争不断加热。既然对人，那就得追查组织、追查目的，还要追查历史地来进行斗争了。

7 月 30 日，主席通知我、小舟、周惠、李锐四个人去谈话。谈话时主席显得火气不大，所以我们也较敢说话。这次谈话，主席给我戴了几顶帽子。说我：一是彭德怀的政治参谋长，二是湖南集团的首要人物，三是"军事俱乐部"的主要成员。还说我与彭德怀的观点基本一致，与彭德怀是"父子关系"。又谈到过去的三军团的历史问题，说不了解我的历史情况等。

我答辩说：我和彭德怀观点基本一致，只能就庐山会议这次的意见而言。过去我和彭德怀争论很多，有不同意见就争，几乎争论了半辈子，不能说我们的观点都是基本一致，但我们的争论不伤感情，过去打"AB团"时，有人要打我，彭还帮我说过话，不然我那次就可能被整掉了。我认为我们的关系是正常的，谈不上什么父子关系。

主席说：理性和感情是一致的东西，我自己总是一致的。看来我不了解你和彭的关系，也不了解你这个人，还得解开疙瘩。

我又说：我当彭的参谋长，是毛主席你要我来当的。我那时在湖南工作，并不想来；是你一定要我来。既然当了参谋长，政治和军事如何分得开？彭德怀的信是在山上写的，我那时还没有上山，怎么能在写"意见书"一事上当他的参谋长？我在湖南工作过多年，和湖南的负责同志多见几次面，多谈几次话，多关心一点湖南的工作，如何就能成为"湖南集团"？至于"军事俱乐部"，更是从何谈起呢？

谈话还涉及到当年东北战场"保卫四平"问题和长时期炮打金门、马祖的问题，我都表示了反对的意见。主席说："保卫四平"是我的决定，难道这也错了？我说：即使是你的决定，我认为那场消耗战也是不该打的。至于炮轰金门、马祖，稍打一阵示示威也就行了。既然我们并不准备真打，炮轰的意义就不大，打大炮花很多钱，搞得到处都紧张，何必呢？

主席笑笑，说：看来，让你当个"右"的参谋，还不错。

周小舟、周惠、李锐都说：会议上空气太紧张，叫人不能说话，一些问题不能辩论清楚。

主席说：要容许辩论、交锋，让大家把话说出来、说完讲透。小舟等又说："湖南集团"的提法，有压力，希望能给以澄清。主席说：可能是有点误会。又说：我和你们湖南几个人，好像还不通心，尤其和周小舟有隔阂。

主席又把话引到他在遵义会议前，怎样争取张闻天、王稼祥等。主席要小舟"不远而复"。主席谈遵义会议，分明是要我们回头，与彭德怀划清界限，希望我们"实迷途其未远，觉今是而昨非"。但我们的思想问题没解决，又都不会作伪，所以我们的表现可能使主席失望。

这次谈话，尽管主席对我的指责颇重，但空气不紧张，能让我们说话感不到压力;即使说的话让主席不满，他表示不同意时，态度也不严厉。所以我们的心情较好。我甚至还有点轻松感：到底有个机会，把话直接向主席说了。

7月31日和8月1日两天，毛主席在他住处的楼上，召开政治局常委会议，批判彭德怀。连中午都不休息，午饭就是吃包子充饥。参加的人员有少奇、恩来、朱总、彭总、林彪、贺帅、彭真等同志，又通知我和二周及李锐四人列席。

主席主持会议，讲话最多，从历史到理论，长篇大套，我无法记述。讲理论，主要是说彭不是马列主义者，思想中有不少封建的、资本主义的东西，是个经验主义者。其中也提到：彭是劳动人民出身，对革命有感情;要革命还是好的，寄以希望。讲历史则是批彭德怀在几次路线斗争中所犯的路线错误，说彭和他的关系是三分合作，七分不合作。彭说是一半对一半。主席仍说是三七开。

谈到彭的"意见书"时，主席说：信上说："有失有得"，把"失"放在"得"的前面，反映了彭的灵魂深处。又说：我们没有经验，没有"失"如何能"得"，胜败兵家常事，要保护群众的革命积极性，不能泼冷水，气可鼓不可泄，要反右倾。又说彭：你讲"小资产阶级狂热性"，主要锋芒是向着中央领导，你是反中央、攻击中央。你的信是准备发表的，目的是用来争取群众、组织队伍。你要按照你的面貌改造党和世界。以前历史上许多重要问题，你都没写信，这次写那么长。对你那些挑拨的话要顶回去。

彭说：我过去在江西也给中央写过长信提意见，这次信是供你考虑，并没想发表。

主席又说：你过去挨了批评，心里怀恨。我们同在北京，连电话都难得打，打几次，没打通，就"老子跟你不往来"。在香山你找我，因我睡觉习惯特殊，警卫员说未起床，你就拂袖而去，不谈了。高、饶事件你陷得很深，你以后会怎样，也难说。

彭说：我过去追随王明、博古路线，1934年1、2月间就转过来了，曾和黄克诚谈过，还得请主席来领导。我今年61岁，以后还能有什么呢？

朱总司令发言温和，主席说是"隔靴搔痒"。

林彪发言说彭是"野心家"、"阴谋家"、"伪君子"；说彭自己有一套纲领、路线，独断专行，攻击主席，用心很深等。这个发言很厉害，以后成了定性的基调。

其他同志多是举个例子，说明彭德怀有问题，表示同意主席意见。

毛主席还说：整人就是要整得他睡不着觉，要触及灵魂深处。说彭：你组织性、纪律性很差，你有个说法，"只要有利于革命，专之可也。"打朱怀冰等，时机紧迫，还可说"专之可也"，打百团大战，为何也不先报告请示一下？人们说你是伪君子，你历来就有野心。我66岁，你61岁，我会死在你前头，许多同志都对你有顾虑，怕难于团结你。

主席最重要的话是说：你们这回是站在右倾的立场上，有组织、有准备的进攻，其目的是动摇总路线、攻击中央领导。毛主席甚至还提到解放军跟不跟他走的问题。

我不能不表态说几句话，我说：我和彭相处久了，许多事都看不清楚。中央苏区后期，他说过还是要请主席来领导，我认为他不是不能辨别正确和错误。他的个人英雄主义我有感觉，今天的会使我认识更全面。希望彭能冷静地听取批评，常委领导同志讲的话，都是好意帮助，等等。

会后，主席把我们四个列席的人留下，又谈了一阵，要我们别再受彭的影响。特别对周小舟寄以希望，要他"迷途知返"。这一串的会议给我的感觉是：主席要教育和争取我们回头。虽然我被认为是彭的亲信，绝对脱不了身，但那时似还没有要定为"反党集团"的迹象。

DeepL translation

Huang Kecheng: What I Know About Lushan Conference

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Topic: Lushan Conference

Huang Kecheng

The Lushan Conference of 1959 has become a famous and significant event in the history of our party and our country, which has been recorded in the annals of history and has far-reaching influence.

Peng Dehuai received the notice of the Lushan meeting at the end of June. Before that, he had been criticized by Chairman Mao at the Shanghai meeting and was unhappy. When the Great Leap Forward had just begun, he was also excited and active. But he changed his mind in a few months after coming into contact with the reality. I, on the other hand, held a conservative attitude from the beginning and had doubts and reservations about the Great Leap Forward.

Later, Peng went on a visit abroad, and when he returned, he read the internal reference news very carefully, circled all the situations that he thought were serious, and sent them to the President to read, which was quite a lot. He made a trip to Hunan before the meeting and talked to Zhou Xiaozhou and Zhou Hui, commenting. But I do have a lot of opinions on major issues related to the

fate of the Party and the country, and Peng Dehuai's views are basically the same, and I very much hope that there will be an opportunity to put forward to the Party Central Committee. Peng Zhen called me and asked me to go with him.

I remember on July 17th arrived at Mount Lushan. After going up the mountain just into the housing, Peng Dehuai took the letter he wrote to Chairman Mao to show me. I carefully read once, said: this letter to mention the views I favor, but the letter is not written well, the language of some of the references to irritating, what are you doing that? He said: the actual situation is so serious, no one at the meeting dared to say sharp words, I just want to mention to attract attention. I said: you are always emotional, you and the President worked together for many years, should know each other better, these words why not talk with the President face to face, why write a letter.

That night or the next morning, Zhou Xiaozhou, Zhou Hui, Li Rui three people to my place to see me. Talking about it, they all agreed that: not to change the "left" approach will not work, and felt that the meeting was under pressure and could not speak freely. Because I had just arrived and did not understand the situation, I said, "Don't be in a hurry, let's take a look first. Then I talked to Li Xiannian, who agreed that the approach at that time was too far and must be changed.

Then I talked to Tan Zhenlin, who was a radical, and his views were completely opposite. And he asked me: Why did you go to see Xiannian first, instead of coming to me first, you were influenced by Xiannian. I said: I shared some of the same views as Xiannian, and I could not say that I was influenced by him. I then expounded my views and thus quarrelled with Tan Zhenlin. Tan and I have always been on very good terms, and I know that he has a straightforward character and a clear-cut attitude, and that if he has something to say, he will argue in person and not in his heart, so I had no worries at all and argued with him very fiercely. Tan fumed and said: Have you eaten dog meat, fever, so come on! You have to know that we asked you to come up to the mountain to bring help, wanting you to support us. I said: then you think wrong, I'm not your savior, is the anti-soldier. The word "anti-soldier" was used in response to Tan Zhenlin's remark that he was "carrying rescuers," which meant that he and I had opposing views, but was later cited as proof that I was "deliberately anti-Party.

From the 18th to the 19th, a group meeting was held to discuss Peng Dehuai's letter, and many people spoke in agreement with Peng's views. I also spoke on the 19th, and more comprehensively expounded my own views in support of Peng Dehuai's opinion. At that time all the comrades in the group, except Luo Ruiqing and Tan Zhenlin, seemed to express sympathy for me. Tan and Luo spoke and criticized me, and I refuted them and argued. This speech should have been recorded in detail and issued in the bulletin, but because my accent was too heavy and I spoke too fast, the comrades who recorded it could not write it down, and when they were organizing it, they found it difficult and asked me to make a whole written statement to them. However, the situation changed rapidly, and the struggle developed in a few days, so I no longer had the time and energy to organize this material. So there was only a simple record of the speech in the briefing. Some comrades were surprised later, how the Lushan meeting was one of the main players in the struggle, not even a more comprehensive statement?

I am most worried about the food problem, hundreds of millions of people lack of food to eat can not be. The meeting adjusted the food production figures to 700 billion pounds, said: 600 million people, per capita production of more than a thousand pounds, food over the hurdle. I said: No, this figure does not correspond to the actual situation. Someone questioned: who said that? I said: I said it, and you said it too. My attitude was still very strong at that time.

On July 23, Chairman Mao held a speech at the General Meeting, which caused a great shock and reversed the direction of the meeting.

I remember that the content of the Chairman's speech was mainly as follows: First, the wind is now blowing both inside and outside the Party. Some people spoke and said nothing more than: Now it's a mess. Good! The more they talk about the mess, the better! We have to hold on to our heads; the sky will not fall, and China will not sink. Because there is a majority support, hard back; we majority comrades, the backbone is to harden up. Second, that there is "petty bourgeois fanaticism". I have two sins: one is the iron and steel, 10.7 million tons is my determination; one is to engage in the

people's commune, I do not have the right to invention, but have the right to promote. 10.7 million tons of steel, 90 million people on the battlefield, the chaos is big, responsible for their own. Some other big guns, others have to share a little. Each person's responsibility should be analyzed, the first responsible person is me. Some mistakes were made, a price was paid, and everyone was educated. We cannot say that the enthusiasm of the masses for early communism is all petty-bourgeois fanaticism, and we cannot pour cold water on it. We must also analyze the "communist wind" and the "one flat, two adjustments and three withdrawals", in which there was petty-bourgeois fanaticism, mainly on the part of the county and community levels, especially the cadres of the communes. But we convinced them and resolutely corrected them. In March and April of this year, the wind was suppressed, a few months to make sense of it, not to do. Third, I advise another part of the comrades, in the emergency, do not waver. There will always be mistakes in the work, hundreds of thousands of production team's mistakes, are taken to say, are published in the newspaper, year-round can not be published. In this way, the country will surely fall, the imperialists will not come, and we will be defeated. I advise some comrades to pay attention to the "direction" of their speeches, to be firm and not to waver. Now, some comrades have wavered. They are not rightists, but they have slipped to the edge of the right, only 30 kilometers away from the right.

The President's speech supported the leftists, advised the centrists, and warned the "rightists", indicating that the President had already regarded the controversy over the views expressed at the meeting as an internal party line struggle.

It was not by chance that the President did so. At that time, there were indeed a lot of opinions inside and outside the Party, and they were even heated. The Chairman had mentioned in his speech that the reaction of the Jiangxi Party School was a concentrated manifestation of this. the wholesale "Li Yunzhong's Opinion Letter" of July 26 was an even more outspoken criticism of the Party's mistakes. Li was a division-level cadre engaged in planning work and was familiar with the situation. The letter cited many facts and numerical materials to illustrate the seriousness of the problem. The letter was sent directly to the chairman in early June. The President wrote a two- or three-thousand word long instruction on the letter. The instructions affirmed that he had the courage to speak out, the shortcomings of the planning work, criticized very pertinent; but also said, Li Yunzhong that

since the fourth quarter of 1958, the Party has committed the error of "left adventurism", "opportunism", the basic point of view is wrong, almost denied everything.

These left a shadow in Chairman Mao's heart. Because the Party Central Committee in this period has been consistent with the Chairman, from the first Zhengzhou meeting, held many meetings, constantly correcting errors, the situation has improved; Chairman is quite confident that, according to do so, do not take a long time to be able to solve the problem. So the first half of the Lushan meeting is known as the fairy meeting, mentioned more than a dozen issues to discuss and study, although there are differences in speeches, but no major exchanges, the atmosphere is not tense. But on the surface of the calm, but hides the "left", "right" of the fight." The "left" side was so aggressive that it did not want to listen to the seriousness of the problem, and some people even interrupted other people's speeches at the meeting. The "right" side wanted to talk enough about shortcomings and mistakes, demanded a full understanding of the seriousness of the situation, and believed that the problem could not really be solved without doing so, and at the same time felt oppressed by the fact that they could not speak freely at the meeting. The Chairman was aware of this situation, but also considered it normal. At this point, the discussion was nearly over, the Minutes were already being drafted and discussed in preparation for the adoption of the Agreed Minutes, and the meeting was over.

It was at this point that Peng Dehuai wrote his submission and sent it to the President on the 14th. He was because the meeting was about to end, but also feel that did not really solve the problem, his own views have not been able to speak freely and write. This letter to Chairman Mao played a strong stimulating effect, can not help but to sleeplessness and hyperactivity. Chairman himself said at the meeting, took three sleeping pills can not sleep. In a state of nervous over-excitement, the result of careful consideration, the letter and the party and all kinds of sharp opposition, are linked; Peng as a representative of the figure, and in the Politburo of the Central Committee. Thinking that his spearhead was directed against the Central Political Bureau and the Chairman, he considered the line struggle inevitable. the speech of July 23 announced that the nature of the meeting had changed and that the meeting would be enlarged and prolonged.

The Chairman's speech was a blow to us, and we were all very shocked. Peng Dehuai had even told the President after the meeting that his letter was for the President's reference and should not be issued. But now that the matter has come to a head, what use could Peng's explanation be? I think about the President's speech, the thought does not make sense, heavy heart; Peng Dehuai burden is heavier, both of us can not eat dinner; although living in the same house, but to avoid talking to each other. I do not understand why the President suddenly came to a big turn, the "corrective" meeting, turned into the "anti-right"; repeatedly thinking, can not be understood.

That night, Zhou Xiaozhou called to say: they want to talk to me. I think this time should be more cautious, do not agree with them to come, but the boat is very persistent, I also gave in, come on. Three people, the boat is the most excited, Li Rui has realized that at this time to come to my place is not good, but failed to stop the boat. Who would have thought that this conversation would become the evidence of the activities of the "anti-party group"?

Xiaozhou, Zhou Hui, Li Rui arrived, behaved very excited, said: we are almost become a rightist. I advised them: do not be anxious, the President supports the left, will not not want the right. Xiaozhou asked: Did the President discuss this sudden change with the Politburo Standing Committee? He also asked: Is the President in danger of Stalin's late years? I said: I don't think so. I said: I don't think so. I also said: If you have any opinions, you should raise them directly with the President. The boat only calmed down, and talked about the situation in Hunan. They were about to leave, Peng Dehuai took a military telegram came over, Xiaozhou said: old total, we are only 30 kilometers away from the right. Peng said: what's the use of being in a hurry. Li Rui urged the boat to go, saying that it was too late. In fact, he probably felt that it was better for these people to leave here early. Zhou Hui, who had always been more cautious, did not say anything, and they left. When they went out, they bumped into Luo Ruiqing, who held the anti-rightist viewpoint and naturally paid attention to this matter. Later, this evening's conversation became an important issue that forced us to give an account.

After the President's speech on the 23rd, the groups began to discuss the President's speech in the afternoon. At that time, the speeches were still relatively moderate, although the criticism of Peng's

letter was different, but did not leave the content of the letter, some people said more powerful, some people also made some self-examination.

On July 26, the President's instructions were conveyed: to the matter, but also to the person. This became another turning point in the meeting. The firepower of criticism was greatly intensified, and the target was focused on people. In addition to Mr. Peng, references to the so-called "Military Club" and the "Hunan Group" came out. The "left" faction, including Ke Qingshi, was very aggressive, and the moderates were forced to raise their tone. Peng Dehuai and the rest of us had no choice but to make a review. I made a review on the 26th, talking about the statement on the 19th as a sniffing mistake, about my own method of thinking, the old problem of thinking about the difficulties and disadvantages; also about my own only think that Peng's letter is not worded properly in some places, but do not recognize the seriousness of the problem and so on. This is of course also against the heart, but not too much.

July 26, in addition to conveying the President said "to the matter should also be to the person" instructions, but also issued the President of Li Yunzhong letter instructions, said more serious: the party inside and outside the emergence of right-leaning ideas, right-leaning activities, there is a rampant offensive trend. In this way, who still dares to be a centrist? Since then, the criticisms and struggles have been heating up. Since it was against people, it was necessary to trace the organization, the purpose, and the history of the struggle.

On July 30, the chairman informed me, Xiaozhou, Zhou Hui, and Li Rui that the four of us were going to have a talk. During the conversation, the chairman did not seem to be too angry, so we also dared to speak up. In this conversation, the chairman put several hats on me. Said I: First, Peng Dehuai's political chief of staff, the second is the primary figure of the Hunan Group, and the third is the main member of the "military club". Also said that I and Peng Dehuai's views are basically the same, and Peng Dehuai is "father and son". He also talked about the past history of the Third Army Corps, saying that he did not understand my history.

I replied: I and Peng Dehuai views are basically the same, only on the Lushan meeting of this opinion. In the past, I argued with Peng Dehuai a lot of different views on the fight, almost half a lifetime, can not say that our views are basically the same, but our arguments do not hurt feelings, in the past to fight the "AB Group", some people want to beat me, Peng also helped me to say, or I may be rectified that time. I think our relationship is normal, and there is no such thing as father-son relationship.

The President said: Reason and emotion are consistent things, and I myself am always consistent. It seems that I do not understand your relationship with Peng, nor do I understand you as a person, and I still have to untangle the lumps.

I also said: I became Peng's chief of staff, is Chairman Mao you want me to be. I was working in Hunan at the time, and did not want to come; you must want me to come. Since I became chief of staff, how can I separate politics and military? Peng Dehuai's letter was written in the mountains, I had not yet been to the mountains, how can I be his chief of staff on the matter of writing "opinion letters"? I have worked in Hunan for many years, and I have met and talked with the Hunan comrades in charge a few more times, and I cared more about the work of Hunan, so how can I become a member of the "Hunan Group"? As for the "Military Club", how can we talk about it?

The conversation also touched upon the issue of "defending Siping" in the northeast battlefield and the issue of shelling Kinmen and Matsu over a long period of time, to which I expressed my opposition. The President said: "Defending Siping" was my decision, is that wrong? I said: Even if it was your decision, I think that the war of attrition should not have been fought. As for the shelling of Kinmen and Matsu, a little demonstration would be enough. Since we are not prepared to really fight, shelling is not very meaningful, the artillery spends a lot of money, make everywhere tense, why bother?

Chairman smiled and said: It seems that you as a "right" staff, not bad.

Zhou Xiaozhou, Zhou Hui, Li Rui said: the air at the meeting was too tense, so people can not speak, some issues can not be debated clearly.

The President said: we should allow debates and exchanges, so that everyone can speak out, finish and speak thoroughly. Xiaozhou and other said: "Hunan Group" reference, there is pressure, I hope to be clarified. The President said, "There may be some misunderstanding. He also said: I and a few people in Hunan, it seems that you do not have a heart, especially with Zhou Xiaozhou have a gap.

The President also led the conversation to his Zunyi meeting before, how to fight for Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang and so on. President to boat "not far and restored". The President talked about the Zunyi Conference, clearly want us to turn back, and Peng Dehuai to draw a clear line, hoping that we "really not far from the lost path, realize that today is the same as yesterday is not". However, our ideological problems have not been solved, and we are all incapable of hypocrisy, so our performance may disappoint the President.

This conversation, although the chairman of the accusations against me quite heavy, but the air is not tense, so that we can not feel the pressure to speak; even if the words make the chairman dissatisfied, he expressed disagreement, the attitude is not harsh. So we were in a better mood. I even felt a bit relieved: there was an opportunity to speak directly to the President.

For two days, July 31 and August 1, Chairman Mao held a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee upstairs in his residence to criticize Peng Dehuai. There was not even a break at noon, and lunch was a bun to fill the stomach. Participants were Shaoqi, Enlai, Zhu, Peng, Lin Biao, He Shuai, Peng Zhen and other comrades, and notify me and two weeks and Li Rui four people to attend.

Chairman presided over the meeting, the most speeches, from history to theory, a long set, I can not remember. In his speech on theory, he mainly said that Peng was not a Marxist-Leninist, that there

were many feudal and capitalist things in his thinking, and that he was an empiricist. It is also mentioned: Peng is a working people from birth, have feelings for the revolution; to revolution or good, hope. Speaking of history, on the other hand, is to criticize Peng Dehuai in several route struggles committed route errors, said Peng and his relationship is three parts cooperation, seven parts non-cooperation. Peng said it was half and half. The President still said it was a three to seven split.

Talking about Peng's "letter of opinion", the President said: the letter said: "there are losses and gains", put "loss" in front of "gain", reflecting the depth of Peng's soul. Also said: we have no experience, no "loss" how to "gain", victory or defeat is commonplace, to protect the masses of the revolutionary enthusiasm, can not pour cold water, the gas can be drums can not be deflated, to fight against right-leaning. Also said Peng: you talk about "petty bourgeois fanaticism", the main front is toward the central leadership, you are anti-Central, attacking the Central Committee. Your letter is ready for publication and is intended to be used to win over the masses and organize the ranks. You want to transform the Party and the world according to your outlook. You have not written letters on many important issues in previous history, and this time you are writing such a long letter. To you those provocative words to be back.

Peng said: I also wrote a long letter to the central government in Jiangxi in the past, this letter is for your consideration, and did not want to publish.

The President also said: you have been criticized in the past, the heart of hate. We are in Beijing, even the phone is difficult to play, play a few times, did not get through, the "old man and you do not deal with". In the Fragrant Hills you find me, because I have special sleeping habits, the security guards said not get up, you brush off your sleeve, do not talk about it. Gao, Rao incident you are in deep, you will do, it is difficult to say.

Peng said: I used to follow Wang Ming, Bogu line, in January and February 1934, turned around, had talked to Huang Kecheng, but also have to ask the President to lead. I am 61 years old this year, what else can there be in the future?

Commander-in-Chief Zhu spoke mildly, but the President said he was "scratching the itch".

Lin Biao said that Peng was an "ambitious man", "conspirator" and "hypocrite"; he said that Peng had his own set of programs and routes, and that he was dictatorial and attacked the President with a very deep intention, etc. This speech was very powerful. This speech is very powerful, and later became the tone of characterization.

Other comrades mostly give an example of Peng Dehuai has a problem, expressed agreement with the chairman of the opinion.

Chairman Mao also said: Persecuting a person is to make him sleepless, to touch the depths of the soul. Said Peng: you are poorly organized and disciplined, you have a saying, "as long as it is conducive to the revolution, specialize in it can be." Hit Zhu Huaibing, etc., the timing is urgent, but also can say "specialization can also", fight the Hundred Regiments War, why not first report for instructions? People say you are a hypocrite, you have always been ambitious. I am 66 years old, you are 61 years old, I will die before you, many comrades have concerns about you, afraid that it is difficult to unite with you.

The most important words of the Chairman were to say: You are this time standing on a right-leaning position, with an organized and prepared attack, the purpose of which is to shake the general line and attack the central leadership. Chairman Mao even mentioned the question of whether the People's Liberation Army would follow him or not.

I could not help but take a stand and say a few words. I said, "I have been with Peng for a long time and I do not see many things clearly. In the late period of the Central Soviet Area, he said that he still wanted to ask the Chairman to lead, and I think it is not true that he is unable to distinguish between right and wrong. I have a feeling about his personal heroism, and today's meeting has made me realize it more fully. I hope Peng can calmly listen to the criticism, and the words spoken by the leading comrades of the Standing Committee are all well-intentioned to help, and so on.

After the meeting, the chairman of the four of us who were present stayed behind, and talked for a while, and asked us not to be influenced by Peng. In particular, Zhou Xiaozhou pinned his hopes on him and asked him to "turn back from the wrong path". This series of meetings gave me the impression that the President wanted to educate and win us back. Although I was considered to be a close associate of Peng and absolutely could not get away with it, there seemed to be no sign at that time that I was to be designated as an "anti-Party group".