

王海光：高饶事件的再解读 Wang Haiguang: Reinterpretation of the Gao-Rao Incident

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首先说一下高饶事件的性质。在过去的党史教科书中，高饶事件被称为建国以后党内第一次大的“路线斗争”。这次党内路线斗争发生在从新民主主义向社会主义过渡的社会大转轨阶段，为建国以后整个党内斗争开创了一种模式，影响非常深远。但是长期以来，人们对事件真相一直不甚清楚，不光是社会大众不清楚，就是学界小众，包括党史学界的资深人士也只知其事，难言其详。在“文革”结束以后的“拨乱反正”中，过去所谓的党内十次“路线斗争”，都逐一被否定了，所造成的冤假错案都得到平反和纠正。只有高饶事件是仅有的两个维持“原判”的事件之一。1980年邓小平做“历史决议”的时候，跟胡耀邦、胡乔木、邓力群等人讲：“揭露高饶的问题没有错。”“这个事情，我知道得很清楚”。同时邓小平又讲：高饶问题“确实没有什么路线。”路线斗争是不能成立的。后来中共十一届六中全会通过的《关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议》，基本上就是按照邓小平的这个讲话定下的调子。路线问题不提了，“反党联盟”的集团问题也不提了，但仍然是肯定了高饶反党的性质。称为：“反对野心家高岗、饶漱石阴谋分裂党、篡夺党和国家最高权力的重大斗争”。建国以后的重大历史事件，一件是高饶事件，一件是反右运动，这两件案子没有翻，其它案子基本都翻了。过后叙述得比较完全的，是薄一波写的《重大决策和事件的回顾》那本书，其中对于高饶事件有专门章节的论述，但是这书撰著者本人对很多事件是避讳的，很多内幕、前因后果都言语不详，而且传主对自己的事情解释过多，让人也有点自我粉饰之感吧！

这以后的官方版本，基本上都是按照薄一波这本书的版本进行叙述。至于一些纪实类的一些小说，什么《高饶事件始末》、《死亡联盟》之类，人为添加的东西就更多了，徒增混乱，可信度很低。多年来，党史界学人对高饶事件都觉得说不太清楚。尽管还是有些零零碎碎的史料披露。比如中央文献研究室出版的毛泽东、刘少奇、周恩来、陈云等人的领袖

传记和年谱，还有《杨尚昆日记》，对此事件都有些记录，但是都比较零碎。最近有这几本书的出版，披露了许多鲜为人知的第一手史料，在海内外影响很大，对解读高饶事件形成一个小高潮。第一本书就是原东北局第三副书记张明远的《我的回忆》；第二本就是原东北局第二副书记张秀山的《我的八十五年——从西北到东北》，这本书披露了很多的细节，特别让人震惊的是披露了当时毛泽东让高岗秘密调查刘少奇 1929 年在奉天被捕一事，这在学界引起了很大的反响。特别是新近由香港大风出版社出版的原高岗秘书和管教组长赵家梁和张明远女儿张晓霁合著的《半截墓碑下的往事——高岗在北京》一书，是目前最完整地反映“高饶事件”的一部著作。这本书有大量的史料，是根据当时的一些日记、笔记等原始材料写的，提供了弥足珍贵的原始史料，披露了许多不为人知的关键细节，给我们对高饶事件的历史认识带来一个全新观感，很多是具有颠覆性的。但是这本书有一个弱点，就是过多运用文学的笔法，在进行历史叙述时，作者心证太多，猜度过重，这就大大影响了其史学价值。

这几本书出来以后，使得我们对高饶事件有了一个全新的理解。所以最近这一两年间，海内外学界掀起了一个重评“高饶事件”的风潮，其中也有高岗家属的声音。比如高岗夫人李立群和“美国之音”的记者谈高饶事件，在海外流传很广。李立群还谈到一个上层动向，中央组织部对高岗过去革命功绩也重新做出了肯定性的结论。

这些新史料的出现，使得我们对原来对高饶事件的历史结论发生了怀疑。大家都知道对高饶事件的处理时间很长，发生时间可以说是在 1953 年底，召开七届四中全会是 1954 年 2 月，真正处理完结的是 1955 年的全国代表大会，整整持续了一年多。这本身就说明高饶事件很复杂，很多事情都落实不了。那么，根据当前披露出的大量新史料，对于高饶事件的问题，现在应如何看？如何重新进行解读？能够得出什么样的判断呢？

首先，高岗和饶漱石是不是个联盟？通过一系列历史细节的披露，我们可以看出来，他们很难说是个联盟，或者说根本不是个联盟。当事人无论是高岗，还是饶漱石，都从来没有承认过他们是个联盟。历史上他们不是一个派系。高岗是 1905 年出生的，是陕北土生土长出来的干部。在陕北领导人谢子长，刘志丹去世以后，高岗就成了陕北根据地的代表，一直在陕北工作，也很受毛的重用。毛曾经说过，中国革命有两个正统，一个大正统是井冈山，再一个小正统就是陕北，这是对高岗的很高的评价。而饶漱石，他是 1903 年出生

的，安徽人，一直是在白区工作的，在皖南事变后接替刘少奇任新四军政委。按道理，从山头派系来讲，他应该算是刘少奇系统的人。高饶两人在历史上没有打过交道，建国以后也没有来往。饶漱石就去过一次大连，考察东北的工业，当时东北的工业是走在前头的。高饶事件后，定性他们是个联盟，是说他们几个大区的书记奉调到北京以后，到1953年秋冬才形成的政治联盟。这个理由非常勉强。1955年毛泽东在全国党代会上讲到为什么高饶是个联盟呢？他说了几条：因为在1953年全国财经会议批薄一波时，他们两个意见是一致的。在1953年10月份召开的全国组织会议批安子文时，他们也是一致的。另外，他们出事以后，高岗替饶漱石说好话，饶漱石替高岗说好话，这就证明他们是联盟。毛泽东还说：联盟不需要签字，不需要契约的。这样定性的反党联盟，理由太牵强了，显然是很难成立的。

我们看看当年给高、饶定下的罪状，能够落实下来的究竟有哪些？1954年召开的高岗问题座谈会和饶漱石问题座谈会，对他们的问题讲的比较全。在高岗问题座谈会上，周恩来对高岗问题有一个发言提纲，周讲了几条，第一条是制造“军党论”，作为分裂党和夺取领导权力的工具；第二条是搞宗派活动；第三条是私下散布党内讨论安子文的一个绝密文件，指的是就是中组部常务副部长安子文草拟的“八大”政治局的最初名单，制造党内不和；第四条就是私自封官许愿；第五条就是搞东北独立王国；第六条是破坏领导人（刘少奇、周恩来）的威信；第七条是剽窃文稿，抬高自己；第八条在中苏关系上拨弄是非；第九条是进行夺取国家权威的活动。还有一条就是生活作风腐化，加起来是十项罪状。

饶漱石的罪状就少了，因为饶漱石生活比较简朴，私生活上没有乱七八糟的事情，生活作风没有问题。主要问题就是他奉调到北京当上中组部长后，在中组部部务会议上批斗安子文，而斗安子文的目的，就是为了整刘少奇，这个罪状是一个现实的罪状。其它的就牵扯到了一些历史问题：一个就是“黄花塘事件”。在新四军时期，饶组织一些人批判陈毅；另一个就是“玩权术”问题。在确定华东军政委员会主席人选的时候（一般说来军政委员会主席都是军队干部，西南是刘伯承，中南是林彪），他给中央报告说华东的同志不同意陈毅当主席，华东大区就成了他党政一肩挑，这就是“玩弄手段，谋取权力”；还有就是1952年中央让饶漱石到北京养病的事。这是毛泽东讲的。饶漱石认为中央不信任他，半夜三更就打电话给毛泽东要求接见，接见以后没什么事，扯了三个多小时，最后毛泽东听出他的意思来了，是不是中央怀疑他，不信任他的问题？毛说没那个事，你要愿意在北京

养病就养病，你不愿意在北京养病，你回去也可以，他这才放心。可见，上述这些都是鸡毛蒜皮的事，弄不到台面上来，怎么能构成罪状呢？所以从当时一直到现在，他们的罪状问题都没有说清楚。拿这两个人的“罪状”进行对比，我个人认为，高饶事件说到底是高岗事件，饶漱石实际上是搭上来的。

从高岗的“罪状”中可以看出，有些是与事实不符的，有些是张冠李戴，而且还有些就是纯粹的扣帽子。比如剽窃文稿、抬高自己这一条，本来中央领导人让手下写文稿的多了，让部下弄个发言提纲，他拿到中央政治局会议上讲一讲，中央政治局说高岗今天发言很好，毛主席表扬高岗，这个就等于说是剽窃？如果说这个事就是剽窃文稿、抬高自己的话，那我们领导人剽窃文稿、抬高自己的就太多了。有的还把集体起草的会议文件编到自己的文集里，那么，性质是不是更严重。

对高饶事件的处理，后来搞《历史决议》时有个说法，说高饶事件，我们处理的比较宽容没整多少人。实际上不对，高饶事件的整人，当然与后来的“反右”、“文革”是没法比的，但就当时来说，应该说还是错整了不少人。东北局班子里的人，除了林枫以外，其余全部拿下。张秀山、张明远分别是第二书记和第三书记，当时称之为“东北五虎将”的张秀山、张明远、赵德尊、马洪、郭峰全部被处理，而且一直整到了下边省市县的领导干部。例如，旅顺市委的领导班子就整的很惨。饶漱石牵扯的面也很广，首先是山东分局的代书记向明，因为牵扯这个事情被打倒，以后又牵扯到了上海市潘汉年和扬帆的案子。而且当时在东北，许多省市一级的领导人都受到牵连。东北原来是全国先进单位，出干部的地方，高饶事件发生以后，牵涉了一大批干部，有的是压制多年不能起用，有的是直接受到降级和党纪处分。更重要的是，高饶事件的处理为建国后的党内斗争开了一个很不好的头，以后，才有了后来整彭德怀，整刘少奇的更多事情出现。可以说，这个事件开创了一个制度路径。

牵扯到高饶事件中的这些干部，在“文革”后基本上都官复原职了。这就成了毛泽东在1955年的时候说的，高、饶成了两个单干户了。毛泽东当时是反对这两个单干户的观点，给他们加上了反党联盟的帽子。现在查明了，东北局干部与高岗只是工作关系，没有高饶联盟这回事儿。说高岗和饶漱石是联盟的最重要的一个例子，是在1953年的组织工作会议上，张秀山在会上发言，饶漱石很欣赏，掀起了一个批判安子文的风潮，所谓“讨

安伐刘”，批判安子文实际上就是打击刘少奇，定的是这么个罪状。现在，这个事情的来龙去脉已经搞清楚了，无论是张秀山的回忆，还是高岗的秘书赵家梁的回忆，都没有这个“联盟”的事情。事实上，张秀山到北京来是参加粮食会议的，他原来根本不想在组工会议上发言，而且高岗还阻止他发言，说这些问题在组织会议上解决不了，不要发言了。然后，高岗就南下休养去了，连看都没有看过张秀山的发言稿。让张秀山到组工会议上发言的是毛泽东和刘少奇。张秀山参加粮食工作会议期间，讲到东北对于中组部是有几点意见，讲了五条。毛泽东就说你到会上去讲讲，但是你讲的这五条都和刘少奇有关系，你先和刘少奇谈一谈。开会的时候，张秀山找了刘少奇同志，说是主席让我先给你说说。刘少奇也知道他要讲什么，就说不用讲了，你就发言吧。张就这样发了言，这完全与高岗、饶漱石无关，有关的倒是刘少奇、毛泽东。张秀山把提的意见也给安子文说了，都是公开提的，放到桌面上的意见。但是张秀山的这个发言引起了会议上的争论，对组织工作的批评意见很大，所以后来就把这件事情当成了高饶联盟的一个主要事件，其实完全是和“联盟”不搭界的事。

还有一个问题，就是高岗里通外国的事，现在争论得比较多，有来自苏联的材料记载为证。但这也是与事实出入很大的事情。当时在中长路的苏方代表，叫科瓦廖夫，他向斯大林报告，说据高岗报告，中共党内有一些反苏的人，比如刘少奇这些都是反苏的人。这件事情已经查明了，确实有这么一个文件，但这事件和高岗一点关系也没有，科瓦廖夫是信口胡说，但事出有因。因为毛泽东在访苏期间，骂了科瓦廖夫一顿，这是有点打狗给主人看的意思。毛泽东访苏在莫斯科期间，一开始斯大林曾经把他晾在那里，不提重新修订中苏友好条约的事，毛泽东就很生气，把科瓦廖夫找来痛骂了一顿，说我到你这里来是有事的，现在我是干什么事呢？整天就吃饭拉屎。科瓦廖夫把这个事情报告斯大林了，斯大林认为此人办事不力。为了弥补过失，科瓦廖夫就给斯大林打了这么一份报告。另外还有一个说法，就说高岗想要把东北变为苏联的第十七个加盟共和国。当时苏军在东北的时候，拆迁了东北很多工厂，而且苏军违反纪律的也不少，包括高岗在内的东北局的干部都很反感，但当时为了顾全大局，就没提这个事。但说高岗要把东北并入苏联，这是没有来由的。最重要的一个证据是：高岗不懂外语，他每次和外国人接触都得借助翻译，都有秘书到场。所以当时刘亚楼还揭发说高岗和洋人密谈了三天三夜，这个根本不可能，已经被否定了。

那么里通外国的事情不存在了，联盟的事情也不存在了，集团的事不存在了，那么能落实什么？这个就是我们今天想要解读的一个问题。其中讲到高岗的问题，有这么一个情节，就是高岗到中央以后不安分，老想夺周恩来、刘少奇的权。最重要的一个例证就是讲高岗拉陈云，拉邓小平。拉陈云的时候，就说是中央现在要多设几个副主席，你一个，我一个，我们现在的党史都是这么叙述的。这是高岗作为野心家搞交易的一个铁证。但据现在的材料，赵家梁的《高岗在北京》一书的披露，这个话并不是高岗说的，而是陈云说的。陈云为什么要说这个话呢？因为陈云跟高岗原来关系是非常好的，高岗是把陈云当圣人看的，一些重大事情都与陈云商量。但从政治上看，高岗的道行还比较浅，是个“二杆子”。

所以，高岗反党的事情怎么发生的？如果仅仅是围绕在这些具体历史细节中间打交道，是不容易看清楚。高饶事件的前因后果是什么？发生的背景是什么？特别重要的是，毛泽东本来是支持高岗的，为什么后来又把高岗一巴掌打下去了呢？也就是说历史细节的披露，给我们提出了新的问题，需要对这些新的史料进行梳理，找出一个事情发生的逻辑线索来。所以我就试图在更大的背景下对高岗的事情做一个解读。

我是把这场党内斗争分成两个大背景看，一个是叫政争的背景，一个是权争的背景。也就是从“政争与权争”的双重背景来认识这个事件。

那政争是指什么呢？因为我们中华人民共和国成立的时候，目标是建立新民主主义国家，这是在建国时期中共和民主党派一齐制订的《共同纲领》中确定的。建立新民主主义性质的国家是中国共产党从抗战以后一直打的旗帜，而新民主主义路线的要点是什么呢？这就是毛泽东在中共七大上讲的“需要资本主义的广大发展”。但是新民主主义在马列经典作家中是个不经不典的非常话语，你找不到什么叫新民主主义社会，只有资本主义社会和社会主义社会。建设新民主主义国家的意思就是中国的生产力特别落后、特别不发达，处于前现代化的时期，要发展一些资本主义，要多元经济成分的共同发展，然后在生产力发达到一定程度上才能够转到社会主义。这是它的一个本意，也是中国共产党夺取天下的一个旗帜，这是很清楚的。建国以后，从中共七届二中全会，《共同纲领》一直到七届三中全会，都是按照新民主主义建国方针，按照多种经济成分共同发展的方针进行建国布局的，

而且当时还做出“三年准备，十年建设”的计划。可以说新民主主义纲领是中共的建国理念和建国旗帜。

1952年的时候，情况有了新的变化。朝鲜战争基本上进入了胶着状态，双方开始谈判了。毛泽东这时候就把从新民主主义向社会主义过渡的时期提上了日程。1952年10月，刘少奇到苏联去，参加苏共十九大，毛泽东就让他把中共中央的意见（实际上是毛的个人意见），就是现在准备从现在起就开始向社会主义过渡的问题，告诉斯大林，征求了斯大林的意见。

此后，中共就开始了建国路线的转变。建国路线转变是纲举目张的根本转变，是牵动大局的一动百动。由此就产生了很多问题与矛盾。比如，人民群众能否接受的问题，党内思想如何统一的问题，特别是中央高层思想统一的问题。在高层，特别是以毛为代表的，在建国以后就为中国走什么样的道路，执行什么样的建国路线，发生过多次的冲突。重要的有四次，这些冲突不仅仅是毛、刘之间，实际上也代表了党内的高层和中层之间的冲突。

一次是关于刘少奇的天津讲话。进城以后，许多干部把在农村打土豪分田地的方式也带到城里去了，在城里组织什么贫农团，还是采取依靠穷人的做法，分店铺这种事件屡有发生。天津的资本家被搞得很恐慌。刘少奇1949年4月份就到天津解决这个问题。刘在天津讲话安抚资本家，鼓励他们安心生产，其中讲到资本家剥削问题，说从马克思的观点来讲，资本主义对于封建主义来说是一个进步，说你们现在剥削不是多了，而是少了。刘少奇的天津谈话，在当时对稳定城市是有很好的效果，以我们今天的认识水平看，这个观点也没有什么错。但当时党内的一些干部，特别是从农村打土豪分田地出来的干部觉得很不服耳，说怎么叫剥削有功了呢？我们搞革命不就是要打倒地主资本家吗？高岗就是其中反对最激烈的人物之一。刘少奇处理了天津问题以后，了解到东北在城市工作中也有一些“左”的东西，就给东北发了一个电报，让东北注意一下民族资本家的政策问题。当时刘少奇看到了东北社会部部长邹大鹏给中央的一个报告，谈到了在东北城市政策中的一些“左”的倾向。就是对资本家光讲斗争，不讲团结，急于消灭资本主义等等问题。刘少奇就给东北局发了电报，以天津的情况为例，要求东北也要注意“左”的问题。高岗则不予理会。还说刘少奇这个思想是“右”的，他不支持。毛泽东对于刘少奇讲的这些话，也认为是讲过头了，不合适。这是一件事。

第二件事就是富农党员问题。这是 1950 年的时候，那时候新解放区刚刚土改，因为东北土改早，很多农民分了土地以后，凭着自己的劳动致富了，就成了新富农。土改后出现的新富农，跟过去的老富农不一样。农民富起来了，就引起人们的一种疑虑：“现在打土豪分田地运动已经结束，出了新富农怎么办？”特别是有些新富农都是土改的骨干。那时候就产生了这么一个问题，说共产党不讲剥削的，你这三十亩地一头牛，你还得雇人，又成了新富农，你这不是和党的宗旨发生了矛盾吗？刘少奇是坚持新民主主义路线的，他就说出现富农党员不可怕（新民主主义是允许剥削的），允许雇工单干，并且给中组部当时的常务副部长安子文讲了。安子文就根据刘的意见，就这个问题怎么处理给东北写了封信，说允许雇工，而且你现在制止了以后，大家都不敢雇佣了，生产力会受损失。所以他赞成富农党员，赞成党员可以雇佣。对此高岗是不高兴的。而且，高岗背后有毛的支持，毛泽东是不赞成这种做法的，认为只要是搞剥削的，就不能进入党。

再一次是 1951 年的互助合作问题。事由是华北局对山西省委互助合作的一个批示。农村分田单干以后，产生的问题除了新富农发财的问题，很重要的问题就是在战争时期形成的一套组织及生产系统需要转换。现在大家都种自己的地了，那过去的互助合作形式就发生了变化。山西这时候就提出来还要重新组织起来走互助合作的道路。因为战时的互助合作是一种代耕制，有人上前线打仗，他家那地村里用互助合作的代耕方式给解决。现在搞完土改了，不打仗了，搞建设，大家都种自己的地去了，那农村基层组织还怎么管？所以这就带来一个老区农村的组织问题。山西省委就把组织互助合作的方式，实际上也当成了一个重新组织农村党的组织的一个方式进行鼓励。这个事情山西报到了华北局，华北局认为这是“左”倾，报给了刘少奇。刘少奇同意华北局的意见，认为这是一种空想社会主义，在小农基础上是搞不出社会主义的，现在还要发展生产力。从刘少奇的思路可以看出来，他还是主张先发展生产力，发展到一定程度以后，搞机械化的农业生产，在机械化条件下再搞合作化，这个思路就叫先机械化再合作化的思路。毛泽东、高岗的思路与刘少奇的思路不一样，他们都是要先组织起来，把组织起来作为机械化的条件。这当中有这么一个差异。毛泽东批评了刘少奇，否定了他的意见，而推广了高岗的东北合作化经验。

其它还有工会工作方针的问题。工会到底是站在什么立场？是站在政府的立场，还是站在工人的立场？这个问题到现在也没解决。在当时李立三和刘少奇赞成工会有相对的独立性

（这个被批判了），高岗表示反对，强调工人利益与国家利益的一致性。毛泽东否定了刘少奇的意见，支持了高岗的意见。从 1950 年到 1951 年发生的这些事情中间可以看到，刘少奇是频频丢分，高岗是频频得分。当时高岗所领导的东北是全国的模范地区，各项工作都走在了全国的前头。在建国以后的政争分歧中可以看出，毛和高岗是一致的，刘少奇和周恩来是一致的。刘、周坚持的是建国时期确定的新民主主义路线。

到了 1952 年下半年，中央开始酝酿向社会主义过渡的事情，这个政治转轨马上带来了四个方面的问题。

第一个问题就是法理上的冲突。建国的《共同纲领》讲的是建立新民主主义社会，现在突然搞社会主义社会，那么执政党过去的承诺还算不算数？从党内来讲，中共依据的是七届二中全会决议，而七届二中全会决议具有两重性。决议基本精神是在新民主主义社会制度下建立国家工业化的初步基础，然后再向社会主义转变；同时，决议又提出工人阶级和资产阶级的矛盾是国内的基本矛盾，也表达了要与资产阶级作斗争的方面。所以这样就产生了一个“双轨制”，可以这样执行，也可以那样执行。所以，即使用党的七届二中全会作为法理基础，它本身也有两重性的问题。当然从一个国家的法理基础看，还是《共同纲领》明确提出的，是新民主主义的法理。这就是法理上的冲突。

第二个问题是战略和策略的冲突。对新民主主义，是作为一个战略方针，作为国家的一个确定的能够长期执行的方针呢？还是作为一个过渡性的策略方针？等到共产党力量强大了，组织起群众了，就马上进行改变的一个策略问题。这个战略与策略的问题，带来了另一个冲突。实际上许多资本家，包括城市里的一些个体户在内，在听到向社会主义过渡的消息以后，就大呼上了贼船，因为私有财产就保不住了。因为共产党原来说的向社会主义过渡，是在二三十年后的事情，不是现在就做的事情。这是在社会层面中间发生的另一个冲突。

第三个问题是理论和现实的冲突。我们可以往后看，毛泽东执政特点是不断求快，“一万年太久，只争朝夕”。从建国到过渡也好，我们往后看到毛泽东领导的社会主义革命也好，都带有这种不断求快的特征。我也一直在想这个问题，毛泽东作为一个有宏大事业情

结的个人，在事业的无限性和生命的有限性这对矛盾中间，他到底是怎么考虑的？毛泽东在搞革命中，是很务实的，反对王明国际派从莫斯科搬来的“本本主义”和教条主义，非常强调本国经验。建国以后，他怎么就由经验主义者变成了一个理想主义者，到最后变成了一个空想主义者呢？

到 1952 年底，国家刚从战争状态下恢复过来，毛泽东为什么急于从建国时确立的新民主主义国家马上转轨到社会主义国家？搞一段时间的新民主主义，中共是对民主党派、各界人士有过承诺的，所以毛泽东也很清楚，这个转轨是要有政治代价的。急于过渡的原因何在？我有一个自己的解读：因为新民主主义革命是个不经不典的话语体系，在马克思主义的意识形态体系中排不上位置。中国要在共产主义世界中间说话能够算数，你必须要使你自己本身先是社会主义。所以这上面我们就可以看到，毛对于过渡到社会主义是特别的急切，一个很重要的原因就是他要争取在社会主义阵营中间的话语权，特别是斯大林在 1953 年 3 月突然去世后，争话语权的问题就更放到重要位置，我认为这是急于过渡的一个现实性的因素。

另外，过渡还牵扯到一个程序理性和非程序理性的冲突问题。在建国初期的时候中国共产党人并不懂的什么是程序正义，也可以说对程序一直不怎么重视，到现在也没有对程序问题真正重视起来。变动一个国家体制的事，是改变国家根本的大事，总得要一个形式，不能在执政党内高层这么自己讨论决定，然后传达贯彻就行了。决定向社会主义的过渡，没有一点法理上的依据。不用说全民公决的形式，就说全国人民代表大会，或者说一种从下而上的民主讨论的形式也可以，但是事实上没有！从过渡时期总路线的制订过程可以看出，根本缺乏现代政治的程序理念、法治理念。从以后的历史中，我们也可以看出这个决策过程缺乏程序理性的问题。在 1949 年建国以后，中共特别是毛，讲民主的时候很多，讲法治的时候很少。而且在很多情况下，中共领导人是把法律看成束缚自己手脚的绳索。从以上的情况可以看出，这次建国路线的大转轨本身就有非程序化的特征。由此带来的问题很多，首先是把所有的矛盾放到了执政党内，集中到党内的高层。从政讲的角度来讲，高饶事件的发生正是决策缺乏程序理性的一个结果，没有把国家大事公开化的一个结果。以至于把这么大的一个事关国体的大变动，最后演化成了一场党内严重的权力斗争。这是从政讲的大背景上讲。

从权争的背景来讲，这个时期从 1952 年、1953 年开始，是中央和地方权力再调整的时期。建国初期中央采取中央政府下设政务院体制，就是中央人民政府。同时又实行中央和大区两级的行政分权体制。就整个国体、国家的权力配置来讲，是双重中央体制。大区体制是在统一全国的军事行动中形成的中央和地方分权的格局，大区政府既是中央政府的代表机关，又是地方最高权力机关，有很大独立性。大区制是延续了过去四大野战军打天下的这样一个格局，分成几个大区，包括东北、华北这些解放比较早的地区。在大区实行军政委员会制，实际上还是个军事体制。这样的双重体制有利于迅速削平抵抗新政权的前政权社会势力。但是它也带来一个问题，就是如果大区相互串联起来，也足可以形成与中央分庭抗礼的地方势力。中国历代王朝，中央政府确立以后都要有一个削藩的过程，都要把权力集中到中央政府。深谙中国历史的毛泽东自然十分熟悉宋太祖“杯酒释兵权”等前朝开国故事，十分警惕国家出现“末大必折，尾大不掉”的局面。这个事情是从 1952 年就开始做起的。1952 年中央说我们现在要集中进行中央政府的领导，要把各大区的干部抽出来加强中央政府，实行大规模的经济建设。当时中国实行大规模的经济建设，就是计划经济，采取苏联体制的重工业优先这套模式。从 1952 年 6 月，陆续把几个大区书记都调到北京来了。西南局的邓小平调得最早，他是 8 月就职；中南局第一书记是林彪，林彪自从打下海南岛以后身体一直病着，由第二书记邓子恢具体主持工作，邓子恢调到中央负责农业口；西北局第一把手是彭德怀，彭德怀正在朝鲜打仗，第二书记习仲勋调来北京，任中宣部长；华东局第一书记饶漱石调京，担任中组部长；高岗是东北局书记，东北人民政府主席，也调来了。当时称“五马进京，一马当先”。“一马当先”，说的就是高岗，因为高岗就任的职务特别重要。高岗调到北京的时候应该是四十七、八岁，是中央政治局委员，中央人民政府的副主席。别人调到中央以后，不再兼任大区的职务，但是高岗仍然兼任东北大区的职务，可见毛泽东对高岗调到北京是特别器重的。高岗到北京以后担任的职务是国家计划委员会主席。当时国家计委和政务院平级，这是模仿苏联体制，等于是把整个工业、经济部门给管起来了，所以这个位置非常重要。“五马进京”以后，特别是高岗到北京以后，毛泽东对高岗特别欣赏。东北各项工作，当时在全国是走在前头的，而且在支援抗美援朝的时候，东北出力最多。彭德怀讲过，当时朝鲜颁给了彭德怀一枚共和国一级勋章，彭就说，这个勋章应该给两个麻子，一个麻子是洪麻子，就是后勤部长洪学智，再一个就是高麻子，就指高岗。从中也可说明他们的关系很好。

高岗到北京以后，他工作的住处和毛很近，两人经常交谈，而且高岗性格、脾气、秉性和毛都很相似，彼此无话不谈，从生活工作，到对一些领导人的评论。那时候因为高岗和毛

走得太近，而且他的权力又很大，所以周恩来在批发文件的时候本来是毛，刘，周，朱，下面才是高岗。周恩来有意识地把高岗往前提，有时候在毛后边就直接是高，有时候是毛，刘，高，然后才是周。高岗的秘书赵家梁很聪明，他给高岗说，这个发文顺序不对。因为在七大会议上，高岗在党内的排名是第八，任弼时死后，他应该排名第七。到了中央，按照他所担任的职务、主管的事情，以及毛对他的信任程度，顶多能提到第四。周恩来把高岗的名字往前提，实际上，是带有一点政治试探的味道。高岗听秘书说这个问题，马上意识到，接着打电话给周恩来，说总理你这样把我放到前面不合适，不要把我放到前面。顺便说一句，周恩来处理排名关系中，把名字写上去的事还有。在文革中间，中共“九大”会上毛泽东就提，中央文革小组不要了，完成任务了。但是毛泽东说话，是真还是假谁也琢磨不透？所以周恩来最初发文的时候还是写中央文革小组。毛后来看到后就问了，怎么还有啊？周恩来才清楚了毛的意思，知道毛是真的要把中央文革小组取消了。所以“九大”以后，文件上就再没有中央文革小组了。

这可以从某种角度上看出，高岗到北京后多么受毛的器重，而且权力多么大。让政务院总理都感觉到压力。而且，这几个大区级的主要领导干部来到北京任职以后，对原来在北京工作的干部都会产生压力。当时组成中央政府的干部多半是来自于老华北局，几个方面的要职都是原来老华北局的干部担任。比如，组织大权是在彭真、安子文的手里，经济大权是在薄一波手里。高岗这些人到北京以后，对原来工作和人事格局是一个冲击。原先各个山头分头打天下，中央人民政府是在华北人民政府的基础上扩建起来的，华北干部自然比较多。但是华北干部是否比别区的干部能力强？当然不是。所以其它大区干部一进北京以后，无论从资历上、能力上、功劳上，比原来在北京的干部都不弱，甚至还更强一筹，这马上就有一个权力再分配的问题。这个权力再分配的问题，那是真刀真枪的干活。

高岗这个人的特点是什么？精力充沛，行政能力很强，而且善于用人，能抓大事。他在东北是党政一把手，说一不二，具体工作，定下就办，雷厉风行，效率很高。但中央的工作有自己的路数，工作按部就班，有自己的程序、自己的轨道。看起来有些磨磨唧唧，扯皮的事情多。高岗从下面一把手的位置上来，对原来中央部门的工作作风不习惯，也和这些部门的主管干部产生一些摩擦。比如他在主持计委工作的时候，一般是很讲效率的，什么事情敢于拍板，决定以后，马上就办，办了就检查就落实。薄一波负责中财委时，有些事情落实不下来，有些领导很有些意见，为了争取自己的部门利益跑到高岗这边，让高帮着

说话。这种事情多了以后，薄一波就很有些看法了。1953年3月有次开会，薄一波就在会上发火，说：“你们什么事情都去找高主席，你们知不知道有个中财委？中财委有个主任叫陈云，还有个主任叫薄一波。”就在会议上大发了一阵火。我们现在来看，这也只是工作事权不明确的问题，所产生的摩擦很自然，未必牵涉其他政治上的问题。但当时有一些干部对薄一波很不服气。如建设部部长陈正人，中央苏区时期就是部长级干部，资格比薄一波老，就跑到高岗那儿去告状了。这样一来二去，就使得华北的干部和外来的干部之间矛盾加深。

这样就带来了党内山头派系问题。中共的组织是从各个山头发展起来的。红军时期有三支主力红军；到了抗战以后，又形成了十九块根据地；到解放战争的时候，有四大野战军；建国后有六个大区。中共七大的时候毛泽东就说了，我们这个党是从无数小山头发展起来的，我们是要承认山头，改造山头，以后还要削平山头。到1952年的时候，情况又有一个很大的变化。一个是大区主要领导人已经调到了北京；再一个是在这个时期又有一次权力再分配的问题出现了：一是要开中共八大，一是要开全国人大（开全国人大是斯大林的意思，说你们得开全国人大，要不然政权的合法性不够），这样就带来了权力再分配的问题。如果说过去在打天下的过程中，华北的人占据中央政府的位子比较多，现在已经打完天下了，削平地方山头，在中央应该是要重新排座次。

1953年2月底，毛泽东提出来说要考虑一下怎么安排中央人事的问题。3月初的时候，刘少奇就提出一个方案，拿出一份名单。这个名单问题是我们认识高岗事件的一个关键地方。《高岗在北京》这本书的价值之一，就是它提供了两份名单。我们过去只知道安子文草拟的一份八大政治局委员的名单，不知道此前刘少奇也有一份人事安排名单，这两份名单结合起来看就很有点意思了。刘少奇最初提出的书记处名单是：政府的党组书记是彭真，组织是安子文，文教是习仲勋，财经是刘澜涛，农业是邓子恢，工青是饶漱石，就是这么一份名单。高岗看了这份名单以后挺不满意，觉得重要岗位还是在华北山头的名下，认为没有意义，他给毛谈了这意见。最重要的是另一份名单，就是安子文起草的那份名单，这份名单是解读高饶事件的大关节。安子文草拟的关于八大政治局委员的名单，来由有三种说法：有高岗授意说，有安子文擅自起草说，还有刘少奇授意说。这三种说法哪种最靠谱呢？在这个事件中安子文只是作为组织部的一个常务副部长，敢自行起草上边领导的名单？这胆子也太大了。可以肯定，如果没有他人授意，安子文起草名单是严重越权行

为。那么，他是得到了谁的授意？高岗不管组织工作，他给安子文说不上话，即使高岗说了，安子文也不该听，因为中央分管组织的不是高岗，是刘少奇。所以从这一点看，我认为刘少奇授意的可能性最大。而且说到底，刘即使说让安先拿出一份大家讨论的草稿，现在来看也不是什么大不了的事情。要在公开化或者一个民主化的决策机制下，这本不应该成为一个事情。

毛泽东接到这份安子文草拟的党内最高机密的名单，就派了他的秘书送到高岗处，让高岗马上看完，随即毛的秘书就把文件拿走了。这份名单机密到什么程度？朱德不知道，政治局委员中也只有少数人知道的，刘少奇应该是知道的，毛泽东是知道的，是毛泽东将这份绝密名单送给高岗阅看。这是很能说明问题的举动，表示他很不赞同刘少奇的人事安排。高岗对华北山头的成见很深，看到这个“有薄（一波）无林（彪）”的名单，自然是非常恼火的。高岗把毛泽东的意见和他的意见掺杂在一起，在高级干部中私下传播，军队高级干部尤其火大。薄一波从资历、能力和贡献来讲，和林彪都是没法比的。林彪的四野打遍天下，四野战将如云，到处是四野的干部。在四大野战军中，四野从东北打到海南岛，位居首功，四野的最高首长居然不在政治局里边，军队干部肯定是窝火了。毛泽东对这份绝密的名单的事发火了，批评安子文说，谁授权给你的，你怎么能起草这个东西？但是最后毛泽东没追究，这就有蹊跷了，他为什么没追究？那肯定他知道不好追究，安子文把这个事担下来就算了。那么因为这件事情，所产生的问题，这就构成了高岗在下边挑动是非的一个关键问题。

我们先把这份名单的事情放到一边，一会再讲。我们先讲讲高层把这些诸侯调到北京来以后，高层权力结构也要进行一种新的调整，从这个新的调整中间，可以看出毛对原来的权力结构的不满。原来的权力结构，基本是延续了延安时期的毛、刘体制，毛泽东是一把手，刘少奇是二把手，主持日常工作。然后，政府，就是周恩来，就是毛、刘、周，形成这么一个格局。但是在共同纲领中，也就是在建国初期的构架中间，中央人民政府这一层是比较虚的，实权在政务院周恩来那儿，党务的事是在刘少奇那儿，刘少奇和周恩来，他们又都是从白区出来的干部，但是他们又不是一个系统的，从某种角度讲刘、周两个人，在历史上面，还有过碰撞，就是在延安整风时期，刘少奇是属于整人的一方，周恩来是属于被整的一方。但在这个时期、这个权力构架中间，所带来一个问题就是党权，我们现在可以从最近出版的文献中看到刘少奇建国以来的文稿，从中看出来，刘少奇那时工作相

当忙，管的相当多，管的面很宽。周恩来管的事情就更多了，政务院管的国家政务，大大小小都管。所以这就产生一个情况，作为中央人民政府主席的毛泽东，他管事反而没有他们多。毛泽东对此很有感觉，说你西花厅就是车水马龙，我颐年堂是门可罗雀。实际上这只是个体制问题，再加上这个时期毛泽东和刘少奇，在贯彻新民主主义方针路线中间都有过冲突，包括跟周恩来也有冲突，毛泽东这就产生了对刘少奇这些人的不满，他把这些不满也都跟高岗谈了。

毛泽东在 1953 年的时候对政府系统采取了一个大手术。这个事情是由实施新税制开始引起来的。建国以后所采取的税法基本上都是保护国有企业的税法，政策比较优惠，而其它的私营企业的税赋是比较重的。1953 年的时候国有企业已经占了大半江山了，这就带来一个问题，就是收税收不上来了。税都压在私人资本上面，使他们经营起来就很困难。所以在周恩来的主持下，薄一波等制订了新的征税办法，新的税法是把流通税放到生产领域，同时调整税率一致，目的是为了开辟税源。新税法制定了以后没通过毛，就在报上发布了。毛泽东就很恼火。而且由于事前工作做得比较粗，发布以后出现了一些问题。山东、北京都有反映。毛泽东借新税制推行中出现的问题大做文章。他尖锐地批评新税制“公私一律平等纳税”是向资产阶级投降。随后，毛泽东在组织上采取了一系列削弱和分割刘少奇、周恩来权力的措施。在遏抑刘、周的同时，让高岗取得了很大权力。

1953 年就有两个大的举动：第一个举动是分了周恩来的权。当时政府部门叫政府党组总干事委员会，由周恩来负责，中央政府党组集中归口周恩来负责。这个时期毛泽东对周恩来提出批评了以后，就把这个总干事会给取消了。并且在政务院中间又分了周恩来的权，把政务院的权力，基本上分拆成了六个口，计划是高岗管；财经是陈云管；文教是习仲勋管；邓小平管民族、宗教、统战等。周恩来虽然是总负责，但具体分管的口子就是外交，实际上是六个口子之一，权力大大削弱了。

第二个举动就是削了刘少奇的权。因为刘少奇在主持日常工作期间，有些报告电文没经过毛泽东看就批发了。毛泽东对此非常生气，发了大火，认为这是瞒着他。实际上我现在忖度刘少奇的做法，也许他认为这是他份内的事，会觉得很具体的份内工作就按照正常的程序走就是了，不一定非得经过主席再审定。应该说，从各司其职的角度上看，这是没有问题的，体现分工负责的原则。但是，毛泽东就认为这是在架空他，所以发了大火，指示刘

少奇和杨尚昆做检讨，要求他们把去年三月份以来所有的电文都给他看，以后凡是没有经过他的文件都不作数。这样，就把刘少奇的权也给收了。

在毛分割刘、周权力的时候，高岗成了分权的一个棋子。分周恩来的权的时候，把政务院工业方面的八个部都划出来了，划给高岗，由高岗的国家计委管这八个工业部。毛泽东把大区书记调到中央来以后，用他们分割了原来刘、周的权力，形成了一个新的权力格局。到了1953年的时候，中央出现了一个新的权力格局——在毛泽东之下，形成三足鼎立的权力格局——刘少奇负责党务，周恩来负责政府工作，高岗负责经济。

实际上，高岗事件就是在党内高层的政争发展到一定程度，权争又到达一定程度的情况下发生的。对于高岗事件的发生，有两个会议是特别重要，一是六月到八月的财经工作会议，一是十月召开的中央组织工作会议。这两个会议对了解高饶事件的发生非常重要。

中央财经会议本来是个经济工作会议，也就是说是一个具体的工作会议。但是在这会议召开期间，毛泽东就提出了过渡时期总路线，六月份向政治局提出的，批了“巩固新民主主义社会秩序”的提法，于是就把财经会议开成了一个贯彻过渡时期总路线的会议。在会议上，群起大批薄一波，实际上也有影射刘少奇的问题。所以这个会议就开得很长，开了两个月。批薄一波，面上的理由就是新税制的问题。毛泽东在会上有些话说的很重，说薄一波是走到资产阶级那里去了，成了资产阶级的代言人。大家也看出了毛主席的意图，批薄一波批得很厉害。有的说薄是季诺维耶夫，有的说是布哈林，把薄一波批得一塌糊涂。薄一波接连做了两次检讨都没能过关。高岗在批薄一波中间也起了很大作用。实际上跳得高的也不只是高岗，谭震林，李富春等人都批得很厉害。此次会议之后，就把薄一波的财政部长给罢免了，由邓小平兼任。因为高岗在这个会上讲话讲得很重，说薄是资产阶级代理人，薄一波觉得这个线上升得太高，接受不了。高岗就把他的发言稿拿出来，说你看这不是我说的，是毛主席说的。毛泽东在总结时还说：资产阶级“精神的糖衣炮弹打中了一个靶子，就是薄一波。”这话够重的。毛泽东选集五卷上就有这篇文章。

原来大家对华北山头就有点情绪、有点矛盾，特别是外地的这些干部。这个事情使得大家情绪更大了，纷纷批判薄一波的问题。实际上在这会上说了一些过头话的也不光是高岗，

我觉得谭震林讲的那些话比高岗还厉害。谭说主席有大权旁落的危险，白区党要夺主席的权，现在情况很危险。在这个会议期间，林彪在西山养病，大家由高岗领衔一块去看望林彪，阵势浩大。题外之意是什么呢？你那名单上不是有薄无林吗，我们偏支持林彪。看望时这些老上级、老部下说了一些话，有些也都很过分。比如，重工业部长王鹤寿在西山上讲，林总看问题就是准，他讲：现在有白区党人篡夺中央权力的危险。谭震林也讲，有两个司令部，一个是以毛主席为首的司令部，一个是以白区党为首的司令部，两个司令部的斗争，主席有被架空的危险。这些话讲得都很过分，也可以看出会议斗争气氛非常紧张。

批薄一波这件事情，让这些各大区的外来干部占了上风。在这个会议上，开创了以大批判作为落实新民主主义纲领的过渡时期总路线的这么一个方式。在这次会上，刘少奇也做了检讨。他检讨了关于在天津讲话的问题，关于在合作化问题上右倾保守的问题，关于富农党员的问题，还检讨了在抗战胜利以后，关于要建立和平民主新阶段的问题。财经会议过后，正如毛泽东常说的，“政治路线确定之后，干部就是决定的因素”，就要开全国第二次组织工作会议，要总结建国以来组织工作的一些经验。这时候大家对于中组部的意见也很大，觉得中组部调配干部不得力，在关于党员的标准上面掌握得不好。

召开组织工作会议，就是从组织上落实过渡时期总路线的问题。这时饶漱石已经到中央就任中组部部长，具体工作处在交接之中，中组部当时的调整是饶漱石当部长，各大区的组织部长到中组部担任副部长，其中东北局到中组部担任副部长的是郭峰，饶漱石当时就说了一句话，因为饶漱石当时要管两个部，一个是管组织部，一个是管劳动部。劳动部是调宋平来当副部长，所以说饶漱石就讲话，说有什么事你们先给郭峰部长、宋平部长看看，再让他们告诉我。实际上，郭峰并没有到任，这个事情后来就成了高饶联盟的一个证据。这都是没有的事情。

在这次组织工作会议中，应该说是吵的某一方面更深了，但是乱的程度可能不如财经会议。这可以从饶漱石后面一个检讨来看。就像我们刚才一开始讲的，东北局的第二书记张秀山到北京参加会议，他并不是要来参加组织工作会议，结果在组织工作会议上面发言以后就引起了反响，就成了和饶漱石联合的一个罪状，连他自己也都莫名其妙。

在这个会议中间，华北山头对其它山头的反击也很大，牵扯到一个问题就是张秀山在发言中间讲的五条中，有一条是党组织要进一步纯洁，过去投敌的，叛变的，自首的这些人，要从党内清理出去。这个意见一发表就使得华北山头很紧张。因为就是刘少奇在抗战前夕，从草岚子监狱中间救出了一批干部，让他们履行了一个自首出狱手续，其中包括薄一波在内。这就是“文革”中所谓“六十一人叛徒集团”的事。所以他们对此这个反应强烈，这等于要他们的政治生命。所以这次组织会议开得效果很不好。对此次会议具体有两个评价：饶漱石就认为这次会议比财经工作会议还有章法，大家说的意见都是有理有据的。但是另有材料就说是恰恰相反，这个组织会议碰到了极大的阻力，实际上会议开不下去了。这是两个说法。

可以看到这个时期，在党的组织路线上如何向社会主义过渡总路线转轨的过程中，党内发生了冲突。刘少奇在组织工作会议中间也做了检查。两次做检讨，表示完全服从了毛泽东的过渡时期总路线。

这个时期在党内最活跃的就是高岗，高岗到了北京以后，毛泽东就经常跟他谈论中央的一些人事问题，表示了对周恩来，对刘少奇的一些不满。说刘少奇“政治上不稳，七大、八大抬得抬高了”。延安时期，在六届七中全会上曾经有一个决议，说毛泽东是根据地正确路线代表，刘少奇是白区正确路线代表。建国后，毛对刘不满，认为把刘少奇抬得过高了。毛泽东私下讲的这些话，对高岗有很大影响。高岗过去就对刘少奇有点看法。高岗在东北根据地的问题上和彭真和林彪就有过冲突。彭、林他们主张占领大城市，不让国民党进入东北。事实上，这是办不到的。高岗和陈云，林彪是要放弃大城市，建立巩固的农村根据地。现在在陈云文选上也可以找到这篇文章。

高岗和华北山头的历史恩怨还不止这些，在当年红军时期，他和刘志丹就是被华北局派来的代表朱理治抓起来了，差点给杀了头，埋他们的大坑都准备好了，这也是一个历史恩怨。高岗对白区的干部，特别是华北局的干部是有看法的。

这个时期最重要的一个事件是毛泽东要高岗密查刘少奇被捕的事情。这两年披露的一个新的史料：1953年春天，毛泽东交给高岗一项绝密任务，让高岗密查刘少奇在1929年奉天

纱厂罢工事件中被捕的事。这个事情使高岗认定了毛泽东对刘少奇的不信任态度。高岗接受任务以后，首先是跟陈云商量。陈云和高岗是两个性格，陈云长于思考，思路很严密。高岗勇于行动，精力过人。一个是行动型的人，一个是思考型的人。他们之间关系非常好，从陕甘宁那时候，就在一起工作过。毛对陈云看不惯，就把陈放到西北政府，后来调陈云到东北，和高在一块搭班子，他们又在一起。高岗到北京以后，大事小事都跟陈云商量，陈云知道这件事情以后，说这切不可外传，要绝密执行。高把此事交给东北第二书记张秀山去查了。张秀山觉得这个事情不好查，所以就派两个组，一个查现实表现，一个查历史情况，等于是大撒网式的查。具体执行者并不知道要查的人是谁，查完以后就把这个事情，密报给了毛泽东。通过这件事情可以看出，高岗在反刘中是起了相当大的作用。

再加上这个时期由于斯大林突然去世，由此带来了苏共的一个权力真空。当时斯大林没有指定接班人，到底是谁接班？国际上也是议论纷纷。实际上赫鲁晓夫是在权力斗争中间最后厮杀出来的。一开始确定的接班人是马林科夫。在这个厮杀过程中，首先发生了“贝利亚事件”。他们把秘密警察头子贝利亚抓起来，接着就处死了。斯大林死后留下的权力真空造成的混乱情况，肯定对中共是有冲击的。所以高岗在北京就说，毛泽东和中央领导人对毛泽东百年之后事情怎么办？说了很多话，表示很担忧。这个事情高岗也给陈云说了，把毛泽东的担忧也给陈云说了。陈云说毛肯定是对刘不满了，我们这个事先干起来，我们干起来再说。“到时候，大旗一倒，你不造反，我先造反！”。这是最近《高岗在北京》一书中所透露出来的一个重要史料。

高岗在军队中间是很有人缘的，跟军队干部关系都很好。所以他在很多场合，都讲过刘少奇的坏话，有些是从毛那里直接听来的，有些就加入了自己的发挥。比如他讲毛泽东对刘少奇不满意，讲刘少奇政治上不成熟，这些话肯定是他跟毛泽东密谈中听到的话。当然，高岗承认在1953年财经会议上批评薄一波时说过“枪杆子造政权、枪杆子造党”之类的话，说是引自毛泽东的《战争和战略问题》。毛泽东在1938年11月的这篇重要的党内讲话中，是提出了“枪杆子里面出政权”、“枪杆子里面出一切东西”的著名论断。高岗以此为论据批薄，不仅是强调根据地和军队在中国革命的主导地位，更是要申明根据地和军队党的重要性远在白区党之上。就是说，根据地党是中国革命的正宗，是主线，白区党的作用只是个副线。他到处鼓吹这个理论，意图是要给毛泽东为首的搞武装斗争的一批人在

历史上树立一个正统地位。说明白区党不能跟根据地党相比，你在中国革命中间起的只是个副线的作用，他要强调的正是这一点。

这个时期，特别是在财经工作会议之后，毛泽东就提出了中央分一、二线的问题。我认为，用一、二线的体制冲突来解释毛泽东和刘少奇的矛盾是有道理的。但毛泽东最早提出一、二线问题，并不是在大跃进过后的调整时期，在 1953 年时就提出来了，这是高岗事件发生的又一历史背景。毛泽东为什么要在 1953 年提出一、二线问题？他到底想做什么？在张明远、张秀山、赵家梁的这几本书出来以后，学界的解读有一种观点，说是毛泽东要用高岗取代刘少奇当接班人，高岗急于抢班，结果做的不机密而导致身败名裂。很多研究者都把高岗的事情放在抢接班人的问题上。

我的观点是毛泽东提出的一、二线体制设想，实际上是一种分权体制。其目的是要改变建国后延续下来的延安体制。当时有这么一些考虑，就是中央是设一个总书记呢？还是设几个副主席呢？政府是不是采取部长联席会议的形式？毛泽东这个时期最初所构想的中央一线是否指在政府部门工作的一线？这些都是分权体制的构想。至于一二线如何分，怎么安排一线人事，我们现在找不到最直接的证据，但是可以找到一个反证，那就是高岗到处（特别是在南下期间）散布的一些言论，说毛泽东要让他搞政治局，让刘少奇搞人大，让周恩来搞政府。高岗这个话后来说成是造谣和企图篡权谋位，但是这些话的源头在哪里？能“无风不起浪”吗？只能是“有风浪三丈”。源头应是还在毛那里，应该说这个人事布局是毛泽东对中央分一、二线的最初思考，他酝酿要实现这么一个架构。从这个架构可以看出来，毛实际上是要在中央一线营造出一个分权的体制，就是由他驾驭的一个三驾马车的体制。后来批高岗，还揭发他还散布过要让林彪当部长会议主席。如果是这样的话，那可能就是四驾马车的体制。周恩来管外交，林彪当部长会议主席，人大是刘少奇，党务是高岗。中央一线可能就是这么一个体制。

因为高岗事件的发生，这些计划应该说是胎死腹中了，根本就无从谈起了。但从这个构架中间，我们可以看出，如果这个构架实现的话，倒是确实符合毛泽东倡导的“大权独揽、小权分散”的思路，也符合中国传统政治的“圣人执要，四方来效”的体制逻辑。所以我的解读就是，毛实际上是想创建一个分权制衡的一线体制，而不是仅仅想更换一个接班人。但是高岗认为毛泽东对刘少奇不满意，就是想换接班人，“二杆子”气太重，一心

想把刘少奇拱下台，到处活动，这就惹出一大堆的麻烦，造成党内不合，最后身败名裂，这样毛泽东原来的一、二设想也就无法实现了。邓小平后来说，高岗就是想抢这个一线。道理也就在这里。

过去说高岗要多设几个副主席是“封官许愿”搞交易，他给陈云说：“你一个，我一个副主席”。实际上，这话是陈云跟他一块议论时，陈云讲的。“我们就多设几个副主席，你一个，我一个。这样他们就不能够架空主席了”，这中间还有这么一句话，“不能架空主席”，这是要点。当时毛泽东对刘少奇不满，批评刘擅自发文件，这党内高层是知道的，陈云讲这话，是从维护毛泽东权威方面说的，并不做交易。

我们还可以再分析一下，总书记制和副主席制的差别是什么？总书记制实际上还是个接班人体制。苏共中央就认为刘少奇是中共总书记。中共接班人体制是一个特别尴尬的体制，既不是一个储君制，又不是一个帝相制，同时又结合了双重的弊端。因为总书记制是个集权的制度，党主席下面是总书记。副主席制则是分别把口、各司其职的制度，党主席是班长，这是个分权制。如果是总书记的话，除了刘少奇没别人，如果设副主席的话，高岗、陈云都可以。是不是就说高岗在这上面搞权权交易呢？到处拉票呢？就如后来批判他的那样。我认为还不能这样简单分析。因为在中央权力格局中间，高岗这时候实际上已经走到了第四位的角色了，毛，刘，周，接下来就应该是高了。朱德在政治局中是一个虚位，没有实权。那么第四把手当了副主席，这算什么野心吗？算不上的。所以问题不在这里。

那么高岗出现问题，毛泽东对他开始警觉，事由就是我们刚才所说的安子文起草的那份名单。高岗南下去休假，一直跑到广东，他一路走，一路就给一些人讲名单上面“有薄无林”的问题。这是个绝密名单，可以说是最高机密了，毛就给他看了，连朱德都没看到。这等大事，他居然到处散布，到了广东告诉了叶剑英、谭政。叶、谭到北京来，问毛泽东关于政治局“有薄无林”的事，毛泽东大吃一惊：“你们怎么知道这个消息？从哪来的？”他们就面面相觑，都不敢说。后来毛就问高岗说：“这个事情怎么来的？”高岗也不敢承认，毛就盯着他说：“我怀疑是饶漱石。”高岗说：“饶漱石不会吧！”他不敢坦率承认，就给自己埋下了倒台的伏笔。实际上，这份名单上面没有列林彪，也是有客观的考虑。林彪身体确实不好，打了海南岛以后一直在养病，难以任事。所以当时在中南主持工作的是邓子恢。名单上有邓子恢没有林彪，这个安排也是有它的理由。但是在重新安排

职务的时候，也不能光安排这些能干事的，打天下的功劳也得平衡一下。所以，这不仅是一个排座次的问题，而且还一个对四野尊重不尊重的问题。可以说，这是一个大疏忽。但是这个疏忽，如果说在一个公开化的，民主化的政治环境下，也不是问题，是完全可以合理解决的。从历史上看，在中共党内路线斗争中，凡是做得越机密的事，知道的人越少的事，到最后出的问题越多。高岗事件正是这样的一个事例。

毛泽东追查名单的事情，已经点高岗头上了，高岗还不敢承认，这不能不使毛泽东对他产生了怀疑。怀疑完全有理由。毛泽东一批评刘少奇，刘少奇就检讨了，两次检讨，一次比一次深刻。高岗却是推推拖拖，畏畏缩缩，不知道到底想干什么？毛认为高不坦白，有在下面搞小动作的嫌疑。作为一把手，谁都担心下面搞小动作的，特别作为最高权威者，更容不得下属蒙蔽自己。所以到1953年11月下旬，12月的时候，毛对高就已经有些看法了。这个最明显的是两件事。一次是12月15日，毛泽东就说了：“我要到南方去走一走，谁在家主持工作？是轮流好呢？还是谁主持好？”这个问题过去没有提出来过，过去毛泽东无论去重庆谈判也好，或者上苏联访问也好，那自然是刘少奇主持工作了。但这次提出来后，高岗就马上说：“轮流好。”周恩来第一个发言的说：“过去是少奇同志主持，现在也还是少奇同志”，邓小平、彭德怀也是主张刘少奇。主张轮流的一个是高岗，一个是朱老总。实际上在这个时期，对于高岗的一些做法，毛已经很有些反感了。到了24日，毛临行前，讲了一番话，说：“我颐年堂（毛的住所）门可罗雀，东交民巷八号（高岗的住处）却是车水马龙。”这句话把高岗敲打得心惊肉跳，确实给吓坏了。高岗这时候还有一个任务，25日他陪苏联的国家苏维埃副主席捷沃西安上鞍钢去，这是他是硬抢着去的。他一到了东北以后，就召集东北局的干部开会，说我们现在要拥护少奇同志领导，不能搞分裂主义。从这话可以看出来，他觉得势头不对，要赶紧表态了。1954年2月，中央召开七届四中全会。在七届四中全会上，大家都做了一些自我批评，通过了一个加强党内团结的决议。从毛泽东的会议部署来讲，是想开成一个加强党内团结的和平大会。大家都是背靠背的说问题，都是自己检查自己的错误，没有搞互相揭发。本来这个会议开得挺顺利，但在这会议结束后，又紧接着开了两个座谈会。一个是高岗问题座谈会，一个是饶漱石问题座谈会。两个会议一开，就不是和平会议了，是斗争会议。会上就把高岗的、饶漱石的这些事，零零碎碎都给抖露出来了，形成了对高岗、饶漱石的揭发批判。高岗座谈会的第四天，高岗第一次用枪自杀，被秘书救了，半年之后再服安眠药自杀身亡。1955年，召开了全国党代表大会，做出了正式决议，把高饶定为反党集团。

高饶事件中间还有一些疑点，第一，为什么说四中全会开的是个和平大会，是个加强团结的大会？末了又搞出揭批高饶的座谈会，非得把问题给揭出来？这个事情无疑只有毛泽东能拍这个板，他为什么要拍这个板？第二，毛泽东一直很信任高岗，什么话都给他讲。什么时候开始，以什么事件开始，就不跟他沟通了呢？四中全会毛没有参加，跑南方去了。会议是按照毛的意思开的。而且后来高岗再三要求跟毛谈一谈，要说清楚一些问题，没有谈成。也可以这样想，如果要是毛泽东主持四中全会，碰到高岗发起驴脾气，再把他们两个私下说过的话都捅出来，那怎么办？当然，这只是一个猜度。有人就说，毛泽东对高岗的做法是要始乱终弃。这个说法是比较有趣，但有些历史环节还是没有说清楚。比如毛什么时候开始想弃他？为什么要采取这么决绝的办法弃他呢？要知道，这个办法是有风险性的。比如派罗瑞卿和林枫到东北开高干会议，罗瑞卿找到张秀山，问你为什么查刘少奇？谁让你查的？张说是高岗叫的，说高岗是奉了主席的命令让我查的，张把查刘的情况都说了。这个罗瑞卿对毛是愚忠的，他就不怕把这个事情弄到最后弄到毛自己身上？一旦抖露出来，毛泽东在密查自己的副手，那这个事情好看吗？难道毛不担心泄露吗？所以，在高饶事件的历史细节方面，确确实实还有很多未解之谜。今天就给大家讲到这里。

提问交流部分：

提问 1：高岗之死是自杀，如果高岗不死，到“文革”时会怎样？能不能给我们推理一下？我觉得高岗的悲哀就是他自杀了。

王海光：我们可以从过后的一些政治事件反推一下。和高岗关系比较好的军队干部，一个是彭德怀，一个是林彪，也就是说都是根据地的代表人物吧。高岗要是接受这次被整的教训，如果能过了庐山会议这一关，在文革打倒刘少奇时，有可能会被再次起用，那时可能当上副统帅的不是林彪，而是高岗了。

提问 2：请问如何看待林彪事件？

王海光：那是另一个话题了。林彪事件也不是路线斗争，内情也是很复杂，不是像我们所想象的那么简单，有时间的时候我们可以再探讨一下林彪事件。

提问 3：毛泽东不是刚开始支持高岗，最后怎么又弃了？

王海光：刚才讲的就是这个问题，到最后哪个时间段，毛认为该把高岗抛弃了，我也没找准。从现在看起来，应该是在 1953 年 12 月初，毛就下了这个决心了。但是为什么下了这个决心，有什么情况刺激了他？这个我还说不清楚。

提问 4：您讲了很多高饶事件的背景情况，我想知道在您看来这类事件，在中国还有没有可能再次发生？

王海光：我觉得没有可能性了，因为现在它不是那个伟人时代，没有一言九鼎的绝对权威人物。像这种情况，只能是在一个人，既是党又是国家的情况下，才会出现这种情况。

提问 5：从您讲的那个事情以及很多问题，好像看起来我们这个党的一个定律，好像二把手总是最危险。刘少奇，邓小平，高岗，林彪，还有后来的赵紫阳，胡耀邦，基本上都是这样。

王海光：接班人体制，不光是中共有这个问题，实际上整个共产主义运动中间，哪个党都没有处理好，它是个制度性问题。

提问 6：我去过万安公墓，看到高岗的墓碑，为什么高岗要埋在万安公墓？

王海光：高岗自杀以后，周恩来批准要厚葬，因为他既然是被戴上反党集团的帽子，上八宝山恐怕不太合适。万安公墓是个很好的墓地，那里面也净是名人，所以把他也葬在那

里。你还比较幸运，看的是个完整的墓碑。我当年看的是半截碑，是文革中间被砸碎了的。

提问 7：我想问一下，在我国建国以后发生的诸多问题，比如说路线的曲折性，以及诸多整人的整风运动等，您认为是体制不完善占据更多原因，还是领导人自身对于宪政以及现代政治体制的不了解，以及权力的屏障，这两个原因哪个更重要一些？第二个问题就是为什么在社会主义阵营中会出现这么多体制方面以及接班人方面的不完善的问题？出发点是什么？谢谢！

王海光：这个问题比较大。当然，人治和法治的最大区别，就是说制度应该把领导人管在里边。如果说一个制度可以让权力随心所欲地玩弄，领导人的话就是法律，无所谓什么程序不程序，那这个国家的政治稳定性肯定是有大问题的。第二个问题讲到国际共运的问题，这是个更大的话题了，不好一下讲清楚。可以说这是属于二十世纪的一段历史吧！

提问 8：这个有没有一些历史渊源，我觉得像刘邦、朱元璋打下江山以后，都会杀掉一批人，还有很多的朋党斗争，我想问其中有什么关系？

王海光：从传统政治到现代政治转型期间，确实是有这么一个问题。实际上中国现代所建立的政权，既不是纯粹的传统，也不是纯粹的现代，而是一个不伦不类的骡子体制。所以制度建设还很不完善，权力缺乏制衡，而且在有一些地方，还兼有了两者的弱点。比如说过去帝王，他可以拥有三宫六院，这是个符合皇权家天下规则的，官员有三妻四妾也是合理合法的，现在就不能了。你再想搞这些勾当，只能偷偷摸摸的搞点事了。

提问 9：王老师，我想请教您一下，您是研究党史的，我对党史也比较感兴趣。我们是不是能出一本比较接近真实的中共党史？

王海光：让我们共同努力吧！

提问 10：王老师，我想问一下，在您心目中，高岗他作为一个历史人物，他的功过应该如何加以评价？第二个问题我知道最近香港中文大学出版了一套杨奎松和沈志华合编的《中华人民共和国史》，您对这一套书有什么评价？

王海光：第一个问题是我不太愿意回答的问题，因为我很怕对一个历史人物进行三七开或对半开，我觉得这样评价不到位，这是一个机械的思维模式，容易把人概念化，所以我不想这么做人物评价。第二个问题关于《中华人民共和国史》，应该说这是目前写得最客观最翔实的一套共和国史，共十卷本，现在还有几卷没有出来。但是它也存在不足：一是受限于材料，应该说就材料来讲它应该是最丰富的，在国内出版的书籍没有比得上的。但有些事件的关键性史料还没有解密，作者只能根据现有材料说话了。二是在史观上没有大的突破，很多卷的描写框架还是中共党史的描写框架，没有大的突破。还有就是研究不足的问题，比如对底层社会的关注，对社会史的研究，对个案的研究，还都比较弱。总体而言，一套好书，但是还有继续深入研究的余地。

提问 11：说高岗生活腐化，是否确有其事？

王海光：是的。

提问 12：您刚才讲到一个细节，就是 1953 年春天的时候毛泽东委托高岗查刘少奇历史上是否被捕，这个有什么结论没有？

王海光：这个当时没有什么结论，因为这个是最高机密。有人就跟我说，说高岗就因为查这个事倒霉。我想未必，这个太简单化了。我想即使查，也不会有什么爆炸性东西。有人跟我说过，查刘少奇这件事是毛刘矛盾的焦点问题，高岗是不是夹在这个缝中间，被两大股势力挤死了，是不是有这种可能性？我后来查了文革时期刘少奇被打成叛徒、内奸、工贼的罪状，我想在文革时期，对刘少奇是要打倒并“踏上一万只脚”的，如果当时查出有问题的话，在他的罪状上面应该有所反映吧。但是我没有看到有任何反映。所列的刘少奇的罪状反映的都是在 1968 年的时候，那时那些证人的供词，那已经很不可信了。如果是

当时弄出 1953 年的，就有这个文件，那肯定会写在上面的。到了 1968 年的时候，制造出的罪状，证人证词可信吗？在那种打倒刘少奇的政治氛围之下，都是欲加之罪的事，这些东西都是不可信的了。

提问 13：是不是天津讲话之后，毛泽东就想把刘少奇搞下去？

王海光：没有，那时候还是一种工作上的意见分歧，毛只是认为他讲的过了。

提问 14：饶漱石最后是什么结局？他又活了好多年？

王海光：饶漱石的情况是这样的。在 1955 年给饶漱石定案以后，他到 1956 年的时候，就是苏共 20 大召开以后，那时候苏共已经对斯大林时期的一些案子开始平反了，饶漱石也提出来要求对他案子重新审查，申述说他跟高岗没有什么联盟。但他的问题重新提出来以后，没有什么结果。后来饶漱石又受到了潘汉年、杨帆案子的牵连，又给他判了徒刑。在 1965 年的时候才放出监狱，到了文革又重新入狱，在监狱中死去了，大体上情况是这样。

主持人：从刚才大家提问中可以看出大家了解历史真相的迫切心情，历史就是一面镜子，可惜我们目前的这面镜子还布满灰尘。我们今天做的工作，就是在一点一点擦拭，我想通过我们不断努力，关心我们过去以及对我们未来有重要影响的这段历史，慢慢会随着时间，随着大家的努力，能够水落石出。今天的讲座就到这里结束。

DeepL Translation

Wang Haiguang: reinterpretation of the Gao-Rao incident

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● Wang Haiguang (Enter the column)

First of all, let's talk about the nature of the Gao Rao incident. In the past, the Gao Rao incident was called the first big "line struggle" within the Party after the founding of the People's Republic of China in Party history textbooks. This internal party line struggle took place at the stage of social transition from new democracy to socialism, and created a pattern for the whole internal party struggle after the founding of the PRC, with far-reaching effects. However, for a long time, people did not have a clear understanding of the truth of the incident, not only the general public, but also a small number of people in the academic circle, including senior members of the Party's history circle, who only knew what had happened, but had difficulty in saying what had happened in detail. During the "Reform and Rehabilitation" after the end of the Cultural Revolution, the ten so-called "line struggles" within the Party in the past have been rejected one by one, and the unjust and false cases caused by them have been vindicated and corrected. All the wrongful cases were vindicated and corrected. Only the Gao Rao case was one of the only two cases in which the "original verdict" was upheld, and when Deng Xiaoping made his "historical resolution" in 1980, he told Hu Yaobang, Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun and others, "There is nothing wrong with exposing the Gao Rao case. Deng Xiaoping said to Hu Yaobang, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun when he made the "Historical Resolution". "I know this matter very well." At the same time, Deng Xiaoping also said; the Gao Rao issue "really has no line." The line struggle cannot be established. The Resolution on Several Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding of the PRC, later adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), basically set the tone in accordance with Deng Xiaoping's speech. The question of the line was not mentioned, nor was the question of the "anti-Party alliance" group, but the nature of Gao Rao's anti-Party activities was still recognized. It was called "a major struggle against the conspiracy of the ambitious Gao Gang and Rao Shushi to split the Party and usurp the supreme power of the Party and the country". One of the major historical events after the founding of the PRC was the Gao Rao incident, and the other was the Anti-Rightist Movement; these two cases were not overturned, while all other cases were basically overturned. After the narrative is more complete, is Bo Yibo wrote the "major decisions and events of the review" of the book, which for the Gao Rao incident has a special section of the discussion, but the book author himself to a lot of events are avoided, many of the insides, causes and consequences of the words are not detailed, and biography of their own things too much explanation, so that people are also a bit of a sense of self-congratulation, right!

The official version after this is basically in accordance with the version of Bo Yibo's book to narrate. As for some documentary novels, what "Gao Rao incident end", "death alliance" and so on, artificial add more things, adding confusion, credibility is very low. Over the years, party history scholars feel that the Gao Rao incident is not very clear. Although there are still some bits and pieces of historical information disclosed. For example, the biographies and chronicles of Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun and other leaders published by the Central Documentation and Research Office, as well as Yang Shangkun's Diary, have some records of this incident, but they are all rather fragmentary. The recent publication of these books has revealed many little-known first-hand historical information, which has had a great impact both at home and abroad, and has created a small climax in the interpretation of the Gao Rao incident. The first book is "My Memories" by Zhang Mingyuan, former third deputy secretary of the Northeast Bureau; the second is "My 85 Years - From Northwest to Northeast" by Zhang Xiushan, former second deputy secretary of the Northeast Bureau, which discloses a lot of details, and especially shocking is the disclosure of the fact that at that time, Mao Zedong asked Gao Gang to secretly investigate the matter of Liu Shaoqi's arrest in Fengtian in 1929. Fengtian, which caused great repercussions in the academic world. In particular, the newly published by the Hong Kong wind publishing house, the former secretary of gaogang and the head of the correctional group ZhaoJiaLiang and ZhangMingYuan daughter ZhangXiaoJi co-authored the book "half tombstone under the past - gaogang in Beijing", is currently the most complete reflection of the "gao rao incident" of a work. This book has a large amount of historical information, is based on some of the diary, notes and other original materials written at the time, provides valuable original historical information, disclosed many unknown key details, to our understanding of the history of the Gao Rao incident to bring a new view, many of which is subversive. However, this book has a weakness, that is, too much use of literary style, in the historical narrative, the author of too much evidence, too much speculation, which greatly affects its historiographic value.

After these books came out, it made us have a brand new understanding of the Gao Rao incident. Therefore, in the last one or two years, the academic circles at home and abroad set off a trend of reevaluating the "Gao Rao incident", which also includes the voices of Gao Gang's family members. For example, Mrs. Li Liqun, Gao Gang's wife, talked to a reporter from the Voice of America about

the Gao Rao incident, which was widely circulated overseas. Li Liquan also talked about an upward trend, the Central Organization Department of the past revolutionary achievements of Gao Gang also made a positive conclusion again.

The emergence of these new historical materials has made us skeptical of the original historical conclusions on the Gao Rao incident. As we all know, the Gao Rao affair was handled over a very long period of time; it took place at the end of 1953, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee was convened in February 1954, and the actual handling of the affair was completed at the 1955 National Congress, which lasted for more than a year. This in itself suggests that the Gao Rao incident was complicated and that many things could not be implemented. So, in light of the large amount of new historical information that is currently being revealed, how should the issue of the Gao Rao incident now be viewed? How should it be reinterpreted? What kind of judgment can be drawn?

First of all, were Gao Gang and Rao Shushi an alliance? Through the disclosure of a series of historical details, we can see that they could hardly be said to be an alliance, or not an alliance at all. The parties concerned, whether Gao Gang or Rao Shushi, have never admitted that they were an alliance. Historically they were not a faction. Gao Gang was born in 1905, a cadre born and raised in northern Shaanxi. After the deaths of the northern Shaanxi leaders Xie Zichang and Liu Zhidan, Gao Gang became the representative of the northern Shaanxi base area, and has been working in northern Shaanxi, and was also very much utilized by Mao. Mao once said that there are two orthodoxies in the Chinese revolution, one big orthodoxy is Jinggangshan, and another small orthodoxy is Shaanbei, which is a very high evaluation of Gao Gang. As for Rao Shushi, he was born in 1903, a native of Anhui, had been working in the White Zone, and succeeded Liu Shaoqi as a political commissar of the New Fourth Army after the Anhui Incident. Logically, he should be considered a member of Liu Shaoqi's system in terms of his mountain faction. Gao and Rao did not have any dealings in history, nor did they have any contacts after the founding of the PRC. Rao Shushi went to Dalian just once to inspect the industry of the Northeast, which was at the forefront at that time. After the Gao Rao incident, the characterization that they were an alliance is that they were several regional secretaries who were transferred to Beijing, and then formed a political alliance

in the fall and winter of 1953. This was a very tenuous reason, and in 1955 Mao Zedong told the National Party Congress why Gao Rao was an alliance. He said a few things: because when Bo Yibo was criticized at the 1953 National Financial Conference, the two of them were in agreement. When the National Organization Conference held in October 1953 criticized An Ziwen, they were also in agreement. In addition, after their accident, Gaogang put in a good word for Rao Shushi, and Rao Shushi put in a good word for Gaogang, which proved that they were in an alliance. Mao also said that an alliance does not require a signature or a contract. The reason for such a characterization of an anti-Party alliance is so far-fetched that it is obviously difficult to establish.

Let us look at the sins laid down for Gao and Rao back then, and what exactly were the ones that could be put into practice? The symposium on Gao Gang and Rao Shushi held in 1954 gave a fuller account of their problems. At the symposium on the Gao Gang issue, Zhou Enlai had an outline of his speech on the Gao Gang issue, and Zhou spoke on several points, the first of which was the creation of the "military-party theory" as a tool for splitting the party and seizing leadership power; the second of which was to engage in sectarian activities; and the third was to privately disseminate a top-secret document of the party discussing the work of An Ziwen, which referred to a "document" drafted by An Ziwen, Executive Vice-Minister of the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China. An Ziwen drafted the initial list of the Politburo for the "Eighth National Congress", creating internal discord within the Party; the fourth is to privately appoint officials; the fifth is to set up an independent kingdom in the Northeast; the sixth is to undermine the prestige of the leaders (Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai); the seventh is to plagiarize manuscripts to elevate himself; the eighth is to make a fuss about Sino-Soviet relations; and the ninth is to carrying out activities to seize the authority of the state. There was also one item of corruption in life style, which added up to ten counts.

Rao Sushi's offenses were fewer, because Rao Sushi lived a relatively simple life, and there was no mess in his private life, so there was no problem with his life style. The main problem is that after he was transferred to Beijing as the head of the Central Organization Department, he criticized An Ziwen at the meeting of the Department of the Central Organization Department, and the purpose of fighting An Ziwen was to straighten out Liu Shaoqi, which is a realistic crime. Others involve

some historical issues: one is the "Huanghuatang Incident". In the period of the New Fourth Army, Rao organized some people to criticize Chen Yi; another is the "power play" problem. When determining the chairman of the East China Military and Political Committee (generally speaking, the chairman of the Military and Political Committee was an army cadre, Liu Bocheng in Southwest China and Lin Biao in Central and South China), he reported to the Central Committee that the comrades in East China didn't agree with Chen Yi to be the chairman, and he became the chairman of the Party and the government of East China, which was "playing with tactics and seeking power"; and there was also the "Huanghuatang Incident". In 1952, the Central Committee asked Rao Shushi to go to Beijing to recuperate. This was told by Mao Zedong. Rao Shushi thought that the Central Government did not trust him, so he called Mao Zedong in the middle of the night and asked for an interview. After the interview, there was nothing much to do, and he talked about it for more than three hours, but in the end, Mao Zedong heard what he meant, that is, did the Central Government suspect him and did not trust him? Mao said there is no such thing, you are willing to recuperate in Beijing to recuperate, you do not want to recuperate in Beijing, you can go back, he was relieved. It can be seen that all these are trivial matters that cannot be brought to the surface, so how can they constitute a crime? Therefore, from that time until now, the question of their guilt has not been made clear. Comparing the "guilt" of these two people, I personally think that the Gao Rao incident is, in the final analysis, an incident of Gao Gang, and Rao Shushi is actually a partner in it.

It can be seen from Gao Gang's "charges" that some of them do not correspond to the facts, some of them are just a case of putting words in his mouth, and some of them are just purely labeling. For example, plagiarism manuscripts, elevate themselves this article, originally the central leaders let his men write more manuscripts, let the subordinates get a speech outline, he got the Central Politburo meeting to talk about, the Central Politburo said that Gao Gang today speech is very good, Chairman Mao praise Gao Gang, this is the same as to say that it is plagiarism? If this is plagiarism and self-aggrandizement, then there are too many of our leaders who plagiarize and self-aggrandize. Some of them even compiled meeting documents drafted collectively into their own anthologies, so is the nature not even more serious.

With regard to the handling of the Gao Rao incident, there was a saying when the Historical Resolution was made that we were more lenient in handling the Gao Rao incident and did not organize many people. In fact, the Gao Rao incident, of course, is not comparable to the later "Anti-Rightist" and "Cultural Revolution", but at that time, it should be said that there were still a lot of people who were wrongly organized. All the people in the Northeast Bureau team, except Lin Feng, were taken down. Zhang Xiushan and Zhang Mingyuan were the second and third secretaries respectively, and Zhang Xiushan, Zhang Mingyuan, Zhao Dezun, Ma Hong and Guo Feng, then known as the "Northeast Five Tigers", were all dealt with, but also the leading cadres of the municipal party committees of the lower provinces. For example, the leadership of the Lushun Municipal Party Committee has been badly organized. Rao Sushi was also involved in a wide range of areas, first of all, Xiang Ming, the acting secretary of the Shandong branch, was knocked down because of his involvement in this matter, and later on, he was involved in the case of Pan Hannian and Yang Fan in Shanghai. And at that time in the Northeast, many leaders at the provincial and municipal levels were implicated. The Northeast was originally a national advanced unit, a place for cadres, but after the Gao Rao incident, a large number of cadres were involved, some of whom had been suppressed for years and could not be utilized, and some of whom were directly demoted and subjected to disciplinary actions. More importantly, the Gao Rao incident for the establishment of the party's internal struggle after the beginning of a very bad head, later, there was later the whole Peng Dehuai, the whole Liu Shaoqi more things appeared. It can be said that this incident created an institutional path.

The cadres involved in the Gao Rao incident were basically reinstated after the Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong said in 1955 that Gao and Rao had become two single cadres. At that time, Mao was against the idea of these two single cadres and labeled them as an anti-Party alliance. Now it has been ascertained that the cadres of the Northeast Bureau had only a working relationship with Gao Gang, and that there was no such thing as an alliance between Gao and Rao. The most important example of the alliance between Gao Gang and Rao Shushi is that at the 1953 Organizational Work Conference, Zhang Xiushan made a speech, which Rao Shushi admired, and set off a trend of criticizing An Ziwen, so-called "discussing An and attacking Liu," criticizing An Ziwen, in fact, as a blow to Liu Shaoqi, and setting up such a crime. Now, the circumstances of this matter have been clarified, neither Zhang Xiushan's recollections, nor Gao Gang's secretary Zhao Jialiang's

recollections, there is no such thing as this "alliance". In fact, Zhang Xiushan came to Beijing to participate in the grain conference, he did not want to speak at the meeting of the organization, and Gao Gang also prevented him from speaking, saying that these issues can not be resolved in the organization of the meeting, do not speak. Then, Gao Gang went south to recuperate, did not even look at Zhang Xiushan's speech. It was Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi who asked Zhang Xiushan to speak at the organization meeting. When Zhang Xiushan attended the Food Work Conference, he talked about how Northeast China had some opinions about the Organization Department and made five comments. Mao Zedong said that you should go to the meeting to talk about it, but the five points you mentioned are related to Liu Shaoqi, so you should talk to Liu Shaoqi first. When the meeting was held, Zhang Xiushan approached Comrade Liu Shaoqi and said that the Chairman had asked me to talk to you first. Liu Shaoqi also knew what he was going to say, so he said that there was no need for him to speak, so you should make a speech. Zhang made a speech in this way, which had absolutely nothing to do with Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, but rather with Liu Shaoqi and Mao Zedong. Zhang Xiushan also gave An Ziwen his opinion, which was openly expressed and put on the table. However, Zhang Xiushan's statement caused a controversy at the meeting, and there was a great deal of criticism of the organizational work, so later on, it was taken as one of the main events of the Gao Rao Alliance, but in fact, it was not related to the "Alliance" at all.

There is also the question of Gao Gang's involvement in foreign affairs, which is now the subject of much debate, as evidenced by materials from the Soviet Union. But this is also something that is very far from the truth. The representative of the Soviet side who was at the Zhongchanglu at that time, called Kovalev, reported to Stalin that according to Gao Gang's report, there were some anti-Soviets in the CCP, such as Liu Shaoqi, and these people were anti-Soviets. This matter has been ascertained, there was indeed such a document, but this incident had nothing to do with Gao Gang at all, Kovalev was talking nonsense, but there was a reason for it. Because Mao Zedong scolded Kovalev during his visit to the Soviet Union, which was a bit like beating a dog to show it to its master. Mao Zedong's visit to the Soviet Union in Moscow, at the beginning of Stalin had hung him out to dry, not to mention the matter of revising the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty, Mao Zedong was very angry, Kovalev to find a scolding, said I came to you here is something, now I am doing what is the matter? Now what am I doing? I just eat and shit all day long. Kovalev reported the matter to Stalin, who thought the man was ineffective. In order to make amends, Kovalev made

such a report to Stalin. There is also a story that Gao Gang wanted to turn the Northeast into the 17th republic of the Soviet Union. At that time, when the Soviet army was in the Northeast, it demolished many factories in the Northeast, and there were many violations of discipline by the Soviet army, and the cadres of the Northeast Bureau, including Gao Gang, resented it, but at that time, in order to take the overall situation into account, they did not mention this matter. But the claim that Gao Gang wanted to annex the Northeast to the Soviet Union is unfounded. One of the most important pieces of evidence was that Gao Gang did not know any foreign language, and every time he came into contact with a foreigner he had to use an interpreter and had a secretary present. So at that time, Liu Yalou also revealed that Gao Gang and foreigners had secret talks for three days and three nights, which is simply impossible and has been completely denied.

So the matter of foreign affairs no longer exists, the matter of alliance no longer exists, the matter of group no longer exists, then what can be implemented? This is one of the issues we want to unpack today. When it comes to the issue of Gao Gang, there is an episode in which Gao Gang was restless after arriving at the Central Committee, always trying to take away Zhou Enlai's and Liu Shaoqi's power. One of the most important examples is about Gao Gang pulling Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping. When he pulled Chen Yun, he said that the Central Committee should set up a few more vice-presidents, one for you and one for me, and this is how the history of the Party tells it now. This is a hard evidence of Gao Gang's dealings as an ambitious person. But according to the material now available, the disclosure in Zhao Jiliang's book *Gao Gang in Beijing*, this remark was not made by Gao Gang, but by Chen Yun. Why did Chen Yun say this? Because Chen Yun and Gaogang had a very good relationship, and Gaogang regarded Chen Yun as a saint, and consulted with Chen Yun on important matters. But from a political point of view, Gao Gang is still relatively shallow, is a "two-stroke".

So how did Gao Gang's anti-Party activities happen? It is not easy to see clearly if we only deal with these specific historical details. What were the causes and consequences of the Gao Rao incident? What was the background against which it happened? What is particularly important is that MAO Zedong was originally in support of GAO Gang, so why did he later slap GAO Gang down? That is to say, the disclosure of historical details has raised new questions for us, and it is necessary to sort

out these new historical materials to find out a logical trail of what happened. That is why I have tried to interpret Gao Gang's case in a wider context.

I am looking at this intra-party struggle in two broad contexts, one called the context of the political struggle and the other the context of the power struggle. That is to say, I recognize this incident from the dual background of "political struggle and power struggle".

What does the political struggle refer to? When the People's Republic of China was founded, the goal was to establish a new democratic state, which was set out in the Common Program formulated by the Chinese Communist Party and the democratic parties during the period of the founding of the People's Republic of China. The establishment of a state of a new democratic nature has been the banner that the CPC has been fighting under since the War of Resistance, and what is the gist of the new democratic line? What is the main point of the new democratic line? It is what Mao Zedong said at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of China, "the need for the extensive development of capitalism". But New Democracy is a non-canonical, non-canonical phrase in the classic Marxist-Leninist writers, and you can't find anything called New Democracy, only capitalist and socialist societies. The meaning of building a new democracy is that China's productive forces are particularly backward and underdeveloped, in a period of pre-modernization, and that it is necessary to develop some capitalism, to have the joint development of multiple economic components, and then only after the productive forces are developed to a certain extent can it be transferred to socialism. This was one of its original intentions and a banner under which the CPC took over the world, which is very clear. After the founding of the country, from the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the layout of the founding of the country was in accordance with the policy of building the country on the basis of New Democracy and the policy of joint development of various economic components, and the plan of "three years of preparation and ten years of construction" was also made at that time. It can be said that the New Democracy Program was the CPC's philosophy and flag of state-building.

In 1952, there was a new change in the situation. The Korean War had basically entered a stalemate, and the two sides began to negotiate. Mao Zedong then put on the agenda the period of transition from new democracy to socialism. In October 1952, when Liu Shaoqi went to the Soviet Union to attend the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Mao Zedong asked him to tell Stalin about the CPC Central Committee's opinion (which was in fact Mao's personal opinion) that it was now ready to start the transition to socialism from now on, and asked for Stalin's opinion.

Thereafter, the CCP began to change its state-building line. The change in the line of the founding of the country was a fundamental change in the outline of the program, and it was a move that affected the overall situation. As a result, many problems and contradictions arose. For example, the question of whether it was acceptable to the people, the question of how to unify the thinking of the Party, and especially the question of unifying the thinking of the top echelons of the Central Committee. At the top level, especially with Mao as the representative, after the founding of the country, there were many conflicts over what kind of road China should take and what kind of route it should take to build the country. There were four important ones, and these conflicts were not only between Mao and Liu, but actually represented conflicts between the top and middle levels of the Party.

One was about Liu Shaoqi's Tianjin speech. After entering the city, many cadres brought the same way of fighting the landlords in the countryside and dividing up the land to the city, organizing some kind of poor peasants' regiment in the city, or adopting the practice of relying on the poor, and incidents like the division of stores occurred repeatedly. The capitalists in Tianjin were made to panic. Liu Shaoqi went to Tianjin in April 1949 to solve this problem. In his speech in Tianjin, Liu pacified the capitalists and encouraged them to produce without fear. He talked about the problem of exploitation by the capitalists, saying that from Marx's point of view, capitalism was an improvement over feudalism, and that you were now exploiting not more, but less. Liu Shaoqi's Tianjin talk was very effective in stabilizing the city at that time, and there is nothing wrong with this point of view in view of our level of understanding today. However, some cadres in the Party at that time, especially those who came out from the rural areas to fight the landlords and divide up the

land, found it very unpleasant, saying that how to call the exploitation meritorious? Isn't the purpose of the revolution to overthrow the landlords and capitalists? Gao Gang was one of the fiercest opponents. After Liu Shaoqi dealt with the Tianjin issue, he realized that there were some "left" things in the urban work in Northeast China, so he sent a telegram to Northeast China, telling it to pay attention to the policy of national capitalists. At that time, Liu Shaoqi saw a report from Zou Dapeng, the Minister of Social Affairs of the Northeast, to the Central Committee, which talked about some "left" tendencies in the urban policy of the Northeast. That is, the capitalists only talk about the struggle, do not talk about unity, eager to eliminate capitalism and so on. Liu Shaoqi sent a telegram to the Northeast Bureau, citing the case of Tianjin as an example, asking the Northeast to pay attention to the "left" problem. Gao Gang ignored it. Gao Gang ignored it and said that Liu Shaoqi's idea was "right" and he did not support it. Mao Zedong also thought that Liu Shaoqi had gone too far in his remarks and that they were inappropriate. This was one thing.

The second thing was the question of the rich peasant party members. This was in 1950, when the newly liberated areas had just undergone land reform, because the land reform in the Northeast was early, and many peasants had become rich with their own labor after they had been given their land, so they became the new rich peasants. The new rich peasants who emerged after the land reform were different from the old rich peasants in the past. When the peasants became rich, it aroused people's doubt: "Now that the movement of fighting the landlords and dividing up the land has ended, what should we do if there are new rich peasants?" In particular, some of the new rich peasants were the backbone of the land reform. At that time, such a question arose, saying that the Communist Party did not talk about exploitation, and you, with this 30 mu of land and a cow, you still have to hire people, and you have become a new rich peasant, aren't you contradicting the tenet of the Party? Liu Shaoqi, who adhered to the line of New Democracy, said that the emergence of rich peasants was not terrible (New Democracy permitted exploitation), and that it was permissible to hire laborers to work alone, and he told An Ziwen, the then executive vice minister of the Organization Department of the Communist Party. Based on Liu's opinion, An Ziwen wrote a letter to the Northeast on how to deal with this problem, saying that it was permissible to hire laborers, and that if you stopped it now, people would not dare to hire, and productivity would suffer. So he was in favor of rich peasant Party members, in favor of Party members being allowed to hire. Gao Gang was not happy about this. Moreover, Gao Gang had Mao's support behind him, and Mao was

not in favor of this practice, believing that as long as one was engaged in exploitation, he could not enter the party.

Once again, there was the issue of mutual aid and cooperation in 1951. The matter was a directive from the North China Bureau to the Shanxi Provincial Committee on mutual aid cooperation. After the division of the countryside into single farms, the problem that arose was not only that of the new rich peasants getting rich, but also that of the need to change the organization and production system that had been formed during the war. Now that everyone is farming their own land, the old forms of mutual aid and cooperation have changed. At this time, Shanxi proposed to reorganize itself to follow the path of mutual aid and cooperation. Because the wartime Mutual Aid Cooperation was a kind of substitute farming system, when someone went to the front to fight in the war, his family's land was settled by the village through the Mutual Aid Cooperation. Now that the land reform is over, there is no more war, and construction is underway, everyone is planting their own land, so how can the grassroots organizations in the countryside manage? So this brought about a problem of organization in the rural areas of the old regions. The Shanxi Provincial Party Committee encouraged the organization of mutual aid and cooperation as a way to reorganize the rural Party organization. This matter was reported by Shanxi to the North China Bureau, which considered it to be "leftist" and reported it to Liu Shaoqi. Liu Shaoqi agreed with the North China Bureau that this was a kind of idealistic socialism, and that socialism could not be realized on the basis of small peasants, and that it was necessary to develop the productive forces. It can be seen from Liu Shaoqi's thinking that he still advocated the development of the productive forces first, and after a certain degree of development, the mechanization of agricultural production, and then under the conditions of mechanization, cooperativization, which was called the idea of mechanization and then cooperativization. The thinking of Mao Zedong and Gao Gang was not the same as that of Liu Shaoqi; they all wanted to organize first, and to organize as a condition for mechanization. There was such a difference. Mao Zedong criticized Liu Shaoqi and rejected his views, while promoting Gao Gang's experience of cooperativization in the Northeast.

There are other issues of the policy of trade union work. What was the position of the trade unions? Is it the position of the government or the position of the workers? This problem has not been

solved even now. At that time Li Lisan and Liu Shaoqi were in favor of the relative independence of the trade unions (which was criticized), and Gao Gang was against it, emphasizing the consistency between the interests of the workers and the interests of the state. Mao rejected Liu Shaoqi's opinion and supported Gao Gang's. As can be seen in the middle of these events from 1950 to 1951, Liu Shaoqi was frequently losing points and Gao Gang was frequently scoring points. At that time, the Northeast under Gao Gang's leadership was a model region of the country, and all the work was in the front of the country. In the political disputes after the founding of the country, it can be seen that Mao and Gao Gang were in agreement, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai were in agreement. Liu and Zhou adhered to the new democratic line established during the period of the founding of the PRC.

By the second half of 1952, the central government began to mull over the transition to socialism, and this political turnaround immediately brought about problems in four areas.

The first problem was a conflict in jurisprudence. The Common Program for the founding of the country talked about the establishment of a new democratic society, but now suddenly a socialist society was to be established, so did the ruling party's past promises still count? From within the Party, the CCP relied on the resolution of the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, which was twofold. The basic spirit of the resolution was to establish the initial basis for the industrialization of the country under the new democratic social system, and then to transform it into socialism; at the same time, the resolution stated that the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie was the basic contradiction in the country, and it also expressed the aspect of the need to fight against the bourgeoisie. So there is a "two-track system", which can be implemented one way or the other. Therefore, even if we use the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) as the legal basis, there is still the problem of duality in itself. Of course, in terms of the juridical basis of a country, it is still the juridical basis of New Democracy, as clearly stated in the Common Program. This is the conflict of jurisprudence.

The second problem is the conflict between strategy and tactics. For New Democracy, is it to be taken as a strategic policy, as a definite policy of the state that can be implemented in the long run?

Or as a transitional strategic policy? It was a question of strategy to change it as soon as the Communist Party became stronger and organized the masses. This question of strategy and tactics brought about another conflict. In fact, many capitalists, including some self-employed people in the cities, when they heard the news of the transition to socialism, cried out that they had fallen into the boat of thieves because they could not keep their private property. This is because the transition to socialism, as originally stated by the Communist Party, was something to be done in 20 or 30 years, not something to be done now. This is another conflict that occurs in the middle of the social level.

The third problem is the conflict between theory and reality. We can look back and see that Mao Zedong's rule was characterized by a constant quest for speed, "10,000 years is too long, just a matter of time". From the founding of the country to the transition, and the socialist revolution led by Mao Zedong, we can see that Mao's rule was characterized by a constant quest for speed. I have also been thinking about this question. As an individual with a grand career complex, what did Mao Zedong think about the contradiction between the infinity of his career and the finiteness of his life? Mao Zedong was very pragmatic in his revolution, rejecting the "bookism" and dogmatism of the Wang Ming Internationalists from Moscow, and emphasizing his own national experience. After the founding of the country, how did he change from an empiricist to an idealist and finally to an idealist?

By the end of 1952, when the country had just recovered from the state of war, why was Mao so eager to switch immediately from the new democracy established at the founding of the country to a socialist state? By engaging in a new democracy for a period of time, the CCP had made a promise to the democratic parties and people from all walks of life, so Mao was also well aware that there was a political price to pay for this transition. What was the reason for the hasty transition? I have an interpretation of my own: because the New Democratic Revolution is an unscriptural discourse that does not rank in the Marxist ideological system. For China to be able to speak in the middle of the communist world, you have to make yourself socialist first. So we can see that Mao was particularly anxious about the transition to socialism, and one important reason was that he wanted to fight for the right to speak in the socialist camp, especially after Stalin's sudden death in March 1953, the issue

of fighting for the right to speak was put into a more important position, which, I think, was a realistic factor for the eagerness to make the transition.

In addition, the transition also involved a conflict between procedural and non-procedural rationality. In the early days of the founding of the country, the Chinese Communists did not understand what procedural justice was, and it can be said that they have never paid much attention to procedures, and they have never really paid attention to procedural issues even now. Changing the system of a country is a major event that changes the very foundation of the country, and it must be done in a form that cannot be discussed and decided by the top echelons of the ruling party and then communicated and implemented. The decision on the transition to socialism has no legal basis. It is not necessary to talk about a referendum, but it is possible to talk about the National People's Congress, or a form of democratic discussion from below, but in fact there is none! As can be seen from the process of formulating the General Line during the transitional period, there was a fundamental lack of the modern political concepts of procedure and the rule of law. From later history, we can also see the lack of procedural rationality in this decision-making process. After the founding of the country in 1949, the CCP, especially Mao, talked a lot about democracy and very little about the rule of law. And in many cases, the leaders of the CCP were looking at the law as a rope to bind their hands and feet. From the above, it can be seen that this great turnaround in the route of nation-building is itself characterized by deprogramming. This has led to many problems, the first of which is that it has put all the contradictions within the ruling party and centralized them in the top echelons of the party. From the point of view of political disputes, the Gao Rao incident is precisely a result of the lack of procedural rationality in decision-making and the failure to publicize national events. So much so that such a major change in the state of the nation eventually evolved into a serious power struggle within the party. This is in terms of the general background of the political struggle.

In terms of the background of the power struggle, this period, which began in 1952 and 1953, was a period of re-adjustment of power at the central and local levels. In the early years of the founding of the PRC, the central government adopted the system of a Council of State under the central government, which was the Central People's Government (CPG). At the same time, a system of

administrative decentralization between the central and regional levels was introduced. In terms of the overall statehood and configuration of state power, it was a dual centralized system. The regional system is a pattern of decentralization of power between the central and local levels formed during the military operations to unify the whole country, and the regional government is both the representative organ of the central government and the supreme local authority, with a great deal of independence. The regional system was a continuation of the past pattern of the four major field armies fighting for the whole country, and was divided into several regions, including the Northeast and North China, which were liberated relatively early. The military-political committee system was practiced in the regions, which was in fact still a military system. Such a dual system was conducive to the rapid neutralization of the social forces of the former regime that resisted the new regime. But it also posed the problem that, if the regions were linked up with each other, they could also be sufficiently powerful to separate themselves from the central government. In all Chinese dynasties, after the establishment of the central government, there was a process of cutting down and centralizing power to the central government. Mao Zedong, who is well versed in Chinese history, is naturally very familiar with the story of the founding of the previous dynasty, such as the Song dynasty's "release of military power in a cup of wine", and is very wary of the country's emergence into a situation of "the end of the big will be folded, and the tail is not big enough to fall off". This was done in 1952, when the Central Government said that we should now centralize the leadership of the central government, and that cadres from all regions should be drawn out to strengthen the central government and carry out large-scale economic construction. At that time, China was practicing large-scale economic construction, that is, planned economy, adopting the Soviet system of prioritizing heavy industry. From June 1952, several regional secretaries were transferred to Beijing one after another. Deng Xiaoping of the Southwest Bureau transferred the earliest, he was inaugurated in August; the first secretary of the Central and South Bureau is Lin Biao, Lin Biao has been sick since the fight on Hainan Island, by the second secretary Deng Zichu specifically presided over the work, Deng Zichu transferred to the Central Committee in charge of the agricultural sector; Northwest Bureau, the first hand is Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai is in the war in North Korea, the second secretary of the second secretary of the XI Zhongxun transferred to Beijing, served as the head of the Propaganda Department; the first secretary of the East China Bureau, Rao Soushi, transferred to Beijing. Rao Sushi, the first secretary of the East China Bureau, was transferred to Beijing as the head of the Central Organization Department; Gao Gang, the secretary of the

Northeast Bureau and the chairman of the Northeast People's Government, was also transferred. At that time, it was said that "five horses came to Beijing, and one horse took the lead". "Gao Gang was the first to be transferred to Beijing, because the post he took up was particularly important. Gao Gang was forty-seven or eight years old when he was transferred to Beijing, and he was a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central People's Government. After being transferred to the Central Committee, other people no longer held regional posts, but Gao Gang still held the post of the Northeast Region, which shows that Mao Zedong attached special importance to Gao Gang's transfer to Beijing. Gao Gang's post in Beijing was Chairman of the State Planning Commission. At that time, the State Planning Commission was at the same level as the State Council, which was modeled after the Soviet system, and it controlled the entire industrial and economic sectors, so this position was very important. After the "Five Horses Entered Beijing", especially after Gao Gang arrived in Beijing, Mao Zedong particularly appreciated Gao Gang. At that time, the work of the Northeast was in the forefront of the country, and the Northeast contributed the most to the support of the anti-U.S. and North Korea. Peng Dehuai said, at that time North Korea awarded Peng Dehuai a Republican First Class Medal, Peng said, this medal should be given to the two pals, one pals is Hong pals, that is, the logistics minister Hong Xuezhai, and another is high pals, refers to Gao Gang. This also shows that their relationship was very good.

Gao Gang to Beijing, he worked in the residence and Mao is very close, the two often talk, and Gao Gang character, temperament, temperament and Mao are very similar to each other, talk to each other, from the life of the work, to the comments of some leaders. At that time, because Gao Gang and Mao is too close, and his power is very big, so Zhou Enlai in the wholesale documents was originally Mao, Liu, Zhou, Zhu, the following is Gao Gang. Zhou Enlai consciously moved Gao Gang forward, sometimes directly after Mao, sometimes Mao, Liu, Gao, and then Zhou. Zhao Jiliang, Gao Gang's secretary, was smart enough to tell Gao Gang that the order of this release was incorrect. Because at the Seventh Congress, Gao Gang was ranked eighth in the Party, and after Ren Bishi's death, he should have been ranked seventh. When he reached the Central Committee, according to the positions he held, the things he was in charge of, and the degree of trust Mao had in him, he could at best be mentioned as fourth. Zhou Enlai put Gao Gang's name forward, in fact, with a little taste of political testing. Gao Gang heard the secretary say this problem, immediately

realized, then called Zhou Enlai, said Premier you so put me to the front is not appropriate, do not put me to the front. By the way, Zhou Enlai's handling of the ranking relationship included putting his name on the list. In the middle of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong mentioned at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China that the Central Committee of the Cultural Revolution Group was no longer needed and had completed its task. But when Mao Zedong speaks, no one can tell whether it is true or not. So Zhou Enlai initially wrote about the Central Cultural Revolutionary Group. When Mao saw it later, he asked, "Why is it still there? It was only then that Zhou Enlai realized what Mao meant and knew that Mao really wanted to abolish the Central Cultural Revolutionary Group. Therefore, after the Ninth National Congress, there was no more Central Cultural Revolutionary Group on the documents.

This can be seen from a certain point of view, Gao Gang after arriving in Beijing, how by Mao, and how much power. Even the Premier of the State Council felt the pressure. Moreover, the arrival of these major leading cadres at the regional level in Beijing put pressure on the cadres who used to work in Beijing. At that time, most of the cadres who made up the central government came from the old North China Bureau, and the key positions in several areas were held by cadres who were originally from the old North China Bureau. For example, the organizational power was in the hands of Peng Zhen and An Ziwen, and the economic power was in the hands of Bo Yibo. After Gao Gang arrived in Beijing, it was a shock to the original work and personnel pattern. The Central People's Government was expanded on the basis of the North China People's Government, and there were naturally more cadres in North China. But were the cadres in North China more capable than those in other regions? Of course not. Therefore, once the cadres from other regions entered Beijing, no matter from the seniority, ability and merits, they were not weaker than the original cadres in Beijing, and even stronger, which immediately had a problem of power redistribution. This power redistribution problem, that is the real work.

What are the characteristics of Gao Gang? Energetic, administrative ability is very strong, and good at using people, can grasp the big things. He is in the Northeast is the party and government hand, say one, specific work, set on doing, thunder and lightning, high efficiency. But the work of the central government has its own way, work step by step, have their own procedures, their own track.

It looks a bit abrasive and tug-of-war. When Gao Gang came up from the position of a hand from below, he was not accustomed to the working style of the original central departments and had some friction with the cadres in charge of these departments. For example, he presided over the work of the Planning Commission, is generally very efficient, what things dare to make a decision, after the decision, immediately do, do check on the implementation. Bo Yibo is responsible for the Central Finance Commission, some things are not implemented, some leaders have some opinions, in order to fight for their own departmental interests to the side of Gao Gang, so that high to help speak. After this kind of thing more, Bo Yibo very some views. 1953 March a meeting, Bo Yibo in the meeting, angry, said: "you all go to find everything to the high chairman, do you know there is a China Finance Committee? There is a director of the Central Finance Committee named Chen Yun, and there is another director named Bo Yibo." And there was a big outburst of anger at the meeting. As we look at it now, it was just a matter of unclear authority over work, and the friction that arose was quite natural and did not necessarily involve other political issues. But at that time there were some cadres who were very unconvinced by Bo Yibo. For example, Chen Zhengren, the Minister of Construction, was a ministerial-level cadre during the period of the Central Soviet Area, and his qualifications were older than Bo Yibo's, so he ran to Gao Gang and complained to him. This led to a deepening of the conflict between the cadres in North China and the foreign cadres.

This led to the problem of factionalism within the Party. The organization of the CCP developed from the various mountains. During the Red Army period, there were three main Red Armies; after the War of Resistance, nineteen base areas were formed; during the War of Liberation, there were four major field armies; and after the founding of the People's Republic of China, there were six regions. At the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong said that we as a party had developed from countless small hills, and that we were to recognize the hills, to transform them, and later to cut them down. By the time 1952 rolled around, there was another big change in the situation. One was that the main leaders of the Region had already been transferred to Beijing; another was that during this period the question of redistribution of power arose once again: one was to convene the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and the other was to convene the National People's Congress (the convening of the National People's Congress was Stalin's way of saying that you have to convene the National People's Congress, or else there would not be enough legitimacy for the regime), and this brought up the question of the redistribution of

power. If in the past, in the process of fighting the world, people in North China occupied more seats in the central government, now that the world had been fought, and the local mountains had been cut down, there should be a rearranging of seats in the central government.

At the end of February 1953, Mao Zedong proposed to consider how to arrange the personnel of the Central Committee, and at the beginning of March, Liu Shaoqi put forward a proposal and came up with a list. This issue of the list is a key place in our understanding of the Gao Gang incident. One of the values of the book *Gao Gang in Beijing* is that it provides two lists. We used to know that An Ziwen had drafted a list of members of the Politburo for the Eighth National Congress, but we didn't know that Liu Shaoqi had a list of personnel arrangements before that, and these two lists are very interesting when we look at them together. Liu Shaoqi initially put forward the list of the Secretariat is: the party secretary of the government is Peng Zhen, the organization is An Ziwen, culture and education is Xi Zhongxun, financial is Liu Lantao, agriculture is Deng Zichu, workers and youth is Rao Shushi, is such a list. Gao Gang read this list after quite dissatisfied, think the important posts are still in the name of the North China mountain, think there is no sense, he gave Mao talked about this opinion. The most important thing is another list, that is, the list drafted by An Ziwen, this list is the big joint in interpreting the Gao Rao incident. An Ziwen drafted a list of the members of the Politburo of the Eighth National Congress, and there are three ways of saying this: Gao Gang's authorization, An Ziwen's unauthorized drafting, and Liu Shaoqi's authorization. Which one of these three versions is the most reliable? In this incident, An Ziwen was only an executive vice minister of the Organization Department, and he dared to draft the list of leaders on his own? This is too much courage. To be sure, without the authorization of others, An Ziwen drafted the list is a serious overstepping of authority. Then, whose authorization did he get? Gao Gang didn't care about organization, so he couldn't say anything to An Ziwen, and even if Gao Gang had said something, An Ziwen shouldn't have listened to him because the person in charge of organization at the Central Committee wasn't Gao Gang, it was Liu Shaoqi. So from this point of view, I think it is most likely that Liu Shaoqi authorized it. And in the final analysis, even if Liu said that he wanted An to come up with a draft for discussion first, it's not a big deal in hindsight. To be in the open or a democratized decision-making mechanism, this should not have been a thing.

When Mao Zedong received this list of top secrets of the Party drafted by An Ziwen, he sent his secretary to Gao Gang to have Gao Gang read it immediately, and then Mao's secretary took the document away. To what extent was this list confidential? Zhu De did not know, only a few members of the Politburo knew, Liu Shaoqi should know, Mao Zedong knew, is Mao Zedong will be this top-secret list to Gao Gang read. This was a very telling move, indicating that he strongly disapproved of Liu Shaoqi's personnel arrangements. Gao Gang, who had deep prejudices against the North China leaders, was naturally very annoyed to see this list of "Bo (Yibo) but not Lin (Biao)". Gao Gang mixed Mao Zedong's opinions with his own and spread them privately among senior cadres, especially the army cadres. Bo Yibo was no match for Lin Biao in terms of seniority, ability and contribution. Lin Biao's Four Wildernesses had fought all over the world, and the Four Wildernesses were full of generals and cadres. In the four major field armies, the four fields from the Northeast to Hainan Island, in the first place, the highest head of the four fields is actually not in the Politburo, the army cadres must be angry. Mao Zedong was furious about this top secret list, criticizing An Ziwen, saying, who authorized you, how can you draft this thing? But in the end Mao didn't pursue it, which is fishy. Why didn't he pursue it? Why didn't he pursue the matter? He must have known that it was not a good idea to pursue the matter, and An Ziwen took the matter on his shoulders and left it at that. So because of this matter, the problems arising, which constitutes a key issue of Gao Gang in the lower side of the stirring up of right and wrong.

Let's put this list of things to one side, a little later. Let's first talk about the high-level transfer of these vassals to Beijing, the high-level power structure is also to carry out a new adjustment, from this new adjustment can be seen in the middle of Mao's dissatisfaction with the original power structure. The original power structure was basically a continuation of the Mao-Liu system of the Yan'an period, with Mao Zedong as the first in command and Liu Shaoqi as the second in command, presiding over the day-to-day work. Then the government, which was Zhou Enlai, was Mao, Liu and Zhou, forming such a pattern. However, in the Common Program, that is, in the early years of the founding of the country, the Central People's Government is relatively virtual, the real power in the State Council Zhou Enlai, the party affairs in Liu Shaoqi, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, and they are both cadres from the White Zone, but they are not a system, from a certain point of view, Liu, Zhou and the two, in history, there is also the collision of the period of rectification, Liu Shaoqi is a part of the rectification of the Yanan period, Liu Shaoqi is a part of the White Zone, but

he is not a system. During the Yan'an Rectification period, Liu Shaoqi was a party to the rectification, and Zhou Enlai was a party to the rectification. But in this period, in the middle of this power structure, one of the problems brought about is the party power, we can now see Liu Shaoqi's manuscripts since the founding of the country from the recently published documents, from which it can be seen that Liu Shaoqi at that time was quite busy with his work, and he managed quite a lot of things, and he managed a very wide range of things. Zhou Enlai was in charge of even more things, the State Council was in charge of state affairs, big and small. So this gave rise to a situation in which Mao Zedong, as Chairman of the Central People's Government, did not have as much to do as they did. Mao Zedong felt very strongly about this, saying that while the Xihuatang was full of cars, the Yiningtang was full of people. In fact, this was just a systemic problem. In addition, during this period, Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi had conflicts in the implementation of the New Democracy policy and line, including conflicts with Zhou Enlai, and Mao Zedong became dissatisfied with Liu Shaoqi and these people, and he talked about these dissatisfactions with Gao Gang.

Mao Zedong took a major operation on the government system in 1953. This matter was caused by the implementation of the new tax system. The tax laws adopted after the founding of the PRC were basically those that protected the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which were more favorable, while the rest of the private enterprises were taxed more heavily, and by 1953 the SOEs had already accounted for half of the country's total, which brought about the problem of not being able to collect taxes. Taxes were pressed on private capital, making it difficult for them to operate. Therefore, under the auspices of Zhou Enlai, Bo Yibo and others formulated a new tax collection method, the new tax law is to put the circulation tax into the production field, while adjusting the tax rate consistently, in order to open up tax sources. After the new tax law was formulated without passing Mao, it was published in the newspaper. Mao was then annoyed. And because of the rough work done beforehand, some problems arose after the release. There were reflections in Shandong and Beijing. Mao took advantage of the problems that arose in the implementation of the new tax system to make a big fuss. He sharply criticized the new tax system as a capitulation to the bourgeoisie in that "public and private sectors are equally taxed". Subsequently, Mao took a series of organizational measures to weaken and divide the power of Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. While suppressing Liu and Zhou, Gao Gang was allowed to gain a great deal of power.

There were two big moves in 1953: the first was to divide Zhou Enlai's power. At that time, the government department was called the Committee of the Director General of the Government Party Group, which was headed by Zhou Enlai, and the Central Government Party Group was centralized under Zhou Enlai. After Mao Zedong criticized Zhou Enlai, he abolished this committee. In addition, Zhou Enlai's power was divided among the State Council, and the power of the State Council was basically split into six departments: Gao Gang was in charge of planning; Chen Yun was in charge of finance and economics; Xi Zhongxun was in charge of culture and education; and Deng Xiaoping was in charge of nationalities, religion, and united front work, etc. Although Zhou Enlai was in charge of general affairs, he was also in charge of the central government party group. Although Zhou Enlai was in overall charge, the specific port in charge was diplomacy, which was actually one of the six ports, and his power was greatly weakened.

The second move was to cut Liu Shaoqi's power. Because Liu Shaoqi was in charge of the day-to-day work, some of the reports and telegrams were wholesaled without Mao Zedong seeing them. Mao Zedong was very angry about this and became furious, believing that this was hidden from him. In fact, I am now speculating on what Liu Shaoqi did, perhaps he thought that this was his part of the job, and he would think that he could just follow the normal procedures for very specific internal work, and it was not necessary to go through the Chairman for further examination. It should be said that from the point of view of each person's own duties, this is not a problem, reflecting the principle of division of labor and responsibility. However, Mao Zedong regarded this as an attempt to override him, so he became furious and instructed Liu Shaoqi and Yang Shangkun to make a review, asking them to show him all the telegrams they had sent since March last year, so that any future documents that did not go through him would not be counted. In this way, Liu Shaoqi's power was also taken away.

When Mao was dividing Liu's and Zhou's power, Gao Gang became a pawn in the division of power. When Zhou Enlai's power was divided, all the eight ministries of the State Council's industrial sector were assigned to Gao Gang, and Gao Gang's State Planning Commission was in charge of these eight industrial ministries. After Mao transferred the regional secretaries to the

central government, he used them to divide the power of Liu and Zhou, forming a new power pattern. By 1953, there was a new power structure in the Central Committee - a three-legged power structure under Mao - Liu Shaoqi was in charge of Party affairs, Zhou Enlai was in charge of government, and Gao Gang was in charge of the economy.

In fact, the Gao Gang Incident took place when the political struggle at the top of the Party had developed to a certain extent and the power struggle had reached a certain level. For the occurrence of the Gao Rao Incident, two meetings were particularly important: the financial and economic work conference held from June to August, and the Central Organizational Work Conference held in October. These two meetings are very important in understanding the occurrence of the Gao Rao incident.

The Central Financial Conference was originally an economic work conference, that is to say, a specific work conference. However, during this meeting, Mao Zedong put forward the General Line for the Transitional Period, which was presented to the Politburo in June, and approved the phrase "consolidation of the new democratic social order", so the Finance and Economics Conference was turned into a meeting to implement the General Line for the Transitional Period. At the meeting, a large number of people criticized Bo Yibo, and in fact there was an insinuation against Liu Shaoqi. So the meeting was a long one, lasting two months. The reason for criticizing Bo Yibo was the new tax system. Mao Zedong made some very strong remarks at the meeting, saying that Bo Yibo had gone over to the bourgeoisie and had become a spokesman for the bourgeoisie. People also saw Chairman Mao's intention and criticized Bo Yibo very severely. Some said Bo was Denoviev, some said Bukharin, and criticized Bo Yibo to no end. Bo Yibo did two reviews in a row and failed to pass. Gao Gang also played a big role in criticizing Bo Yibo. In fact, Gao Gang was not the only one who jumped high, Tan Zhenlin and Li Fuchun were all criticized very severely. After this meeting, Bo was dismissed as Minister of Finance, and Deng Xiaoping was appointed as Minister of Finance. Because Gao Gang made a very strong speech at this meeting, calling Bo an agent of the bourgeoisie, Bo Yibo felt that this line had been raised too high and could not accept it. Gao Gang then took out the draft of his speech and said, "You see this is not what I said, it is what Chairman

Mao said. Mao summarized by adding that the bourgeoisie's "sugar-coated shells of the spirit have hit a target, Bo Yibo." That's a heavy word. It's in Mao's Selected Works, Volume Five.

Originally, there was a little bit of emotion and ambivalence towards the North China Mountain, especially among the cadres from abroad. This incident made everyone even more emotional, and there was a flurry of criticism of Bo Yibo's problems. In fact, Gao Gang was not the only one who said something over the top at this meeting. I think that Tan Zhenlin's remarks were even more powerful than Gao Gang's. Tan said that the President had a great deal of power in his hands and that the President had a great deal of power in his hands. Tan said that the Chairman was in danger of losing his power, that the White Party wanted to seize the Chairman's power, and that the situation was now very dangerous. During this meeting, LIN Biao was recuperating in Xishan, and everyone, led by GAO Gang, went to visit LIN Biao in a big formation. What is the meaning of the title? You do not have Bo and not Lin on that list, we favor Lin Biao. During the visit, these old superiors and subordinates said some things, some of which were excessive. For example, Wang Heshou, the Minister of Heavy Industry, said on Xishan Mountain that Mr. Lin was right on the mark: there was a danger of the White Party usurping power in the Central Committee. Tan Zhenlin also said that there were two commands, one headed by Chairman Mao and the other by the White Zone Party, and that the struggle between the two commands was threatening to overthrow the Chairman. These words were all very excessive, and it could also be seen that the atmosphere of struggle in the meeting was very tense.

The matter of criticizing Bo Yibo gave the upper hand to these foreign cadres from the various regions. At this meeting, the Great Criticism was created as a way to implement the New Democracy Program as the general line for the transitional period. At this meeting, Liu Shaoqi also made a review. He reviewed the issue of his speech in Tientsin, the right-leaning conservatism on the issue of cooperativization, the issue of rich peasants, and the issue of establishing a new stage of peace and democracy after the victory in the war. After the Finance and Economics Conference, as Mao Zedong used to say, "After the political line is determined, the cadres are the deciding factor", the Second National Conference on Organizational Work was to be held to sum up some of the experiences in organizational work since the founding of the country. At this time, people had

strong opinions about the Central Organization Department (COD) and felt that the COD was not effective in allocating cadres, and that it did not have a good grasp of the standards of party members.

The conference on organization work was convened to implement the general line of the transitional period from an organizational point of view. At that time, Rao Sushi had already been to the central government as the Minister of the Organization Department, the specific work in the transition, the Organization Department was adjusted to Rao Sushi as the Minister, the Organization Minister of the regions to the Organization Department as a deputy minister, which the Northeast Bureau to the Organization Department as a deputy minister of Guo Feng, Rao Sushi said at that time because Rao Sushi at that time, to manage the two ministries, one of them is to manage the Ministry of Organization, and the other one is to manage the Ministry of Labor. The Ministry of Labor was transferring Song Ping to be the Vice-Minister, so that's why Rao Shushi made a speech, saying that if there is anything you should first show Minister Guo Feng and Minister Song Ping, and then let them tell me. In fact, Guo Feng did not arrive, and this incident later became an evidence of Gao Rao's alliance. This is all a no-brainer.

In this organizational meeting, I should say that the bickering was deeper in one way or another, but the chaos was probably not as great as in the financial meeting. This can be seen from a review made by Rao Sushi later on. As we said at the beginning, Zhang Xiushan, the second secretary of the Northeast Bureau, went to Beijing to attend the meeting, he did not come to participate in the organizational meeting, but as a result, after he spoke at the organizational meeting, it caused repercussions, and became a joint sin with Rao Sushi, even he himself was puzzled.

In the middle of this meeting, the North China mountain on the other mountain counterattack is also very big, involving a problem is Zhang Xiushan in the middle of the speech of the five, one is the party organization to further purity, the past defection, mutiny, surrender of these people, to be cleaned out of the party. As soon as this opinion was published, it made the North China mountain very tense. Liu Shaoqi, on the eve of the war, rescued a group of cadres from Caolanzi Prison and let them fulfill the procedure of turning themselves in and leaving the prison, including Bo Yibo.

This was the so-called "61-member group of traitors" during the Cultural Revolution. So they reacted strongly to this, and it was tantamount to taking their political lives. So this organizational meeting was very ineffective. There are two specific evaluations of this meeting: Rao Sushi thought that this meeting was more organized than the financial and economic work conference, and that everyone's opinions were well-founded. But other materials say that it was just the opposite, that the organizational meeting met with great resistance, and in fact the meeting could not go on. These are two accounts.

It can be seen that during this period there were conflicts within the Party over how to change the Party's organizational line to the general line of socialist transition. Liu Shaoqi also made a review in the middle of the organizational work conference. Twice he made a review and expressed his complete obedience to Mao Zedong's general line for the transitional period.

The most active person in the Party during this period was Gao Gang. After Gao Gang arrived in Beijing, Mao Zedong often talked to him about some personnel problems of the Central Committee and expressed his dissatisfaction with Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi. He said that Liu Shaoqi was "politically unstable, and that the 7th and 8th congresses had raised his head. During the Yan'an period, there was a resolution at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee that Mao Zedong was the representative of the correct line in the base area and Liu Shaoqi was the representative of the correct line in the White Area. After the founding of the country, Mao was dissatisfied with Liu and thought that Liu Shaoqi had been elevated too high. Mao's private remarks had a great influence on Gao Gang. In the past, Gao Gang had some opinions about Liu Shaoqi. Gao Gang had clashed with Peng Zhen and Lin Feng over the issue of the base areas in the Northeast. Peng and Lin advocated the occupation of the big cities to prevent the Kuomintang from entering the Northeast. In fact, this could not be done. Gao Gang and Chen Yun and Lin Biao wanted to give up the big cities and establish consolidated rural bases. You can now also find this article in Chen Yun's anthology.

Gao Gang's historical grudge with the North China Mountain is not limited to these. During the Red Army period, he and Liu Zhidan were arrested by Zhu Lizhi, a representative sent by the North

China Bureau, and almost killed, with a big pit ready to bury them. Gao Gang had a view of the cadres of the White Zone, especially those of the North China Bureau.

One of the most important events of this period was Mao's request that Gao Gang secretly investigate the arrest of Liu Shaoqi. A new piece of historical information disclosed in the past two years is that in the spring of 1953, Mao Zedong gave Gao Gang a top-secret mission to investigate the arrest of Liu Shaoqi in the Fengtian Yarn Factory Strike of 1929. This incident led Gao Gang to identify Mao's distrustful attitude toward Liu Shaoqi. After accepting the assignment, Gaogang firstly discussed it with Chen Yun. Chen Yun and Gao Gang were two personalities. Chen Yun was a long thinker and had a very strict mindset. Gao Gang was courageous in action and had excessive energy. One was an action-oriented person and the other was a thinking person. They have a very good relationship with each other, from the time of Shanxi-Gannin, they have worked together. Mao was not happy with Chen Yun, put Chen to the Northwest Government, and later transferred Chen Yun to the Northeast, and high in a team, they are together again. After Gao Gang arrived in Beijing, major and minor matters are discussed with Chen Yun, Chen Yun knew about this matter, said that this must not be publicized, to be implemented in top secret. Gao handed the matter over to Zhang Xiushan, the second secretary of the Northeast, to investigate. Zhang Xiushan felt that this matter was not easy to investigate, so he sent two groups, one to investigate the actual performance, and the other to investigate the historical situation, which was like a wide-spread-net investigation. The specific executives did not know who they were checking, and after checking, they reported the matter to Mao Zedong. It can be seen through this incident that Gao Gang played a considerable role in the anti-Liu campaign.

In addition, the sudden death of Stalin during this period brought about a power vacuum in the Soviet Communist Party. At that time, Stalin did not appoint a successor, so there was a lot of international debate about who should succeed him. There was a lot of international debate about who should succeed him. In fact, Nikita Khrushchev was the last one to emerge from the power struggle. At the beginning, the successor was determined to be Malinkov. In the course of this struggle, the Beria affair occurred first. They arrested and executed Beria, the head of the secret police. The chaos caused by the power vacuum left by Stalin's death must have had an impact on the

CCP. That's why Gao Gang said in Beijing that Mao Zedong and the central leaders were concerned about what would happen to things after Mao Zedong's 100 years. He said a lot of things and expressed great concern. Gao Gang also told Chen Yun about this, and told Chen Yun about Mao's concerns. Chen Yun said Mao must be dissatisfied with Liu, we this first dry up, we dry up and then say. "When the time comes, when the flag falls, if you don't rebel, I'll rebel first!" . This is an important historical information revealed in the recent book "Gao Gang in Beijing".

Gao Gang was very popular among the army and had good relations with the army cadres. So on many occasions, he spoke ill of Liu Shaoqi, some of which he heard directly from Mao, and some of which he added to his own play. For example, when he said that Mao Zedong was not satisfied with Liu Shaoqi and that Liu Shaoqi was politically immature, he must have heard these words in his secret talks with Mao Zedong. Of course, Gao Gang admitted that when he criticized Bo Yibo at the 1953 Finance and Economy Conference, he said something like "the barrel of the gun creates the regime, the barrel of the gun creates the party", saying that he had quoted from Mao's War and Strategic Issues. In this important Party speech in November 1938, Mao Zedong made the famous assertion that "power comes out of the barrel of a gun" and "everything comes out of the barrel of a gun". Gao Gang used this as an argument to criticize Thin, not only to emphasize the dominant position of the base area and the army in the Chinese revolution, but also to affirm that the importance of the base area and the army party was much higher than that of the party in the white zone. That is to say, the base area party is the authentic and main line of the Chinese revolution, and the role of the white zone party is only a side line. He advocated this theory everywhere with the intention of establishing an orthodox position in history for the group of people engaged in armed struggle headed by Mao Zedong. To say that the White Zone Party could not be compared with the Base Area Party, that you played only a side-line role in the middle of the Chinese revolution, was precisely the point he wanted to emphasize.

During this period, especially after the financial and economic work conference, Mao raised the question of dividing the central government into one and two lines. I think it is reasonable to explain the conflict between Mao and Liu Shaoqi in terms of the institutional conflict between the first and second lines. However, Mao first raised the issue of one or two lines not during the adjustment

period after the Great Leap Forward, but in 1953, which was another historical background to the Gao Gang incident. Why did Mao raise the issue of one or two lines in 1953? What exactly did he want to do? After these books by Zhang Mingyuan, Zhang Xiushan and Zhao Jialiang came out, there was a viewpoint in the interpretation of the academia that Mao wanted to use Gao Gang to replace Liu Shaoqi as the successor, and Gao Gang was eager to grab the job, and as a result, he did an unclassified job which led to his ruin. Many researchers have put the Gao Gang matter on the issue of stealing the successor.

My point is that Mao Zedong's idea of a one- or two-tier system was actually a decentralized system. Its purpose was to change the Yan'an system that had been carried over after the founding of the country. At that time, there were such considerations as whether the Central Committee should have one General Secretary? Or should there be several Vice-Presidents? Should the government take the form of a joint conference of ministers? Did the first line of the Central Government initially conceived by Mao Zedong in this period refer to the first line working in government departments? All these are ideas of a decentralized system. As to how the first and second tiers were divided and how the personnel of the first tier were organized, we cannot find the most direct evidence now, but we can find a counter-evidence, that is, some remarks spread by GAO Gang everywhere (especially during the period of going down south), saying that MAO Zedong wanted him to take charge of the Politburo, LIU Shaoqi of the National People's Congress (NPC), and ZHOU Enlai of the government. Gao Gang's remarks were later described as rumor-mongering and attempts to usurp power, but where did these remarks originate? But where did these words originate? Can there be "no wind and no waves"? It can only be that "there is wind and waves". The source should still lie with MAO. It should be said that this personnel layout was MAO Zedong's initial thinking about the division of the Central Committee into one and two lines, and he had conceived such a structure to be realized. It can be seen from this structure that Mao actually wanted to create a decentralized system in the first line of the central government, that is, a troika system under his control. Later, when Gao Gang was criticized, it was also revealed that he had spread the idea of making Lin Biao the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. If that was the case, then it might have been a troika system. Zhou Enlai was in charge of foreign affairs, Lin Biao was Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Liu Shaoqi was in charge of the NPC, and Gao Gang was in charge of Party affairs. That was probably the system at the central line.

Because of the Gao Gang incident, these plans were, shall we say, dead in the water, and there was no way to talk about them. But from this structure, we can see that if this structure is realized, it is really in line with the idea of "monopoly of power and decentralization of small power" advocated by Mao Zedong, and also in line with the logic of the system of traditional Chinese politics that "the sages will execute the important points, and the four directions will come to follow". So my interpretation is that Mao actually wanted to create a first-line system of decentralization and checks and balances, not just to replace a successor. However, Gao Gang thought that Mao Zedong was not satisfied with Liu Shaoqi and wanted to change his successor, and that he was too "two-stroke" and wanted to get Liu Shaoqi out of power, so he went around, which caused a lot of trouble, led to internal disagreement within the Party, and finally led to a break in the Party's reputation, so that Mao Zedong's original vision of the first and second line of authority could not be realized. Deng Xiaoping later said that Gao Gang was trying to steal the first line. Herein lies the rationale.

In the past, it was said that Gao Gang's request for more vice-chairmen was a deal to "seal the deal", and he said to Chen Yun: "One for you, one for me". In fact, this was said by Chen Yun when Chen Yun was discussing with him. "Let's just have a few more vice-chairmen, one for you and one for me. That way they won't be able to override the Chairman", and there was this phrase in the middle, "not to override the Chairman", which was the gist of it. At that time, Mao Zedong was dissatisfied with Liu Shaoqi and criticized Liu for issuing documents without authorization, which was known to the Party hierarchy. Chen Yun said this from the aspect of safeguarding Mao Zedong's authority, and did not make a deal.

We can also analyze further what is the difference between the General Secretary system and the Vice-Chairman system. The General Secretary system is actually still a succession system. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union then considered Liu Shaoqi to be the General Secretary of the CCP. The succession system of the CCP is a particularly awkward system, which is neither a system of the Crown Prince nor a system of the Imperial Prime Minister, but at the same time combines the disadvantages of both. This is because the General Secretary system is a centralized system, with the General Secretary below the Party Chairman. The system of

vice-chairmen, on the other hand, is a decentralized system in which the party chairman is the head of the class, and the vice-chairman is the head of the class, and the vice-chairman is the head of the class. If it was the General Secretary, there was no one else but Liu Shaoqi, and if there were to be Vice-Chairmen, Gao Gang and Chen Yun would be fine. Does it mean that Gao Gang is engaging in power trading on this? Canvassing for votes everywhere? As he was later criticized. I don't think we can simply analyze it like that. Because in the middle of the central power pattern, Gao Gang at this time has actually gone to the fourth role, Mao, Liu, Zhou, the next should be high. Zhu De in the Politburo is a virtual position, no real power. So the fourth in command became vice chairman, does that count as any ambition? It doesn't count. So that's not the problem.

So the problem with Gao Gang, and Mao's alarm about him, was the list of names drafted by An Ziwen, which we've just described. Gao Gang went south on vacation, all the way to Guangdong, and all the way there, he told some people about the list, "There's Bo but no Lin". This is a top secret list, can be said to be top secret, Mao showed him, even Zhu De did not see. This is a big deal, but he actually spread it around and told Ye Jianying and Tan Zheng in Guangdong. Ye and Tan came to Beijing, asked Mao Zedong about the Politburo "thin without Lin", Mao Zedong was shocked: "How do you know this news? Where did you get it?" They looked at each other in disbelief and did not dare to say anything. Then Mao asked Gao Gang, "How did this come about?" Gao Gang didn't dare to admit it, so Mao stared at him and said, "I suspect Rao Shushi." Gao Gang said, "Rao Shushi wouldn't!" He did not dare to frankly admit it, so he laid the groundwork for his downfall. In fact, there were objective considerations for not listing Lin Biao on this list. Lin Biao's health is not good, after the fight on Hainan Island has been sick, difficult to serve. So at that time in the South Central presided over the work of Deng Zichu. The list has Deng Zichu not Lin Biao, this arrangement also has its reasons. But when rearranging the positions, we can't just arrange for these capable officers, and the credit for fighting the world must also be balanced. Therefore, this is not only a question of ranking, but also a question of respect or disrespect for the four fields. It can be said that this is a big negligence. But this negligence, if said in an open and democratic political environment, is not a problem and can be solved reasonably. Historically speaking, in the internal line struggle of the CCP, the more secret things are done and the fewer people know about them, the more problems there are in the end. The Gao Gang incident is just such an example.

Mao Zedong pursued the matter of the list, and had already pointed at Gao Gang's head, and Gao Gang still dared not admit it, which could not but make Mao Zedong suspicious of him. The suspicion was fully justified. Mao Zedong once criticized Liu Shaoqi, Liu Shaoqi reviewed, twice, once more profound. Gao Gang was pushing and dragging his feet, cowering, not knowing what he wanted to do. Mao believes that high does not confess, there is a suspicion of small moves below. As a hand, who are worried about the following small moves, especially as the highest authority, more tolerant of subordinates to deceive themselves. So by the end of November 1953, December time, Mao on the high already have some views. This is most obvious in two incidents. Once on December 15, Mao Zedong said: "I'm going to the south to take a walk, who will preside over the work at home? Is it better to take turns? Or is it better who presides?" This question has not been raised in the past, in the past, no matter whether Mao Zedong went to Chongqing to negotiate, or visit the Soviet Union, it is naturally Liu Shaoqi presided over the work. But this time raised, Gao Gang immediately said: "take turns good." Zhou Enlai was the first to speak, said: "In the past is Comrade Shaoqi presided over, and now also Comrade Shaoqi", Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai is also advocating Liu Shaoqi. The one who advocated rotation was Gao Gang and the other was Zhu Laogang. In fact, during this period, for some of the practices of Gao Gang, Mao has been very some resentment. By the 24th, before Mao's departure, he made a remark, saying, "My Yi Nian Tang (Mao's residence) is crowded, but No. 8 Dongjiaominxiang Lane (Gao Gang's residence) is crowded with cars." These words knocked Gao Gang to his core and really gave him a fright. Gao Gang at this time there is another task, on the 25th he accompanied the Soviet Union's vice chairman of the State Soviet Tervosian to go to Anshan Steel, which he was hard to grab to go. As soon as he arrived in the Northeast, he called a meeting with the cadres of the Northeast Bureau and said that we must now support Comrade Shaoqi's leadership and not engage in separatism. From these words, we can see that he felt that the momentum was not right, and he had to hurry to take a stand. In February 1954, the Central Committee held the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, everyone did some self-criticism and passed a resolution to strengthen the unity of the Party. In terms of Mao Zedong's deployment of the meeting, it was intended to be a peaceful conference to strengthen unity within the Party. Everyone spoke about the problems back to back, examined their own mistakes, and did not expose each other. Originally, this meeting went quite smoothly, but after the end of this meeting, two symposiums were held immediately afterwards. One is a symposium on Gao Gang, and the other is

a symposium on Rao Shushi. Once the two meetings were held, it was not a peace meeting, it was a struggle meeting. At the meeting, Gao Gang's and Rao Sushi's things were revealed in bits and pieces, forming a critique of Gao Gang and Rao Sushi's revelations. On the fourth day of Gao Gang's symposium, Gao Gang committed suicide with a gun for the first time, but was saved by his secretary, and then committed suicide by taking sleeping pills half a year later. 1955, the National Party Congress was held, and an official resolution was made to designate Gao Rao as an anti-Party group.

There are still some doubts about the Gao Rao incident. Firstly, why did you say that the Fourth Plenary Session of the National Party Congress was a peaceful meeting, a meeting to strengthen unity? At the end of the meeting, a symposium was held to expose and criticize Gao Rao, so that the problem had to be exposed? Undoubtedly, only Mao Zedong could have made this decision, why did he make this decision? Secondly, Mao Zedong always trusted Gao Gang and gave him everything. Since when and with what incident did he stop communicating with him? Mao didn't attend the Fourth Plenary Session and ran away to the South. The meeting was held according to Mao's wishes. And later on, Gao Gang repeatedly asked to talk to Mao to clarify some issues, but it didn't work out. We can also think of it this way, if Mao Zedong presided over the Fourth Plenary Session, and encountered Gao Gang's donkey temper, and then exposed what they had said in private, what would happen then? Of course, this is just a guess. Some people just say that what Mao did to Gao Gang was to start a mess. This is a rather interesting claim, but there are some historical links that are still not clear. For example, when did Mao first want to abandon him? Why did he take such a decisive approach to abandon him? You have to realize that this approach was risky. For example, when he sent Luo Ruiqing and Lin Feng to the Northeast to hold a meeting of senior cadres, Luo Ruiqing found Zhang Xiushan and asked, "Why are you investigating Liu Shaoqi? Who told you to check? Zhang said it was Gao Gang who told him to do so, saying that Gao Gang had been ordered by the President to let me investigate, and Zhang told him everything about the investigation of Liu. This Luo Ruiqing was foolishly loyal to Mao. Wasn't he afraid that this would end up on Mao himself? Once it's revealed that Mao is secretly investigating his own deputy, will it look good? Wasn't Mao worried about leakage? Therefore, in terms of the historical details of the Gao Rao incident, there are indeed many unanswered questions. That's all for today.

Question exchange section:

Question 1: Gao Gang's death was a suicide. If Gao Gang had not died, what would have happened during the Cultural Revolution? Can you give us some reasoning? I think the sadness of Gao Gang is that he committed suicide.

WANG Haiguang: We can extrapolate from some of the political events that happened afterward. The army cadres who were on good terms with Gao Gang were Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao, both representatives of the base area. If Gao Gang accepts the lesson of this time, if he can pass the Lushan meeting, when Liu Shaoqi was defeated in the Cultural Revolution, he might be used again, and then it might not be Lin Biao who became the deputy commander-in-chief, but Gao Gang.

Question 2: How do you think about the Lin Biao incident?

Wang Haiguang: That is another topic. The Lin Biao incident was not a line struggle either, but the inner story was also very complicated and not as simple as we think, so we can discuss the Lin Biao incident again when we have time.

Q3: Didn't Mao Zedong support Gao Gang at the beginning and then abandon him in the end?

Wang Haiguang: That's what I was talking about. I haven't been able to find out which time period Mao thought it was time to abandon Gao Gang. From now on, it seems that it should be in early December 1953, Mao made up his mind. But why did he make this decision, and what circumstances stimulated him? This I can't say yet.

Q4: You've talked a lot about the background of the Gao Rao incident, and I'd like to know in your opinion, is there any possibility of this kind of incident happening again in China?

Wang Haiguang: I don't think there is any possibility, because now it's not the era of the great man, there is no absolute authoritative figure who can say anything. A situation like this can only happen when there is one person, who is both the party and the state.

Question 5: From that thing you talked about and a lot of issues, it seems like it seems to be a law of our party, like the second-in-command is always the most dangerous. Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Gaogang, Lin Biao, and later Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang, basically.

Wang Haiguang: The succession system, not only the CCP has this problem, but in fact the whole communist movement, which party has not dealt with it well, it is a systemic problem.

Q6: I've been to Wan'an Cemetery and saw Gao Gang's tombstone, why is Gao Gang buried in Wan'an Cemetery?

Wang Haiguang: After Gao Gang committed suicide, Zhou Enlai authorized a generous burial, because since he was labeled as an anti-Party group, I'm afraid it's not appropriate to go to the Eight Treasure Mountain. Wan'an Cemetery is a very good cemetery, it is also a net of celebrities, so he was buried there. You are lucky to see a complete tombstone. The one I saw back then was half a monument, smashed in the middle of the Cultural Revolution.

Q7: I would like to ask, in the many problems that occurred after the founding of our country, such as the twists and turns of the routes, and the many rectification campaigns to rectify people's situation, do you think that the imperfections of the system were more important, or the leaders' own lack of understanding of the constitution and the modern political system, as well as the barriers of power, and which of the two reasons was more important? The second question is why there are so many institutional and succession imperfections in the socialist camp? What are the starting points? Thank you!

Wang Haiguang: This is a bigger question. Of course, the biggest difference between the rule of man and the rule of law is that the system should keep the leaders inside. If a system allows power to be played with as it pleases, and the words of the leaders are the law, regardless of procedures, then there must be a big problem with the political stability of this country. The second question is about the international communist movement, which is a much bigger topic and not easy to explain at once. It can be said that this is a part of the history of the 20th century!

Q8: Is there any historical origin for this? I think that after Liu Bang and Zhu Yuanzhang won the throne, they would kill a group of people, and there were a lot of crony struggles, so I would like to ask what is the relationship between them?

Wang Haiguang: During the transition from traditional to modern politics, there is indeed such a problem. In fact the regime established in modern China is neither purely traditional nor purely modern, but an incestuous mule system. So the institution is still very imperfectly built, power lacks checks and balances, and in some places, it has the weaknesses of both. For example, in the past, the emperor, he can have three palaces and six houses, which is a conformity with the rules of the imperial family world, officials have three wives and four concubines is also reasonable and legitimate, now it can not. If you want to engage in such activities, you can only do something sneaky.

Question 9: Mr. Wang, I would like to ask you a question. You are a researcher of party history, and I am also interested in party history. Are we able to produce a history of the CCP that is closer to the real one?

Mr. Wang Haiguang: Let's work together!

Question 10: Mr. Wang, I would like to ask, in your mind, how should Gao Gang be evaluated in terms of his merits and faults as a historical figure? The second question I know that recently the Chinese University of Hong Kong has published a set of "History of the People's Republic of China" co-edited by Yang Kuisong and Shen Zhihua, what is your evaluation of this set of books?

Wang Haiguang: The first question is a question I am not very willing to answer, because I am very afraid to make a three-seven or half of a historical figure, I think this evaluation is not in place, this is a mechanical mode of thinking, easy to conceptualize the person, so I do not want to do so for the evaluation of the character. The second question is about the History of the People's Republic of China. I should say that this is the most objective and informative set of history of the Republic written at present, totaling ten volumes, and there are still a few more volumes yet to come out. However, there are also shortcomings in it: first, it is limited by the material, and I should say that it should be the richest in terms of material, and there is no book published in China that compares with it. However, the key historical materials of some events have not been declassified, so the author can only speak according to the existing materials. Secondly, there is no major breakthrough in the historical viewpoint, and the depiction framework of many volumes is still that of the CCP history, with no major breakthrough. There is also the problem of insufficient research, such as the concern for the underclass, the study of social history, the study of individual cases, are still relatively weak. Overall, a good set of books, but there is still room for further research.

Q11: Is it true that Gao Gang lived a corrupt life?

Wang Haiguang: Yes.

Q12: You just mentioned a detail, that is, in the spring of 1953 Mao Zedong commissioned Gao Gang to check whether Liu Shaoqi had been arrested in history, and what was the conclusion of this?

Wang Haiguang: There was no conclusion at that time because it was top secret. Some people told me that Gao Gang was out of luck because of this investigation. I don't think that's necessarily true, it's too simplistic. I don't think there will be anything explosive even if it is investigated. Someone told me that the investigation of Liu Shaoqi was the focal point of the conflict between Mao and Liu, and that Gao Gang was caught in the middle of this gap and was being squeezed to death by the two forces, was there such a possibility? I later looked up the charges against Liu Shaoqi during the Cultural Revolution that he had been branded as a traitor, a mole, and a worker thief. I thought that during the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shaoqi had to be defeated and "put on 10,000 feet", so if there was a problem with the investigation at that time, there should be some reflection of this in the charges against him, right? But I don't see any such reflection. The list of Liu Shaoqi's crimes reflects the confessions of those witnesses in 1968, which were already very unreliable. If it had been made out in 1953, there would have been this document, and it would have been written on it. By the time 1968 came along, the incriminating document that was manufactured, was the witness testimony credible? In that political atmosphere of downing Liu Shaoqi, it was all a matter of guilt by association, and these things were not credible anymore.

Q13: Was it after the Tianjin speech that Mao wanted to bring down Liu Shaoqi?

Wang Haiguang: No, at that time it was still a kind of working disagreement, and Mao just thought that he had gone too far.

Q14: What happened to Rao Shushi? Did he live for many years?

Wang Haiguang: Rao Shushi's situation was like this. After Rao Sushi's case was finalized in 1955, he came to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956, when the CPSU had begun to vindicate some of the cases from the Stalinist period, and Rao Sushi also requested that his case be re-examined, stating that he had no alliance with Gao Gang. However, after his case was reopened, nothing came of it. Later, Rao Sushi was implicated in the cases of Pan Hannian and Yang Fan, and was sentenced to prison again. He was only released from prison in

1965, and then re-incarcerated in the Cultural Revolution, where he died in prison, and that was generally the case.

Moderator: From the questions we just asked, we can see the urgent mood to understand the truth of history, history is a mirror, but unfortunately our current mirror is still covered with dust. The work we are doing today is to wipe it off bit by bit, and I think through our continuous efforts, this part of history, which concerns our past as well as has an important impact on our future, will slowly come to light with time and with everyone's efforts. That concludes today's lecture.