

毛泽东与三反运动 Mao Zedong and the Three-Anti Campaign

发布时间：2007-08-17 22:06 作者：杨奎松

New url: <http://w.hybsl.cn/article/13/1858>, accessed September 30, 2023

FN 121 – Yang Kuisong on Mao and the ‘Three Antis’ Campaign

1951 年底至 1952 年 6 月，在中国正在轰轰烈烈地展开抗美援朝、土地改革和镇压反革命三大运动的几乎同时，毛泽东又发动了一场反对贪污、反对浪费、反对官僚主义的“三反”运动。与三大运动以及紧随“三反”运动而掀起的“五反”（反对行贿、反对偷税漏税、反对盗窃国家资财、反对偷工减料和反对盗窃国家经济情报）不同的是，三大运动所针对的分别是农村地主、敌国美国、国内敌对分子，“五反”运动所针对的是亦敌亦友的资本家，“三反”运动的斗争矛头则是主要指向共产党内部以及党政国家机关和企事业单位的各级工作人员。而这场运动的关键，实际上更是旨在通过肃清和惩戒一切政权内部的贪污腐败分子的办法，来消除中共进城掌权以来，在干部中间出现的日趋严重的拜金主义思潮和权力寻租现象，避免重蹈明末李自成农民起义军进城后迅速腐化瓦解，惨遭失败的覆辙。

现有关于“三反”运动的研究成果，基本上都还是属于介绍性的。即使是仅有的谈论这一运动的著作，也与学术研究相去甚远。[1]其中的一个关键所在，就在于它们明显地对这场运动本身的理解过于简单化、概念化，没有注意到这场运动及其效果的极度复杂性。而这也正是今天面对几乎同样却严重无数倍的贪污腐败现象，一些读者寄希望于再来一次“三反”运动，而另一些读者则根本排斥这一被前者高度评价为“成功实践”[2]的一个重要原因。

同镇反运动一样，在“三反”运动的发动和推进过程中，毛泽东起了几乎是决定性的作用。显然，厘清毛泽东在这场运动发生、发展过程中的作用及其不同阶段的意图和具体设计，也是厘清这场运动来龙去脉的一个极其重要的历史环节。鉴于毛泽东对于这场运动的绝大多数指示或批示均已发表或已开放，从毛泽东与“三反”运动关系这样一种角度来具

体考察促成这场运动跌宕起伏的种种内幕，已经成为一种可能。相信这样的考察，将会有助于读者深化对这场运动的了解和思考。

“三反”运动之发动

发动“三反”运动并不在毛泽东预定的计划之中。最早提出反贪污问题的是中共东北局书记高岗。他于1951年8月31日在东北局的党员干部会议上率先发表了《反对贪污蜕化、反对官僚主义》的讲话。[3]几天后，东北局就正式通过了《关于开展反对贪污蜕化倾向，反对官僚主义作风的决定》的文件。[4]对于高岗和东北局的这一举措，中共中央虽然也予以了肯定，并且批转各地，[5]但是，依照以往的作法，它这时显然还只是设想通过整党整风的办法来解决这类问题。而与此同时，在这一年10月间召开的中共中央政治局会议上，与会者讨论的中心问题，则是朝鲜战局的发展趋势与应对目前财政严重困难的对策问题。会议明确决定，鉴于1952年度将会面临更严重的财政困难，必须“要求各地从11月起开展全面增产节约运动”，尤其要“提倡节约，严禁浪费。”[6]毛泽东随后在10月23日召开的政协一届三次全体会议上发出了“增加生产，厉行节约，以支持中国人民志愿军”的公开号召。[7]中共中央并因此成立了以薄一波为首的中央人民政府节约检查委员会，各中央局及其下属省市党委亦相继成立了各级增产节约委员会、分会和支分会。发动一场全国性的增产节约运动，而不是“三反”运动的任务，成为1951年底中共中央计划中的中心工作。[8]

就在毛泽东政协讲话发表几天之后，高岗再度在东北局党员干部会议上做报告，将增产节约问题与反贪污斗争联系起来，头一次提出了“反贪污、反浪费、反官僚主义”的“三反”概念。[9]读到报告后，毛泽东敏锐地注意到，和增产节约的现实需要相比，解决政府部门中各级干部贪污腐化的问题，同样是一个相当严重和迫切的任务。而且，增产节约的问题确实可以和反贪污、反浪费的斗争一并进行，相得益彰。故他很快就高岗的报告做出批示，要求各级党委都要“重视这个报告中所述的各项经验，在此次全国规模的增产节约运动中进行坚决的反贪污、反浪费、反官僚主义的斗争。”[10]紧接着，依据毛泽东的意见，《人民日报》11月23日发表了《向贪污行为作坚决斗争》的社论，公开宣布说：

“东北地区反贪污蜕化、反官僚主义斗争的经验证明，增产节约运动的最大敌人，是贪污浪费和官僚主义。如果贪污浪费现象不能肃清，不但会断送一些干部的前途，而且会妨碍

资金的积累，妨碍新民主主义制度的巩固。因此，全国各地都应该迅速行动起来，展开一个坚决反对贪污的斗争，来彻底消灭一切贪污现象。” [11]

毛泽东对于开展反贪污斗争必要性的看法，毫无疑问是以这时所得到的相关报告为基础的。然而，这个时候东北局的报告对党政工作人员贪污腐化情况的估计还不是十分严重，1950年8个月中虽然处理了贪污分子3258人，其中党员干部因贪污受处分者，不过十分之二上下。高岗之所以相信必须马上着手解决这一问题，只是因为发现贪污现象发展的速度太快。据报，“沈阳市人民法院贪污案件逐年统计，一九四九年下半年贪污犯占案犯总数百分之五点三，一九五零年上升为百分之五点七，一九五一年第一季度又上升为百分之一三点二。” [12]因为这时相关报告较少，故《人民日报》社论这时公开断言，贪污问题主要发生在“承袭着国民党反动派的贪污作风”的留用人员当中，因为他们“占了全部贪污人数的百分之九十九”，只有1%的“参加革命较久的人员，因其政治品质恶劣，未能在长期的革命斗争中彻底克服贪污腐化思想，进入城市后，又接受了帝国主义者、封建官僚、国民党反动派所遗留的恶习的影响，于是迅速堕落，贪赃枉法，营私舞弊，成为人民革命事业中的害虫。” [13]

但是，即使是基于这样一种估计，毛泽东也还是在政治局会议上特别提出了反贪污斗争的重要性问题。何况，接连得到的几份报告，使毛泽东和中共中央对贪污问题的估计变得更加严重起来了。

据11月28日中共华北局的报告称：“华北全区去年一年共处理了干部党员贪污受贿腐化堕落者三百零三人，今年仅上半年就处理了此类案件五百三十一人。又据河北省委纪律检查委员会去年十、十一、十二三个月很不完全的统计，贪污腐化者共一百零七人，而今年九月份一个月的贪污案件即有一百零二人。”其中，“太原市七区区委书记赵城、区长任华等，自入城以来，除集体贪污浪费、挪用公粮、公款共约折合米麦八万九千余斤外，并勾结私商投机倒把。赵城身兼三家私人商店的董事长，在私人煤窑顶有两个好汉股，并和十四家私商集股开设电磨房，已俨然成为一个有政治特权的商业资本家了。”“山西交城县县长孙进才等，在移交机关生产时，大吃大喝，编造假帐，诈骗国家小米七十一万四千九百余斤，该县政府和县委两机关，一年来即挥霍浪费小米三十二万四千余斤。”“华北军区后勤部汽车学校政治委员李晋吾（长征干部）被有重大特务嫌疑的私商引诱宿娼，吸

食料面。李发觉大同市公安局对该私商怀疑时，竟向其告密。此外，并隐藏特务恶霸的儿子，伪称叔侄关系，终至畏罪携公款三千余万元潜逃。” [14]

这时发现的更为严重的案件，是身为高级干部的天津地委前任书记刘青山和现任书记兼专员张子善被人揭发，暗中与私商勾结，“先后动用全专区地方粮折款二十五亿元，宝坻县救济粮四亿元，干部家属补助粮一亿四千万元，从修潮白河民工供应站中苛剥获利二十二亿元，冒充修建名义向银行骗取贷款四十亿元。总计贪污挪用公款约二百亿元左右，投入地委机关生产，作投机倒把的违法活动。”其作法不仅使“私商从中贪污中饱”，而且“二人私用达四五亿元，并向上下级及其亲友送礼，有的达一二千万元之巨。据有帐可查者，达一亿三千万元。” [15]再加上刘青山长期吸食鸦片，因此，事情披露后，中共河北省常委会议当即决定上报中共华北局，建议逮捕二人。经华北局报周恩来批准，11月29日，“河北省公安厅依法逮捕了张子善（刘青山当时在国外，12月2日归国后当即逮捕归案）。” [16]

刘青山、张子善以及太原区长、区委书记、山西交城县县长等，堕落到如此地步，让毛泽东颇为震动。他显然赞同批捕刘青山、张子善，并且专门去电华北局，要求后者将对太原市委书记赵城、区长任华“等重大贪污犯判处了何种罪刑，向我们作一补充的报告”。 [17]

就在这一天，即12月1日当晚，毛泽东在审阅中共中央《关于实行精兵简政，增产节约，反对贪污，反对浪费和反对官僚主义的决定》草案时，特别加写了这样一段话，即：“自从我们占领城市两年至三年以来，严重的贪污案件不断发生，证明一九四九年春季党的二中全会严重地指出资产阶级对党的侵蚀的必然性和为防止及克服此种巨大危险的必要性，是完全正确的。现在是全党动员切实执行这项决议的紧要时机了。再不切实执行这项决议，我们会犯大错误。现在必须向全党提出警告：一切从事国家工作、党务工作和人民团体工作的党员，利用职权实行贪污和实行浪费，都是严重的犯罪行为。中央人民政府不久将颁布惩治贪污的条例和惩治浪费的条例，各级领导机关必须仿照实行惩治反革命条例那样，大张旗鼓地发动一切工作人员和有关的群众进行学习，号召坦白和检举，并由主要负责同志亲自督促和检查。一切贪污行为必须揭发，按其情节轻重，给以程度不同的处理，从警告、调职、撤职、开除党籍、判处各种徒刑、直至枪决。典型的贪污犯，必须动员群众进行公审，依法治罪。” [18]

12月4日，北京市委向中共中央提交了党政工作人员中贪污现象及今后开展反贪污斗争意见的报告。毛泽东当即批转各中央局，并以相当严厉的口吻发布指示称：“中央责成你们在接到本指示三星期内，至迟在一个月內，有计划地初步地检查自己单位和所属下一级各单位工作人员的贪污现象，仿照北京市委所订各项办法，发动党内外最广大群众（包括各民主党派及社会民主人士），大张旗鼓地、雷厉风行地检查和惩治贪污人员。……中央责成你们大体上仿照北京市委的报告样式，在收到本指示后一个月內，向中央作第一次关于检查和惩治贪污人员的报告。所有中央和军委各部门，均分别向中央和军委作报告。所有中央人民政府各党组、各中央局、各分局、各省委、各市委、各区党委、各地委、各县委，均按级向中央及其上级作报告。县委以上的报告，除发其上级外，均同时直接发中央。” [19]

次日，毛泽东接到中央贸易部党组关于反对贪污现象和惩治贪污人员的报告后，更进一步明确要求各地：“遵照中央十二月一日二十时的指示，参照北京市委和中央贸易部党组的分析和办法，迅速订出自己的反贪污计划，并开始着手发动这一斗争。各地党委应统一布置这一斗争，使政府系统（重点在财经部门及总务人员）、军事系统（重点在后勤部门）、党派团体系统，都同时动作起来。” [20] “三反”运动就在这样一种背景下发动起来了。

毛泽东力排众议

“三反”运动的部署刚一下达，中央各部就率先向中共中央提出了报告。据中央财政部、中央贸易部、中央水利部、中央轻工业部以及人民银行总行等部门的党组报称，根据已经掌握的部分情况初步估计，贪污人数通常要占到机关总人数的30—40%左右。贪污者

“一般是新干部多于老干部，下级多于上级，但严重程度是上级严重于下级。”贪污的方式，有“出卖财经情报（如将税率变动、物资底价密告资本家）”的；有“勾结私商盗卖国家资财”的；有贵买贱卖从中谋利的；有“侵吞公物，监守自盗”的；有“造假帐目、假单据”的；有“大斗秤入小斗秤出，开税票大头小尾”的；有假借职位“敲诈勒索”的；有“受贿赂，吃回扣”的；有“报假账，吃空额”的；有“公私不分，损公肥私”

的。更多的则是“造假预算、搞两套帐、打埋伏、虚报开支、下级套上级、损大公肥小公、以及藉口‘改善生活’挪用公款等”等行为。[21]

自入城以来，毛泽东最担心的就是党的各级干部会在金钱和享乐的巨大诱惑面前打败仗。一下子看到各级机关中竟有如此多的干部贪污受贿，损公肥私，自然让他颇为焦虑。

12月8日，毛泽东答复福建省委办公厅的询问时，严厉地表示：“贪污分子、浪费分子和官僚主义分子当然大多数不是反革命分子（可能有一部分人即是反革命分子），他们的罪名是贪污浪费和官僚主义。但这个问题现在已极严重，必须看作如同镇压反革命斗争一样的重要，一样的发动群众大张旗鼓去进行斗争，一样的用死刑和徒刑等对待他们，并且一样的要查明情况，心中有数（犯贪污的占全体工作人员的百分之几，轻者重者最重者又占百分之几），精密地掌握这一斗争。”他并且表示：“全国可能须要枪毙一万至几万贪污犯才能解决问题”。[22]

这个时候摆上毛泽东案头的各种报告，已经够得上触目惊心。除刘青山、张子善一案外，其他较典型的案例有：

西北局报称：“天水专区税务系统初步检查，贪污干部占全体干部百分三十强。陕西二十七个县公安局长中，有七个贪污。泾阳县有七个区长以上干部因贪污撤职。已发现有县级、专区级重要干部贪污的，如渭南分区副司令员马华廷有很多贪污行为。”[23]

华北局报称：“天津一个公安分局（全市共十二个分局）因受贿而被释放、取消管制的反革命分子六百七十四人，其中有十九名特务分子。这个分局的干部、警士受过三千五百一十四户商家的贿赂。”[24]

中南局报称：“江西金谿县外派干部二十六人，即有十五个贪污，十一个因此脱离革命逃亡回家，遂川县外派干部五十八人，只二人不贪污。”[25]

河北省报称：“石家庄市整风审干中查出两个干部即贪污三千万元，军区一个团十个连长中有八个贪污。” [26]

甘肃省委报称：“武都税局长冯俊明领导干部七人集体贪污受贿。兰州市税局三百零九个干部五十七人贪污。天水专区税务干部百分之三十点九贪污。平凉市税局八十八个干部有四十个贪污。省粮食局运输公司一百八十个干部，八十一人贪污。酒泉专区粮食局八个县的干部有二十五人贪污。永登县粮食局十五个干部集体贪污。……海源县书、县长、组织部长、公安局长领导四十个干部集体贪污反革命财产。” [27]

由于这时的报告大都表示对情况已基本掌握，对完成中央部署的斗争任务信心满满，因此，毛泽东这时对开展“三反”运动的难度和发展前景，亦多少有些估计不足。考虑到原定 1952 年各项任务都很艰巨，他在 12 月 22 日和 24 日甚至接连批评了那种准备花几个月时间和集中全部力量来突击进行“三反”斗争的意见，说：“有些同志认为发动这个斗争很不容易，需要几个月时间才能结束，这种意见不甚正确。”“就一般情形来说，一个月左右的时间也就差不多了。特别是一般的浪费现象，就一个机关来说，从调查、研究、批评、检查到定出新的制度，停止浪费开支，大约有半个月左右的时间也就够了。许多机关已有这种经验。也不是停止一切工作不做，专做三反斗争，而是和各项工作结合，特别是和整党整风工作结合去做，三反斗争就是目前整风的主要内容。” [28]

但不过几天时间，随着报来的贪污案例越来越多，毛泽东明显地沉不住气了。注意到贪污问题如此严重，“有些共产党员比国民党还坏”，[29]共产党已经走到变质的边缘，一些党政领导人对运动却仍不积极，这让毛泽东的态度再度发生了变化。他先是在 30 日批转西南军区党委会关于三反斗争简报的批示中，要求各大军区都应按期编发关于三反斗争的每周简报，一月四次；接着又在当天以中共中央名义发出指示，要求中央一级、大行政区一级和省市一级共三级的一切工作部门，对所属单位的“三反”运动，“在一九五二年的头四个月内，须每月作一次报告，以便中央有所比较，看出各级领导同志对这一场严重斗争哪些是积极努力的，哪些是消极怠工的（消极怠工的原因，一种是领导人有官僚主义，一种是领导人手面不干净），以便实行奖励和惩处。”对一切态度消极的党政领导人“限期（例如十天），遵照中央决议，认真发动群众开展反贪污反浪费反官僚主义的斗争，否则即须撤职。如果本人有贪污实据，还须开除党籍，严重者须送法院惩办。” [30]

31日上午，毛泽东并召开会议讲话称：“三反不反，党就会变质。从二中全会算起，如十年内不进行三反，共产党就会变成国民党。说党不会变质，只有进行三反这一条下才有可能。如不进行三反，一样可以腐化。过去在山上看不见，一到城市就看见了。要进行三反，马克思主义才灵，不进行三反，马克思主义、共产党员八个条件都不灵。有些人不进行三反看不出来，镇反中有些人也看不出来，有些公安人员对五种敌人的斗争是坚决的，但就是贪污腐化，如卜盛元、刘青山（镇反有成绩，还出过国）。过去整党整风只是整坏人，不整好人，这次是坏人好人一齐整，好人整得更好。……有多少反多少，开除四百万党员还有一百八十万……在所不惜。过去看联共党史，看见大批开除党员，当时了解不深刻，现在才体会到这一点。只有这样党才能健康。”有人问：怎样算是达到标准？毛泽东明确讲：“就是‘发烧发热，上吐下泻’，否则火力不够。”“办法就是大张旗鼓，雷厉风行，要比作战还紧张。还有就是限期发动，点名反省，放手发动群众，成绩就是要交数字，要大的，越多越大越光荣，应有尽有。”毛泽东当场问中共中央办公厅主任杨尚昆：“所有机关都有大老虎，党中央机关就没有？”你敢写保证书吗？杨当即答应交出50个。毛强调：“出大虎的地方是那些有金、木、水、火、土的地方（水主要是指轮船运输，火指油、电料，土指建筑工程—引者注）”。但同时也说：“安子文同志等地方，的确是清水衙门，但也不忙做结论，看看再说。” [31]

当天下午，按照毛泽东的要求和政治局会议的决定，中央直属机关总党委在中南海怀仁堂召开了党、政、军、团、群等机关处长级以上数百名干部参加的党委扩大会议，由薄一波和机关总党委第二书记兼中央节约检查委员会委员的安子文出面宣布：中央所属各部门，限期发动群众揭发检举和坦白，1月11日必须向中央交出合格的报告，“违者，不论部长、行长、署长、处长、局长、科长、股长或经理，一律撤职查办。”“不管什么人，部长、局长……官僚主义、手上不干净的，一律撤职，撤职后不给饭吃。”薄一波并当场宣布对军委技术部部长戴镜元、中央交通部办公厅主任张文昂和重工业部部长陆达“撤职查办”。各单位与会负责人“当日回去，连夜开会，元旦整日开会。很多部长、副部长到一下团拜会就回去，戏也不看了。” [32]

1月4日，结合中央财政部的“三反”情况报告，毛泽东向各中央局及分局等各级党的领导部门介绍了中直总党委12月31日动员大会的经验，说明：“这样的高级干部会议，现

规定每十天开一次，除重病不得请假。估计到一月底，中央一级可以基本上解决问题。”各地也应一律照办，“立即抓紧三反斗争，缩短学文件的时间（有四五天就够了），召开干部会，限期（例如十天）展开斗争，送来报告，违者不是官僚主义分子，就是贪污分子，不管什么人，一律撤职查办。在干部会上应指名批评落后的单位及其领导人，指名奖励做得好的单位及其领导人，宣布撤职的名单及理由。”中央委托薄一波用电话与负责同志直接联系，“每三天至五天通话一次，检查各区三反进度”。[33]

在毛泽东的大力推动下，“三反”运动开始在全国各地迅速发动起来了。北京市甚至率先把运动推向了腐蚀干部负有重大责任的工商界。据报：“在一个多星期中，各行业开会已达三千一百二十五次。……现在公务人员和公营企业员工中，已有七千余人坦白了有贪污或占公家小便宜的行为。其中贪污公款在一百万元以下者七千一百七十一人，一百万元至五百万元者三百六十二人，五百万元至一千万元者三十一人，一千万至五千万者三十三人，五千万至一亿元者三人，一亿元以上者二人。工商界已有一千六百五十九户坦白并检举了二千九百二十三人有贪污或行贿行为。”由于扩大了斗争范围，北京市委发现“斗争的内容和规模，比运动开始时我们所想象的要复杂和大得多”。“在公务人员方面，有各种侵吞、盗窃、骗取公家财物、吃‘回扣’、吃‘底子钱’和贪占公家小便宜的行为；有私设工厂、商店、假公济私利用公家各种条件图暴利的变相盗窃行为；有利用职权地位敲诈勒索，占老百姓便宜的行为；有各种接受贿赂、勾结包庇商人盗窃骗取公家财物的行为；有在生活和工作中的各种浪费和违犯制度、化大公为小公等行为。……贪污现象最严重的是税务人员（已坦白者约占总人数百分之四十）、合作社人员（已坦白的约占总人数百分之十七）、贸易机关和各种采购人员。敲诈勒索的，主要是公安部门的下级员警，敲诈对象主要是被管制分子和反动会道门道徒等。”“有些市民对若干派出所尚有顾忌，因而不敢检举。我们已决定把作风不好的所长集训，并号召有贪污勒索行为者坦白。此外，为了便于群众检举，在全市设接待站和检举箱，并派妥人负责。”对于不断引发贪污现象的各单位的机关生产，已决定全部统一管理。[34]

对于北京的这一经验，毛泽东当即批转各地，要各大中小城市一律仿照办理。“一定要使一切与公家发生关系而有贪污、行贿、偷税、盗窃等犯法行为的私人工商业者，坦白或检举其一切犯法行为，特别注意在天津、青岛、上海、南京、广州、武汉、重庆、沈阳及各省省城，用大力发动这一斗争，藉此给资产阶级三年以来在此问题上对于我党的猖狂进攻

（这种进攻比战争还要危险和严重）以一个坚决的反攻，给以重大的打击，争取在两个月至三个月内基本上完成此项任务。请各级党委对此事进行严密的部署，将此项斗争当作一场大规模的阶级斗争来看待。此种部署应当是内部（各机关、学校、部队和国营企业）和外部（私人工商界）同时进行，领导机关和法庭密切配合，报纸和广播则大力宣传，并注意组织机密消息的内部通报。” [35]

明确把“三反”斗争与打击资产阶级的的问题联系起来，并且宣称资产阶级三年以来一直对中国共产党“猖狂进攻”，而且强调这种进攻“比战争还要危险和严重”，这就使得这场原本旨在清理政权内部贪污分子的斗争，变成了一场带有你死我活性质的阶级斗争。在这种情况下，对形势的估计自然会愈加严重，任何没有把自己所在地区或单位的贪污问题提高到如此高度，或估计不够严重的报告，都不免会受到毛泽东的严厉批评。用毛泽东的话来说：任何在报告中说贪污情况不甚严重，贪污人数少，款数不多，都是不真实的。“不要被下面的不真实的报告欺骗了”。[36]凡是下级机关的反贪污斗争比不上中央机关的，“就是那里的领导人不行，方针和办法不对，必须立即加以检讨和改正。” [37]毛泽东并以集宁军分区和遵义军分区的报告加以对比，批转各地道：我们“不愿意看那些好像太平无事的报告。集宁军区只说了浪费和生活腐化，还没有提到贪污事件。像一个军分区一定有大片的贪污犯，望各地严格注意，一切没有切实暴露问题和解决问题的部队，必须从头做过，做好了三反再做整编。三反一天没有做好，即一天不准进行整编。”“遵义分区这个报告比刚才转发的集宁分区的报告接近事实得多。一个分区，一个军，一个小市，一个县，必定有大片的贪污犯，这是决然无疑的。凡说那里只有浪费而无贪污，或贪污甚少者，必不可靠，千万不要相信。在一阵风停止浪费之后，必须立即穷追贪污。不能自己解决贪污问题者，上级应即派遣检查组下去督追，务将一切贪污分子追出而后止。” [38]以此为标准，他再度断言：“各单位的报告，凡属不痛不痒敷衍塞责者，其领导人不是官僚主义分子，就是贪污分子，这类报告应立即予以批判。” [39]

这个时候，中共进城不久，许多制度尚未建立健全，仅供给制和工资制并行就引发许多问题，更不用说从抗战时期带过来的各部门各机关用于为本单位谋福利的所谓机关生产及其单位小金库（又称“小家当”），各级主管干部大多都有涉嫌非法谋利、偷税漏税、挪用公款、损公肥私和严重违反财经纪律等问题。哪些算是贪污，哪些算是浪费，贪污浪费的政策界限如何，一时间谁也说不清。这种情况不能不极大地束缚了各级领导干部的手

脚，使许多人畏首畏尾。负责领导华东军区“三反”斗争的陈毅就报告说：“华东三反运动一月六日实行主席限期、点名、清查的办法，已大规模的开展起来。”但是，我们“深深感觉到各级领导人，特别是中级以上，硬是推不动。以前什么运动只要毛主席一喊便千唤万灵，而这次三反硬喊不起来”。根本问题就是领导人“一部分不干净，首先害怕”。[40]

正是因为这种情况，不管毛泽东如何号召放手“三反”，各地方及各部门领导人却还是纷纷制定标准，想要区分贪污浪费的界限，以避免乱打乱斗，使工作垮台。关于这一点，川南区党委的一个报告讲得非常清楚。它指出：各级干部中贪污现象非常普遍，但“县以下贪污现象比上面更严重，估计很多负责的县区干部要垮台。如何使三反与土改兼顾，如何使绝大多数干部得到挽救而不致垮掉，是值得慎重考虑的政策问题”。[41]显然，这并非仅仅是县区一级的麻烦问题，同时也是许多上级部门所面临的问题。不对贪污、浪费的标准做出明确的界定，就难以使众多部门的领导干部洗清自己，站出来领导运动。

为此，华东局这时就率先提出划分浪费与贪污的四条标准，强调因经验不够或全无经验而造成的浪费，因制度未建立或在短期内无法建立而造成的浪费，和经过组织批准或决定的个人超支，以及机关生产在补助和提高集体生活方面造成的浪费，今后应加注意和改正，但对过去不必追究。只有“个人享受腐化、生活特殊及腐化性的挥霍，即是迹近贪污的浪费或由贪污而来的浪费，应特别加以审查和揭发。”[42]

军委总政治部也明确指示西南军区说：宣布该军区后勤系统34%的人员都有贪污行为必须慎重。尤其是，“对于贪污行为和一般公私不分的错误行为，必须加以区分，并分别对待，不能把占公家的小便宜统统叫作贪污。”[43]

中央节约检查委员会最终也不能不发布指示，说明：供给制干部超支，应分为个人超支和机关集体生活超支两大类。集体生活超支不能视为贪污，超支太多可视为浪费。即使个人超支，也应分为三类，“第一类为合理的超支，为入城后必不可少的开支，不过尚无明文规定。这类超支如经过适当领导机关批准，则完全合法，如未经批准，只能认为组织手续不完备，不能认为浪费，更不能认为贪污。第二类为生活铺张浪费的超支，性质为浪费，

不是贪污，应作检讨，并加改正。……第三类为接近于贪污的超支，应作严格检讨，立即停止这种支出，并接受适当行政处分。”至于较为普遍的化大公化小公的问题，应肯定为违反财纪律。“造成这种现象的原因，有些是当事人有意违反财政纪律，有些是财政制度本身尚不健全，不能一律认为是贪污浪费。要确定各单位大公化小公是否贪污或者浪费，应根据小公的用途来决定。如果用途正当，这种错误只在财政手续方面；如果用途不当，则根据具体情况分别属于浪费或贪污。” [44]

对于上述种种复杂问题，毛泽东其实也没有做好足够的应对准备。如中南局和华东局均报告说：目前机关生产和小家当十分普遍。财产很多，各部、处、科乃至地、县、区，层层都有，“大的拥有几十亿元，小的也有几百万元”，很大部分被用了在少数干部身上，

“而且机关生产实际上与商业投机有联系，为贪污受贿大开方便之门。从已经暴露出来的大量问题看，小家当利少害多，需要有步骤地予以取缔。”毛泽东对此亦表示一时间难以解决，只能暂时“责成原机关负责管理，并不得抽动任何人员和财产”，等待中央研究出一个包括党、政、军、民在内的切实可行的办法。[45]但不难了解的是，毛泽东并不主张给群众太多的框框和限制。他对总政治部对西南军区的批示就明确表示不赞同，理由是：

“西南军区后勤系统清出百分之三十四的贪污分子是合乎事实的。目前的大多数机关部队的偏向是不愿或不知道认真去清查贪污分子。” [46]他对西南军区报告的批示是：“我们不怕贪污人数多，款数大，只怕不能发动群众斗争，不能将大中小各类贪污分子全部弄清楚。” [47]他再三告诫各级党委说：“无论党政军民哪一系统，哪一机关，只要是大批地管钱管物的，就一定有大批的贪污犯。很多机关压迫民主，群众怨愤极深。有些机关官僚主义极为严重，领导者脱离群众，闹得不像样子。凡此一切，均须彻底揭发，才能解决问题。” [48]至于许多基层权力部门反贪污可能造成干部全体垮掉，毛泽东主张：“不要怕，有人接替。垮了是好的，资产阶级堡垒不垮，我们共产党就要垮。牺牲贪污分子和牺牲党与人民，二者必居其一。” [49]

“打虎”战役的推动

对于毛泽东的不满，负责指导全国“三反”运动的薄一波自然心知肚明。其在1月19日就中央直属机关“三反”情况所做的报告中，一方面说明“已发现有贪污行为者为一万人左右，其中贪污一亿元至几十亿元者十八人，贪污一千万元以上一亿元以下者一百三十人

左右。”一方面则特别指出：“这个数字，是远远落后于实际状况的。根据现在已经初步掌握的材料看来，一亿以上的，几十亿的大贪污犯，除上述十八人外，至少尚有四五十人。”“如果在这次运动中不彻底肃清这些大贪污犯，在运动高潮中他们暂时藏起来，一阵风过后，他们又会继续起来作恶。”故尽管已经取得很大成绩，中央直属机关党委仍“决定重新组织力量，从二十日起至二十七日止，八天之内，对大贪污犯来一个猛烈的进攻。”[50]

由于薄一波同时还兼任中共华北局书记和华北军区政委，因此，他在19日当天还专门召集华北军区各部队各军区首长开会，具体部署下一周的“战役”目标：“集中力量捉大老虎”。其策略是：“（1）区别贪污、浪费界限，使有些领导同志下台，以便指挥作战。

（2）摘除一些小的公私不分，占小便宜的人的贪污帽子，指出错误，不算贪污。（3）对自动坦白，酌情退赃，决心悔过，不再重犯，贪污款在一千万元以下，情节不严重的贪污犯，减轻或免于刑事处分，使之放下包袱。”进而“分配任务”，即“根据重点单位和已有线索由，各单位自报公议，于一周内交贪污一千万得多少人的任务，并力求超过”。[51]而层层分配打“虎”数字，也正是毛泽东这时用以突破“三反”发动瓶颈的一种办法。

1月22日，毛泽东在接到华北军区报告的当天即将其批转各地，并批示道：“华北军区一月二十二日报告很好，这即是中央的意见，请你们一体遵行。”同时，他又在给中南和华东两军区的电报中指示：“你们两个大军区（指中南华东）规定一月份以三反为主，结合整编，我们亦已同意。现在看来不妥，必须以全力进行三反，三反完了再整编，全军不许有一人例外。时间照前通知延至二月十日。请你们至少每三天和各军区各军用电话通话一次，不要单靠电报。你们两大军区所属各军区和各军的三反报告，有许多单位劲头不足，空话太多，不能令人满意，请你们给以批评，严令他们限期检讨，尤其注意打一亿元以上的大老虎。各大军区和你们清出的老虎都太少。像华东中南西南三大军区系统估计至少有大老虎二百个以上，华东中南可能更多，千万不要让他们溜走了。望各大军区提出一个大老虎的估计数字告我为盼。（中央一级估计至少可以打出七十只大老虎）”[52]

同一天，华北局还报来山西省委的“三反”报告。报告说明：不少运动开展不好的地方，不是因为领导干部官僚主义、麻木不仁，就是因为自身问题严重，有的一级党政领导人员

已经堕落到“与资本家毫无二致”。对此，省委“由省委委员带头，推动各级党政负责干部向所属机关干部群众脱裤子，一次通不过，二次再来”；并派出得力干部，到落后的和问题严重的单位坐镇指挥，给群众撑腰，“必要时可采取非常手段，把那些障碍运动的‘石头’搬下来。”[53]华北局对此高度评价说：“山西的经验再次证明首长勇敢”脱裤子“，层层带头检讨是发动群众的关键。对于麻木不仁严重的官僚主义分子和手面不干净的领导人，必须采取上下夹攻的办法，使之猛省，丢下包袱，毫不犹豫地投入战斗，攻打敌人。对于毫无勇气揭发自己，而又无心对敌战斗的各级领导人，或则撤职，搬掉障碍，或则暂时不管（即令其自己离职反省），去掉累赘，以免耽误紧张的急迫的”打大老虎“的中心战斗任务。”毛泽东对此报告也格外欣赏，特别批示：“山西省委这个报告极好，务请同志们精读几遍，注意仿行，并在党刊上登载，使广大干部看到。”[54]

经历过镇反运动之后，各级领导干部对于中央在运动中分配任务指标的作法早已熟悉了。因此，薄一波 19 日报告之后，再加上毛泽东的一连串批示，多数机关部队都迅速做出了响应。空军直属机关党委就报告称：“听了薄一波同志一月十九日在中直总党委扩大会议上的报告后，二十日空军党委召开扩大会议进行研究，廿一日上午召开空军直属机关积极分子会议，共一百七十余人，布置‘打老虎’的工作。”[55]毛泽东在明确肯定该报告的同时，还特别告诫各地称：“有些人以为党的机关、宣传和文化教育机关、民众团体，用钱不多，必无大老虎，这是不正确的。早几天还以为中央文教机关一个老虎也没有，经过最近两天的寻找研究，就发现至少可以捉到十五个贪污一亿元以上的大老虎。因此，请你们注意，在每一部门每一地区‘三反’斗争激烈发展之后，就要将同志们的注意力，引向搜寻大老虎，穷追务获，不要停留，不要松劲，不要满足于已得成绩。在这方面要根据情况订出估计数字，交给各部门为完成任务而奋斗。在斗争中还要根据情况的发展，追加新任务。例如中央一级，在一月十八日以前查出的一万名贪污分子（其中有很多人款数甚少，情节甚轻，迹近贪污，实际不能叫作贪污）中，只有十八名一亿元以上的大贪污犯。至一月十八日，认为可以再查出五十名。最近两天又有增加。估计将来还有增加。这一经验务请你们注意，要向同志们指出，如果他们不愿意包庇大贪污犯，以致将来查出来（总有一天会查出来），自己要受指责和处分，就应组织一切可用的力量为搜尽一切暗藏的大贪污犯而奋斗。”[56]

1月24日，中共中央政治局开会研究“三反”问题，谈到中央机关的打“虎”数字时，与会者明显地对原有的估计感到不满足了。眼见各机关打“虎”运动进行得热火朝天，原先打出70只“老虎”的计划已被突破，一些人已经提出“老虎”可能达到150只以上的问题了。毛泽东因此颇为振奋，随即在西南军区的简报上批示道：“每个大军区系统（包括各级军区和各军）至少有几百只大小老虎，如捉不到，就是打败仗。地方上每一个大省也可能有几百只，每个大城市可能有一百只至几百只，上海可能有上千只。中央一级昨天还以为只有八十多只，今天会上就有一百五十只，可能达到二百只。”[57]

正是在这样一种情绪的支配下，毛泽东明显地对那些数字大、比例大的报告格外欣赏。他这时就对志愿军十九兵团党委报告关于该部“一般财经管理干部中，有些单位暴露了百分之八十以上的人有贪污，有的单位甚至达到百分之百”的说法，非常满意。他明确批示：

“这种认识是合乎事实的。”可惜，“从我手头已经收到的志愿军各兵团各军师有关三反的报告看来，有这样认识的还是少数，多数还没有这种认识。”事实上，“不仅财经部门有贪污，司令部政治部等部门也有贪污”。“必须从各级机关和一切部门中……坦白检举和检查出惊人的成百成千的中小贪污分子。”“照我推测，在一百多万志愿军中很可能捉到几百个大老虎，你们应为此目标而奋斗。这些大小老虎是资产阶级安置在我军内部的堡垒，他们已经是资产阶级分子，是叛变人民的敌人，如不清出惩办，必将为患无穷。”

“凡说在朝鲜环境不可能有贪污的人，凡对清出一批中小贪污分子就认为已经满足已经胜利的人，必须加以批判。已收场者必须重来，一个月不足，再加一个月。两个月不足，再加一个月。”[58]他公开号召：“组织一切可能的力量，为搜尽一切暗藏的大贪污犯而奋斗”。[59]

毛泽东的三令五申终于取得了明显的效果。中央机关已打出和认定能打出的贪污上亿元的“大老虎”，几天就达到400只。北京市查出上亿元的“大老虎”36只，已认定的40只，同时计划机关企业要打出100只，工商界要打出300只。[60]华北局自然不甘人后，严令各地委及省属市委必须“做出打虎的具体计划，有必成数，有期成数，根据情况发展，还应追加数字。”以此来作为评定各部门领导人对“三反”斗争是否努力的标准。[61]而华北军区在1月22日得到毛泽东的初步表扬后，“三反”斗争也是突飞猛进。其通过组织“打虎基干队”，“专案专人，包打包查”，23日即打出64只大中老虎，“二十四日又捉住一千万元以上者三十七名，二十五日捉住一千万元以上者四十八名，五天共捉

一百四十九名。”“连三反以来所捉大小老虎共二百八十八只。其中大老虎十二只，中老虎十八只（五千万元以上）。这些老虎的贪污款数（总数超六十五亿元），仅系根据它自己初步承认材料，将来挤干净时，有些小老虎必是中老虎，有些中老虎必是大老虎。”。报告并提出：“估计有一批真正的大老虎尚未捉到”，仍在组织力量进行突击。[62]毛泽东对这一成绩也给予高度评价，不仅将其报告转发各地，而且批示各地学习其经验。称：“华北军区过去成绩甚微，经过严词督责，最近五天突飞猛进，捉虎甚多，令人振奋。打虎要有一套战术，凡已普遍展开的，就要迅速总结经验，组织专门打虎部队，向大小老虎突击。”[63]

眼见打“虎”数量节节攀升，毛泽东愈加相信搜“虎”正未有穷期。1月30日，华北局报告山西省一周捉“虎”48只，而他们认为，山西理应捉“虎”1000至1300只。毛泽东则表示：“我以为这个数目只是一个最低的估计，实际上可能大大超过此数，社会上即工商界中的老虎还不算在内。”[64]华东军区报称计划打“虎”200只，毛泽东批示：“一个大军区不会只有两百多个大老虎，但第一次规定这样一个数目是适当的，以后可以根据认识的深入逐步追加打虎任务。”必须通过严格督促，不断追加任务，才能达成奋斗目标。[65]东北局报告清出大小贪污分子16万余，计划在各级党政军机关及企业工作人员中打出“大老虎”500只，毛泽东复电说：“你们暂时以五百只为目标是适当的”，但“根据中央一级十二万人中就有四百大老虎的情况，东北全境各级党政军机关及企业的工作人员中可能不止五百只大老虎，可能一倍或几倍于此数”。[66]

为了有利于乘胜追击，掀起更大的打“虎”浪潮，中共中央这时专门批准在北京召开了公审大贪污犯大会。中节检委主任薄一波、中央公安部部长罗瑞卿等都在大会上讲了话。会议当场宣布了公安部行政处宋德贵和中国畜产公司业务处薛昆山等人死刑。毛泽东并且亲自审定和修改了薄一波的讲话稿，公开宣告：“只要贪污的严重，并有了确实的证据，不管他本人怎样拒不承认，满一亿元或者不满一亿元，都可以定其为大贪污犯，判处死刑。”但只要能主动坦白或能立功赎罪者，则可根据具体情况，从宽惩处。[67]

按照此时中共中央所定标准，“一切国家机关、企业、党校及其附属机构的工作人员，凡利用职权侵吞、盗窃、骗取、套取国家财物和索取他人财物，收受贿赂及假公济私非法取利者，就是贪污犯。”贪污上1亿元者为“大老虎”，贪污3千万元以上不满1亿元者为

中老虎，贪污 1 千万以上不满 3 千万元者为小老虎，贪污 1 千万元以下者为一般贪污分子。[68]但从毛泽东对薄一波讲话稿批改的情况看，“大老虎”的标准明显地有所变化了。在 2 月 2 日毛泽东批转李富春在中央财经委员会汇报会上的报告时解释说：“大老虎不限一亿元以上，富春报告中所说的六条都应算做大老虎。”这就是：“（1）个人贪污一亿元以上者。（2）贪污不满一亿元，但对国家经济损失很大者。例如：将国家的二亿元物资偷卖给私商，自己得六千万元，实际国家损失二亿元，商人也赚了不少钱。（3）满了一亿元以上的集体贪污案的组织者、主谋者。主谋者不论个人所得是否满一亿元。（4）贪污在五千万以上，但性质严重，如克扣救济粮、侵吞抗美援朝捐款者。（5）坐探分子。与私商勾结盗窃经济情报的，或利用职位自肥的，不管本人得钱多少，但国家损失在一亿元以上者。（6）全国解放时隐瞒吞没国家财产或官僚资本未报，价值在一亿元以上者。”不仅如此，毛泽东还提出：清查资产阶级安插在我们政权内部的“经济内奸”的同时，还要注意清查“政治内奸”的问题。说：“跟着清查经济内奸的发展，必能清出许多政治内奸，有些经济内奸本人即是政治内奸，务请同志们注意这点。”[69]

而这时有关基层贪污问题的揭露，更使毛泽东对各地目前的打“虎”计划感到不能满足。如“平原省武陟县机关已初步清出一千万以上的老虎十八只，其中有一只一亿元以上的大老虎。该县继续搜捉，还可能超过此数。”“根据河北省香河县九个村的初步调查，有贪污行为的村干部，多者占村干部总数的百分之七十二，少者占百分之十三，平均为百分之三十三，九个支书中七个贪污，九个村长中八个贪污，其中有一个村干部独自贪污公粮一万斤以上，是个小老虎。”故毛泽东要求各地对此高度重视，强调：“凡说县一级无老虎或很少老虎的，应即以武陟县的证据驳倒他。”“凡说乡村干部中没有或很少贪污的，凡说乡村中虽有贪污但是没有老虎的（当然不是说每乡都一定有老虎），应即以香河县的证据驳倒他。”[70]

上述“大老虎”标准的改变和查“虎”线索的扩大，自然使毛泽东相信老虎的数量应该更多。因此，他这时不仅对打“虎”计划数字小的地方和单位严加批评，而且又开始按照镇反运动的经验，根据人口比例来检查各地打“虎”数字和分配指标了。[71]

2 月 4、5 两日，毛泽东接连批评中南局和华南分局“对各省压力太小，迁就他们的右倾思想”，分配数目太少，不合实际。如“广东军区系统包括海防和各军在内至少有几万只

乃至上千只大中小老虎，而你们只分配该军区大老虎二十只，中小老虎一百八十只，这是完全不适当。” [72]批评“重庆只计划捉二百几十个老虎则是完全不符合实际的”。 [73]批评山东分局“对下面督促不严，没有批判干部中对大贪污分子认识不足的右倾思想”，

“打虎无成绩”。“像山东这样的大省，有党、政、军、民、学五个方面，有十几个大中城市，有很多分区和县城，一千万元以上的大中小老虎，应当不是几百只而是几千只，不是一二千只而是三四千只。其中一亿元以上的大老虎以十分之一计，应当不是几十只而是几百只。”而山东至今“还没有做出全省包括县以上党、政、军、民各系统的打虎预算”。 [74]

与此同时，在批转华北局关于停止河北省委员金城、省军区司令员王光华党内外一切职务限一周内做出彻底反省再行议处的通报时，毛泽东写道：“河北省（不包括京、津两市）人口三千万，规定打小虎二千三百只，大虎二百只，这是适当的。请各省按人口及其他特点规定自己的打虎计划。目前的特点，正像镇反初期同志们对于反革命的严重性估计不足一样，是对于大贪污分子的存在估计不足，就是说存在着严重的右倾思想，必须不断地给以批判，才能克服此种错误思想。其严重者须由各中央局、分局和军区党委做出单独的决定，如同华北局对河北省委所做的决定那样，并且要迅速、不要迟疑不决。” [75]

同一天，对薄一波、刘澜涛报告华北区准备二月份内捉虎 12 万只的计划，毛泽东也给予了高度评价，但对东北局的打“虎”数字提出了疑问。他在批转薄、刘报告给各中央局时写道：“你们这个报告一下子提高了一个大行政区的打虎水平至很高的程度。你们计划在二月底全区捉大中小老虎一万一千多只，还只包括县以上的，不包括县以下的，只包括党政军民学内部的，不包括工商界的。华北没有政府，华北军区系统也不如有些军区那样庞大，尚能捉虎这样多，其他大区，应当更多。东北局二月一日来电说：”东北地区的老虎估计会不少于两千“。这里未说明老虎的大中小。如包括大中小老虎，则数字太低，东北当有大中小老虎二万只以上。……总之虎数增多，证明认识进步，信心增高，劲头增大。” [76]

值得注意的是，毛泽东这时对比例数相当重视，对单位性质，即有无大批管钱管物部门的情况，却不特别看重了。比如，2月4日，毛泽东明确批复中南军区的计划说：“中南军区委二月一日电所报中南军区直属机关部队计划打大老虎一百零六只，小老虎三百五十七

只，我们认为是适当的。” [77]但当中南军区 6 日报告全军区除直属机关部队外，还准备打大老虎 107 只，中小老虎 1100 多只时，毛泽东却批评其“计划太小”，称“大虎至少要增加五倍，即不是一百零七只而是五百多只。中小虎不是一千一百多只，而是五千多只。这个数字可以包括大军区直属部门在内。” [78]原因就是，中南军区直属机关部队和军区其他所属部队的人数比例，是 1：5 之比。

除了重视比例以外，毛泽东还格外重视政治宣传攻势的作用。2 月 6 日，薄一波报告称：自 2 月 1 日北京召开公审大贪污犯大会之后，中央各单位捉“虎”的数量就迅速增长。

“二月一日前共捉大虎一六一只，二月二日到二月五日又捉住一百一十四只，四天以来每天平均捉大虎二十九只。群情甚为鼓舞。……大贪污犯不反攻了，嫌疑犯不”对口“了，有些小贪污升级为大贪污，案情大，牵连广，一窝子一窝子的大贪污犯开始而且普遍露头了，严重的反革命分子和反革命小集团也开始暴露了，更大更多的贪污犯在今后十天内将大批大批地就网。”中央机关已经决定将大老虎的数目从原定 400 只，增加到 700 只。虽然报告提出，中央机关此时成功的经验包括“四查”，即“查经济、查人事、查账目、查资料”；大胆使用非党积极分子和民主人士，使用已经缴械投降的“俘虏”，以及大贪污嫌疑分子的家属；和实行“专案、专组、限期破案，包打老虎制”， [79]但是，毛泽东显然看重的主要还是公审大会的效力。他在转发薄一波的报告时批示：“请各中央局考虑在二月按期仿照中央一级二月一日审判七名大贪污犯的办法办，审判各大行政区一级的数名大贪污犯（一亿元以下的中小贪污犯暂时不要审判），其中有判死刑的，有判死刑缓期的，有判长期徒刑的，有判短期徒刑的，有判徒刑缓期的，有判免于处刑的（此项须给行政处分），藉以推进打虎斗争。” [80]

毛泽东这时推动打“虎”的另一个办法，就是拿各地各单位的打“虎”数字相互比较，以大促小。如华北军区所属六十六军报告称：确定“打虎预算为二百二十只，内大老虎二十二只。截止二月六日，已打虎一百四十一只，内大老虎四只。”毛泽东得报后即批示：根据六十六军的打虎预算及已得成绩，华北军区原定打虎预算必须重做。“各级军区和各军打虎预算和打虎成绩不及六十六军的，须说出令人信服的理由，否则其负责人一定有问题，不是思想右倾，或方法不对，就是自己是贪污犯。” [81]2 月 7 日，李富春报告中财委系统“至昨六日止已打出大老虎一百五十只”，“中财委及财经各部共十五个部门，共同拟定在二月底以前必成数为三百十八只，期成数为三百七十九只，在二月十五日以前定

打出二百只（即七天内再打五十只），大家劲头足，信心高。”毛泽东见报即批：“如此预算，我认为中央一级可期成七百五十只”。[82]

鉴于毛泽东的这种态度，许多地方和单位自然也就见风涨。如东北局，1月26日预计打“大老虎”500只，因受到毛泽东批评，2月3日即跃升至2000只了。随即发现仍比不上华北等区，仅三天，即2月6日就再涨一倍，定为4000只。终于在9日得到毛泽东的夸奖，称其“计划打大虎四千只，中小虎二万五千只，为全国六大区第一位。”要求“各大区虽然不能都向东北看齐，但要根据自己情况逐步提高预算，批判干部中的右倾思想。”[83]又如华东军区，1月下旬预订捉“大老虎”200多，被毛泽东批评，2月1日涨为500只，7日更涨至1000只，成为全国各大军区中最高预算数，因而受到毛的表扬，并号召“各军向华东军区学习”。[84]

当然，即使在大区和大军区中，也有在数字上始终表现得比较谨慎的。如中南军区“三反”运动发动之后，就一直没有能跟上毛的步伐。以至于毛泽东“觉得中南军区动作稍缓，即于元旦凌晨两点起草复电，要求他们对运动要‘严加督促，勤加指导，务使每天都有收获’，并对来电不妥之处作了修改，派专人连夜乘专机将修改稿送到，以引起中南军区的高度重视。”[85]但直到1月22日，中南军区所属各军区和各军的“三反”报告，仍旧不能让毛泽东满意，被批评为清出的“老虎”太少，“劲头不足，空话太多”。[86]2月1日，中南军区鼓足勇气，上报军区直属机关部队计划打“大老虎”106只，毛泽东虽予以肯定，但认为还是一个初步的预算，以后还需要随时追加。[87]至2月11日，鉴于华东军区打“虎”预算突飞猛进，中南军区的打“虎”数字再度受到毛泽东的批评。他明确电告中南局并规定数字称：“中南打虎应大致和华东看齐。华东局八日电告不包括区、乡、军队和工商界，单是县以上党、政、群及财政企业打大虎五千，中小虎二万。另外华东军区打大虎一千，中小虎三千。由此看来，你们最近规定打大虎三千，中小虎二万，还是低了。军队方面，必须和华东军区看齐，打大虎一千，中小虎三千以上，并迅速分配下去。地方应增多少，请考虑再告。”尤其属中南军区管辖的华南军区，直到这时，对打“虎”数字仍是缩手缩脚，更是让毛泽东很不满。他同样亲自规定了打“虎”数字。电称：“华南军区二月九日电，规定打大老虎四十，中小虎八百多，这个数目少了十倍，像华南军区系统有这样多的大小单位，至少应打大虎四五百，中小虎一二千。”[88]

鉴于中南、华南两军区始终跟不上中央的步伐，毛泽东甚至下决心派公安部长罗瑞卿亲往武汉和广州，督导中南局和华南分局的工作。果然，罗瑞卿到后不久，中南局就于2月13日一鼓作气地把打“大老虎”的数字提高到了8000，把打“小老虎”的数字提高到了4.2万。对此，毛泽东满意地表扬说：“这个大虎八千，小虎四万二千余的新计划，把全国各大行政区的打虎水平，提高到了目前时期的最高度，比过去所设想的计划接近于实际”。但他又转过来拿这个数字来对比其他地区和单位了，要求各中央局都参照中南局的新数字，“在适当时机酌量修改自己的计划”。[89]

不过，中南军区这一天所报的打“虎”数字，毛泽东还是不能满意。本来，根据人数比例，参考华东军区的数字，中南军区努力把打大老虎的数字提高了数倍，达到800只，华南军区也努力把打“大老虎”的数字提到了183只。但这与毛泽东规定的数字，即中南军区1000只，华南军区四五百只，仍不相符。何况，仅几天时间，华东军区就又把打“大老虎”的数字从1000只提升到了1600只。结果，中南军区和华南军区的数字报上来，毛泽东还是严辞批评。称：“你们军区打虎预算据中南局最近电告增至打大虎八百，这比你们过去的数字是增大了，但和华东军区的一千六百相比，仅及其一半。实际上华东军区大虎将来可能打至二千五百至三千，你们基本上应与他们看齐……特别是华南军区系统可能打大虎一千以上，中小虎数万，而他们定得很低，勇气不旺。”[90]

运动的结束及影响

毛泽东给各地规定打“虎”数目，各地又是如何具体消化分解的呢？这里可以华东区的报告来一窥究竟。

按照毛泽东的要求，华东局也是一次次提高打“虎”数字，2月8日最终确定不含军队、学校、工商界和区乡一级，要打“大老虎”5000只，中小“虎”2万只。华东局创造了这一各大行政区“最高数字”，即分派任务给各省市地区。具体分派指标如下：“山东四千三百只（内大虎八百只，中小虎三千五百只）；浙江三千七百只（内大虎七百只，中小虎三千只）；苏南三千一百只（内大虎六百只，中小虎二千五百只）；安徽三千二百只（内大虎五百只，中小虎二千七百只）；苏北二千七百只（内大虎四百只，中小虎二千三百

只）；福建二千一百只（内大虎三百只，中小虎一千八百只）；上海三千五百五十只（内大虎七百五十只，中小虎二千八百只）；南京七百五十只（内大虎一百五十只，中小虎六百只）；华东直属机关一千六百只（内大虎八百只，中小虎八百只）。” [91]毫无疑问，具体到各个省市地区，自然也是一样将自己得到的打“虎”数字进一步向下分派，最后分摊到具体单位或部门的头上。

至于每一个领受到具体数字的单位或部门，其完成任务的办法也是大同小异。即是首先“采取经费用站队（用了多少钱？用在那些方面？），经手人站队，关系人站队及有关私营厂商站队（跟那些厂商有过多少交易？），再联系其他因素（去查本人出身、社会关系、生活收支情况、平素表现、是否兼营工商业等），加以对照分析”，查“虎迹”，找“虎窝”。一有线索后即专人专案，或交专门的打“虎”队，包查包打，开始全面内查外调，包括检查账面、单据、进货、质量、仓库存货等。同时对嫌疑人“实行隔离、封锁，切断其一切内外联系”，并“采取大会压、小会挤、内外追、个别谈、领导开导、家属劝说、反复对证等方法，使‘老虎’无喘息、通气、招架之余地。” [92]很显然，由于不少部门和单位，有贪污行为者达半数以上，中共中央专门下令解除占整个贪污分子 90% 以上的小贪污分子的顾虑，将那些贪污在 50 万元以下，情节不严重，又能彻底坦白，保证不再重犯者，一律不按贪污分子看待，并免除其行政处分，使其轻装上阵，参加打“虎”，对运动帮助极大。 [93] 因为，出于感恩戴德或戴罪立功的想法，这一部分人多半都能够在打“虎”战役中充当积极分子的角色。

但是，由于“老虎”的数字来自于上级的估算，甚至是相互攀比层层加码的结果，因此也就不可避免地会严重脱离实际。同中国历次群众性政治运动都会出现的情况一样，此举更是给一些人打击报复、诬陷栽赃自己的仇家，大开了方便之门。甚至有些人因响应上级号召，检举有贪污嫌疑者，自己反倒被打成贪污分子，蒙受冤屈。 [94] 而把诸多不是“老虎”打成“老虎”，把“小老虎”打成“大老虎”，更是不能不诉诸于“逼”、“供”、“信”。其实，打“虎”斗争刚刚开始，毛泽东就注意到一些部队和地方在搞“逼”、“供”、“信”了。他为此还专门发出指示，要求“打虎必须从算账入手”，不要“专去逼供”。 [95] 打“虎”进入高潮后，各地也先后提出过“防止单纯逼供不择手段”的问题，甚至提出过“可疑错，不可打错，防止逼供信”的主张，对此毛泽东也表赞成。 [96] 但实际上，不要说对非“老虎”者，就是对诸多算得上“老虎”之人，要在那样一种压力

之下，又有严格的时间规定，要想不利用“逼”、“供”、“信”的办法来达成目的，几乎都是不可能的。注意到这种情况，因此，毛泽东对此的态度也多少留有余地，即“必须从算账入手”，不要“专去逼供”。

以华北军区某军打“虎”战役为例。该军因为要在打“虎”斗争中争荣誉，下达打“虎”任务时特别强调各团之间相互比赛，看谁打出“老虎”最多。结果有的团号召党员互相怀疑，带头坦白，结果是没有贪污的党员，也说贪污过几百万，以示党员“示范作用”。有的团对怀疑对象打、骂、捆、冻，指数问供，只要贪污数字，不管有无证据。有的团更是使用车轮战，并上肉刑伺候，两天就搞出贪污 1000 万元以上的贪污分子 20 多人。[97]如察哈尔省天镇县以区为单位，为找嫌疑，打“老虎”，把干部集中在一个院里吃饭睡觉，紧闭大门，一律不许出入。街上还布置了警卫队，一碰上区干部便端枪逼问，严禁信件往来、打电话和会客。又如山西富农滩煤矿为打“虎”，创造出“软硬兼施”战术，其中“硬”的办法就有 17 种之多。包括“（1）一律不准出门；（2）戴布条（蓝布条可自由活动，红布条在院内活动，白布条不准出门。据八十人统计，戴蓝条的仅二十五人，戴红条和白条的有五十五人）；（3）大会斗争；（4）不准睡觉（反省）；（5）用棍顶下颚（迫其不能低头）；（6）罚蹲（一直到腿酸也不准动）；（7）通宵罚站；（8）坐反椅；（9）跪板凳；（10）头抵墙；（11）头顶碗；（12）两手举木棍；（13）不坦白不叫上厕所；（14）变相的打（指头、扭耳）；（15）上‘临时法庭’（设一二审判员，由总支或保卫科长担任；三四个武装队员，曾审讯过六个人，这六个人都在‘法庭’上被捆过）；（16）捆；（17）手铐加木塞。”[98]

虽然一般情况下“逼”、“供”、“信”问题中央比大区好些，大区比省好些，省比地、市好些，地、市又比县好些，但上级单位其实也一样存在“逼”、“供”、“信”，不过程度不同而已。如华南财委各机关就同样存在肉刑或变相肉刑的现象。据报，“由于老虎顽固不化，拒不坦白或再三反供，群众激愤，对贪污分子施以打骂。如物管局斗争走私老虎方兆辉时，竟至打伤其面部，领导阻止不了。有色局平时常罚老虎跪地，在斗争顽固到底之黄敬文时，个别群众把他绑起。商检局斗争破坏商检政策之简建贤时，要他跪凳跪木条，手上还要举木凳。”[99]

如此打“虎”的结果可想而知。运动高潮之时，“老虎”的数字扶摇直上，到处报捷。同时，众多被冤打者，亦痛苦难耐，不少自寻短见。等到运动转向定案和结束时，则大批“老虎”翻供，很多材料无法核实。比较典型者如西北军政委员会贸易部在打“虎”高潮时，因打“虎”队手法简单急燥，依靠肉刑甚至用火筷烙手，以致自杀者即有9人，“其中上吊者五人，刀割者三人，跳楼一人，已死者三人，未死者六人。”[100]上海及华东在沪一些单位因使用“逼”、“供”、“信”办法，仅在3月13日至23日10天的时间里，就造成60人自杀。[101]四川江津地区打“虎”期间使用吊打和肉刑逼供，造成58人自杀。[102]淮北盐特区“全区参加‘三反’运动的共有九五五人，遭受肉刑者即有二一八人，肉刑和逼供信花样多至一二五种，残酷程度骇人听闻，不少人被打得死去活来，被打伤致死者二人，自杀五人，共死七人（其中被株连而死的群众五人），自杀未遂者十三人，打伤甚至终身残废者十九人。”[103]最为引人注目的，是青岛市的“三反”打“虎”战役，大搞“逼”、“供”、“信”，“据全市不完全统计，打死与自杀已死者达一百七十二人。”仅青岛纺管分局、四方铁路机厂、港务局、对外贸易局、卫生局等五单位就有54人被打死或自杀，另有50人自杀未遂，还有26人被打致残。“在这一百零四起案件中，大多数既无贪污又无政治问题，而工人及其家属和警卫人员则达六十六名。”[104]

由此不难了解，打“虎”战役发生了严重的扩大化的情况。

上述淮北盐特区总共955人，打出大小“老虎”282只，被施以肉刑逼供者就有218人。经复查，282只“老虎”均不能成立，一部分根本就没有贪污问题。[105]

乌鲁木齐公安局打“虎”中由于使用“逼”、“供”、“信”的办法，把一些没有贪污的打成了贪污分子，把有的小贪污打成了大贪污。事后对其中43件案件加以甄别，结果全部不能成立，12名被打错，31名被打冒。[106]

陕西省军区“三反”复审定案时发现，“全军区原共打虎1231只，其中一亿元以上的14只。第一次甄别定案，（只能）定虎276只，其中一亿元以上的3只。经过复审以后，现肯定贪污在一千万元以上的227只，一亿元以上2人。原打为虎，现下降千万元以下500万元以上者205人；降至500万元以下100万元以上者535人；降至100万元以下者213

人；确定查明无贪污者 24 人。”另外像“安康军区原打虎 112 只，第一次定虎 33 只。经复查后，真正贪污千万元以上的只有 11 人，占原虎数的 11%。” [107]

苏南地委因为打“虎”战役中普遍发生逼供现象，不少“老虎”打冒，甚至打假了。最后发现“原反出来的贪污千万元以上的‘老虎’有 5471 人，经定案后，结案的占 16.4%；销案的占 76.2%”。 [108]

据安子文就结束“三反”所做的报告中说：“‘三反’运动中全国打出一千万元以上的贪污分子最高数为二十九万二千多人，现在剩下十五万五千多人，减少了百分之六十五左右。东北区老虎下降最少，约百分之三十一，华东区下降比例最大，为百分之八十三。”

“由于追算时间过长，折算标准不统一，折价过高而成为老虎的约占百分之三十三，小贪污打过头而成为老虎的约占百分之四十七。由于对贪污界限不清，把公私不分、失职、浪费和有政治问题的人算成老虎的，约占百分之十五。根本没有贪污，完全打错了的约占百分之五（河北最高，占百分之十点五四）”。 [109]

其实，安子文报告的时间是 1952 年 10 月 18 日，其当时所得上报材料既不包括 10 月以后各地复审的资料，如上述淮北盐特区和乌鲁木齐公安局 100%打错的数据，更不包括当年被各级领导强制压下，未能查出冤情和解除罪名的种种情况。最明显者如《建国以来毛泽东文稿》中注明者，解放军军事学院院务部副部长朱由芹，当年受开除党籍和行政撤职、降级处分，1980 年才得以复查平反，恢复级别和待遇。 [110]查原西康省地区这时被冤打定罪者，不少人也是存活到 1982—1986 年间，才得以向四川省法院申诉并获平反。 [111]全国类似的情况尚不知有多少。

当年一些地方党政官员压制甄别和平反工作的情况到底有多严重呢？这里仍以上述被发现的青岛市的问题为例，即可有所了解。由于青岛市前市委书记被当作“老虎”打倒，新市委领导与旧市委领导下属之间存在矛盾，故“三反”运动中青岛市委对打“虎”战役十分投入，造成大量冤假错案，而运动结束后自然也就被受压一方告到中央。不得已，青岛市委在中共中央的要求下进行了某种形式的复查工作，承认在运动中完全打错了的，有 129 人之多。然而，因为此一数字与事实出入很大，中央与山东省联合派出调查组赴青岛调

查。结果，虽然只调查了几个部门，就证实青岛市委的复查结果完全不可信。据查，仅纺管分局一个部门被打错者即有 470 人，比青岛市委自报全市被打错人数就超出 3 倍以上。如果再加上已调查的港务局打错的 54 人，四方机厂打错的 34 人，连同青岛纺管分局，这三个单位被打错的人数就达到 612 人。而已知青岛国棉六、七、八厂 3 个厂还有 184 人被打错，两项加起来被打错者就已经达到将近 800 人之多了。仅由上述 6 个单位的数字简单推算一下，就可以确信，青岛市在“三反”中被冤打成贪污分子的，恐怕不下数千人。

[112]

实际上，还在 2 月下旬，中共中央就已经多少开始意识到打“虎”运动的一些偏差了。2 月 29 日，毛泽东特别批转了东北贸易部关于打“虎”要严格规定纪律，禁止打人和变相打人的经验。[113]3 月 4 日，毛泽东又进一步批转肖华关于军委直属部队防止与纠正

“左”的偏向，“禁止打、骂、捆等人格侮辱和变相肉刑”、“不得采用‘疲劳战术’和‘车轮战术’”的打“虎”经验，要求各部仿行。[114]可知此时各地各单位用打人或变相打人的办法来打“虎”已渐成燎原之势，毛泽东非出面阻止不可了。

3 月 6 日，毛泽东明令批准发布《关于处理贪污、浪费及克服官僚主义错误的若干规定》，第一次对贪污问题提出了统一的政策性标准。其规定明确指出：“凡贪污未满一百万元者，只要其情节不严重恶劣，彻底承认错误，保证不再犯，一律不以贪污分子看待”。“凡贪污超过一百万元，未满一千万之贪污分子，只要其情节不严重恶劣，彻底承认错误，保证不再犯，一律不予刑事处分……如系年岁较轻或偶一失足而能自动坦白者，或系发觉后积极参加三反工作并业已立功自赎者，得免以贪污分子论处，不予行政处分”。“凡贪污超过一千万，未满一亿元之贪污分子，可依其情节轻重、坦白认罪程度、退赃和检举立功等情况，分别给以适当的刑事处分，或免刑而只予行政处分”。“凡贪污超过一亿元之贪污分子，一般均应按其情节轻重给以不同的刑事处分，追缴贪污款物，但自动坦白、真诚悔过，退出赃物，在反贪污斗争中检举立功者，亦可免于刑事处分，改给以适当的行政处分。”而计算贪污违法时间，则“一般应自中华人民共和国成立之日，即一九四九年十月一日算起……凡在中华人民共和国成立以后解放的地方，应自解放之日算起。惟起义部队一律自该部队建立革命政治工作制度之日算起。”[115]

紧接着，毛泽东亦签发了《中华人民共和国惩治贪污条例》，其中具体规定了贪污和惩处的标准。对贪污罪的定性为：“一切国家机关、企业、学校及其附属机构的工作人员，凡侵吞、盗窃、骗取、套取国家财物，强索他人赃物，收受贿赂以及其他假公济私违法取利之行为，均为贪污罪。”惩处标准则以1亿元，5000万元和1000万元为界线，贪污数额1亿元以上者，可判处10年以上有期徒刑或无期徒刑，情节特别严重者可判处死刑；5000万元以上不满1亿元者，判处5年以上10年以下有期徒刑；1000万元以上不满5000万元者，判处1年以上5年以下有期徒刑，或1年至4年劳役，或1年至2年的管制。不满1000万元者，可根据情况判处1年徒刑、劳役或管制，亦可免于刑事处分，给予开除、撤职、降职、降级、记过或警告等行政处分。凡有危害国家、社会或人民生命安全、或出卖坐探国家经济情报、敲诈勒索、组织集体贪污、拒不坦白或掩饰罪行之情况，得从重处刑；凡主动或彻底坦白、检举他人或年岁较轻者，可从轻处罚。[116]

尽管《条例》的规定形式上仍旧相当严厉，实际上，只要注意到毛泽东在指导起草上述规定和条例过程中，再三强调“要宽一点”，不要太严，[117]就不难看出，毛这时其实已经从最初扬言非枪毙几万贪污分子不能解决问题的激愤中平静了下来。也正是在这种情况下，毛泽东不仅开始同意对打“虎”运动可能出现的“假老虎和不够标准的老虎”做甄别工作，而且对随后的追赃工作和定案工作，也再三做出指示，强调：“必须将一切真正的贪污犯、贪污嫌疑分子和弄错了的人，按照中央历次指示和政府法令，认真地如实地加以判处和审查清楚，不得放纵一个坏人，不得冤枉一个好人。”“是者定之，错者改之，应降者降之，应升者升之，嫌疑难者暂不处理”。“对赃款凡有追出者必须一律坚决追出，惟不得累及无辜家属，不得派人到农村追赃款……不得硬追本来追不出的部分。”[118]

除了对“三反”的种种作法做出政策性的修正和约束以外，毛泽东还在很大程度上修正了其此前对资产阶级的激烈态度。比如，他不仅开始公开批评因“三反”而一浪高过一浪的广泛批判资产阶级和小资产阶级思想的作法，[119]而且明确提出，无论是贪污分子，还是资产阶级分子，最严重最恶劣的只是极少数，因而号召一切“洗了手的工作人员和工商业者也和我们团结起来”，共同巩固人民民主统一战线和人民民主专政。[120]他甚至表示：

“就资产阶级的大多数人来说，一个人的思想中有坏的方面，也有好的方面，我们应该帮助他们去掉坏的方面，发展好的方面。”而对那些有远见的资本家，我们并不要求他们马上改变自己的成份和事业，同时也欢迎他们将来做一个社会主义者。[121]当然，这一切并

不意味着毛泽东改变了其内心对资产阶级高度戒备的心理。其在“三反”运动结束前明确主张国家机关工作人员必须普遍交待同资产阶级关系问题，就是一个证明。[122]

全国性的“三反”运动及其打“虎”战役，至1952年3—4月间先后结束，定案和追赃工作持续时间较长，但至6—7月间多数地方和单位也渐告一段落。据6月初中共中央纪律检查委员会就华北、华东、东北、西南和西北五个行政区（军队和中央机关除外）“三反”运动结果的统计报告，即参加运动312.2437万人，其中有贪污行为和可以定为贪污分子者122.6984万人，占参加运动人数39%强，其中党员20.2683人，占贪污分子总数16.5%。[123]加上中央机关等还有70余万人参加运动，被认定有贪污行为和可以定为贪污分子者亦在30%以上，可知被认定有贪污行为和可以定为贪污分子的人数应在150万人左右。经过部分甄别，至10月初，这一数字就已经大为缩水。安子文在10月18日报告称：“全国县以上党政机关（军队除外）参加‘三反’运动总人数三百八十三万六千多人，共查出贪污分子和犯贪污错误的一百二十万三千多人，占参加‘三反’运动总人数的百分之三十一.四。其中共产党员十九万六千多人，占贪污总人数的百分之十六.三。贪污一千万以上的十万五千九百一十六人，占贪污总人数百分之八点八。”这里，贪污分子和犯贪污错误者少了将近30万人。另外，上述人中，总计判刑38402人，其中处以死刑者42人，死刑缓期执行者9人，无期徒刑者67人，有期徒刑9942人，劳动改造11165人，机关管制17175人。[124]

但是，无论最后定案人数如何缩水和在打“虎”战役中发生了怎样严重的扩大化的情况，中共进城以后党政国家机关工作人员普遍发生贪污腐化的现象依旧是极其严重，甚至是触目惊心的。类似刘青山、张子善[125]那样的中共高级干部，利用职位和权力，化公为私、损公肥私、假公济私和铺张浪费的情况，人数已经越来越多，一般罚刑都难以起到威慑的作用。特别是县以下的基层干部，相当多数因为权力不受监督 and 限制，可以为所欲为，以至于违法乱纪的现象十分普遍，导致一些地方民众认为“看不出他们和国民党作风有什么区别？”咒骂他们“比国民党还厉害”。[126]罗瑞卿所谓“国民党所有的（问题），我们今天也应有尽有”，毛泽东所谓“十年内不进行三反，共产党就会变成国民党”，并非危言耸听。[127]1952年的“三反”运动刚一结束，中共中央就在1953年不得不紧接着发动了以反对干部违法乱纪为主要内容的所谓“新三反”运动，同样也是逼不得已之举。

在这样一种情况下，1952年“三反”运动的发动，毫无疑问有其遏止共产党逐渐国民党化的发展趋势的意义所在。“三反”运动之后，各级党政国家机关工作人员当中的贪污腐败问题明显地较前减少了。然而，这并不等于权力机关工作人员贪污腐败的问题会因此而得以解决。“三反”运动过去不过一年左右的时间，中共中央就不能不提醒相关部门防止“三反”后再度普遍发生贪污事件和要求大力进行“反贪污教育”，[128]以后更是几度再次大规模地进行反贪污斗争。[129]这足以说明，“三反”运动并没有、也不可能根本解决问题。事实上，真正使此后政权内部的贪污腐败现象没有再像建国初期那样恶性发展的原因，并不是因为“三反”运动本身具有多久的持续效力，而是因为中国很快就实行了社会主义改造，取消了市场经济，包括一切可以被联想到“奢侈”二字的生产和服务行业，确立起计划经济体制、平均主义的分配制度和闭关锁国的政策。正是这些制度和政策强制性地使在权力和金钱之间设置了障碍，使党政工作人员大笔贪污公款和进行奢侈性消费的难度大大增加。然而，一旦市场经济重新启动，国门大开，而权力结构和权力制度却毫无改变时，权力寻租、权钱勾结乃至权力腐败的现象就会卷土重来，并且会随着开放程度以及整个经济规模的日渐扩大愈演愈烈至一发而不可收拾。“绝对权力”还是会“绝对腐败”。

归根到底，毛泽东发动“三反”运动的动机无可指摘，其效果却利弊可见。权力机关工作人员贪污腐化的问题，只有在成熟的法制体制内，使权力受到必要的制约，并且只有在公民对行使权力的人员以及行使权力的过程能够保持有效监督的情况下，才有可能最大限度地被减少和遏制。

NOTES

[1]在各种中华人民共和国通史一类的著作中，大都有高度评价性的简要介绍，少数专论此运动的文章，也往往是将“三反”运动与“五反”运动一并说明，如庞松：《“三反”“五反”运动》，《中华人民共和国专题史稿》，卷一，成都，四川人民出版社，2004年，第298—326页。王朝彬的《三反实录》是目前所见唯一以“三反”运动为题的专书，作者参阅了大量保存在中共中央党校的相关档案资料，但其简单“实录”的写法，正如作者自己所言，使该书“只是通俗读物，不是学术著作”。

[2]见于王朝彬前引书，其自序中一连用了三个“成功实践”。称“三反运动是执政党自身建设的成功实践，是人民民主政权建设的成功实践，是改造社会、移风易俗、清洗封建污毒的成功实践。”

[3]转见《新建设》1951年12月号，第13—17页。

[4]转见中共牡丹江市委党史研究室编：《没有枪声的战斗——“三反”“五反”运动专辑》，黑龙江朝鲜民族出版社，1990年，第3页。

[5]《中央转发东北局反对贪污蜕化官僚主义的报告》，1951年9月28日，陕西省档案馆藏 123/44/29/202—205。

[6]薄一波：《若干重大决策与事件的回顾》（上），北京，中共中央党校出版社，1993年，第139—140。

[7]毛泽东：《三大运动的伟大胜利》，1951年10月23日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第二册，第481—483页。

[8]根据华北局传达的中共中央这时所提出的1952年的三大任务，则是：“增产节约、抗美援朝、思想改造”。

[9]高岗：《全面开展增产节约运动，进一步深入反贪污、反浪费、反官僚主义的斗争》，1951年10月26日（据《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第二卷，第513页和薄一波前引书第140页，时间应为1951年11月1日），《新建设》1951年12月号，第17—20页。

[10]毛泽东：《在中央转发高岗三反斗争报告上的批语》1951年11月20日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第二册，北京，中央文献出版社，1991年，第513页。

[11]转见《新建设》1951年12月号，第20—21页。

[12]报告称：“据沈阳市人民法院贪污案件逐年统计，一九四九年下半年贪污犯占案犯总数百分之五点三，一九五零年上升为百分之五点七，一九五一年第一季度又上升为百分之一三点二。”“整个贸易工作系统的统计，去年一月到八月犯贪污错误的有七百人，而今年只第二季度贪污者即有五百余人。”《东北局关于反对贪污蜕化官僚主义的报告》，1951年9月14日，见陕西省档案馆藏档，123/44/29/203—205。

[13]转见《新建设》1951年12月号，第20—21页。

[14]《向贪污腐化倾向展开坚决的斗争》，中共华北局党刊：《建设》第一二七期，1951年11月24日，第9—11页。

[15]《华北局关于逮捕大贪污犯天津地委前任书记刘青山和现任书记张子善向中央的报告》，1951年11月29日，《建设》第一二九期，1951年12月10日，第4页。另据随后《河北省关于第三次省党代表会议向华北局的报告》称：“张子善在最近三个月内只私人开支即达三亿多元”。见《建设》第一二九期，1951年12月10日，第9—11页，并见《人民日报》1951年12月30日。

[16]薄一波前引书，第151页。

[17]毛泽东：《中央关于补报重大贪污犯的处理情况给薄一波（第一书记）、刘澜涛（第三书记）的电报》，1951年12月1日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第二册，第530页。

[18]见《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第二册，第534—536页。

[19]《中央关于发动党内外群众大张旗鼓检查和惩治贪污人员的指示》，1951年12月4日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第二册，第542—543页。

[20]《中央批转贸易部党组关于大张旗鼓公开地反对贪污现象和惩治贪污人员的报告的指示》，1951年12月5日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第二册，第544页。

[21]《华北局关于在全区大张旗鼓开展反贪污反浪费反官僚主义运动向毛主席的报告》，1951年12月12日；《人民银行总行党组关于反贪污反浪费反官僚主义的报告》，1951年12月4日；《中央水利部党组关于反贪污反浪费反官僚主义的报告》，1951年12月4日；《中央轻工业部党组关于反贪污反浪费反官僚主义的报告》，1951年12月4日；《中央贸易部党组关于大张旗鼓公开地反对贪污现象和惩治贪污人员的报告》，1951年12月5日；《中央财政部党组关于开展反贪污反浪费反官僚主义运动的报告》，1951年12月6日；《建设》第一三〇期，12月19日，第1—2，5—6，15—16，17—18，19，21—22页。

[22]《中央关于三反斗争必须大张旗鼓进行的电报》，1951年12月8日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第二册，第548—549页。

[23]《习仲勋关于西北地区反贪污斗争的报告》，1951年12月13日，《建设》第一三六期，1952年1月9日，第1—2页。

[24]《华北局关于在全区大张旗鼓开展反贪污反浪费反官僚主义运动向毛主席的报告》，1951年12月12日，《建设》第一三〇期，1951年12月19日，第1—2页。

[25]《中南局关于三反运动的报告》，1951年12月14日，《建设》第一三六期，1952年1月9日，第4—5页。

[26]《河北省委关于第三次省党代表会议向华北局的报告》，1951年12月，《建设》第一二九期，1951年12月10日，第9—11页。

[27]《甘肃省委关于反贪污反浪费反官僚主义的报告》，1951年12月15日，《建设》第一三二期，1951年12月30日，第3—4页。

[28]《中央批转甘肃省委关于反贪污反浪费反官僚主义的报告》，1951年12月22日；《中央批转铁道兵团联运党委关于三反斗争的报告》，1951年12月24日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第二册，第612，631页。

[29]罗瑞卿报告即讲到过毛这方面的谈话内容，称：“有些共产党员比国民党还坏。如长沙公安局长贪污廿亿，（国民党时期的）长沙警察局长都不敢搞这样多，因他们有宗派。”《罗瑞卿同志在华南分局第七十二次常委会上的传达报告》，1952年2月25日，广东省档案馆藏，206/1/44/60页。（据1991年出版的《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册293页注2，原长沙市公安局局长王丕敏因严重违法乱纪被处决一案，“正在复查中”，但十几年之后亦未见有此案已经改正的消息。）

[30]毛泽东：《批转并奖励西南军区党委会关于三反斗争的一周简报》，1951年12月30日；《中央关于中央、大区、省市三级一切工作部门向中央主席和军委主席作三反报告的指示》，1951年12月30日；《对董必武等关于五机关合署办公及开展三反斗争情况报告的复信》1951年12月30日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第二册，第646，653，652页。

[31]《罗瑞卿同志在华南分局第七十二次常委会上的传达报告》，1952年2月25日，广东省档案馆藏，206/1/44/58—59页。

[32]薄一波前引书，第147页；并见《中央关于立即抓紧三反斗争的指示》，1952年1月4日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第12—13页。

[33]《中央关于立即抓紧三反斗争的指示》，1952年1月4日，《建设》第一三七期，1952年1月10日，第1—2页。

[34]《北京市委关于三反运动开展情况和继续开展这一运动的意见的报告》，1952年1月4日，《建设》第一三七期，1952年1月10日，第8—10页。

[35]《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第21—22页。

- [36] 《毛主席批转甘肃省委关于三反运动进入坦白检举阶段的报告》，1952年1月9日，《建设》第一三九期，1952年1月18日，第6—7页。
- [37] 《毛主席批转罗瑞卿关于中央公安部猛烈开展三反斗争的报告》，1952年1月10日，《建设》第一三九期，1952年1月18日，第1—3页。
- [38] 《毛主席转发集宁军分区三反情况报告》，1952年1月14日，陕西省档案馆藏 123/44/5/240；毛泽东：《对遵义军分区关于三反运动的综合报告的批语》，1952年1月14日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第52页。
- [39] 转见陕西省档案馆藏 123/44/30/78.
- [40] 《陈毅关于华东军区三反运动报告》，1952年1月16日，陕西省档案馆藏 123/44/5/248.
- [41] 《川南区党委关于“三反”问题给西南局并发各地市委的报告》，1952年1月19日，四川省档案馆藏，建东/2/767/25—26.
- [42] 转见《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第60—61页。
- [43] 转见《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第64页。
- [44] 转见《建设》第一四一期，1952年1月26日，第4—5页。
- [45] 毛泽东：《在中南局关于处理机关小家当的请示报告上的批语》，1952年1月13日；毛泽东：《转发饶漱石关于华东各地三反斗争情况的报告的批语》，1952年1月13日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第40，42—43页。
- [46] 毛泽东：《对总政关于西南军区三反运动第三周简报的批示的批语》，1952年1月15日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第64页。
- [47] 转见陕西省档案馆藏 123/44/30/83.
- [48] 毛泽东：《转发贵州军区三反运动三日简报第一号的批语》，1952年1月15日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第62页。
- [49] 《罗瑞卿同志在华南分局第七十二次常委会上的传达报告》，1952年2月25日，广东省档案馆藏，206/1/44/60页。
- [50] 《薄一波同志关于中央一级各机关三反运动情况和全面展开向大贪污犯总进攻向毛主席的报告》，1952年1月19日，《建设》第一四一期，1952年1月26日，第1—2页。

- [51]《华北军区党委会关于动员全军集中火力打“大老虎”向毛主席的报告》，1952年1月22日，《建设》第一四一期，1952年1月26日，第6页。
- [52]毛泽东：《关于全军必须以全力进行三反然后整编的电报》，1952年1月22日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第78页。
- [53]《山西省委关于三反斗争情况给华北局的报告》，1952年1月12日，四川省档案馆藏，建东/2/762/154—165。
- [54]《毛泽东批转山西省委三反综合报告要各地精读仿行电》，1952年1月23日，陕西省档案馆藏 123/44/5/259。
- [55]《空军党委关于布置搜寻大贪污犯的报告》，1952年1月22日，重庆市档案馆藏，资料/D65/30/2—4。
- [56]毛泽东：《关于集中力量搜寻“大老虎”的指示》，1952年1月23日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第87—88页。
- [57]毛泽东：《对西南军区三反运动第五周简报的批语》1952年1月24日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第89页。
- [58]毛泽东：《转发志愿军十九兵团党委三反报告的批语》，1952年1月25日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第94—95页。
- [59]转见重庆市档案资料，/D65/30/10-13。
- [60]毛泽东：《批转北京市委关于打虎经验的报告》，1952年1月28日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第111页。
- [61]《华北局关于各省市地委一律做出打虎计划、结束三反须经过批准的紧急指示》，1952年1月26日，《建设》第一四二期，1952年2月2日，第4页。
- [62]《华北军区党委关于一周中捉虎二百十八个向毛主席的报告》，1952年1月25日；《刘澜涛同志关于华北军区两天中捉住八十五个老虎向毛主席的报告》，1952年1月26日，《建设》第一四二期，1952年2月2日，第7—9页。
- [63]毛泽东：《对刘澜涛转报华北军区报告的批示》，1952年1月26日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第102页。
- [64]《华北局关于山西省应捉虎一千三百只的指示与毛主席的批示》，1952年1月30日，《建设》第一四三期，1952年2月4日，第4页。

[65]毛泽东：《转发华东军区党委关于打虎预算报告的批语》，1952年1月30日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第112页。

[66]毛泽东：《关于搜捕大老虎和检查处理违法资本家给高岗的电报》，1952年1月31日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第117—118页。

[67]参见薄一波前引书，第144页。

[68]华南财委节约检查委员会印发：《怎样打虎提纲（草案）》，1952年2月，广东省档案馆藏，206/1/44/192。

[69]毛泽东：《转发李富春在中财委汇报会议上的打虎总结报告的批语》，1952年2月2日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第134页；《李富春在中财委汇报会议上的打虎总结报告》，1952年1月30日，建东/2/762/47—49。

[70]毛泽东：《关于限期向中央报告打虎预算和县、区、乡开展三反运动的电报》，1952年2月4日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第141—142页。

[71]时任《中国青年》杂志总编辑的韦君宜回忆当时经由毛批准的文件，曾规定每个单位必须打出5%的贪污分子。见韦君宜：《思痛录》，香港天地图书有限公司，2000年，第27页。

[72]毛泽东：《关于增加打虎分配数目给谭政的电报》，1952年2月4日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第143页。

[73]转见四川省档案馆藏，建东/2/767/11。

[74]毛泽东：《对山东分局打虎报告的批语》，1952年2月5日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第151页。

[75]毛泽东：《对华北局关于停止河北省委员金城、省军区司令员王光华党内外一切职务限的通报的批示》，1952年2月4日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第138页。

[76]毛泽东：《对薄一波、刘澜涛同志关于华北区二月份内捉虎约一万二千只的报告的批示》，1952年2月4日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第145页。（事实上，东北局2月3日即报告称，全东北计划捉大老虎2000只。）

[77]毛泽东：《关于限期向中央报告打虎预算和县、区、乡开展三反运动的电报》，1952年2月4日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第140页。

[78]毛泽东：《对中南军区党委打虎报告的批语》，1952年2月7日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第163页。

[79]《薄一波关于中央一级公审大会后打虎情况的总结报告》，1952年2月6日，四川省档案馆藏，建康／2／2473／16—19。

[80]毛泽东：《批发薄一波关于中央一级公审大会后打虎情况总结报告的批语》，1952年2月7日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第161页。

[81]毛泽东：《对刘澜涛关于六十六军捉虎经验报告的批语》，1952年2月8日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第167—168页。

[82]《毛泽东转发富春同志二月七日关于中财委及财经各部的打虎计划和打虎策略给主席的信》，1952年2月8日，四川省档案馆藏，建康／1／2473／22—23。

[83]毛泽东：《对高岗关于东北打虎计划报告的复电》，1952年2月9日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第177—178页。

[84]毛泽东：《转发华东军区捉虎报告的批语》，1952年2月10日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第180页。

[85]薄一波前引书，第147—148页。

[86]毛泽东：《关于全军必须以全力进行三反然后整编的电报》，1952年1月22日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第78页。

[87]毛泽东：《关于限期向中央报告打虎预算和县、区、乡开展三反运动的电报》，1952年2月4日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第140页。

[88]毛泽东：《关于中南打虎应大致和华东看齐的报告》，1952年2月11日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第193页。

[89]毛泽东：《批转中南局打“虎”新计划的批语》，1952年2月17日；毛泽东：《转发习仲勋关于西北区打虎新预算报告的批语》，1952年2月17日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第221，225页。

[90]毛泽东：《关于中南军区应增加打虎预算给谭政等的电报》，1952年2月18日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第228页。

[91]《华东局关于打虎预算的报告》，1952年2月11日，四川省档案馆藏，建东／2／762／85—86。

- [92]《华东局关于直属机关“打虎”初步经验的通报》，1952年2月12日，重庆市档案馆藏，资料/D65/31/1-4.
- [93]《中央关于三反运动中若干问题的处理意见》，1952年2月12日，陕西省档案馆藏 123/44/2/83-84；《中央关于解除小贪污分子的顾虑及处分问题的决定》，1952年3月2日，《建设》第一五〇期，1952年3月7日，第1-2页。
- [94]此种情况不且枚举，可参见北京市档案馆藏，215/16/75，77，79，84，123，126，127，212，216，217，221，235，279，288，289，等。
- [95]毛泽东：《转发李富春在中财委汇报会议上的打虎总结报告的批语》，1952年2月2日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第134页。
- [96]《察哈尔省委关于第二个打虎战役计划及今后部署的报告》，1952年2月7日；毛泽东：《转发习仲勋关于西北区打虎新预算报告的批语》，1952年2月17日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第225页。
- [97]《华北局关于注意防止三反斗争中发生偏向的通报》，1952年2月，《建设》第一四五期，1952年2月13日，第13页。
- [98]《山西富家滩煤矿三反中发生严重的逼供信错误》，1952年3月，《建设》第一四九期，1952年3月4日，第11页。
- [99]《财委三反办公室调研组会议讨论摘要》，1952年2月，广东省档案馆藏，206/1/44/197.
- [100]《西北军政委员会贸易部紧急通报》，1952年3月16日，陕西省档案馆藏，123/44/34/152-153.
- [101]《上海市委关于三反、五反工作中严格执行各项纪律的决定》，1952年3月25日，陕西省档案馆藏 123/44/5/2344-347.
- [102]《江津地委对反贪污、反浪费、反官僚主义运动的总结》，1952年5月15日，重庆档案馆资料 D221.719/18-1/36/10.
- [103]《江苏省委给华东局并转中央的报告》，1952年12月16日，中共江苏省党史工作办公室、江苏省档案馆编：《“三反”、“五反”运动（江苏卷）》，中共党史出版社，2003年，第98页。

- [104] 《中央关于青岛市“三反”中发生逼供信严重错误的通报》，1952年12月10日；
《中央对青岛市委检讨“三反”中所犯错误及处理善后的指示》，1952年12月27日，
陕西省档案馆藏 123/44/5/72-73.
- [105] 《江苏省委给华东局并转中央的报告》，1952年12月16日。
- [106] 《迪化市公安局关于“三反”甄别总结报告》，1952年11月8日，中共乌鲁木齐党史工作委员会编：《乌鲁木齐市“三反”“五反”运动》，第201-202页
- [107] 《陕西军区三反复审定案工作总结报告》，1952年9月1日，陕西省档案馆藏 123/44/17/22.
- [108] 《关于苏南县以上机关“三反”运动的总结报告》，1952年7月16日，《“三反”、“五反”运动（江苏卷）》，第128, 130, 133-136页。
- [109] 《安子文关于结束“三反”问题的报告》，1952年10月18日，张培田主编：《新中国法制研究史料通鉴》第二卷，北京，中国政法大学出版社，2001年，第2049-2050页。
- [110] 《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第171页注4.
- [111] 参见四川省档案馆藏，建康 11/1, 5, 14, 18, 20, 163-164, 212-214 等。
- [112] 《中央对青岛市委检讨“三反”中所犯错误及处理善后的指示》，1952年12月27日。
- [113] 毛泽东：《对东北贸易部围剿大贪污分子大会的经验的批语》，1952年2月29日，
《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第277页。
- [114] 毛泽东《在肖华关于军委直属部队开展打虎运动的报告上的批语》，1952年3月4日，
《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第300-301页。
- [115] 《中央节约检查委员会关于处理贪污、浪费有克服官僚主义错误的若干规定》，1952年3月8日，《三反五反运动文件续编》，北京，人民出版社，1952年，第55-58页。
- [116] 转见《新中国法制研究史料通鉴》第二卷，第1978-1979页。
- [117] 毛泽东：《对李富春关于起草处理贪污分子规定和追赃规定的报告的批语》，1952年3月1日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第282页。

[118]毛泽东：《中央转发罗瑞卿关于华南军区纠正三反定案中右倾思想的报告的批语》，1952年5月9日；毛泽东：《中央转发重工业部关于三反追赃定案经验报告的批语》，1952年5月10日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第374，445页。

[119]毛泽东的批评导致中央宣传部和《学习》杂志等不得不就其前此的激烈言论作出检查。参见毛泽东：《对统战部关于各民主党派三反运动结束时几项问题的处理意见的指示稿的修改》，1952年3月27日；毛泽东：《中央转发中宣部关于杂志所犯错误的检讨的批语和对检讨的修改》，1952年4月4日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第376—377页。

[120]毛泽东：《对中华人民共和国惩治贪污条例草案说明稿的批语和修改》，1952年4月16—17日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第411—414页。

[121]毛泽东：《对黄炎培一篇讲话稿的复信、批语和修改》，1952年9月5日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第533—535页。

[122]毛泽东：《对中央关于干部交代同资产阶级关系的指示稿的批语和修改》，1952年4月5日；毛泽东：《中央转发轻工业部关于党内外干部普遍交代经济关系和社会关系报告的批语》，1952年4月17日，《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第三册，第382—383页。中共中央6月15日正式下发的《关于争取胜利结束“三反”斗争运动中的若干问题的指示》，也特别规定了全面交代与资产阶级关系的具体做法。见前引《新中国法制研究史料通鉴》第二卷，第2043-2944页。

[123]《中央纪律检查委员会关于全党纪律检查工作向毛主席的总结报告》，1952年7月，《建设》第一六六期，第13—16页。

[124]前引《安子文关于结束“三反”问题的报告》，1952年10月18日。

[125]两人在1952年2月10日被公审枪毙。

[126]《华北局宣传部关于文艺界的三反与文艺整风开始后的初步情况简报》，1952年3月，《建设》第一五〇期，1952年3月7日，第8—9页；《中共遂川县委大部成员蜕化变质》，《人民日报》1952年1月23日；《前平原省内黄县公安局干部严重违法乱纪事件》，《建设》197期，1953年1月15日，第19页。

[127]前引《罗瑞卿在华南分局第七十二次常委会上的传达报告》，1952年2月25日。

[128] 《上海市人民政府及市监察委员会关于三反后发生严重贪污问题的通知》，1953 年 1 月，上海市档案馆藏，B65／2／309；《中央人民政府政务院和人民监察委员会关于防止和处理三反后贪污事件的通报》，1953 年 6 月，北京市档案馆藏，215／18／2603；《上海市人民政府监察委员会关于三反后继续发生贪污问题的通报》，1953 年 9 月 30 日，上海市档案馆藏，B65／2／309。

[129]如 1954—1955 年开展的反贪污宣传学习运动，1960—1961 年在农村干部中开展的以反贪污为中心的“三反”斗争（也称三反运动），1963-1964 年在全国范围内开展的包含反贪污内容的“五反”运动等即是。

（来源：《史林》2006 年第 4 期）

DeepL Translation

Mao Zedong and the Three Anti-campaigns

Published: 2007-08-17 22:06 Author: Yang Kuisong Browsed: 103times

From the end of 1951 to June 1952, when China was vigorously launching the three major campaigns against the United States and North Korea, land reform and the suppression of counter-revolution, Mao Zedong launched the "Three Anti-Corruption" campaign against corruption, waste and bureaucracy. Unlike the Three Great Campaigns and the Five Antis (against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state assets, jerry-building, and theft of state economic information) that followed the Three Antis, the Three Antis were directed against rural landlords, hostile Americans, and the domestic economy, respectively. Unlike the three major campaigns, which were directed against rural landlords, the U.S. enemy, and domestic hostile elements, the "Five Antis" campaign was directed against capitalists, who were both enemies and friends, while the "Three Antis" campaigns were mainly directed against the internal Communist Party, as well as all levels of staff of the Party, state organs, enterprises and public institutions. The crux of the campaign was to eliminate the increasingly serious money-worshipping and rent-seeking phenomena among cadres since the CCP came to power in the city by purging and punishing all corrupt elements within the regime, so as to

avoid a repeat of the late Ming Dynasty's disastrous defeat of the Li Zicheng peasant insurgency that had quickly corrupted and disintegrated after it had come to power in the city.

The existing research results on the "Three Anti" campaign are basically introductory. Even the only works that talk about this movement are far from academic research. [One of the keys to this is that they are obviously too simplistic and conceptual in their view and understanding of the movement itself, failing to notice the extreme complexity of the movement and its effects. And this is precisely one of the reasons why some readers hope for another "Three Anti" campaign, while others simply reject this campaign, which is highly regarded as a "successful practice" by the former, in the face of almost the same, but countless times more serious corruption phenomenon [2]. reason.

As in the case of the anti-revolutionary campaigns, Mao Zedong played an almost decisive role in the launching and promotion of the "Three Anti" campaigns. Obviously, clarifying the role of Mao Zedong in the process of the movement's occurrence and development, as well as his intentions and specific designs at different stages, is also an extremely important historical link in clarifying the ins and outs of the movement. Given that most of Mao's directives or approvals for the campaign have been published or made public, it has become possible to examine the inner workings of the ups and downs of the campaign from the perspective of Mao's relationship with the "Three Anti-campaigns". It is believed that such an examination will help readers deepen their understanding of and reflection on the campaign.

The Launching of the "Three Anti" Campaigns

The launching of the "Three Anti-corruption" campaign was not in Mao Zedong's predetermined plan. It was Gao Gang, secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC, who first raised the issue of anti-corruption. On August 31, 1951, he was the first to deliver a speech entitled "Against Corruption and Metamorphosis, Against Bureaucracy" at a meeting of the party cadres of the Northeast Bureau. [3] A few days later, the Northeast Bureau formally adopted the document "Decision on Carrying Out the Tendency to Oppose Corruption and Metamorphosis and

Bureaucracy". [4] For Gao Gang and the Northeast Bureau of this initiative, the CPC Central Committee, although also affirmed, and approved all over, [5] but, according to the past practice, it is clear that at this time only envisioned the solution of such problems through the method of party rectification and rectification of the wind. Meanwhile, at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in October of that year, the central issue discussed by the participants was the development trend of the war situation in Korea and the countermeasures to deal with the present serious financial difficulties. It was clearly decided that in view of the more serious financial difficulties to be faced in 1952, it was necessary to "ask all places to carry out a comprehensive campaign to increase production and economize from November onwards," and in particular to "advocate economizing and strictly prohibit waste." [6] Mao's political bureau was also concerned with the development of the war situation in Korea and the measures to deal with the current serious financial difficulties. [6] Mao Zedong then issued a public call at the third plenary session of the first session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on October 23 to "increase production and economize in order to support the Chinese People's Volunteer Army". [7] The CPC Central Committee also set up the Central People's Government's Economy Inspection Committee headed by Bo Yibo, and the Central Bureaus and their subordinate provincial and municipal Party committees also set up production and economy committees, branches and sub-branches at all levels. The task of launching a nationwide campaign to increase production and economize, rather than the "Three Anti" campaigns, became the centerpiece of the CPC Central Committee's program at the end of 1951. [8]

Just a few days after Mao Zedong's speech to the CPPCC, Gao Gang once again made a report to a meeting of party members and cadres of the Northeast Bureau, linking the issue of increasing production and economizing with the fight against corruption, and for the first time put forward the concept of the "Three Anti's", which were "anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucracy. [After reading the report, Mao Zedong keenly noted that, compared with the real need to increase production and economize, solving the problem of corruption of cadres at all levels in government departments was also a rather serious and urgent task. Moreover, the problem of increasing production and saving could indeed be complemented by the fight against corruption and waste. Therefore, he quickly gave instructions on Gao Gang's report, requesting all Party committees at all levels to "attach importance to the experiences described in this report, and to carry out a resolute

fight against corruption, waste and bureaucracy in this nationwide campaign to increase production and economize." [10] Immediately afterward, based on Mao Zedong's comments, the People's Daily published an editorial on November 23 entitled "A Resolute Struggle Against Corruption," openly announcing, "The experience of the struggle against corruption and bureaucracy in the Northeast has proved that the greatest enemies of the campaign to increase production and economize are corruption and waste and bureaucracy. If the phenomenon of corruption and waste cannot be purged, it will not only jeopardize the future of some cadres, but will also hinder the accumulation of funds and the consolidation of the new democratic system. Therefore, all parts of the country should act swiftly to wage a resolute struggle against corruption to completely eliminate all corruption." [11]

Mao's views on the necessity of waging a struggle against corruption were undoubtedly based on the relevant reports available at this time. However, the reports of the Northeast Bureau at this time were not very serious in their estimation of the corruption of party and government workers, and although 3,258 persons were dealt with for corruption in the eight months of 1950, only two-tenths of the party cadres were punished for corruption. The reason why Gao Gang believed that the problem must be solved immediately, only because the phenomenon of corruption was found to be developing too quickly. It was reported that "the Shenyang Municipal People's Court embezzlement cases year by year statistics, the second half of 1949 embezzlement offenders accounted for 5.3 percent of the total number of offenders, 1950 rose to 5.7 percent, the first quarter of 1951 and rose to 13.2 percent." [12] Because there were fewer relevant reports at this time, the editorial in the People's Daily openly asserted at this time that the problem of embezzlement occurred mainly among the retained personnel who "inherited the embezzlement style of the Kuomintang reactionaries" because they "accounted for 99 percent of all embezzlers" "Only 1 per cent of "those who had participated in the revolution for a long time, because of their poor political qualities, failed to completely overcome their corrupt ideas during the long revolutionary struggle, and, after entering the cities, accepted the influence of the vices left behind by the imperialists, feudal bureaucrats and reactionary factions of the Kuomintang, and thus degenerated rapidly into corruption and misappropriation of the law and misappropriation of funds and became the pests in the cause of the people's revolution. vermin in the cause of the people's revolution." [13]

However, even on the basis of such an estimate, Mao Zedong still specifically raised the question of the importance of the struggle against corruption at the Politburo meeting. What's more, several reports received in quick succession made Mao and the CCP Central Committee's estimation of the problem of corruption become even more serious.

According to a report from the North China Bureau of the CPC on November 28, "The whole region of North China dealt with a total of three hundred and three cadres and party members who were corrupted and corrupted by corruption and bribery last year, and five hundred and thirty-one such cases were dealt with in the first half of this year alone. And according to the very incomplete statistics of the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee for the months of October, November and December last year, the total number of corrupt and corrupted persons was one hundred and seven, while in September this year there were one hundred and two cases of corruption in one month." Among them, "Zhao Cheng, secretary of the committee of the seven districts of Taiyuan City, and Ren Hua, district chief, have, since entering the city, besides collectively embezzling and wasting and misappropriating public grain and money, amounting in all to about eighty-nine thousand pounds of rice and wheat, colluded with private merchants to speculate and cheat. Zhao Cheng is the chairman of three private stores, two good men's shares at the top of a private coal kiln, and fourteen private merchants to collect shares to open an electric mill, has become a commercial capitalist with political privileges." "Shanxi Jiaocheng County mayor Sun Jincai, etc., in the handover of the production of organs, eating and drinking, fabricating false accounts, defrauding the state of millet seventy-one million four hundred and ninety-nine hundred pounds of millet, the county government and the county party committee of the two organs, that is, a year squandered and wasted more than three hundred and twenty-four thousand pounds of millet." "Li Jingu (a Long March cadre), political commissar of the automobile school of the Logistics Department of the North China Military Region, was lured into prostitution by a private merchant suspected of being a major secret agent, and inhaled material noodles. When Li realized that the Datong Public Security Bureau was suspicious of the private merchant, he went so far as to inform him. In addition, he hid the son of the secret service bully, falsely claiming an uncle-nephew relationship, and eventually absconded with more than 30 million yuan of public funds in fear of the crime." [14]

A more serious case discovered at this time was that Liu Qingshan, the former secretary of the Tianjin local committee who was a senior cadre, and Zhang Zishan, the current secretary and commissioner, had been uncovered to have secretly colluded with private businessmen to "successively use 2.5 billion yuan of local grain discounts in the whole prefecture, 400 million yuan of relief grain in Baodi County, 140 million yuan of subsidized grain for the family members of cadres, and 22.2 billion yuan of profits from the repair of the Chaobaihe Civilian Workers' Supply Depot, to make a profit on the bank under the guise of construction. The government also made 2.2 billion yuan in profits from the construction of the Chaobai River supply station for civilian laborers, and obtained 4 billion yuan in fraudulent loans from banks in the name of construction. Total embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds about 20 billion yuan or so, into the production of the local party committee organs, for speculation and illegal activities." Its practices not only make "private businessmen from which corruption satiate", but also "two private use of up to four or five hundred million yuan, and to the superior and subordinate and their friends and relatives to send gifts, some of which amounted to one or two thousand million yuan of huge. According to the accounts available, amounted to one hundred and thirty million dollars." [15] Coupled with the fact that Liu Qingshan had been a long-time opium smoker, the matter was disclosed and the Standing Committee Meeting of the Hebei Provincial Committee of the CPC immediately decided to report it to the North China Bureau of the CPC, recommending the arrest of the two men. After the North China Bureau reported to Zhou Enlai for approval, on November 29, "the Hebei Provincial Public Security Department arrested Zhang Zishan in accordance with the law (Liu Qingshan was abroad at the time, and was arrested immediately upon his return on December 2)." [16]

Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan, as well as the governor of Taiyuan, the secretary of the district party committee, and the governor of Jiaocheng County in Shanxi, had degenerated to such a state that Mao was quite shaken. He apparently endorsed the arrest of Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan, and sent a special telegram to the North China Bureau requesting the latter to give us an additional report on "what sentences have been handed down to major embezzlers such as Zhao Cheng, secretary of the Taiyuan Municipal Party Committee, and Ren Hua, district governor." [17]

On this very day, the evening of December 1, when reviewing the draft of the CCP Central Committee's Decision on Streamlining Administration, Increasing Production and Saving Money, Opposing Corruption, Waste and Bureaucracy, Mao Zedong added a special paragraph that reads, "Since we have occupied the cities for two to three years, serious cases of embezzlement have continued to occur, proving that the Second Plenum of the Party in the spring of 1949 had seriously pointed out that the bourgeoisie had been the most powerful and most important group in China, and that it was the most important group of the Party's leaders. The Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Party in the spring of 1949 was entirely correct in pointing out seriously the inevitability of bourgeois encroachment on the Party and the necessity of preventing and overcoming this great danger. Now is the critical time for the whole Party to mobilize for the practical implementation of this resolution. If we do not effectively implement this resolution, we will make a big mistake. It is now necessary to warn the whole Party that it is a serious crime for all Party members engaged in State work, Party affairs and the work of people's organizations to use their official position to commit embezzlement and waste. The Central People's Government will soon promulgate regulations on the punishment of embezzlement and on the punishment of waste, and the leading organs at all levels must follow the example of the regulations on the punishment of counter-revolution, launching with great fanfare a campaign of study among all the staff and the masses concerned, calling for confessions and denunciations, and personally supervising and checking by the chief comrades-in-charge. All acts of embezzlement must be denounced and dealt with in varying degrees according to the seriousness of the circumstances, ranging from warnings, transfers, dismissals, expulsions from the Party, and sentences of various kinds of imprisonment up to execution by firing squad. Typical embezzlers must be mobilized for a public trial and punished according to the rule." [18]

On December 4, the Beijing Municipal Committee submitted a report to the CCP Central Committee on the phenomenon of corruption among party and government workers and the views on the future struggle against corruption. Mao Zedong immediately approved and forwarded the report to the Central Bureaus and issued instructions in a rather stern tone, saying, "The Central Committee instructs you, within three weeks of receipt of these instructions, or within one month at the latest, to carry out a systematic and preliminary examination of the phenomenon of corruption among the staff of your own units and those belonging to the lower levels of your organization, to

follow the methods laid down by the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, and to mobilize the greatest possible number of people inside and outside the Party (including the various democratic parties and social democrats), and to make a big fuss about the phenomenon of corruption. The Central Committee has instructed you to make a great effort to check and punish corrupt officials with great fanfare and vigor. The Central Committee instructs you to make your first report to the Central Committee on checking and punishing corrupt persons, roughly in the style of the Beijing Municipal Committee's report, within one month of receiving these instructions. All departments of the Central Government and the Military Commission are to make separate reports to the Central Government and the Military Commission. All Central People's Government Party groups, Central Bureaus, Branch Bureaus, Provincial Party Committees, Municipal Party Committees, District Party Committees, Local Party Committees, and County Party Committees make reports to the Central Authorities and their superiors on a hierarchical basis. All reports from the county committees and above are at the same time sent directly to the Central Committee, in addition to being sent to their superiors." [19]

On the following day, after receiving a report from the Party Group of the Central Trade Ministry on the fight against corruption and the punishment of corrupt persons, Mao Zedong went further and explicitly requested all localities to "follow the Central Committee's instructions of December 1 at 20:00 hours, and, with reference to the analyses and methods of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee and the Party Group of the Central Trade Ministry, to draw up their own plans for the fight against corruption quickly and to begin to launch this struggle. The Party committees of the various localities should unify the arrangements for this struggle, so that the government system (focusing on the financial and economic departments and the general staff), the military system (focusing on the logistical departments), and the system of party groups, all act at the same time." [20] It was against this background that the "Three Anti" campaign was launched.

Mao Zedong's strong opposition

As soon as the deployment of the "Three Anti" campaign was announced, the central ministries took the lead in submitting reports to the CCP Central Committee. According to the party groups of

the Central Ministry of Finance, the Central Ministry of Trade, the Central Ministry of Water Conservancy, the Central Ministry of Light Industry, and the head office of the People's Bank of China, preliminary estimates based on some of the information already available indicated that the number of embezzlers usually accounted for about 30-40% of the total number of people in the organization. The embezzlers "are generally more new cadres than old cadres, more subordinates than superiors, but the severity of the situation is more serious for superiors than for subordinates." The methods of embezzlement included "selling financial information (e.g., informing capitalists of changes in tax rates and prices of goods)"; "colluding with private merchants to steal and sell state assets"; "buying at a low price and selling at a high price to make a profit"; "embezzling public property and stealing from the public"; "supervising and stealing from the public"; and "embezzling and stealing from the public". There are those who "embezzle public property and steal from the public"; those who "make false accounts and documents"; those who "put in a big bucket of scales and take out a small bucket of scales, and issue tax invoices with big heads and small tails"; those who "extort money" under the guise of their positions; those who "extort money"; those who "extort money"; and those who "extort money". "The"; there are "bribery, kickbacks"; there are "reporting false accounts, eat the empty amount"; there are "public and private, the public and private". More are "fake budgets, engage in two sets of accounts, ambush, misrepresentation of expenditures, subordinate sets of superiors, loss of large public fat small public, as well as on the pretext of 'improving the life of' misappropriation of public funds, etc." and other acts. [21]

Since entering the city, Mao Zedong's greatest fear was that Party cadres at all levels would defeat the war in the face of the great temptation of money and pleasure. Seeing at once that so many cadres at all levels were corrupt and bribed to enrich themselves at the expense of the public, naturally made him quite anxious.

On December 8, in reply to an inquiry from the Fujian Provincial Party Committee Office, Mao Zedong sternly stated, "Of course most of the embezzlers, wasteful and bureaucratic elements are not counter-revolutionaries (there may be some of them that is, counter-revolutionaries), and they are guilty of embezzlement, wastefulness and bureaucracy. But this problem is now so serious that it must be regarded as as important as the suppression of the counter-revolutionary struggle, the same

mobilization of the masses to carry out the struggle with great fanfare, the same treatment of them with death penalty and imprisonment, etc., and the same need to find out the situation and have a good idea of the situation (what percentage of all staff members are guilty of corruption, and what percentage of the light and heavy ones account for the heaviest), and to master the struggle in a precise manner. " He also said, "The whole country may have to shoot 10,000 to tens of thousands of embezzlers in order to solve the problem." [22]

The reports that came across Mao's desk at this time were alarming enough. In addition to the case of Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan, other more typical cases were:

The Northwest Bureau reported, "A preliminary examination of the tax system in the Tianshui Prefecture showed that embezzled cadres accounted for more than thirty percent of all cadres. Of the twenty-seven county public security bureau chiefs in Shaanxi, seven were corrupt. In Jingyang County, seven cadres above the level of district chief have been removed from their posts because of corruption. It has been found that there are important cadres at the county and prefectural levels who are corrupt, such as Ma Huating, deputy commander of the Weinan sub-district, who has a lot of corrupt behavior." [23]

The North China Bureau reported, "Six hundred and seventy-four counter-revolutionaries, including nineteen secret agents, were released and removed from control in a public security sub-bureau in Tientsin (of which there are twelve in the city) for accepting bribes. The cadres and sergeants of this sub-bureau were bribed by 3,514 merchants." [24]

The Central and Southern Bureau reported that "of the twenty-six cadres sent out from Jinxi County in Jiangxi, that is, fifteen were corrupt, eleven fled home from the revolution as a result, and of the fifty-eight cadres sent out from Suichuan County, only two were not corrupt." [25]

The Hebei Province newspaper said, "In Shijiazhuang City, two cadres were found to have embezzled 30 million yuan in the rectification and review of cadres, and eight out of ten company commanders of a regiment in the military district were found to have embezzled." [26]

The Gansu Provincial Party Committee reported, "Wudu tax director Feng Junming led a cadre of seven people to collectively embezzle and accept bribes. Fifty-seven of the three hundred and nine cadres of the Lanzhou Municipal Taxation Bureau were corrupt. Thirty-nine percent of the tax cadres in Tianshui Prefecture were corrupt. Forty of the eighty-eight cadres of the Pingliang Municipal Taxation Bureau were corrupt. One hundred and eighty cadres of the Provincial Grain Bureau Transportation Company, eighty-one of them were embezzled. Twenty-five of the eight county cadres of the Jiuquan Prefecture Grain Bureau were embezzled. Fifteen cadres of the Yongdeng County Grain Bureau were collectively corrupt. Haiyuan County Book, County Governor, Minister of Organization, and Director of Public Security led forty cadres in collective embezzlement of counter-revolutionary property." [27]

Since most of the reports at this time indicated that they had a basic grasp of the situation and were full of confidence in accomplishing the tasks of the struggle deployed by the central government, Mao Zedong at this time also somewhat underestimated the difficulty and prospects for the development of the "three counter-revolutionary" campaign. Considering that all the tasks scheduled for 1952 were very difficult, on December 22 and 24, he even criticized one after another the opinion of those who were prepared to spend several months and concentrate all their strength to carry out the "Three Anti-campaigns" in a surprise attack, saying: "Some comrades think that it is not easy to launch this campaign and that it will take several months to finish it. "Some comrades think that it is not easy to launch this struggle and that it will take several months to finish it, and this opinion is not quite correct." "In general, a month or so is about right. Especially in the case of wastefulness in general, for an organ, about half a month or so is enough from the time of investigation, study, criticism and inspection to the time when a new system is worked out to stop wasteful spending. Many organizations have already had this experience. It is not a matter of stopping all work and specializing in the three counter-struggles, but of combining them with all

other work, especially with the work of rectifying the Party and the public morale, the three counter-struggles being the main element of the present rectification." [28]

But within a few days, as more and more cases of corruption were reported, Mao became visibly sullen. Noting that the problem of corruption was so serious, that "some Communists are worse than the Kuomintang,"[29] that the Communist Party was on the verge of degeneration, and that some party and government leaders were still inactive about the campaign, this caused Mao's attitude to change again. First, in his instructions to the Party Committee of the Southwest Military Region on the briefings on the Three Anti-corruption Struggles on the 30th, he requested that all the major military regions issue weekly briefings on the Three Anti-corruption Struggles on a regular basis, four times a month; and then on the same day, in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCPC), he issued a directive requesting that all the three levels of the Central Committee, the administrative regions, and the provinces and municipalities, to "take a close interest in the Three Anti-corruption Struggles" in their units. "campaign, "to make monthly reports during the first four months of 1952, so that the Central Committee can make comparisons and see which leading comrades at all levels are making active efforts in this serious struggle and which are slacking off (the reasons for slacking off are bureaucracy on the part of the leaders and a lack of clean hands on the part of the leaders) in order to impose rewards and punishments." Party and government leaders with negative attitudes are "given a deadline (e.g., ten days) to comply with the Central Government's resolution and seriously mobilize the masses to carry out the struggle against corruption, waste and bureaucracy, or else they must be dismissed from their posts. If they have evidence of corruption, they must also be expelled from the Party, and in serious cases, they must be sent to the courts for punishment." [30]

On the morning of the 31st, Mao Zedong and convened a meeting to address the meeting, saying, "If the three anti-bureaucratic campaigns are not countered, the Party will deteriorate. Counting from the Second Plenum, if the Three Anti's are not carried out within ten years, the Communist Party will become the Kuomintang. To say that the Party will not deteriorate is possible only if the Three Anti-countermeasures are carried out. If we do not carry out the Three Anti-corruption Campaigns, we can still be corrupted. In the past, we could not see it in the mountains, but we could

see it in the cities. Marxism is only effective if the Three Reflections are carried out. Without the Three Reflections, neither Marxism nor the eight conditions for Communist Party members are effective. Some people can't be seen without the Three Reflections, and some people can't be seen in the Crackdown. Some public security officers are resolute in their struggle against the five enemies, but they are just corrupt, such as Bu Shengyuan and Liu Qingshan (who have made achievements in the Crackdown and have even traveled abroad). In the past, the whole party rectification just rectify the bad people, not rectify the good people, this time is bad people and good people a whole, good people rectify better. How much counter how much, expulsion of four million party members and one million eight hundred thousand have no hesitation. In the past, when I read the history of the United Communist Party, I saw a large number of expulsions of party members, and I didn't understand it deeply at that time, but now I realize this. Only in this way can the party be healthy." Some people ask: How is it considered to have met the standard? Mao Zedong clearly said, "It's 'fever and heat, vomiting and diarrhea,' otherwise the fire is not enough." "The way to do it is to make a big fuss and thunder, to be more intense than combat. There is also a deadline for launching, naming and reflecting, letting go of mobilizing the masses, and the achievement is to hand in the numbers, to be big, the more and the bigger the more glorious, and all that." Mao Zedong asked Yang Shangkun, Director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, on the spot, "There are big tigers in all organs, but not in the organs of the Party Central Committee?" Do you dare to write a pledge? Yang immediately promised to hand over 50. Mao emphasized: "The places where big tigers are found are those where there is gold, wood, water, fire and earth (water mainly refers to ship transportation, fire refers to oil and electricity, and earth refers to construction work - citation needed)." But at the same time, it also says: "Comrade An Ziwen and other places are, indeed, clear-water government offices, but they are not too busy to draw conclusions, let's see." [31]

In the afternoon of the same day, in accordance with Mao Zedong's request and the decision of the Politburo meeting, the General Party Committee of the Organs Directly Under the Central Government held an enlarged meeting of the Party Committee at Huairan Hall in Zhongnanhai with hundreds of cadres of the Party, the government, the military, the corps, the groups, and other organs of the Party at the level of division chiefs and above, in which Bo Yibo and the second secretary of the General Party Committee of the Organs and member of the Central Committee of

Provincial Inspection, An Ziwen, appeared to proclaim that: all departments of the central government are under the central government, and that they are under a deadline for mobilizing the public to expose and report and confess and on January 11 must hand over qualified reports to the Central Committee, "Violators, no matter what ministers, governors, administrators, division chiefs, directors, section chiefs, unit chiefs or managers, will be removed from their posts and investigated." "No matter what people, ministers, directors bureaucracy, unclean hands, all dismissed, dismissed without food." Bo Yibo and announced on the spot on the Military Commission, Minister of Technology Dai Jingyuan, the Central Ministry of Transportation, Zhang Wenang, Director of the General Office and the Ministry of Heavy Industry, Lu Da "dismissed and investigated". Units in charge of the meeting "the same day back, overnight meeting, New Year's Day meeting the whole day. Many ministers, deputy ministers to a reunion to go back, the theater also do not see." [32]

On January 4, in conjunction with the Central Ministry of Finance's report on the "Three Anti-countermeasures," Mao introduced the experience of the December 31 mobilization meeting of the CPC Central Committee to the Party leadership at all levels, including the Central Bureaus and sub-bureaus, explaining, "Such meetings of senior cadres are now required to take place once every ten days, and no leave of absence is permitted, except in the case of serious illness. No leave of absence is allowed except for serious illness. It is estimated that by the end of January the problem can be basically solved at the central level." All localities should follow suit, "Immediately grasp the three anti-struggles, shorten the time for learning documents (four or five days is enough), hold cadres' meetings, launch the struggle within a time limit (e.g., ten days), send in the report, and remove and investigate those who violate the rules, whether they are bureaucrats or embezzlers, no matter what they are. At the cadres' meeting the backward units and their leaders should be criticized by name, and the units and their leaders who have done well should be rewarded by name, and the names of those who have been dismissed and the reasons for their dismissal should be announced." The Central Committee commissioned Bo Yibo to use the telephone to communicate directly with the responsible comrades, "calling every three to five days to check the progress of the three countermeasures in each district." [33]

Under Mao Zedong's impetus, the "Three Anti-countermeasures" campaign began to be rapidly mobilized throughout the country. Beijing even took the lead in pushing the campaign into the business community, which was largely responsible for corrupting the cadres. It was reported that "in a little more than a week, 3,125 meetings were held in various industries. Now more than 7,000 public officials and employees of public enterprises have confessed to embezzlement or taking advantage of the public. Of these, 7,171 have embezzled less than one million dollars, 362 between one million and five million dollars, 31 between five million and ten million dollars, 33 between ten million and fifty million dollars, three between fifty million and one hundred million dollars, and two above one hundred million dollars. One thousand six hundred and fifty-nine households in the industrial and commercial sector have already confessed and reported 2,923 persons for embezzlement or bribery." As a result of the broadening of the scope of the struggle, the Beijing Municipal Committee found that "the content and scale of the struggle were much more complex and larger than we had imagined at the beginning of the movement." "On the part of public officials, there were all kinds of embezzlement, theft, cheating of public property, taking 'kickbacks,' eating 'bottom money,' and greedily taking advantage of small advantages in the public sector; there were private factories, stores, and the use of all kinds of conditions in the public sector under false pretenses of public assistance Figure profiteering disguised as theft; there is the use of power and position of extortion, take advantage of the people's behavior; there are a variety of accepting bribes, collusion and harboring businessmen to steal and cheat public property; there are a variety of life and work in the waste and violation of the system, the public for the public and other behaviors. The most serious cases of embezzlement are among tax officials (about forty percent of the total number of people who have confessed), cooperative officials (about seventeen percent of the total number of people who have confessed), trade organizations, and various kinds of purchasing officials. Extortion is practiced mainly by lower-ranking members of the Public Security Department, and the targets of extortion are mainly controlled elements and reactionary club members." "Some members of the public still have scruples about a number of police stations and are therefore afraid to report them. We have decided to collectively train station chiefs with bad practices and call on those who have committed acts of corruption and extortion to confess. In addition, in order to make it easier for the public to report, reception stations and report boxes have been set up throughout the city, with proper personnel assigned to them." It was decided to unify the management of the production of each unit, which had been the cause of corruption. [34]

With regard to this experience in Beijing, Mao immediately approved it to be followed in all large, medium and small cities. "It is essential to make all private industrialists and businessmen who are involved with the public sector and who have committed such offenses as embezzlement, bribery, tax evasion, theft, and so on, confess or report all their offenses, and to pay special attention to the launching of this struggle with great vigor in Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai, Nanking, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chungking, Shenyang, and in the provincial cities of all the provinces, in order to bring to an end the rampant attack (which is far worse than the attack which has been made by the bourgeoisie against the Party for three years) which the bourgeoisie has made against the Party over this issue. By launching this struggle with great vigor, we will give a resolute counter-attack to the bourgeoisie's rampant attacks on our Party on this question over the past three years (which are even more dangerous and serious than the war), and deal a major blow, and strive to basically accomplish this task within two to three months. The Party committees at all levels are requested to make a close deployment of this matter, treating this struggle as a large-scale class struggle. Such deployment should be carried out both internally (in the organs, schools, troops and public enterprises) and externally (in the private industrial and commercial sector), with close coordination between the leading organs and the courts, with vigorous propaganda in the newspapers and on the radio, and with attention to organizing internal notification of confidential information." [35]

By explicitly linking the "Three Anti" struggles with the question of the fight against the bourgeoisie, and by declaring that the bourgeoisie had been "attacking furiously" the CCP for three years, and by emphasizing that this attack was "even more dangerous and serious than a war", this made the "Three Anti" struggles even more difficult. "This has turned the struggle, which was originally aimed at cleaning up the corrupt elements within the regime, into a class struggle of a deadly nature. Under such circumstances, the estimation of the situation would naturally become more and more serious, and any report that did not raise the problem of corruption in one's own region or unit to such a high level, or that did not estimate it seriously enough, would inevitably be severely criticized by Mao Zedong. In Mao's words: any report in which it is stated that the situation of embezzlement is not very serious, that the number of people embezzled is small, and that the amount of money is not large, is untrue. "Do not be deceived by untrue reports from below." [36] Where the anti-corruption struggle of the lower organs is not as good as that of the central organs, "it is the leaders there who

are not good, and the approach and methods are not right, and they must be reviewed and corrected at once." [37] Mao also contrasted the reports of the Jining and Zunyi military divisions, approving them as follows: We "do not want to read those reports which seem to be peaceful. The Jining Military Division only talks about waste and corruption in life, but does not yet mention incidents of embezzlement. Like a military division must have a large number of embezzlers, looking around strict attention, all the troops did not effectively expose the problem and solve the problem, must be done from scratch, do a good job of the three anti-revolution and then do the integration. If the three countermeasures are not done properly, integration will not be permitted for one day." "This report of the Zunyi sub-district is much closer to the truth than the report of the Jining sub-district, which has just been forwarded. There is no doubt that there must be a large number of embezzlers in a sub-district, an army, a small city, or a county. Anyone who says that there is only waste but no corruption, or that there is very little corruption, is not reliable and must not be believed. After the wastefulness is stopped in a gust of wind, the corruption must be pursued immediately. Those who are unable to solve the problem of corruption by themselves should have their superiors send inspection teams down to supervise and pursue them, and make sure that all the corrupt elements are found out before they are stopped." [38] Taking this as a criterion, he again asserted, "The reports of the various units, all of which are painless and perfunctory, and whose leaders are either bureaucrats or embezzlers, should be criticized at once." [39]

At this time, the CCP had not long been in the city, and many systems had not yet been established and perfected; the parallel supply system and wage system alone caused many problems, not to mention the so-called organ production and its unit kitty (also known as the "kitty"), which had been brought over from the war period and used by various departments and organs for the welfare of the unit, and which was suspected of being used by the cadres in charge at all levels. Illegal profits, tax evasion, misappropriation of public funds, public enrichment and serious violations of financial discipline. No one can tell for a while what is considered corruption, what is considered waste, and what are the policy boundaries of corruption and waste. This situation can not help but greatly bound the hands and feet of leading cadres at all levels, so that many people are afraid of the end. Chen Yi, who was responsible for leading the "Three Anti" campaign in the East China Military Region, reported, "The East China Three Anti Campaign, which was launched on January 6 by the chairman of the committee, has been carried out on a large scale by means of deadlines, name-

calling, and inventory." However, we "deeply feel that the leaders at all levels, especially those above the middle level, are hard pressed. In the past, whenever Chairman Mao shouted, he would call out to all, but this time the three countermeasures could not be shouted up. The fundamental problem is that the leaders are "partly unclean and first afraid." [40]

It was precisely because of this situation that no matter how much Mao Zedong called for letting go of the Three Anti-corruption Measures, leaders of various localities and departments still tried to set up standards to differentiate the boundaries of corruption and waste in order to avoid a chaotic struggle that would bring down the work. On this point, a report of the Party Committee of the Chuannan District made it very clear. It pointed out that corruption was very common among cadres at all levels, but that "corruption is more serious below the county level than above it, and it is estimated that many responsible county and district cadres will have to collapse. How to strike a balance between the three counter-revolutions and the land reform, and how to make sure that the vast majority of cadres can be saved without collapsing, is a policy issue that deserves careful consideration." [41] Clearly, this was not a troublesome problem at the county and district level alone, but also one faced by many higher authorities. Without a clear definition of the criteria for embezzlement and waste, it would be difficult to get the leading cadres of the many departments to clean themselves up and come forward to lead the movement.

For this reason, the East China Bureau at this time took the lead in proposing four criteria for dividing waste and corruption, stressing that waste caused by insufficient or no experience at all, waste caused by a system that had not been set up or could not be set up in a short time, and personal overspending approved or decided by the organization, as well as waste caused by the production of organs in the area of subsidies and improvement of the collective life, should be paid attention to and corrected in the future, but there was no need to pursue the matter in the past. Only "corruption of personal enjoyment, special living and corruptive squandering, that is, waste bordering on corruption or waste derived from corruption, should be particularly scrutinized and denounced." [42]

The General Political Department of the Military Commission also explicitly instructed the Southwest Military Region that it must be prudent to declare that 34 percent of the personnel in the region's logistics system were guilty of embezzlement. In particular, "a distinction must be made and treated separately between acts of embezzlement and the general wrongdoing of not distinguishing between public and private affairs; taking advantage of the public's small advantages cannot be called embezzlement." [43]

The Central Economy Inspection Committee could not but eventually issue instructions stating that overspending by supply system cadres should be divided into two categories: individual overspending and overspending on the collective life of the organization. Collective living overspending could not be regarded as embezzlement, and too much overspending could be regarded as waste. Even personal overspending should be divided into three categories: "The first category is reasonable overspending, which is indispensable after entering the city, but there are no explicit regulations yet. This type of overspending is perfectly legal if it is approved by the proper governing body; if not, it can only be considered a lack of organizational formalities, not waste, let alone embezzlement. The second type of overspending is wasteful living, which is wasteful in nature, not embezzlement, and should be reviewed and corrected. The third category is overspending that borders on embezzlement, which should be subject to strict review, immediate cessation of such expenditures, and appropriate administrative sanctions." As for the more common problem of turning big publics into small publics, it should be recognized as a violation of financial discipline. "The causes of this phenomenon, some of which are intentional violations of fiscal discipline by the parties concerned, and some of which are the result of the fact that the fiscal system itself is not yet sound, should not be uniformly regarded as embezzlement and waste. To determine whether or not the big publicizing of small publics in each unit is embezzlement or waste, it should be decided on the basis of the use of the small publics. If the use is proper, the error is only in the area of fiscal formalities; if the use is improper, it is waste or embezzlement, respectively, depending on the circumstances." [44]

Mao was not really prepared enough to deal with all the above complications. For example, both the Central and South Bureau and the East China Bureau reported that at present organ production and

small family possessions were very common. There is a lot of property, in ministries, divisions, sections, and even in districts, counties, and districts, with "the big ones possessing billions of yuan, and the small ones a few million yuan," most of which is used on a few cadres, "and the production of organs is actually linked to commercial speculation, opening the door to corruption and bribery. From the large number of problems that have already been exposed, it is clear that the small family business has few benefits and many disadvantages, and that it needs to be outlawed in a systematic manner." Mao Zedong also said that it would be difficult to solve the problem for a while, but could only temporarily "entrust the original authorities with the responsibility of management, and shall not draw any personnel and property", waiting for the central government to study a practicable solution that included the party, the government, the military, and the people. [45] But it is not difficult to understand that Mao did not advocate giving the masses too many boxes and restrictions. His disapproval of the General Political Department's instructions to the Southwest Military Region was made clear on the grounds that "it is factually correct that thirty-four percent of the corrupt elements were cleared out of the logistics system of the Southwest Military Region. The present bias of most of the organs and units is that they are unwilling or unaware of the need to seriously go through the process of clearing out the embezzlers." [46] His instructions to the report of the Southwest Military Region were, "We are not afraid of a large number of people and large sums of money being embezzled, but we are only afraid of not being able to mobilize the masses in the struggle and not being able to clear up all types of embezzlers, large, medium and small." [47] He repeatedly admonished the Party committees at all levels, saying, "No matter which system or organ of the Party, government, army, or people, as long as a large number of people are in charge of money and goods, there must be a large number of embezzlers. Many organs are oppressing democracy, and the masses are extremely resentful. Some organs are extremely bureaucratic, and their leaders are detached from the masses, making the situation unseemly. All this must be thoroughly exposed before the problem can be solved." [48] As for the possible collapse of all cadres as a result of the anti-corruption efforts of many grassroots authorities, Mao advocated, "Don't be afraid, there will be replacements. Collapse is good; if the bourgeois bastion does not collapse, our Communist Party will collapse. Sacrifice the corrupt and sacrifice the Party and the people, one of the two must be sacrificed." [49]

Promotion of the "Tiger Fight" Campaign

Bo Yibo, who was in charge of guiding the national "Three Anti-corruption" campaign, was naturally well aware of Mao's dissatisfaction. In his January 19th report on the "Three Anti-corruption Campaign" of the Central Government, Bo Yibo stated on the one hand that "about 10,000 people have been found to have committed acts of corruption, including 18 people who have embezzled from 100 million yuan to several billion yuan, and about 130 people who have embezzled more than 10 million yuan and less than 100 million yuan. " On the other hand, it is specifically stated that "this figure is far behind the actual situation. According to the material that has now been initially grasped, it seems that there are at least forty or fifty more big embezzlers of more than one hundred million and several billion dollars, in addition to the eighteen mentioned above." "If these big embezzlers are not thoroughly purged in this campaign, they will temporarily go into hiding during the climax of the campaign, and after a gust of wind has passed, they will continue to rise up and do evil again." Therefore, in spite of the great achievements made, the Party Committee of the Central Organs "decided to reorganize its forces and to make a fierce attack on the big embezzlers within eight days, from the 20th to the 27th." [50]

Since Bo Yibo was also the secretary of the North China Bureau of the CCP and the political commissar of the North China Military Region, he called a meeting with the heads of the North China Military Region on the 19th to specifically deploy the "campaign" goal for the following week: "Concentrate on catching the big tigers". The strategy was: "(1) Distinguish between corruption and waste, and make some leading comrades step down in order to command the battle. (2) Remove the corrupt hats of some small people who do not distinguish between public and private affairs and take advantage of small advantages, and point out their mistakes, so that they are not considered to be corrupt. (3) To reduce or exempt from criminal punishment those who have confessed voluntarily, refunded the stolen goods as appropriate, resolved to repent and not to repeat the crime, and embezzled less than ten million yuan under non-serious circumstances, so as to make them put down their burdens." And then "assign tasks", that is, "according to the key units and existing clues by, each unit of self-reporting public discussion, within a week to submit embezzlement of 10 million how many people's task, and strive to exceed". [51] And layers of distribution of "tiger" figures, but also Mao Zedong this time to break through the "three anti-" launch bottleneck of a way.

On January 22, Mao Zedong received a report from the North China Military Region on the same day that he was about to forward it to various places, with the following instructions: "The report of the North China Military Region of January 22 is very good, and this is the opinion of the Central Committee, so please follow it as a whole." At the same time, he instructed in a telegram to the Central and South China and East China Military Regions, "Your two major military regions (meaning Central and South China and East China) have stipulated that January should be dominated by the three counter-insurgencies in conjunction with the reorganization, and we have agreed to this. Now it does not seem right; we must carry out the three counter-insurgencies with all our strength, and then integrate after the three counter-insurgencies are completed; no one in the whole army is allowed to make an exception. The time will be extended to February 10 as previously announced. Please talk to the military districts by telephone at least once every three days, and do not rely solely on telegrams. In the reports on the three counter-attacks of the military districts and armies belonging to your two major military districts, there are many units which are not vigorous enough, and there are too many empty words which are unsatisfactory, so I ask you to criticize them, and to order them to make a review within a period of time, and to pay particular attention to hitting the big tigers which have a value of more than 100 million yuan. The tigers cleared out by the major military regions and by you are too few. Like the three major military region systems in east central and south central and southwestern China are estimated to have at least two hundred or more big tigers, and east central and south central China may have even more, so don't let them slip through the cracks. I hope that each military region will give me an estimate of the number of big tigers. (At the central level, it is estimated that at least seventy big tigers can be hit)."[52]

On the same day, the North China Bureau also reported the report of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee on the "Three Countermeasures". The report stated that many places where the campaign was not well carried out were either because the leading cadres were bureaucratic and insensitive, or because they had serious problems of their own, and that some party and government leaders at one level had degenerated to the point where they were "no different from capitalists". In this regard, the provincial party committee "by the provincial party committee members to take the lead, to promote all levels of party and government cadres in charge of the cadres and masses of their own organs to take off their pants, once through the failure, the second time to come back";

and send competent cadres to the backward and serious problems of the unit to sit in the town of command, to give the masses backing, "if necessary, can be taken by extraordinary means, the those 'stones' which are obstacles to the movement down." [The North China Bureau spoke highly of this, saying: "The experience of Shanxi proves once again that it is the key to mobilizing the masses for the chiefs to bravely "take off their pants" and take the lead in reviewing the situation at all levels. For the insensitive and serious bureaucratic elements and leaders with unclean hands, it is necessary to take the approach of attacking from above and below, so that they can vigorously save themselves, leave their baggage behind, and do not hesitate to engage in fighting and attacking the enemy. For leaders at all levels who have no courage to expose themselves and have no intention of fighting against the enemy, they should either be dismissed and the obstacles removed, or they should be left alone for the time being (i.e., be made to leave their posts and reflect on themselves), so as not to delay the tense and urgent central task of "fighting the big tigers"." Mao Zedong also particularly appreciated this report, special instructions: "Shanxi Provincial Party Committee this report is very good, make sure that comrades read several times, pay attention to the imitation of the line, and in the party magazine published, so that the majority of cadres to see." [54]

After experiencing the anti-reverse movement, the leading cadres at all levels had long been familiar with the Central Committee's practice of assigning tasks and targets during the movement. Therefore, after Bo Yibo's report on the 19th, coupled with Mao's series of instructions, most organs and units responded quickly. The Party Committee of the Air Force Organs Directly Under the Air Force then reported, "After listening to Comrade Bo Yibo's report at the enlarged meeting of the General Party Committee of the C.C.C. on January 19, the Air Force Party Committee held an enlarged meeting on the 20th to conduct a study and on the morning of the 21st held a meeting of activists of the Air Force Organs Directly Under the Air Force, a total of more than one hundred and seventy, to lay out the 'Fight the Tiger ' work." [55] While explicitly recognizing the report, Mao also specifically cautioned the localities, saying, "Some people think that the Party organs, propaganda and cultural and educational organs, and popular organizations, which do not use a lot of money, must not have any big tigers, which is incorrect. A few days ago, they thought that there was not a single tiger in the Central Cultural and Educational Organs, but after the last two days of searching and researching, they found that at least fifteen big tigers who had embezzled more than one hundred million yuan could be caught. Therefore, please pay attention to the fact that after the

intensified development of the 'Three Anti's' struggle in each department and each region, it is necessary to direct the comrades' attention to the search for big tigers, to pursue and catch them, and not to stop, not to slacken off, and not to be satisfied with the achievements already made. In this regard, estimates should be drawn up in the light of the situation and handed over to the various departments to strive for the fulfillment of the task. In the course of the struggle, new tasks should be added according to the development of the situation. For example, at the central level, of the 10,000 embezzlers (many of whom were found to have made very small sums of money, under very minor circumstances, and were so close to embezzlement that they could not actually be called embezzlers) found prior to January 18, there were only eighteen major embezzlers of more than 100 million yuan. As of January 18, it was thought that 50 more could be identified. In the last two days, there has been an increase. It is expected that there will be more in the future. This experience must be brought to your attention, and it must be pointed out to the comrades that if they are not willing to harbour the big embezzlers, so that in the future when they are found out (and they will be found out one day), they themselves will be blamed and punished, they should organize all the forces available to them in order to fight for the search of all hidden big embezzlers." [56]

On January 24, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting to study the issue of the "three countermeasures", and when it came to the figures of the central authorities in the fight against the "tigers", the participants were obviously dissatisfied with the original estimates. Seeing that the campaign of fighting "tigers" in various organs was in full swing, the original plan of fighting 70 "tigers" had been broken through, and some people had already raised the question that the number of "tigers" might reach 150 or more. Some people had already raised the question that the number of "tigers" might reach 150 or more. Mao Zedong was so excited about this that he immediately gave instructions in a briefing paper of the Southwest Military Region: "Each large military region (including all levels of military regions and armies) has at least a few hundred tigers of various sizes, and if we fail to catch them, we will be defeating the war. At the local level, there may be several hundred tigers in each big province, one hundred to several hundred tigers in each big city, and thousands of tigers in Shanghai. At the central level yesterday it was thought that there were only eighty or so, but today at the meeting there were one hundred and fifty, possibly up to two hundred." [57]

It was in the grip of such a mood that Mao apparently appreciated particularly those reports with large numbers and proportions. At this point he was very pleased with the report of the Party Committee of the Nineteenth Corps of the Volunteer Army concerning the ministry's statement that "among the general cadres of financial management, some units have revealed that more than eighty percent of them are corrupt, and in some cases, even up to one hundred percent". He explicitly approved: "This understanding is in line with the facts." Unfortunately, "from the reports on the three countermeasures received by me from the various corps and divisions of the Volunteer Army, it seems that those who have such an understanding are still in the minority, and most of them do not have such an understanding." As a matter of fact, "there is corruption not only in the financial and economic departments, but also in the Command Political Department and other departments." "A staggering number of hundreds and thousands of small and medium-sized embezzlers must be frankly prosecuted and checked out from all levels and all departments." "According to my speculation, it is likely that several hundred big and small tigers will be caught among the more than one million volunteers, and you should fight for this goal. These big and small tigers are the bastions placed by the bourgeoisie inside our army; they are already bourgeois elements, enemies who have defected from the people, and if they are not punished, they will be a source of endless trouble." "Anyone who says that corruption is impossible in the Korean environment, anyone who thinks that he is satisfied and has won by clearing out a group of small and medium-sized corrupt elements, must be criticized. Those who have already closed must start all over again, and if one month is not enough, add another month. If two months are not enough, add another month." [58] He openly called for "organizing all possible forces to fight for the search of all hidden big embezzlers." [59]

Mao's three orders finally had a noticeable effect. The number of "big tigers" with hundreds of millions of dollars of corruption that the central authorities had uncovered or were able to uncover reached 400 in a few days. In Beijing, 36 "big tigers" with hundreds of millions of yuan had been found and 40 had been identified, while it was planned that 100 would be hit by the organs and enterprises and 300 by the industrial and commercial circles. [Naturally, the North China Bureau was not willing to be left behind, and strictly ordered the local and provincial committees to "make specific plans to fight tigers, with a certain number, a certain period of time, and according to the development of the situation, there should also be additional figures." This was to be used as a criterion for evaluating whether the leaders of the various departments were making efforts in the

"Three Anti-Tiger" struggle. [61] And after the North China Military Region received Mao's initial commendation on January 22, the "Three Anti-countermeasures" struggle also advanced by leaps and bounds. Through the organization of the "tiger-fighting base team", "special cases, special people, packages and packages of investigation", on the 23rd, that is, 64 large and medium-sized tigers, "on the 24th and caught more than 10 million yuan of 37, 25 days caught 10 million yuan of more than 48, five days caught 10 million yuan of more than 48, and five days caught 10 million yuan of more than 48, and the military region in North China, after Mao Zedong's initial praise. On the twenty-fourth, thirty-seven of those with over ten million yuan were caught, and on the twenty-fifth, forty-eight of those with over ten million yuan were caught, making a total of one hundred and forty-nine in five days." "The total number of tigers captured since the Three Anti-countermeasures was 288. Among them, there are twelve big tigers and eighteen medium-sized tigers (over 50 million yuan). The amount of money embezzled by these tigers (totaling more than 6.5 billion yuan) is only based on their own preliminary admissions; in the future, when they are squeezed clean, some of the small tigers will surely be medium-sized tigers, and some of the medium-sized tigers will surely be big tigers." The report also states, "It is estimated that some small tigers will become medium tigers and some medium tigers will become big tigers. The report also suggested that "it is estimated that a number of really big tigers have not yet been caught" and that forces were still being organized to carry out raids. [62] Mao Zedong also spoke highly of this achievement, not only forwarding his report to all regions, but also authorizing them to learn from his experience. He said, "The North China Military Region, which had achieved very little in the past, has made rapid progress in the last five days after severe supervision, catching many tigers, which is encouraging. Fighting tigers should have a set of tactics, where it has been generally launched, we should quickly sum up the experience and organize special tiger-fighting troops to the size of the tiger raid." [63]

Seeing that the number of "tigers" was rising, Mao Zedong believed more and more that there was no end to the search for "tigers" On January 30, the North China Bureau reported that 48 "tigers" had been caught in Shanxi Province in a week, and they believed that Shanxi deserved to catch "tigers". In their opinion, Shanxi should have caught 1,000 to 1,300 tigers. Mao Zedong said, "I think this number is only a minimum estimate, but in reality it may be much higher, not counting the tigers in society, i.e., in the industrial and commercial circles." [64] The North China Bureau reported that Shanxi caught 48 "tigers" in a week. [64] The East China Military Region reported that it

planned to fight 200 tigers, and Mao Zedong said, "A large military region will not have only 200 or so big tigers, but it is appropriate to set such a number for the first time, and the task of fighting tigers can be added gradually in the future according to the deepening of understanding." "The goal of the struggle must be reached through strict supervision and constant additional tasks. [65] The Northeast Bureau reported that it had cleared out more than 160,000 large and small embezzlers, and that it planned to fight 500 "big tigers" at all levels of Party, government, and military organs as well as among the staffs of enterprises. Mao Zedong replied, "It is appropriate for you to aim at 500 for the time being." But "Based on the fact that there are 400 big tigers among 120,000 people at the central level, there may be more than 500 big tigers among the staff of Party, government and military organs and enterprises at all levels throughout the Northeast, and the number may be double or several times that." [66]

In order to pursue the attack and set off a bigger wave of tiger fighting, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) at this time specifically authorized the holding of a public trial of the great embezzlers in Beijing. Bo Yibo, director of the Central Public Prosecution Commission, and Luo Ruiqing, minister of public security, spoke at the conference. The meeting pronounced on the spot the death sentences of Song Degui of the Administrative Department of the Ministry of Public Security and Xue Kunshan of the Business Department of the China National Livestock Corporation. Mao Zedong also personally scrutinized and revised Bo Yibo's speech, and publicly declared: "As long as the embezzlement is serious and there is solid evidence, no matter how much he refuses to admit it, whether it amounts to one hundred million yuan or less than one hundred million yuan, he can be recognized as a major embezzler and sentenced to death." However, as long as the person can voluntarily confess or can make meritorious contributions to atone for his crime, he can be punished leniently according to the specific situation. [67]

According to the standards set by the Central Committee of the Communist Party at this time, "All staff members of state organs, enterprises, party schools and their affiliates who use their official position to embezzle, steal, cheat, or arbitrage the state's property and solicit other people's property, accept bribes, and illegally gain benefits under false pretenses of public office, are embezzlers." Those who embezzled more than 100 million yuan were considered "big tigers", those who

embezzled more than 30 million yuan but less than 100 million yuan were considered medium tigers, those who embezzled more than 10 million yuan but less than 30 million yuan were considered small tigers, and those who embezzled less than 10 million yuan were considered ordinary embezzlers. [68] However, the criteria for "big tigers" clearly changed when Mao Zedong criticized the draft of Bo Yibo's speech. In his February 2 approval of Li Fuchun's report to the Central Financial and Economic Committee's debriefing session, Mao explained, "A big tiger is not limited to 100 million yuan or more, and all six items mentioned in Fuchun's report should be counted as big tigers." These are: "(1) Individuals who have embezzled more than 100 million yuan. (2) Those who have embezzled less than 100 million yuan, but have caused great economic losses to the country. For example, if one sells 200 million yuan of the country's goods to a private merchant and gets 60 million yuan for himself, the country actually loses 200 million yuan and the merchant makes a lot of money. (3) Organizers and masterminds of collective embezzlement cases involving more than 100 million yuan. The mastermind does not care whether his personal gains amount to 100 million yuan or not. (4) Those who embezzled more than fifty million yuan, but of a serious nature, such as withholding relief food and embezzling donations for the fight against the U.S. and North Korea. (5) Sitting on the sidelines. Those who collude with private businessmen to steal economic information or use their positions for self-enrichment, regardless of how much money they get, but the national loss is 100 million yuan or more. (6) Those who concealed and swallowed up state property or bureaucratic capital unreported at the time of the nation's liberation, the value of which was over one hundred million yuan." In addition to this, Mao Zedong also suggested that while investigating the "economic traitors" planted by the bourgeoisie within our regime, attention should also be paid to the problem of investigating the "political traitors". He said: "Following the development of the investigation of economic traitors, many political traitors will be uncovered, and some of the economic traitors are themselves political traitors, so please pay attention to this." [69] [69]

At this time, the revelation of corruption at the grassroots level made Mao feel even more dissatisfied with the current program of fighting "tigers" in various places. For example, "The Wuzhi County authorities in the Plain Province have initially identified eighteen tigers worth more than ten million dollars, including a big tiger worth more than one hundred million dollars. If the county continues to search and capture, the number may exceed this number." "According to a preliminary

survey of nine villages in Xianghe County, Hebei Province, the village cadres who have committed acts of corruption account for seventy-two percent of the total number of village cadres in the greater number, thirteen percent in the lesser number, and thirty-three percent on the average; seven out of nine branch secretaries are corrupt, and eight out of nine village chiefs are corrupt, and among them there is one village cadre who alone has embezzled more than 10,000 pounds of grain, and who is a small tiger. " Therefore, Mao Zedong demanded that great attention be paid to this everywhere, emphasizing, "Whoever says that there are no tigers or very few tigers at the county level should be refuted at once on the basis of the evidence of Wuzhi County." "Whoever says that there is no or very little corruption among the rural cadres, and whoever says that there is corruption in the villages but no tigers (not, of course, that there must be tigers in every township), should immediately refute him on the basis of the evidence of Xianghe County." [70]

The above change in the criteria for "big tigers" and the expansion of the leads in the investigation of "tigers" naturally led Mao to believe that the number of tigers should be greater. Therefore, at this time, he not only severely criticized the places and units with small numbers of tiger-fighting plans, but also began to follow the experience of the counter-revolutionary campaigns, checking the numbers of tiger-fighting plans and allocating targets according to the proportion of the population in each place. [71]

On February 4 and 5, Mao successively criticized the Central and South China Bureau and the South China Branch for "exerting too little pressure on the provinces and accommodating their right-leaning ideology," and for allocating too small and unrealistic numbers. For example, "there are at least several hundred, if not thousands, of large, medium and small tigers in the Guangdong Military Region system, including the coastal defense and the various armies, but you have only allocated 20 large tigers and 180 small and medium tigers to that military region, which is totally inappropriate." [72] Criticizing "Chongqing for planning to catch only two hundred or a few dozen tigers is totally unrealistic." [73] Criticized the Shandong branch for "lax supervision of the following, for failing to criticize the right-leaning thinking of the cadres who did not know enough about the big embezzlers," and for "having no success in fighting the tigers." "In a province as large as Shandong, with five parties, the government, the military, the people, and the academy, a dozen large and

medium-sized cities, and many sub-districts and counties, there should be not a few hundred but a few thousand big and small tigers of more than ten million dollars, not one or two thousand but three or four thousand. Among them, more than 100 million yuan of big tigers to one-tenth, should be not dozens but hundreds." Shandong, however, "has not yet made a budget for fighting tigers in the province, including the Party, government, military, and civilian systems above the county level." [74]

At the same time, in approving the North China Bureau's circular on the cessation of all internal and external duties of Jin Cheng, a member of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee, and Wang Guanghua, the commander of the Provincial Military Region, who was to make a thorough introspection within a week and then be dealt with, Mao Zedong wrote: "The population of Hebei Province (excluding the cities of Beijing and Tianjin) is 30 million, and the provision for fighting two thousand three hundred small tigers and two hundred large tigers is appropriate. Each province is requested to prescribe its own plan for fighting tigers according to its population and other characteristics. At the present time, just as the comrades at the beginning of the crackdown underestimated the seriousness of the counter-revolution, they underestimated the existence of the big corrupt elements, that is to say, there exists a serious right-leaning ideology, which has to be constantly criticized in order to overcome such erroneous thinking. Its seriousness must be decided individually by the Central Bureaus, Branch Bureaus and the Party Committees of the military districts, as was done by the North China Bureau with regard to the Hebei Provincial Committee, and swiftly and without hesitation." [75]

On the same day, Mao also spoke highly of Bo Yibo's and Liu Lantao's report on the North China Bureau's plan to capture 120,000 tigers in February, but questioned the Northeast Bureau's figure for "tiger fighting. When he approved Bo and Liu's report to the Central Bureaus, he wrote: "This report of yours has at once raised the level of tiger hunting in a large administrative region to a very high level. You plan to catch more than 11,000 tigers of all sizes in the region by the end of February, and that includes only those above the county level, not those below the county level, and only those within the party, government, army, civil society and academia, not those in the industrial and commercial sectors. There is no government in North China, and the military district system in

North China is not as large as some military districts, so it is still possible to catch as many tigers as this, and other large districts should have more. The Northeast Bureau called on February 1 and said, "The number of tigers in the Northeast is estimated to be not less than 2,000". The size of the tigers was not specified here. If we include large, medium and small tigers, the number is too low, and there should be more than 20,000 large, medium and small tigers in the Northeast. All in all, the increase in the number of tigers proves that the understanding has progressed, the confidence has increased, and the strength has grown." [76]

It is worth noting that Mao Zedong at this time attached considerable importance to the proportion of the number of the nature of the unit, that is, the presence or absence of a large number of management of money and property departments, but not particularly important. For example, on February 4, Mao Zedong explicitly approved the plan for the Central and South Military Region, saying, "The plan of the units of the Central and South Military Region directly under the Central and South Military Region to fight one hundred and six big tigers and three hundred and fifty-seven small tigers as reported by the Central and South Military Region Committee in its February 1 telegram is, in our opinion, appropriate." [77] However, when the Central and South Military Region reported on the 6th of February that in addition to the troops of the directly subordinate organs of the whole military region, it was also planning to fight 107 big tigers and more than 1,100 small and medium tigers, Mao Zedong criticized his "plan as too small", saying, "The number of big tigers should be increased by at least five times, i.e., not one hundred and seven, but more than 500 tigers. The number of small and medium-sized tigers should not be more than 1,100, but more than 5,000. This number can include the direct departments of the big military districts." [78] The reason for this is that the ratio of the number of troops in the directly subordinate organs of the Central and Southern Military Region to the number of troops in the other subordinate units of the Military Region is a ratio of 1:5.

In addition to the ratio, Mao also attached great importance to the role of political propaganda, and on February 6, Bo Yibo reported that the number of "tigers" caught by central government units had increased rapidly since February 1, when Beijing held a public trial of major embezzlers. "Before February 1, a total of one hundred and sixty-one tigers were caught, and from February 2 to

February 5, one hundred and fourteen were caught, with an average of twenty-nine tigers being caught every day for four days. The crowd was very encouraging. big embezzlers do not counter-attack, suspects do not "counterpart", some small embezzlement upgraded to big embezzlement, the case is big, involved in a wide range of a nest of big embezzlers began to and generally exposed, serious counter-revolutionaries and counter-revolutionary cliques began to be exposed. and larger and larger numbers of embezzlers will be netted in large numbers within the next ten days." The central authorities have decided to increase the number of big tigers from the original 400 to 700. While the report suggests that the Central Organ's successes at this time include the "four investigations," i.e., "investigation of the economy, personnel, accounts, and information"; the bold use of non-Party activists and democrats, the use of surrendered "prisoners," and the use of the "captives," the Central Organ's "four investigations," the Central Organ has decided to increase the number of big tigers from the original 400 to 700. Captives", as well as the families of major corruption suspects; and the implementation of the "special case, special group, deadline for solving the case, and the system of beating the tiger", [79] but Mao apparently valued the effectiveness of the public trial congresses above all else. In forwarding Bo Yibo's report, he instructed: "Please ask the Central Bureaus to consider holding trials in February on a regular basis, following the example of the trial of seven major corrupt criminals on February 1 at the central level, and to try a number of major corrupt criminals at the level of the major administrative districts (small and medium-sized corrupt criminals below 100 million yuan should not be tried for the time being), with some of them sentenced to death, some given suspended death sentences, some sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and some sentenced to short terms of imprisonment, some sentenced to suspended prison terms, and some sentenced to short-term imprisonment, and some sentenced to suspended prison terms. Some of them were sentenced to death, some to suspended sentences, some to long prison terms, some to short prison terms, some to suspended prison terms, and some were sentenced to exemptions from punishment (which are subject to administrative penalties), so as to promote the fight against tigers." [80]

Another way Mao Zedong promoted the fight against the "tiger" at this time was to compare the figures of the fight against the "tiger" of various units around the country, so as to promote the small with the large. For example, the Sixty-sixth Army of the North China Military Region reported that it had set a budget of 220 tigers, with 22 big tigers. As of February 6, it had fought one hundred

and forty-one tigers and four big tigers." Upon receiving the report, Mao Zedong authorized that, based on the budget for fighting tigers of the 66th Army and its achievements, the original budget for fighting tigers of the North China Military Region must be redone. "Military districts and armies at all levels whose tiger-fighting budgets and tiger-fighting achievements are not as good as those of the Sixty-sixth Army must give convincing reasons, otherwise there must be something wrong with the people in charge of them, either they are right-leaning in their thinking, or their methods are wrong, or they are themselves embezzlers." [81] On February 7, Li Fuchun reported that the CFFC system "had fought 150 big tigers up to yesterday," and that "the CFFC and the financial and economic ministries, comprising fifteen departments, had jointly formulated that the number of tigers to be killed by the end of February would be three hundred and eighteen, and the number of tigers to be killed by the end of the period would be three hundred and seventy-nine, and that two hundred (i.e., seven) had been fought by the end of February 15, and that the number of tigers to be killed by the end of the period would be three hundred and eighteen. Before February 15, the number was set to be 200 (i.e., another 50 within seven days), and everyone was full of vigor and confidence." Mao Zedong saw the paper and immediately approved, "With such a budget, I think the central level can be set at seven hundred and fifty." [82]

Given Mao's attitude, many localities and units naturally saw the wind rising. For example, the Northeast Bureau, which on January 26 expected to hit 500 "big tigers", jumped to 2,000 on February 3 after being criticized by Mao. Then, realizing that the number was still not as high as that of North China and other regions, the Bureau doubled the number to 4,000 on February 6, just three days later. Finally, on the 9th, Mao Zedong praised his "plan to fight 4,000 large tigers and 25,000 small and medium-sized tigers, which is the first of the six major regions in the country." It was requested that "although not all the regions should be on a par with the Northeast, they should gradually raise their budgets according to their own circumstances and criticize the right-leaning ideology among the cadres." [83] Another example is the East China Military Region, in late January, more than 200 "big tigers" were booked to be caught, which was criticized by Mao Zedong, and on February 1, the budget rose to 500, and on February 7, it rose to 1,000, which became the highest budget among all the major military regions in the country, and thus was praised by Mao, who also called on "all the armies to learn from the East China Military Region!" [84]

Of course, even among the major regions and military districts, there were some that were always more cautious in their numbers. For example, after the launching of the "Three Anti-countermeasures" campaign in the Central and Southern Military Region, it never managed to keep pace with Mao. So much so that Mao Zedong "felt that the action of the Central and Southern Military Region was a little slow, that is, at 2:00 a.m. on New Year's Day, he drafted a reply to the telegram, requesting them to 'strictly supervise and diligently guide the campaign, and make sure that there are gains every day', and revised the inappropriate aspects of the telegram, and sent a special person to take a special airplane overnight to send the revised draft to arouse the Central and Southern Military Region's great attention. Military Region's great attention." [85] But as late as January 22, the reports on the "Three Anti-countermeasures" of the military districts and armies belonging to the Central and South Military Region still failed to satisfy Mao Zedong, and were criticized as having cleared out too few "tigers," and as being "insufficiently vigorous, with too much empty talk. The report was criticized for having too few "tigers" cleared out, "not enough energy, and too much empty talk. [86] February 1, the Central and South Military Region, drumming up the courage to report that the military region directly under the plan to fight the "big tiger" 106, Mao Zedong, although affirmed, but that it is still a preliminary budget, and need to be added at any time in the future. [87] On February 11, in view of the rapid progress of the East China Military Region's budget for fighting "tigers", the Central and South Military Region's figures for fighting "tigers" were once again criticized by Mao Zedong. He explicitly telegraphed to the Central and South Bureau and stipulated the figures, saying: "Central and South China's tiger-fighting should be roughly on a par with East China. The eight-day telegram from the East China Bureau did not include the districts, townships, the army and the industrial and commercial sectors, but only the Party, government, public organizations and financial enterprises above the county level to fight 5,000 big tigers and 20,000 small and medium-sized tigers. In addition, the East China Military Region to play big tiger 1,000, small and medium tiger 3,000. From this it seems that your recent regulations to fight big tigers three thousand, small and medium tigers twenty thousand, or low. For the army, it must be on par with the East China Military Region, fighting 1,000 large tigers and 3,000 small and medium tigers or more, and distributing them quickly. How much the localities should be increased, please consider before telling." In particular, the South China Military Region, which was under the jurisdiction of the Central and South China Military Region, was still shrinking in the number of tigers fought up to this time, which made Mao Zedong very dissatisfied. He also personally

stipulated the number of "tigers" to be fought. Electricity said: "South China Military Region on February 9 electricity, the provisions of the fight big tiger 40, small and medium tiger more than 800, this number is ten times less, like the South China Military Region system has such a large number of large and small units, at least should fight big tiger 4,500, small and medium tiger 1,000 or 2,000." [88]

In view of the fact that the two military districts of Central and South China were never able to keep pace with the Central Committee, Mao Zedong even resolved to send Luo Ruiqing, the Minister of Public Security, to Wuhan and Guangzhou in person to supervise the work of the Central and South China Bureau and the South China Branch. Soon after Luo Ruiqing's arrival, the Bureau raised the number of "big tigers" to 8,000 and the number of "small tigers" to 42,000 on February 13th. In this regard, Mao Zedong praised with satisfaction: "This new plan of 8,000 big tigers and more than 42,000 small tigers has raised the level of tiger-fighting in all major administrative districts of the country to the highest level of the current period, and is closer to the actual plan than the one envisaged in the past". But he then turned around and compared this figure to other regions and units, asking all Central Bureaus to refer to the new figures of the Central and South Bureaus and "revise their own plans at the appropriate time and at their own discretion." [89]

However, Mao was still not satisfied with the figures reported by the Central and South Military Region on this day. Originally, according to the ratio of the number of people, referring to the figures of the East China Military Region, the Central and South Military Region tried to increase the number of big tigers to 800, and the South China Military Region also tried to increase the number of "big tigers" to 183. However, this was still not in line with Mao Zedong's stipulated figures of 1,000 in the Central and South Military Region and 400 or 500 in the South China Military Region. Moreover, in just a few days, the East China Military Region raised the number of "big tigers" from 1,000 to 1,600. As a result, when the figures of the Central and South China Military Regions were reported, Mao Zedong still criticized them severely. Mao Zedong still criticized them severely, saying: "The budget for fighting tigers in your military districts has been increased to 800 big tigers according to the recent telegram from the Central and Southern Bureau, which is an increase over your past figures, but compared with the 1,600 in the East China Military Region, it is only half of

that. In fact, the east China military region big tiger in the future may fight to two thousand five hundred to three thousand, you basically should be on a par with them especially the south China military region system may fight big tiger more than one thousand, small and medium tens of thousands of tigers, and they set a very low, courage is not prosperous." [90]

The end of the campaign and its impact

Mao Zedong set the number of "tigers" to be fought in each region, but how did each region digest and break it down? Here is a glimpse of the reports from East China.

According to Mao Zedong's request, the East China Bureau also raised the number of "tigers" over and over again, and on February 8, it was finally decided that 5,000 "big tigers" and 20,000 small and medium-sized "tigers" should be fought, excluding the army, schools, the industrial and commercial sector, and the districts and townships. "The East China Bureau has created this big number of big tigers. The East China Bureau created this "highest number" for all major administrative regions, i.e., assigning tasks to various provinces and municipalities. Specific assignment targets are as follows: "Shandong 4,300 (800 large tigers, 3,500 small and medium tigers); Zhejiang 3,700 (700 large tigers, 3,000 small and medium tigers); South Jiangsu 3,100 (600 large tigers, 2,500 small and medium tigers); Anhui 3,200 (500 large tigers, 2,700 small and medium tigers); North Jiangsu 2,700 (400 large tigers, 200 small and medium tigers); North Jiangsu 2,700 (400 large tigers, 200 small and medium tigers); North Jiangsu 2,700 (400 large tigers, 200 small and medium tigers); and North Jiangsu 2,700 (400 large tigers, 200 small and medium tigers). four hundred large tigers and two thousand three hundred small and medium tigers); Fujian two thousand one hundred (three hundred large tigers and one thousand eight hundred small and medium tigers within); Shanghai three thousand five hundred and fifty (seven hundred and fifty large tigers and two thousand eight hundred small and medium tigers within); Nanjing seven hundred and fifty (one hundred and fifty large tigers and six hundred small and medium tigers within); and one thousand sixteen hundred (eight hundred large tigers and eight hundred small and medium tigers within) in the East China Direct. " [There is no doubt that each province, city, and region will naturally distribute the number of "tigers" they received further downward, and finally apportion it to the heads of specific units or departments.

As for each unit or department that received a specific figure, the method of accomplishing the task was similar. That is, first of all, "to take the funding stand (how much money spent? Used in those areas?) The first step is to "take the funding line (how much money was spent? On what?), the handler line, the relationship line and the private sector manufacturers line (how many transactions with those manufacturers?), and then linked to other factors (to check the manufacturers?). In addition, then linked to other factors (to check my origin, social relations, living income and expenditure, ordinary performance, whether part-time business and industry, etc.), to be contrasted and analyzed", checking the "tiger tracks", looking for "tiger nest. Once there are clues that is dedicated to a special case, or hand over a special team of "tiger", packet checking and fighting, began a comprehensive internal and external investigation, including checking the books, documents, incoming goods, quality, warehouse inventory, and so on. At the same time on the suspect "isolation, blockade, cut off all internal and external links", and "take the General Assembly pressure, small meetings squeeze, internal and external pursuit, individual talk, leadership guidance, family persuasion, repeated testimony and other methods, so that the 'tiger' without breathing, ventilation, and leeway to fight." [92] Obviously, since many departments and units, those who have committed acts of embezzlement amount to more than half of the total, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China specifically ordered to relieve the small embezzlers, who accounted for more than 90% of the entire number of embezzlers, of their concerns, and to treat those who embezzled less than 500,000 yuan, whose circumstances were not serious, and who were able to make a thorough confession and guarantee that they would not reoffend again, as not being treated as embezzlers, and exempted them from administrative penalties, so as to enable them to lighten their loads, and take part in the fight against the "Tiger", which helped the movement immensely. [93] This is because, out of gratitude or the idea of making up for their sins, most of these people will be able to act as activists in the battle against the "tiger".

However, since the number of tigers is estimated by superiors, or even as a result of mutual comparison, it is inevitable that the number of tigers will be seriously detached from reality. As has been the case with all China's mass political campaigns, this move has opened the door for some people to retaliate and plant false accusations against their enemies. Some people even responded to the call of their superiors to report those suspected of corruption, but they themselves were branded

as corruptors and suffered grievances. [94] And many are not "tigers" into "tigers", "small tigers" into "big tigers", is not without resorting to the "tiger", "big tigers". The "tiger" is not a "tiger", the "small tiger" into a "big tiger", but also can not help but resort to "force", "confession", "letter". In fact, the fight "tiger" struggle has just begun, Mao Zedong noticed that some troops and places in the "force", "confession", "letter". "He also issued special instructions to this effect. He also issued a special instruction to "fight the tiger must start from the accounts", do not "specialize in forced confessions". [95] fight "tiger" into the climax, around the world has also raised the issue of "to prevent simple forced confession by any means", and even put forward "suspicious of errors, not to play the wrong, to prevent forced confession letter Mao Zedong was also in favor of the idea of "preventing the use of unscrupulous means to extract confessions". [96] But in fact, not to mention the non-"tiger" people, even for many counted as "tiger" people, to be under such a kind of pressure, but also has a strict time limit, in order not to take advantage of the "forced", "confession", "confession", "confession", "confession", "confession", "confession", "confession", "confession", "confession", "confession", "confession", "confession" and "confession". ", "confession", "letter" approach to achieve the purpose, almost impossible. Noted this situation, therefore, Mao Zedong's attitude towards this also more or less left some room for manoeuvre, that is, "must start from the accounts", do not "specialize in forcing confessions".

Take the example of an army in the North China Military Region, which fought the "Tiger" battle. The army because of the "tiger" in the fight for honor in the fight, issued the "tiger" task, especially stressed the regiments to compete with each other to see who hit the "tiger" the most. As a result, some regiments called on party members to suspect each other and take the lead in confessing, and as a result, party members who had not embezzled said that they had embezzled several million dollars to show that party members had a "demonstration effect". Some regiments beat, scold, tie up and freeze the suspects, and index their confessions, as long as the figures of embezzlement are available, regardless of whether there is any evidence or not. Some regiments even use wheel warfare, and on the meat torture waiting, two days to get out of the embezzlement of more than 10 million yuan of embezzlers more than 20 people. [97] Such as Chahar Province, Tianzhen County to district as a unit, in order to find the suspect, fight the "tiger", the cadres concentrated in a courtyard to eat and sleep, closed the door, are not allowed to go in and out. The street also arranged the guards, a touch of the district cadres will be forced to ask the gun, strictly prohibit the exchange of

letters, phone calls and meeting guests. Another example is the Shanxi Funongtan coal mine for the fight "tiger", to create a "soft and hard" tactics, of which the "hard" approach there are 17 kinds of. Including "(1) all are not allowed to go out; (2) wearing cloth (blue cloth can move freely, red cloth in the yard activities, white cloth is not allowed to go out. According to the statistics of eighty people, only twenty-five wore blue strips, and fifty-five wore red and white strips); (3) general assembly struggles; (4) not allowed to sleep (introspection); (5) using a stick to the jaw (forcing them not to lower their heads); (6) squatting as a punishment (not allowed to move until their legs are sore); (7) standing all night long as a punishment; (8) sitting on an anti-chair; (9) kneeling on a bench; (10) putting their heads against the wall; (11) putting their heads against the bowls; (12) raising a wooden stick in their hands; (13) not confessing; (14) not confessing; (15) not confessing to anything; and (16) not confessing to any of the other things. wooden stick; (13) not confessing and not asking to go to the toilet; (14) disguised beatings (finger pointing, ear twisting); (15) going to the 'temporary court' (there were one or two adjudicators, who were the chief of the general branch or the defense section; three or four armed members, who had interrogated six people, who had been tied up in the 'court') ' on which they had been bound); (16) bundles; (17) handcuffs with corks."

[98]

Although in general the problems of "forcing", "confessing" and "believing" are better in the center than in the regions, better in the regions than in the provinces, better in the provinces than in the districts and cities, and better in the districts than in the counties, there are in fact also problems of "forcing", "confessing" and "believing" in the higher-level units. In fact, there is also the same "force", "supply", "letter", but to a different extent. For example, corporal punishment, or corporal punishment in disguise, also exists in the organs of the South China Finance Commission. It was reported that "because of the intransigence of the tigers, their refusal to confess or their repeated refusals to confess, the public became so enraged that they beat and scolded the embezzlers. For example, when the Bureau of Material Management fought the smuggling tiger Fang Zhaohui, it went so far as to injure him in the face, and the leaders could not stop it. Colored Bureau usually punished the tiger to kneel down, in the fight to the end of the stubborn Huang Jingwen, individual people tied him up. Commodity Inspection Bureau to fight the destruction of the commodity inspection policy of Jian Jianxian, to kneel on the stool kneeling wooden bar, hands, but also to raise the wooden stool." [99]

The result of such a fight against the "tiger" can be imagined. At the climax of the campaign, the number of "tigers" rocketed and successes were reported everywhere. At the same time, many of those who had been unjustly beaten suffered so much that many of them took their own lives. When the campaign turned to finalization and conclusion, a large number of "tigers" retracted their confessions, and much of the material could not be verified. Typical examples are the Trade Department of the Northwest Military and Political Commission, which at the height of the Tiger Fight, had nine suicides due to the simple and hasty methods of the Tiger Fight team, which relied on corporal punishment and even branded hands with chopsticks, "five of them hanged, three cut with knives, three jumped from a building, and three were cut with knives, three were cut with knives, and three jumped from a building." Among them, five hanged themselves, three cut themselves with knives, one jumped from a building, three died, and six have not yet died." [Some units in Shanghai and East China caused 60 suicides in the 10 days from March 13 to 23 by using the methods of "force", "confession" and "letter". Suicide. [101] During the fight against the "tiger" in the Jiangjin area of Sichuan, 58 people committed suicide as a result of the use of hanging and corporal punishment to force confessions. [102] Huaibei Yante District, "the whole district to participate in the 'Three Anti' movement of a total of 955 people, suffered corporal punishment that is, there are 218 people, corporal punishment and forced confessions to as many as 125 kinds of tricks, the degree of cruelty is horrifying, a lot of people were beaten to death, beaten to death, two people died of injuries, five people committed suicide, the total number of deaths is seven (of which the deaths were implicated). (five of the masses were implicated in the deaths), thirteen attempted suicides, and nineteen injured or even crippled for life." [103] Most notable was the Qingdao "Three Anti-Tiger" campaign, which involved the use of "force", "confession", and "letter". ", "confession", "letter", "according to the city's incomplete statistics, killed and suicides have been killed up to one hundred and seventy-two people." Qingdao Spinning Control Branch, Sifang Railway Factory, Port Authority, Bureau of Foreign Trade, Bureau of Health and other five units alone, 54 people were killed or committed suicide, another 50 people attempted suicide, and 26 people were beaten and disabled. "Of these one hundred and four cases, most were neither corrupt nor political, while workers, their families and guards amounted to sixty-six." [104]

From this it is easy to understand that the battle against the "tiger" has been seriously expanded.

Of the 955 people in the Huaibei Salt District, 282 "tigers" of various sizes were fought, and 218 people were tortured to make them confess. Upon review, none of the 282 "tigers" could be convicted, and some of them had no corruption problems at all. [105] [105]

In the Urumqi Public Security Bureau's fight against the "tigers," the use of "coercion," "confessions," and "beliefs" turned some of those who were not corrupt into corrupt individuals. In the fight against the "tiger", due to the use of the methods of "coercion", "confession" and "letter", some of those who were not corrupt became corrupt, and some of those who had committed small-scale corruption became large-scale corrupt. Afterwards, 43 of these cases were screened and all of them could not be established, 12 were typed wrongly and 31 were typed falsely. [106]

When the Shaanxi Provincial Military Region reviewed and finalized the cases, it was found that "the entire military region had originally fought a total of 1,231 tigers, 14 of which were over 100 million yuan. In the first screening and finalization of cases, only 276 tigers could be identified, of which three were over 100 million yuan. After the review, now sure corruption in ten million dollars or more 227, more than 100 million yuan 2 people. Originally fought as a tiger, is now down ten million yuan below 5 million yuan or more 205 people; down to 5 million yuan below 1 million yuan or more 535 people; down to 1 million yuan or less 213 people; determined to find out that there is no embezzlement 24 people." Also like "The Ankang Military Region originally fought 112 tigers, and the first time 33 tigers were identified. After review, only 11 people, or 11% of the original number of tigers, actually embezzled more than ten million dollars." [107]

Because of the widespread phenomenon of forced confessions in the battle against the "tigers", many of the "tigers" were faked or even faked. In the end, it was found that "there were 5,471 'tigers' who had embezzled more than ten million yuan, and after the cases were finalized, 16.4% of the cases were closed; 76.2% of the cases were dismissed". [108]

According to An Ziwen's report on the conclusion of the "Three Anti-corruption Campaigns", "The highest number of embezzlers over 10 million yuan uncovered during the "Three Anti-corruption Campaigns" was more than 292,000, but now there are more than 155,000 left, a reduction of about 65 percent. percent. The northeastern zone has seen the least decline in tigers, about thirty-one percent, and the eastern zone of China has seen the largest percentage decline, eighty-three percent." "Due to the long period of time for tracing and calculation and the inconsistent standard of discounting, about thirty-three percent of those who became tigers due to excessive discounting, and about forty-seven percent of those who became tigers due to over-hitting of minor grafts. Due to unclear boundaries of corruption, those who have public-private mismatch, dereliction of duty, wastefulness and political problems are counted as tigers, accounting for about 15 percent of the cases. Those who were not corrupt at all, but were completely mistaken, accounted for about five percent (the highest in Hebei, at 10.54 percent)." [109]

In fact, the time of An Ziwen's report was October 18, 1952, and the materials reported at that time did not include either the information reviewed in various places after October, such as the above-mentioned data on the 100 percent of wrongful convictions in Huaibei Yante District and the Urumqi Public Security Bureau, or the various situations in which leaders at all levels had forcibly suppressed and failed to find out the grievances and discharge the charges. The most obvious, as noted in Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, is Zhu Yuqin, Deputy Minister of the Hospital Affairs Department of the People's Liberation Army's Military Academy, who was expelled from the Party and administratively dismissed and demoted, and who was only vindicated and reinstated to his rank and treatment in 1980. [110] In the region of Xikang Province, many of those who were wrongfully convicted at this time survived until 1982-1986, when they were able to appeal to the Sichuan Provincial Court and were vindicated. [111] It is not known how many similar cases there are throughout the country.

How serious was the suppression of screening and vindication by party officials in some places? The example of Qingdao, where the above-mentioned problems were discovered, will give some idea. Since the former secretary of the Qingdao Municipal Party Committee was defeated as a "tiger" and there were contradictions between the new leaders of the Municipal Party Committee and their

subordinates, the Qingdao Municipal Party Committee was very involved in the "Three Anti-Tiger" campaign, resulting in a large number of false accusations. Therefore, the Qingdao Municipal Party Committee was very devoted to the "Three Anti-tiger" campaign, which resulted in a large number of wrongful convictions, and after the end of the campaign, the oppressed party naturally sued the central government. As a result, the Qingdao Municipal Party Committee, at the request of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, carried out some form of review and admitted that as many as 129 people had been wrongly convicted during the campaign. However, because this figure was so far from the truth, the Central Committee and Shandong Province jointly sent an investigation team to Qingdao to investigate. As a result, although only a few departments were investigated, it was confirmed that the results of the Qingdao Municipal Committee's review were not credible at all. According to the investigation, only one department of the spinning tube sub-bureau has been wrongly hit by 470 people, than the Qingdao Municipal Party Committee self-reported that the number of wrongly hit in the city more than three times. If you add to the investigation of the Port Authority to play the wrong 54 people, the Sifang machine factory to play the wrong 34 people, together with the Qingdao Spinning Bureau, the three units were playing the wrong number of people reached 612 people. Qingdao cotton is known to six, seven, eight factories in three factories, there are 184 people were wrong, the two together were wrong people have reached nearly 800 people. Only from the above six units of the number of simple projection, we can be sure, Qingdao city in the "three against" in the wrongly beaten into corruption, I am afraid that no less than thousands of people. [112]

In fact, in late February, the CCP Central Committee had already begun to realize some of the deviations of the "Tiger Fighting" campaign, and on February 29, Mao Zedong especially approved the report of the Northeast Ministry of Trade on the need for strict discipline in fighting the "Tiger Fighting," which prohibited hitting and disguised hitting of people. Experience. The experience of fighting the "tiger", which "prohibits beating, scolding, binding and other humiliations and disguised physical punishment" and "does not allow the use of 'fatigue tactics' and 'wheel tactics'", was demanded to be copied by all ministries. [114] It can be seen that at this time all units around the use of beating or disguised beating to fight the "tiger" has gradually become a prairie fire, Mao Zedong had to step in to stop it.

On March 6, Mao Zedong explicitly approved the release of "on the handling of corruption, waste and overcoming bureaucratic errors in a number of provisions", the first time on the issue of corruption put forward a unified policy standards. Its provisions clearly stated, "Anyone who has embezzled less than one million yuan will not be treated as an embezzler as long as his or her circumstances are not serious and egregious, and he or she thoroughly admits his or her mistakes and promises not to commit them again." "Any embezzler who has embezzled more than one million yuan and less than ten million yuan shall not be subject to criminal punishment as long as he or she does not have serious and egregious circumstances, thoroughly admits his or her mistakes, and promises not to commit the crime again. If he or she is younger or has made a mistake and can confess on his or her own initiative, or if he or she is found to be actively taking part in the work of the Three Anti-counterterrorism Measures and has already established a record of merit If the offender is young or has made an occasional mistake and can confess voluntarily, or if the offender has actively participated in the Three Anti-corruption Work after being discovered and has already made meritorious achievements and redeemed himself or herself, he or she shall be exempted from being treated as an embezzler, and shall not be subject to any administrative punishment. "Any embezzler who has embezzled more than ten million yuan but less than one hundred million yuan may be given appropriate criminal punishment, or exempted from punishment and given administrative punishment only, depending on the seriousness of the circumstances, the degree of confession, the return of stolen goods, and the merits of the prosecution." "Any embezzler who has embezzled more than 100 million yuan shall generally be given different criminal penalties according to the seriousness of the circumstances and the recovery of the embezzled funds and property, but those who have confessed to the crime, sincerely repented of their sins, withdrawn the stolen goods and reported meritorious deeds in the fight against corruption may also be exempted from the criminal penalties and be given appropriate administrative penalties instead." As for the calculation of the time of corruption and violation of the law, it "shall generally be counted from the date of the founding of the People's Republic of China, i.e., October 1, 1949. Where a place is liberated after the founding of the People's Republic of China, it shall be counted from the date of liberation. However, in the case of insurrectionary forces, it shall always be counted from the date on which the revolutionary political work system is established in the force." [115]

Immediately following this, Mao also issued the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Punishing Corruption, which specified the criteria for corruption and punishment. The crime of embezzlement was characterized as "All staff members of state organs, enterprises, schools and their affiliates who embezzle, steal, cheat, or arbitrage state property, force others to take stolen goods, accept bribes, and other acts of false publicity to benefit illegally are guilty of the crime of embezzlement." The punishment standards are delineated by 100 million yuan, 50 million yuan and 10 million yuan, with those embezzling more than 100 million yuan being sentenced to more than 10 years of imprisonment or life imprisonment, and those with particularly serious circumstances being sentenced to death; those with more than 50 million yuan but less than 100 million yuan being sentenced to more than 5 years and less than 10 years of imprisonment; and those with more than 10 million yuan but less than 50 million yuan being sentenced to more than 1 year and less than 5 years of imprisonment, or one to four years of hard labor, or one to two years of control. Those with less than 10 million yuan may be sentenced to one year's imprisonment, hard labor or control, depending on the circumstances, or may be exempted from criminal punishment and given administrative punishment such as dismissal, demotion, demerit or warning. Anyone who endangers the State, society or the lives of the people, or who sells economic information about the State, engages in extortion, organizes collective embezzlement, or refuses to confess or cover up a crime is liable to a heavier penalty; anyone who voluntarily or completely confesses or informs on another person, or who is younger, is liable to a lighter penalty. [116] [116]

Although the provisions of the Regulations were still formally quite severe, in fact, if one notes that Mao Zedong, in guiding the drafting of the above provisions and regulations, repeatedly emphasized the need to be "a little more lenient" and not to be too strict,[117] it is not difficult to see that Mao had already calmed down from his initial indignation of saying that he would not solve the problem unless he had to shoot several tens of thousands of embezzlers. Mao had calmed down. It was also under these circumstances that Mao not only agreed to screen the "fake tigers and substandard tigers" that might emerge from the "tiger" campaign, but also repeatedly instructed the subsequent recovery of stolen goods and the finalization of cases, emphasizing that: "All genuine embezzlers, suspected embezzlers and those who have made mistakes must be sentenced and examined carefully and truthfully in accordance with the Central Government's successive instructions and government decrees, and not a single bad person must be indulged or a single good person wrongly convicted."

"Those who are fixed, those who are wrong are corrected, those who should be lowered are lowered, those who should be promoted are promoted, and those who are suspected of being difficult are not dealt with for the time being." "On the stolen money where there is a recovery out of the people must be all resolute recovery out, but shall not involve innocent family members, shall not be sent to the countryside to chase the stolen money shall not be hard to catch up with the part of the original can not be recovered." [118]

In addition to making policy corrections and constraints on the practices of the "Three Anti-countermeasures," Mao Zedong to a large extent revised his earlier vehement attitude toward the bourgeoisie. For example, he not only began to openly criticize the widespread criticism of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology that came in waves as a result of the "Three Anti-corruption Measures", [119] but also made it clear that the worst of the worst, whether they were corrupt or bourgeois, were only in the minority, and called on all "[t]he workers who have washed their hands and the industrial and commercial workers and the industrial and commercial workers and the industrial and commercial workers and the industrial and commercial workers and the industrial and commercial workers and the industrial and commercial workers". workers and industrialists who have washed their hands also unite with us" to consolidate the people's democratic united front and the people's democratic dictatorship. [120] He even stated, "As far as the majority of the bourgeoisie is concerned, there are bad and good aspects in one's thinking, and we should help them to get rid of the bad aspects and develop the good ones." And for those capitalists who have a vision, we do not ask them to change their composition or their career at once, but at the same time we welcome them to be a socialist in the future. [121] Of course, all this does not mean that Mao Tse-tung has changed his inner psychology of being highly wary of the bourgeoisie. This is evidenced by the fact that before the end of the "Three Anti" campaign, he explicitly advocated a general confession of bourgeois ties on the part of the staff of state organs. [122]

The nationwide "Three Anti" campaign and its battle against the "tiger" ended in March-April 1952, with the work of finalizing the cases and recovering the stolen goods continuing for a long time, but by June-July most of the localities and units had also come to an end. But by June-July most of the places and units had come to an end. According to the statistical report of the Discipline Inspection

Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the results of the "Three Anti-corruption" campaigns in the five administrative regions of North China, East China, Northeast China, Southwest China, and Northwest China (except the army and central government organs) at the beginning of June, i.e., the number of people who participated in the campaigns was 3,122,437,000, of whom 1,226,984,000, or 39 per cent, of the number of participants, were those who had committed acts of corruption and those who could be classified as corrupt. 39% of the total number of participants, of whom 202,683 were Party members, accounting for 16.5% of the total number of corrupt elements. [123] Together with the more than 700,000 people from the central authorities who participated in the campaign, and the more than 30% of those who were found to have committed acts of corruption and those who could be classified as corrupt, it can be seen that the number of people who were found to have committed acts of corruption and those who could be classified as corrupt should be around 1.5 million people. After partial screening, by early October, this number had shrunk considerably. An Ziwen reported on October 18: "The total number of participants in the 'Three Anti' campaign in party and government organizations above the county level (except the military) was more than 3,836,000, and a total of more than 1,203,000 people were found to be corrupt and to have committed corruption mistakes, accounting for about one percent of the total number of participants in the 'Three Anti' campaign. The total number of participants in the 'Three Anti-corruption' campaign was 311.4 percent. Among them, there were more than 196,000 Communist Party members, accounting for 16.3 percent of the total number of embezzlers. One hundred and fifty-nine thousand nine hundred and sixteen of those who embezzled ten million yuan or more accounted for 8.8 percent of the total number of embezzlers." Here, there are nearly 300,000 fewer embezzlers and those who made embezzlement mistakes. In addition, of the above people, a total of 38,402 were sentenced to death, of whom 42 were sentenced to death, 9 to suspended execution, 67 to life imprisonment, 9,942 to fixed-term imprisonment, 11,165 to reform through labor, and 17,175 to control by authorities. [124]

However, no matter how the final number of convictions was reduced and how serious the expansion of the "Tiger" campaign was, the widespread corruption of party and state officials after the CCP's entry into the city was still extremely serious and even alarming. The number of senior CCP cadres like Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan[125] who took advantage of their positions and power to use public office for private gain, to enrich themselves at the expense of the public, to use

public office for private gain, to use public office for private gain, and to spread wastefulness has grown so large that it is difficult for ordinary penalties and punishments to act as a deterrent. In particular, the majority of grass-roots cadres below the county level can do whatever they like because their power is not subject to supervision or restriction, so that lawlessness and indiscipline are very common, leading some local people to think that they "can't see the difference between their style and that of the Kuomintang". Cursing them as "even more powerful than the Kuomintang". [126] Luo Ruiqing's claim that "we have all the problems of the Kuomintang today" and Mao Zedong's claim that "if we don't carry out the Three Anti-corruption Programs within ten years, the Communist Party will turn into the Kuomintang" were not alarmist talk. [As soon as the "Three Anti-corruption" campaign of 1952 was over, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had to launch the so-called "New Three Anti-corruption" campaign in 1953, with the main content of opposing cadres' violation of the law and discipline, which was likewise an act of necessity.

Under such circumstances, the launching of the "Three Anti-corruption Campaign" in 1952 undoubtedly had the significance of curbing the trend of gradual nationalization of the Communist Party. After the "Three Anti-corruption Campaigns", the problem of corruption among the staff of the party and state organs at all levels was significantly reduced. However, this does not mean that the problem of corruption among the staff of power organs has been solved. Only a year or so after the "Three Anti-corruption" campaign, the CCP Central Committee could not help but remind the relevant departments to prevent the recurrence of widespread corruption after the "Three Anti-corruption" campaign, and to call for "anti-corruption education", [12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]. After that, the CPC Central Committee had to remind the relevant departments to prevent the recurrence of widespread corruption after the "Three Anti-corruption Campaigns" and to call for "anti-corruption education". [This is enough to show that the "three anti-corruption" campaigns did not and could not solve the problem at all. In fact, the reason why corruption within the regime did not develop as viciously as it did in the early years of the founding of the People's Republic of China was not because of the duration of the "Three Anti-corruption Campaigns" themselves, but rather because of the socialist transformation of China, which soon led to the abolition of the market economy, which included everything that could be associated with the word "luxury", including the "luxury" and the "luxury". It was because

China quickly implemented socialist transformation, abolished the market economy, including all production and service industries that could be associated with the word "luxury," and established a planned economic system, an egalitarian distribution system, and a closed-door policy. It was these systems and policies that mandatorily put up barriers between power and money, making it much more difficult for party and government workers to embezzle large sums of public money and spend lavishly. However, once the market economy is restarted and the doors of the country are opened wide, while the power structure and power system remain unchanged, the phenomenon of power rent-seeking, power and money collusion, and even power corruption will make a comeback, and with the degree of openness and the expansion of the overall economic scale will become more and more intense and uncontrollable. "Absolute power" is still "absolute corruption".

In the final analysis, Mao Zedong's motives for launching the "Three Anti-corruption" campaign were irreproachable, but its effects were both favorable and unfavorable. The problem of corruption among the staff of power organs can be minimized and curbed only if power is subject to the necessary constraints within a mature legal system, and only if citizens can maintain effective supervision over those who exercise power and the process of exercising power.

NOTES:

[1] Most of the various works on the general history of the People's Republic of China contain highly critical brief introductions, and the few articles devoted to this movement tend to describe the "Three Antis" movement together with the "Five Antis" movement, such as Pang Song's ""Three Antis"" and "Five Antis"". "Three Against Five" Campaign", Thematic History of the People's Republic of China, vol. 1, Chengdu, Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2004, pp. 298-326. The author refers to a large number of relevant archival materials kept at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCPC), but the simple "factual record" style of writing makes the book, as the author himself puts it, "just a popular book". "is only a popular book, not a scholarly work".

- [2] In the book cited by Dynasty Bin, its preface used three "successful practice" in a row. Said "three anti-movement is the successful practice of the ruling party's own construction, is the successful practice of the people's democratic regime construction, is the successful practice of transforming the society, changing the customs and cleaning the feudal filth."
- [3] Reprinted in the December 1951 issue of *New Construction*, pp. 13-17.
- [4] See CCP Mudanjiang Municipal Party Committee Party History Research Office, ed. *Battles Without Gunshots - Album of the "Three Antis" and "Five Antis" Campaigns*, Heilongjiang Korean Nationalities Publishing House, 1990, p. 3.
- [5] "The Central Committee Transmits the Report of the Northeast Bureau Against Corruption and Bureaucracy," September 28, 1951, Shaanxi Provincial Archives 123/44/29/202-205.
- [6] Bo Yibo, *A Review of Some Major Decisions and Events* (above), Beijing, Party School Press of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1993, pp. 139-140.
- [7] Mao Zedong, "The Great Victory of the Three Major Movements," October 23, 1951, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book II, pp. 481-483.
- [8] According to the three major tasks for 1952 proposed by the CCP Central Committee at this time, as conveyed by the North China Bureau, they were, "Increasing production and saving, resisting the United States and helping North Korea, and ideological reform."
- [9] Gao Gang, "Carry out a comprehensive campaign to increase production and economize, and further deepen the struggle against corruption, waste, and bureaucracy," October 26, 1951 (according to Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Volume II, p. 513 and Bo Yibo op. cit. p. 140, the date should be November 1, 1951), *New Construction*, December 1951 issue, pp. 17 -20 pp.
- [10] Mao Zedong, "Criticisms on the Central Committee's Transmission of Gao Gang's Report on the Three Anti-Struggles," November 20, 1951, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book II, Beijing, Central Literature Publishing House, 1991, p. 513
- [11] Reprinted in *New Construction*, December 1951 issue, pp. 20-21.
- [12] The report states, "According to the year-by-year statistics on corruption cases in the People's Court of Shenyang City, in the second half of 1949 corrupt offenders accounted for 5.3 percent of

the total number of offenders, rising to 5.7 percent in 1950, and then to 1.3.2 percent in the first quarter of 1951." "The statistics of the entire trade work system show that seven hundred persons committed corruption mistakes from January to August last year, while in the second quarter of this year alone there were more than five hundred embezzlers." Report of the Northeast Bureau on Opposition to Corruption and Metamorphosis of Bureaucracy, September 14, 1951, in Shaanxi Provincial Archives Collection, 123/44/29/203-205.

[13] Reprinted in *New Construction*, December 1951 issue, pp. 20-21.

[14] "Launching a Resolute Struggle Against Corrupt Tendencies," *Party Journal of the North China Bureau of the CCP: Construction*, No. 127, November 24, 1951, pp. 9-11.

[15] "North China Bureau's Report to the Central Committee on the Arrest of Liu Qingshan, Former Secretary of the Tianjin Local Committee, and Zhang Zishan, Current Secretary of the Tianjin Local Committee, on the Great Corruptor", November 29, 1951, *Construction*, Issue 129, December 10, 1951, p. 4 Also according to the subsequent "Report of the Hebei Provincial Committee on the Third Provincial Party Delegates' Conference to the North China Bureau," "Zhang Zishan's private expenses alone amounted to more than 300 million yuan in the last three months. See *Construction*, No. 129, Dec. 10, 1951, pp. 9-11, and see *People's Daily*, Dec. 30, 1951

[16] Bo Yibo op. cit. p. 151.

[17] Mao Zedong, "Telegram from the Central Committee to Bo Yibo (First Secretary) and Liu Lantao (Third Secretary) on the Supplementary Report on the Handling of Major Corrupt Criminals," December 1, 1951, *Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC*, Book II, p. 530.

[18] See *Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC*, Book II, pp. 534-536.

[19] "Instruction of the Central Committee on Mobilizing the Masses Inside and Outside the Party to Examine and Punish Corrupt Persons with Great Fanfare," December 4, 1951, *Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC*, Book II, pp. 542-543

[20] Instruction on the Central Committee's Approval of the Report of the Party Group of the Ministry of Trade on Opposing the Phenomenon of Corruption and Punishing Corrupt Persons with Great Fanfare and Openness, December 5, 1951, *Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC*, Book II, p. 544

[21] Report to Chairman Mao by the North China Bureau on the Anti-Corruption, Anti-Waste, and Anti-Bureaucracy Campaign to be Launched with Great Fanfare in the Whole Region, December 12, 1951; Report by the Party Group of the People's Bank Head Office on the Anti-Corruption, Anti-Waste, and Anti-Bureaucracy Campaign, December 4, 1951; Report by the Party Group of the Central Ministry of Water Conservancy on the Anti-Corruption, Anti-Waste, and Anti-Bureaucracy Campaign, December 4, 1951; and Report by the Report of the Party Group of the Central Ministry of Light Industry on Anti-Corruption, Anti-Waste, and Anti-Bureaucracy, December 4, 1951; Report of the Party Group of the Central Ministry of Trade on Fanfare and Public Opposition to Corruption and Punishment of Corrupt Personnel, December 5, 1951; Report of the Party Group of the Central Ministry of Finance on the Launching of a Campaign to Combat Corruption, Anti-Waste, and Anti-Bureaucracy, December 6, 1951; Construction, First III0, December 19, pp. 1-2, 5-6, 15-16, 17-18, 19, 21-22.

[22] "Telegram from the Central Committee on the Three Anti-Corruption Struggles That Must Be Conducted with Great Fanfare," December 8, 1951; Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book II, pp. 548-549

[23] "Xi Zhongxun's Report on the Anti-Corruption Struggle in Northwest China," December 13, 1951, Construction, No. 136, January 9, 1952, pp. 1-2

[24] "Report of the North China Bureau to Chairman Mao on the Anti-Corruption, Anti-Waste and Anti-Bureaucracy Campaign to be Launched with Great Fanfare in the Whole Region," December 12, 1951, Construction, No. 130, December 19, 1951, pp. 1-2

[25] "Report of the Central and Southern Bureau on the Three Anti-Bureaucratic Campaigns," December 14, 1951, Construction, No. 136, January 9, 1952, pp. 4-5

[26] "Hebei Provincial Committee's Report to the North China Bureau on the Third Provincial Party Delegates' Conference," December 1951, Construction, No. 129, December 10, 1951, pp. 9-11

[27] Report of the Gansu Provincial Committee on Anti-Corruption, Anti-Waste and Anti-Bureaucracy, December 15, 1951, Construction, Issue 132, December 30, 1951, pp. 3-4

[28] "The Central Committee Approves and Transmits the Report of the Gansu Provincial Committee on Anti-Corruption, Anti-Waste and Anti-Bureaucracy," December 22, 1951; "The Central Committee Approves and Transmits the Report of the Joint Party Committee of the Railway

Corps on the Three Anti-bureaucratic Struggles," December 24, 1951, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book II, pp. 612, 631

[29] Luo Ruiqing reported on the content of Mao's talks in this regard, saying, "Some Communists are worse than the Kuomintang. For example, the Chief of Public Security in Changsha embezzled 2 billion yuan, and the Chief of Police in Changsha (during the Kuomintang period) did not dare to make such a large sum, because they were sectarian." Comrade Luo Ruiqing's Conveyance Report at the 72nd Standing Committee of the South China Branch, February 25, 1952, Guangdong Provincial Archives Collection, pp. 206/1/44/60 (According to Note 2 on page 293 of Book III of Mao's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC, published in 1991, the case of Wang Pimin, the former head of the Changsha Public Security Bureau, who was executed for serious violations of the law and discipline, "is under review", but there is no news of this case having been corrected even after more than a decade.)

[30] Mao Zedong, "Approving and Rewarding the Weekly Briefing by the Party Committee of the Southwest Military Region on the Three Anti-corruption Struggles," December 30, 1951; "Instructions of the Central Government on the Reporting of the Three Anti-corruption Struggles to the Chairman of the Central Committee and to the Chairman of the Military Commission by All Working Departments of the Central Government, the Regions, the Provinces and the Municipalities," December 30, 1951; and "Replying to the Report of Dong Biwu and Others on the Co-ordination of the Five Organs and the Carrying Out of the Three Anti-corruption Struggles, December 30, 1951, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the State, Book II, pp. 646, 653, 652.

[31] "Comrade Luo Ruiqing's Report Conveyed at the Seventy-Second Standing Committee of the South China Branch," February 25, 1952, Guangdong Provincial Archives, pp. 206/1/44/58-59

[32] Bo Yibo op. cit. p. 147; and see "The Central Committee's Instruction on Immediately Grasping the Three Anti-Corruption Struggles," January 4, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, pp. 12-13.

[33] "Instruction of the Central Committee on Immediately Grasping the Three Anti-corruption Struggles," January 4, 1952, Construction, No. 137, January 10, 1952, pp. 1-2

- [34] "Report of the Beijing Municipal Committee on the Development of the Three Anti-campaigns and the Opinions on the Continuation of this Campaign," January 4, 1952, *Construction*, No. 137, January 10, 1952, pp. 8-10
- [35] Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the State, Book III, pp. 21-22.
- [36] "Chairman Mao Approves and Transmits the Report of the Gansu Provincial Committee on the Three Anti-campaigns Entering the Stage of Confessing and Prosecuting," January 9, 1952, *Construction*, Issue 139, January 18, 1952, pp. 6-7
- [37] "Chairman Mao Grants and Transmits Luo Ruiqing's Report on the Central Public Security Department's Fierce Struggle against the Three Anti-campaigns," January 10, 1952, *Construction*, Issue 139, January 18, 1952, pp. 1-3
- [38] "Chairman Mao Transmitting the Report on the Three Anti-campaign Situation in the Jinjing Military Sub-district," January 14, 1952, Shaanxi Provincial Archives Collection 123/44/5/240; Mao Zedong, "Criticisms on the Comprehensive Report of the Zunyi Military Sub-district on the Three Anti-campaigns," January 14, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the State, Book III, p. 52
- [39] Cited in Shaanxi Provincial Archives Collection 123/44/30/78.
- [40] "Chen Yi's Report on the Three Anti-campaigns in the East China Military Region," January 16, 1952, Shaanxi Provincial Archives Collection 123/44/5/248.
- [41] "Report of the Party Committee of the South Sichuan District on the Three Anti-campaigns to the Southwest Bureau and the Local Municipal Committees", January 19, 1952, Sichuan Provincial Archives, Jiandong/2/767/25-26.
- [42] See Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, vol. 3, pp. 60-61.
- [43] Reprinted in Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 64.
- [44] Reprinted in *Construction*, No. 141, January 26, 1952, pp. 4-5
- [45] Mao Zedong, "Criticisms on the Report of the Central and South Bureau on the Petition to Deal with the Small Families of the Organs," January 13, 1952; Mao Zedong, "Criticisms on the Report of Rao Shushi on the Situation of the Three Anti-counter-Struggles in Various Parts of East

China Transmitted to the Central and South Bureaus," January 13, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Volume III, pp. 40, 42-43.

[46] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the General Administration's Critique of the Third Weekly Briefing on the Three Anti-campaigns in the Southwest Military Region", January 15, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 64

[47] Cited in Shaanxi Provincial Archives Collection 123/44/30/83.

[48] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the First Number of the Three-Day Briefing on the Three Anti-campaigns in the Guizhou Military Region," January 15, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 62

[49] "Comrade Luo Ruiqing's Report Conveyed at the Seventy-Second Standing Committee of the South China Branch," February 25, 1952, Guangdong Provincial Archives, pp. 206/1/44/60

[50] "Comrade Bo Yibo's Report to Chairman Mao on the Situation of the Three Anti-corruption Campaigns in the Organs at the Central Level and the Full Commencement of the General Offensive Against the Great Corruptors," January 19, 1952, Construction, No. 141, January 26, 1952, pp. 1-2

[51] "Report of the Party Committee of the North China Military Region on Mobilizing the Entire Army to Concentrate Firepower to Fight the "Big Tigers" to Chairman Mao", January 22, 1952, Construction, No. 141, January 26, 1952, p. 6

[52] Mao Zedong, "Telegram on the Three Anti-countermeasures to be carried out by the Whole Army with All-out Efforts, then Integration", January 22, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 78

[53] "Report of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee to the North China Bureau on the Situation of the Three Anti-counter-Struggles," January 12, 1952, Collection of Sichuan Provincial Archives, Jiandong/2/762/154-165.

[54] "毛泽东批转山西省委三反综合报告要各地精读仿行電" ["Mao Zedong approves the Shanxi Provincial Committee's comprehensive report on the Three Anti-campaigns to be read carefully and imitated by all places"], January 23, 1952, Shaanxi Provincial Archives Collection, 123/44/5/259.

- [55] "Report of the Party Committee of the Air Force on Arranging the Search for the Great Corruptors," January 22, 1952, Collection of Chongqing Municipal Archives, Information/D65/30/2-4.
- [56] Mao Zedong, "Instructions on Concentrating on the Search for the 'Big Tigers'", January 23, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, pp. 87-88.
- [57] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the Fifth Weekly Briefing on the Three Anti-campaigns in the Southwest Military Region" January 24, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 89
- [58] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the Report on the Three Anti-campaigns of the Party Committee of the Nineteenth Corps of the Volunteer Army," January 25, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, pp. 94-95
- [59] Reprinted in Chongqing Municipal Archives, /D65/30/10-13.
- [60] Mao Zedong, "Approving and Transmitting the Beijing Municipal Committee's Report on the Experience of Fighting Tigers," January 28, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 111.
- [61] "Urgent Instruction of the North China Bureau Concerning All Provincial, Municipal and Local Committees Making Plans to Fight Tigers and Ending the Three Anti-campaigns Subject to Approval," January 26, 1952, Construction, Issue 142, February 2, 1952, p. 4
- [62] "Report of the Party Committee of the North China Military Region on the Catching of Two Hundred and Eighteen Tigers in One Week to Chairman Mao," January 25, 1952; "Comrade Liu Lantao's Report on the Catching of Eighty-Five Tigers in Two Days in the North China Military Region to Chairman Mao," January 26, 1952, Construction, Issue 142, February 2, 1952, pp. 7-9
- [63] Mao Zedong, "Instructions on Liu Lantao's Transmission of the Report on the North China Military Region," January 26, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 102
- [64] "The North China Bureau's Instruction that Thirteen Hundred Tigers Should be Captured in Shanxi Province and Chairman Mao's Instructions," January 30, 1952, Construction, No. 143, February 4, 1952, p. 4

[65] Mao Zedong, "Criticisms on the Report of the Party Committee of the East China Military Region on the Budget for Fighting Tigers", January 30, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Volume III, p. 112

[66] Mao Zedong, "Telegram to Gao Gang on the Search for Big Tigers and the Inspection and Handling of Illegal Capitalists", January 31, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, pp. 117-118

[67] See Bo Yibo op. cit. p. 144.

[68] Issued by the Economy Inspection Committee of the South China Finance Committee, How to Fight Tigers Outline (Draft), February 1952, Guangdong Provincial Archives, 206/1/44/192.

[69] Mao Zedong, "Criticisms on Forwarding Li Fuchun's Summary Report on Fighting Tigers at the Reporting Meeting of the Central Finance Committee," February 2, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, vol. 3, p. 134; and "Li Fuchun's Summary Report on Fighting Tigers at the Reporting Meeting of the Central Finance Committee," January 30, 1952, Jiandong / 2/762/47-49.

[70] Mao Zedong, "Telegram on the Deadline for Reporting to the Central Committee on the Budget for Fighting Tigers and the Three Anti-campaigns to be Carried Out in the Counties, Districts, and Townships," February 4, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, pp. 141-142.

[71] Wei Junyi, then editor-in-chief of the China Youth magazine, recalled that documents approved by Mao at the time had stipulated that each unit had to hit 5 percent of the embezzlers. See Wei Junyi, A Record of Thoughts and Pains, Hong Kong Tiandi Books Limited, 2000, p. 27.

[72] Mao Zedong, "Telegram to Tan Zheng on Increasing the Number of Allocations for Fighting Tigers", February 4, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 143

[73] Cited in Sichuan Provincial Archives Collection, Jiandong/2/767/11.

[74] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the Report of the Shandong Branch on Fighting Tigers", February 5, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 151.

[75] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the North China Bureau's Circular on the Cessation of Jin Cheng, Member of the Hebei Provincial Committee, and Wang Guanghua, Commander of the Provincial Military Region, from All Positions Within and Outside the Party for a Limited Period", February 4, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 138

[76] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of Comrades Bo Yibo and Liu Lantao's Report on the Capture of About Twelve Thousand Tigers within the Month of February in North China," February 4, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 145 (In fact, the Northeast Bureau reported on February 3 that 2,000 large tigers were planned to be caught throughout the Northeast.)

[77] Mao Zedong, "Telegram Concerning the Deadline for Reporting to the Central Committee on the Budget for Catching Tigers and the Three Anti-campaigns to be Carried Out in Counties, Districts, and Townships," February 4, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 140

[78] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the Report on the Fighting of Tigers by the Party Committee of the Central and Southern Military Region", February 7, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 163

[79] "Bo Yibo's Summary Report on the Fighting of Tigers after the Public Trial Conference at the Central Level", February 6, 1952, Sichuan Provincial Archives, Jiankang/2/2473/16-19.

[80] Mao Zedong, "Wholesale Bo Yibo's Critique of the Summary Report on the Situation of the Fight Against Tigers after the Public Trial Conference at the Central Level", February 7, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC, Volume 3, p. 161

[81] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of Liu Lantao's Report on the Sixty-sixth Army's Experience in Catching Tigers", February 8, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, pp. 167-168

[82] "Mao Zedong Transmits Comrade Fuchun's Letter to the Chairman on February 7 Regarding the Tiger-Catching Plans and Tiger-Catching Strategies of the Central Finance Commission and the Financial and Economic Ministries," February 8, 1952, Collection of Sichuan Provincial Archives, Jiankang/1/2473/22-23.

- [83] Mao Zedong, "Reply to Gao Gang's Report on the Plan to Fight Tigers in the Northeast," February 9, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, pp. 177-178.
- [84] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the Report on Catching Tigers in the East China Military Region", February 10, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 180
- [85] Bo Yibo op. cit. pp. 147-148.
- [86] Mao Zedong, "Telegram Concerning the Entire Army Must Conduct the Three Anti-countermeasures and Then Integrate with All Its Power", January 22, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 78
- [87] Mao Zedong, "Telegram Concerning the Deadline for Reporting to the Central Committee on the Budget for Fighting Tigers and the Three Anti-campaigns to be Carried Out in Counties, Districts, and Townships", February 4, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Volume III, p. 140
- [88] Mao Zedong, "Report on the Fighting of Tigers in Central and South China Should Be Broadly Aligned with East China", February 11, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 193
- [89] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the Central and South Bureau's New Plan for Fighting Tigers", February 17, 1952; Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the Report of Xi Zhongxun on the New Budget for Fighting Tigers in the Northwest Region", February 17, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC, Vol. 3, pp. 221, 225.
- [90] Mao Zedong, "Telegram to Tan Zheng and Others Concerning the Central and South Military Region Should Increase the Budget for Fighting Tigers", February 18, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 228
- [91] "Report of the East China Bureau on the Budget for Fighting Tigers," February 11, 1952, Sichuan Provincial Archives, Jiandong/2/762/85-86.
- [92] "Circular of the East China Bureau on the Preliminary Experience of the Directly Undertaken Organs in the Fight Against Tigers", February 12, 1952, Chongqing Archives, Data/D65/31/1-4.

- [93] Opinions of the Central Committee on the Handling of Certain Issues in the Three Anti-corruption Campaigns, February 12, 1952, Shaanxi Provincial Archives 123/44/2/83-84; Decision of the Central Committee on the Issues of Relieving the Concerns of the Petty Corruptors and Disciplining Them, March 2, 1952, Construction, No. 150, March 7, 1952, pp. 1-2. -2 pp.
- [94] For a list of such cases, see Beijing Archives Collection, 215/16/75, 77, 79, 84, 123, 126, 127, 212, 216, 217, 221, 235, 279, 288, 289, et al.
- [95] Mao Zedong, "Criticisms on Forwarding Li Fuchun's Summary Report on the Fight Against Tigers at the Reporting Meeting of the Central Finance Committee," February 2, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the State, Volume III, p. 134.
- [96] Report of the Chahar Provincial Committee on the Second Battle Plan for Fighting Tigers and Future Deployment, February 7, 1952; Mao Zedong, "Criticisms on the Report on the New Budget for Fighting Tigers in the Northwestern District Forwarded to Xi Zhongxun," February 17, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 225
- [97] "Circular of the North China Bureau on Paying Attention to Preventing Bias in the Struggle Against the Three Anti-countermeasures," February 1952, Construction, No. 145, February 13, 1952, p. 13
- [98] "A Serious Error of Forced Confessions and Letters in the Three Anti-campaigns in the Fujitan Coal Mine in Shanxi", March 1952, Construction, No. 149, March 4, 1952, p. 11
- [99] Summary of the Discussion at the Meeting of the Research Group of the Three Anti-countermeasures Office of the Finance Commission, February 1952, Guangdong Provincial Archives, 206/1/44/197.
- [100] "Emergency Circular of the Trade Department of the Northwest Military and Political Commission," March 16, 1952, Shaanxi Provincial Archives Collection, 123/44/34/152-153.
- [101] "Decision of the Shanghai Municipal Committee on the Strict Enforcement of Disciplines in the Work of the Three Anti-campaigns and Five Anti-campaigns," March 25, 1952, Shaanxi Provincial Archives Collection, 123/44/5/2344-347.
- [102] "Summary of the Jiangjin Local Committee on the Anti-Corruption, Anti-Waste, and Anti-Bureaucracy Campaign," May 15, 1952, Chongqing Archives Collection D221.719/18-1/36/10.

- [103] "Jiangsu Provincial Committee's Report to the East China Bureau and to the Central Committee", December 16, 1952, CCP Jiangsu Provincial Office of Party History and Jiangsu Provincial Archives, eds: "The Three Anti-Bureaucratic Campaigns and the Five Anti-Bureaucratic Campaigns (Jiangsu Volume)", CCP History Publishing House, 2003, p. 98 , 2003, p. 98.
- [104] "Circular of the Central Committee on the Serious Error of Forced Confessions in the Qingdao "Three Anti-campaigns"", December 10, 1952; "Instructions of the Central Committee to the Qingdao Municipal Party Committee for Reviewing the Errors Committed in the "Three Anti-campaigns" and Dealing with the Aftermath of the Matters", December 27, 1952, Shaanxi Provincial Archives Collection. 27, Shaanxi Provincial Archives Collection 123/44/5/72-73.
- [105] "Report of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee to the East China Bureau and to the Central Committee", December 16, 1952
- [106] "Dihua Municipal Public Security Bureau's Summary Report on the "Three Anti" Screening," November 8, 1952, CCP Urumqi Party History Working Committee, ed. " campaign, pp. 201-202.
- [107] "Summary Report on the Work of the Three Repeated Audit Cases in the Shaanxi Military Region," September 1, 1952, Shaanxi Provincial Archives Collection 123/44/17/22.
- [108] "Summary Report on the "Three Anti" Campaigns of the Authorities Above the County Level in Southern Jiangsu", July 16, 1952, "The "Three Anti" and "Five Anti" Campaigns (Jiangsu Volume)". pp. 128, 130, 133-136.
- [109] An Ziwen's Report on Ending the "Three Anti-campaigns", October 18, 1952, Zhang Peitian, ed: New China's Legal System, Volume II, Beijing, China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2001, pp. 2049-2050.
- [110] Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, p. 171, note 4.
- [111] See Sichuan Provincial Archives Collection, Jiankang 11/1, 5, 14, 18, 20, 163-164, 212-214, et al.
- [112] "Instructions of the Central Committee to the Qingdao Municipal Party Committee on Reviewing the Mistakes Made in the "Three Anti-countermeasures" and Dealing with the Aftermath of the Mistakes", Dec. 27, 1952

[113] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the Experience of the Northeast Trade Ministry's Conference on Rounding Up the Great Corruptors", February 29, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Vol. 3, p. 277

[114] Mao Zedong, "Criticism on Xiao Hua's Report on the Campaign to Fight Tigers in the Units Directly Under the Military Commission," March 4, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, pp. 300-301

[115] Several Provisions of the Central Provincial Inspection Committee on Dealing with Corruption and Wastefulness Having Overcome Bureaucratic Errors, March 8, 1952, Continuation of Documents on the Three Anti-Five Anti-Corruption Campaigns, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1952, pp. 55-58

[116] Reprinted in New China's Legal System Research Historical Materials, Volume II, pp. 1978-1979.

[117] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of Li Fuchun's Report on the Drafting of Provisions for Dealing with Embezzlers and Provisions for the Recovery of Stolen Goods", March 1, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Vol. III, p. 282

[118] Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the Central Committee's Transmission of Luo Ruiqing's Report on the Correction of Right-Leaning Ideology in the Three Anti-corruption Settlements in the South China Military Region," May 9, 1952; Mao Zedong, "Criticism of the Central Committee's Transmission of the Report of the Ministry of Heavy Industry on the Experience of the Three Anti-corruption Settlements on the Recovery of Spoils," May 10, 1952, Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC, Volume III, pp. 374, 445.

[119] Mao's criticisms led to the Central Propaganda Department and Study magazine, among others, having to censor themselves over their previous heated remarks here. See Mao Zedong, "Revisions to the Draft Instruction of the United Front Work Department on the Handling of Several Issues at the End of the Three Anti-campaigns of the Democratic Parties," March 27, 1952; Mao Zedong, "The Central Committee's Criticisms of the Central Propaganda Department's Transmittal of the Review of the Magazines on the Mistakes Made by the Magazines and Revisions to the Review," April 4, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the Republic of China, vol. 3, pp. 376 -377 pp.

[120] Mao Zedong, "Criticisms of and Revisions to the Explanatory Draft of the Draft Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Punishment of Corruption", April 16-17, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, pp. 411-414

[121] Mao Zedong, "Reply, Criticisms and Revisions to a Draft Speech by Huang Yanpei", September 5, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC, Book III, pp. 533-535

[122] Mao Zedong, "Criticisms and Revisions to the Draft Instruction of the Central Committee on the Accounting by Cadres of Their Relations with the Bourgeoisie," April 5, 1952; Mao Zedong, "Criticisms of the Central Committee's Transmittal of the Report of the Ministry of Light Industry on the General Accounting by Cadres, Both Inside and Outside the Party, of their Economic and Social Relationships," April 17, 1952, Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the Republic of China, Vol. III, pp. 382-383. The CCP Central Committee's June 15 Instruction on Several Issues in the Struggle for the Victorious Conclusion of the "Three Anti-bourgeois Struggles," which was formally issued, also stipulated the specific practice of giving a full account of one's relations with the bourgeoisie. See the cited above, *New China's Legal System, Historical Materials*, vol. 2, pp. 2043-2944.

[123] "Summary Report of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee on the Disciplinary Inspection Work of the Whole Party to Chairman Mao," July 1952, *Construction*, No. 166, pp. 13-16.

[124] An Ziwen's Report on the Question of Ending the "Three Reflexions", October 18, 1952, *op. cit.*

[125] Both men were shot on February 10, 1952, in a public trial.

[126] "Briefing Note of the Propaganda Department of the North China Bureau on the Three Anti-campaigns in the Literary and Artistic Sectors and the Preliminary Situation after the Beginning of the Literary and Artistic Rectification," March 1952, *Construction*, No. 150, March 7, 1952, pp. 8-9; "Metamorphosis of the Members of a Large Part of the CCP's Suichuan County Party Committee," *People's Daily*, January 23, 1952; and "Cadres of the Public Security Bureau of the Former Neihuang County of Plain Province Serious Incidents of Illegal and Unruly Discipline," *Construction* 197, January 15, 1953, p. 19

[127] Op. cit. "Luo Ruiqing's Conveyance Report at the Seventy-Second Standing Committee of the South China Branch," Feb. 25, 1952

[128] Circular of the Shanghai Municipal People's Government and the Municipal Supervisory Committee on the Serious Corruption Problems Occurring after the Three Anti-corruptions, January 1953, Shanghai Municipal Archives Collection, B65/2/309; Circular of the Central People's Government's State Council and People's Supervisory Committee on Preventing and Dealing with the Incidents of Corruption after the Three Anti-corrections, June 1953, Beijing Municipal Archives Collection, 215/18/2603; The Circular of the Supervisory Committee of the Shanghai Municipal People's Government on the Continuation of the Problem of Corruption after the Three Anti-corruption Campaigns, September 30, 1953, Shanghai Municipal Archives Collection, B65/2/309.

[129] For example, the propaganda and study campaign against corruption carried out in 1954-1955, the "Three Anti-corruption" campaign (also known as the Three Anti-corruption Campaign) centered on anti-corruption among rural cadres in 1960-1961, and the nationwide campaign against corruption carried out in 1963-1964, which consisted of a campaign against corruption, and a nationwide campaign against corruption that included a campaign against corruption. (also known as the Three Anti-corruption Campaign), the 1963-1964 nationwide "Five Anti-corruption Campaign", which included anti-corruption elements.

(Source: Shilin, No. 4, 2006).