

解放战争解放军为何越打越多？ 改编吸收国军士兵 300 万 Why did the PLA grow larger the more it fought more in the War of Liberation? Reorganization absorbed 3 million Nationalist soldiers

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FN 54 – Jiang Linping on why PLA Grew during the civil war

解放战士，一般指解放战争时期“被人民解放军俘虏而从国民党反动军队中解放出来、经过教育、参加人民解放军的原国民党军士兵”（《毛泽东军事文集》第5卷，军事科学出版社、中央文献出版社1993年版，第61页；《周恩来军事文选》第3卷，人民出版社1997年版，第636页。）。但实际上这一称呼在解放战争之前就已经存在，它泛指被中共军队俘虏而又加入中共军队的原敌对阵营的士兵。（据1945年3月《晋冀鲁豫军区政治部关于太岳军区野战医院一所政治工作通报》记载：“十三旅一个解放战士开小差被抓回来，经过酝酿，由他当众认错，并提出保证。在群众热情的思想互助下，他解除了某些解放战士对我们害怕的疑问，同时，也稳定了个别想开小差的同志的思想。”（何正清主编《刘邓大军卫生史料选编》，成都科技大学出版社1991年版，第38页））这个群体还有“解放兵”、“俘虏成分”、“解放战士成分”、“俘虏兵”（“俘虏兵”有时指解放战士，即正式编入中共军队序列当中的被俘士兵，但有时则泛指所有俘虏。）等多种称谓。他们在解放战争中起过重要作用，甚至在一定时期内，占了中共军队的多数。但是，多年来学术界对这个群体的关注甚少，而且角度单一，多是就改造俘虏的经验来研究。解放战士是怎样产生的？他们在中共领导的人民军队当中有多大的规模？这是本文研究的主旨所在。

“解放战士”这个群体的产生与中共的俘虏政策密切相关。早在1928年2月18日，毛泽东在宁冈县茅坪攀龙书院门口召开的军民大会上，宣布工农革命军的俘虏政策：“不打骂俘虏，受伤者给予治疗，愿留的收编入伍，要走的发给路费。”（《毛泽东年谱

（1893-1949）》上卷，中央文献出版社 2002 年版，第 235 页。）有人认为，俘虏不愿留下即发给路费欢送的做法渊源于此；1928 年 2 月到 4 月间，红军优待俘虏的政策已经初步形成。（参见左双文：《试论三大起义后红军优待俘虏政策的形成》，《华南师范大学学报》（社会科学版）1997 年第 2 期。）1929 年 12 月，古田会议作出的《中国共产党红军第四军第九次代表大会决议案》指出：“优待俘虏兵的方法：第一，是不搜查他们身上的钱和一切物件，过去红军的士兵搜查俘虏兵的财物的行为要坚决的废掉。第二，是要以极大的热情来欢迎俘虏兵，使他们感觉到精神上的欢乐，〈反〉对于俘虏兵以任何言语上的或行动上的侮辱。第三，是给俘虏兵以和老兵一样的物质上的平等待遇。第四，是不愿留的，在经过宣传之后，发给路费放他们回去，使他们在白军中散布红军的影响，反对只贪兵多把不愿留的分子勉强地留下来。以上各项，对俘虏过来的官长，除特殊情况下[均]适用。”这一时期的俘虏政策主要是作为对敌宣传政策的组成部分而存在，《决议案》将之置于“红军宣传工作问题”小标题下进行阐述，并认为“优待敌方俘虏兵，是对敌军宣传极有效方法”。（《中共中央文件选集》第 5 册，中共中央党校出版社 1989 年版，第 823-824 页。）当然，在没有建立巩固的革命根据地、兵源严重不足的情况下，补充俘虏亦是一种充实部队的应急策略。

1928 年底，毛泽东在给中共中央的报告中提到边界红军的来源“以敌军俘虏为多，设无此项补充，则兵员大成问题”（《毛泽东选集》第 1 卷，人民出版社 1991 年版，第 63 页。）。1931 年 5 月 31 日，第二次反“围剿”刚刚结束，为了应对接踵而来的第三次“围剿”，中共红一方面军临时总前委会议决定：为了扩大红军的迫切需要，这回的俘虏兵一个也不放走，以补充红军，及时编到各师去训练，在训练中再去挑出坏的送走。（参见《毛泽东年谱（1893-1949）》上卷，第 346 页。）不过，“一个也不放走”只是特例，没有成为红军的长期政策。

中共在自身经费困难的情况下，依然发路费给选择离开的俘虏，具体发放多少则有不同。1930 年 5 月，时任红四军军委委员、代理书记、代理政治委员的熊寿祺在全国苏维埃区域代表会议和全国红军代表会议上说：“每次捉到的俘虏兵都是由政治部去宣传，他如果愿意在红军就留下，不愿的每人发五元路费（如果路远的就多发）给他，开一欢送大会送他回去，这就是对俘虏兵的宣传。对于俘虏伤兵每名发十元钱，另外再发路费，把药上好用船送他出境，并派人去安慰他宣传他。”（熊寿祺：《红军第四军状况（从 1929 年

7月到1930年4月)》，《党的文献》1999年第2期。) 1931年5月3日，毛泽东、朱德发出的《战前各种固定事宜的训令》中提到：“关于遣送俘虏兵之规定，暂规定发2元。”（顾龙生编著《毛泽东经济年谱》，中共中央党校出版社1993年版，第54页。）据当时宁冈县苏维埃政府副主席谢森发回忆，1933年秋，他所在的宁冈县地方武装对于俘虏“不愿走的人，欢迎他们参加我军，愿意回家的，发给他们三块大洋作路费”（谢森发：《奋斗的足迹，艰难的历程》，福泉市史志编纂委员会办公室编印《红军长征过平越》，1999年内部版，第202页。）。当时红四军士兵的给养标准是“每人每日一角五分大洋”（熊寿祺：《红军第四军状况（从1929年7月到1930年4月）》，《党的文献》1999年第2期。），而参与“剿共”的军队多来自江西及其周边省份，据此可以推断，发给俘虏的路费完全能够支持他们回家或回到原部队。

抗日战争时期，中共的俘虏政策与土地革命时期相比，基本上没有变化。1940年5月，朱德在一次谈话中提到：“我军对俘虏兵的政策是，凡没有不良嗜好、品行端正、自愿留在我们部队服役者，可以收留；其余一律遣送回家。在这一点上，宁缺毋滥。”

（《在历史巨人身边：师哲回忆录》（修订本），李海文整理，中央文献出版社1995年版，第190页。）朱德强调“自愿”，显然不愿留下的俘虏是可以选择离开的。同年10月12日，为留用黄桥战役俘虏的国民党官兵和大批收容知识分子，毛泽东、朱德、王稼祥致电陈毅：“俘虏兵只释放少数坏分子，其余一概补充自己，加以训练，增强部队战斗力。下级俘虏军官亦应留一部分稍带革命精神者，其余官长一概优待释放，不杀一人（无论如何反动）。”（《毛泽东年谱（1893-1949）》中卷，中央文献出版社2002年版，第210页。）在这种情况下，俘虏的去留决定权并不掌握在自己的手中。不过，这一指示是对新四军发出的，针对的只是黄桥战役的俘虏，仍是一个特例。1941年5月1日，毛泽东多次修改并经中央政治局批准的《陕甘宁边区施政纲领》正式发表，其第20条规定：“对于在战斗中被俘之敌军及伪军官兵，不问其情况如何，一律实行宽大政策，其愿参加抗战者，收容并优待之，不愿者释放之，一律不得加以杀害、侮辱、强迫自首或强迫其写悔过书。其有在释放之后又连续被俘者，不问被俘之次数多少，一律照此办理。国内如有对八路军、新四军及任何抗日部队举行攻击者，其处置办法仿此。”

（《毛泽东文集》第2卷，人民出版社1993年版，第337页。）

以上论述说明，解放战争前中共的俘虏政策主要是为了宣传自己、瓦解敌军。虽然在特定情况下俘虏兵被中共用以“补充自己”，但一般而言，俘虏能够自由选择去留。

解放战士大量产生并在中共军队中占据较大比重，是解放战争时期中共调整俘虏政策的结果。

1947年10月，毛泽东亲自起草了《中国人民解放军宣言》，公布对国民党军政人员采取“首恶者必办，胁从者不问，立功者受奖”的方针，同时宣布“本军对于放下武器的蒋军官兵，一律不杀不辱，愿留者收容，愿去者遣送”。（《毛泽东选集》第4卷，人民出版社1991年版，第1238页。）不过，解放战争中“愿去者遣送”主要是一种宣传口号，具体执行时则是不同的。

事实上，中共对待俘虏的政策早已悄悄发生变化。1945年10月16日，《中央关于战俘处理办法的指示》首次阐明了中共在解放战争中执行的俘虏政策：“为了削弱国民党军队，增加我军之补充，及为了将来向国民党交换我之被俘被捕人员起见，今后凡在战斗中俘获之国民党军队及伪军之官佐、士兵及特务人员等，均按下列办法处理：（一）一切精壮士兵，均加争取，补充我之部队。（二）一切官佐，均加争取，其愿为我军服务者，令其服务。其不愿为我军服务或坚决顽强反我者，则加看管教育，并令其生产，一律不放回。如集中看管困难，则分散交地方政府看管教育和生产。以便将来战争结束时向国民党交换我之被捕被俘人员。（三）一切老弱残疾，对我对敌系无用之人，则予以宣传教育后放走。（四）对于在顽官欺骗下，其士兵受我军影响尚浅，尚未明了我军俘虏政策之个别部队，在俘虏其官兵后，加以切实的宣传教育，应适当的以其最好的一部分散放其原部队，以便扩大我军影响，反动官佐，经教育后，亦可放回几个，借以证明我党不杀俘虏的政策。”（中国人民解放军政治学院政治工作教研室编《军队政治工作历史资料》第10册，中国人民解放军战士出版社1982年版，第49页。）

这一俘虏政策与中共在土地革命时期和抗日战争时期的俘虏政策是有很大差别的，其基本立足点就是补充自己、削弱敌人。一年后，中共在回顾前一年的俘虏政策时用了“本人

人有用之原则，基本上不释放”来概括这一时期政策的特点。“基本上不释放”使得放回去的俘虏数量有限，结果造成敌方任意歪曲中共的俘虏政策，国民党士兵因为害怕被俘而顽强抵抗。这一政策同时意味着中共要把俘虏的吃、穿、住、用承担下来，加上有些俘虏特别是官佐不易改造，管理、教育成本很大，以致劳民伤财，成了解放区的累赘。有鉴于此，中共中央对此前的俘虏政策作了调整：“一般俘虏旅级以上者，进行教育，特别优待，争取做宣传号召工作，基本上不释放。团营级以上者，送军区教育训练，争取部分为我使用，选择其中比较进步而又愿回去者，可给以任务，个别先行释放；除极顽固反动或有交换价值者外，一律分期释放。连排级经短期训练后，除可留用者外，给以任务即时释放。对士兵俘虏内之老弱、残废、兵痞及有某些封建关系不易教育者，给以优待，于进行简单教育诉苦运动后，仍给以简单任务释放；其余大部争取补充我军，或选择一部分进行教育后，放回做瓦解工作。”（《中共中央对俘虏工作指示》（1946年11月14日），中国人民解放军政治学院政治工作教研室编《军队政治工作历史资料》第10册，第421页。）

这一政策可以说是中共历来俘虏政策的集大成之作。一方面，它继承了土地革命时期、抗日战争时期俘虏政策的精髓，即用俘虏进行对敌宣传，瓦解敌军；另一方面，它沿袭了解放战争初期的政策，即用俘虏来补充自己，壮大革命力量。从这个时候起，俘虏中承担对敌宣传任务的主要是军官，而士兵则用来补充中共军队。

当战争进行到1948年，由于战争的破坏和前线人力物力的需求与日俱增，各解放区普遍感到支前压力十分沉重。彭德怀反映西北军区“敌人三光政策，人民损失五年难以恢复”（转引自王政柱：《毛主席和我们在一个战场》，《缅怀毛泽东》下，中央文献出版社1993年版，第240页。）；聂荣臻也反映华北军区“在人力物力动员上都是最大的限度了”（《军队建设问题的报告》（1948年2月16日），《聂荣臻军事文选》，解放军出版社1992年版，第280页。）。毛泽东等中央领导人也认为“乡村人口大为减少……各区扩兵（包括东北在内）均已至饱和点”，因此发出指示：“今年华北、华东、东北、西北各区除个别地方原定扩兵计划准予完成外，其余均不应扩兵……今后前线兵源全部依靠俘虏及某些地方部队之升格。”（《毛泽东军事文集》第4卷，军事科学出版社、中央文献出版社1993年版，第530页。）

当时中共地方部队肩负着保卫解放区与参加生产的双重任务，地方部队升格为奔赴前线作战的野战军，必然要求补入新的兵源参加地方部队。“前线兵源 全部依靠俘虏及某些地方部队之升格”，最终都需要从俘虏这一群体上作打算。因此，1948 年 8 月发布的《中央军委关于兵源补充问题的指示》，对俘虏政策再次作了 调整：“除俘虏军官与士顽仍按中央工委会议决定方针处理，给以良好教育，分批放走以瓦解敌人外，对俘虏士兵原则上应是一个不放，大部用于补充部队，小部用于后方生产……其不能充任战斗兵者，亦可充任担架兵、辎重兵或分配后方机关服务，调换青壮人员补充前方。一般不能服兵役之老弱，应分配在解放区就业，参加 农业生产或其它生产，以增强解放区劳动力，减少敌区的劳动力。”（中国人民解放军政治学院政治工作教研室编《军队政治工作历史资料》第 12 册，中国人民解放军战士出版社 1982 年版，第 85 页。）

从上面的论述看，在解放战争中，“愿去者遣送”没有得到真正实施，这一点也可以从俘虏遣散费中得到佐证。以西北军区为例，《人民解放军西北野战军 1948 年 8 月份经费供给标准》规定：“俘虏遣散费送出边区外者，每月平均 50000 元。”（该文件还记载了西北野战军“一等伤员负伤每次 200000 元；二等伤员负伤每次 160000 元；三等伤员负伤每次 120000 元”。（中共陕西省委党史研究室编《方仲如》，陕西人民出版社 2002 年版，第 172 页）另据一些资料记载，1948 年西北野战军的供给标准是：“一等伤员，每次发 16 万元；二等伤员，每次发 12 万元；三等伤员，每次发 8 万元。”俘虏遣散费是“送出边区以外的俘虏每人发给路费 3 万元”。（《洛川县军事志》，三秦出版社 2009 年版，第 148 页；《黄龙县军事志》，三秦出版社 2009 年版，第 98 页））这个金额是以 1948 年 1 月陕甘宁边区银行与晋绥边区农民银行合并后发行的西北农币来计算的，当时的物价是“猪肉 1 斤 42000 元；清油 1 斤 50000 元；盐 1 斤 13000 元；菜 1 斤 6000 元；硬柴 1 斤 800 元”。那时西北野战军的伙食标准是“1 币话愤笱罽咳嗣吭 291500 元；2 泵穹蚰锤趁咳嗣吭 291500 元；3 毙＝罽锤趁咳嗣吭 474000 元；4 鄙嗽被锤趁咳嗣吭 549000 元；5 敝脣肆魔趁咳嗣吭 785250 元；6 庇以上伤员每人每月 675000 元；7 毙营连伤员每人每月 405000 元；8 蔽脣医院伤员每次负伤补助 84000 元；9 笨头姑咳嗣刻 9717 元；10 币共免咳嗣客 3240 元”。（中共陕西省委党史研究室编《方仲如》，第 173、170 页。）在西北与中共军队作战的国民党士兵多半来自南方 彭德怀在一份文件中提到西北野战军的俘虏“绝对多数是四川人”，补入部队后，使得西北野战军“基本上已成为南方军队”。（参见《彭德怀关于西北敌军动态及 野战军部署致毛泽东电》（1949 年 2 月 8 日），第一野战军战史编审委员会编《中国人民解放军第一野战军文献选编》第 2 册，解放军出版社

2000年版，第251页。），路途遥远，即便按最低的生存标准来衡量，被遣散的俘虏也没有办法靠遣散费回家。

到底有多少俘虏参加了解放军？解放战士在人民解放军中的比重有多大？完全弄清这些问题是很困难的，因为即便是中共中央领导人和各中央局、各野战军负责人，在多数情况下也只知道概数，极少有准确的统计数据。1951年，周恩来在全国复员工作总结会议上无奈地表示：“我们的部队没有经过核实，虚数很大……到现在我们部队的确实数目还不能统计出来。”（《周恩来总理在全国复员工作总结会议上的讲话》（1951年2月12日），中央转业建设委员会编印《中国人民解放军复员工作文件汇编（1950年-1954年）》，1958年内部版，第132页。）所以，本文也只能尽量通过对各种资料的解读来把握上述问题的大致情况。

解放战争时期，从1947年3月开始，国民党军在全面进攻之后，开始重点进攻。一个重点进攻方向是西北，另一个则是山东。因此，西北野战军和华东野战军是较早与国民党军展开大规模激烈战斗的两支部队。这两支野战军俘获了大量俘虏，其部队成分也因之发生显著变化。

西北野战军是五大野战军中解放战士较早超过半数的一支部队。西北土地贫瘠、人烟稀少，稍一进行战争动员，就会达到解放区负担能力的极限。1947年初，西北晋绥分局已经“动员壮丁的十之六、七”（《晋绥分局关于春季扩兵工作决定》（1947年2月15日），中国人民解放军政治学院政治工作教研室编《军队政治工作历史资料》第10册，第557页。），从此，“新成分的补充从过去主要靠子弟兵变为几乎全部从俘虏兵中解放入伍”（《廖汉生回忆录》，八一出版社1993年版，第392页。）。1947年8月，贺龙表示“现在俘虏兵占了百分之八十”（《贺龙在绥德分区县委书记联席会议上的报告》（1947年8月10日），第一野战军战史编审委员会编《中国人民解放军第一野战军文献选编》第3册，解放军出版社2000年版，第20页。）。同年11月，彭德怀、张宗逊指出：“部队补入俘虏有些已超过百分之八十，有些百分之六十，平均当在百分之七十左右。”（《彭德怀、张宗逊关于攻榆及部队休整情况致军委并贺龙、习仲勋电》（1947

年11月27日），第一野战军战史编审委员会编《中国人民解放军第一野战军文献选编》第1册，解放军出版社2000年版，第576页。）1949年2月，彭德怀向毛泽东报告，称西北野战军“现有九万五千人……俘虏兵约占全军百分之八十，连队比例更大，班长绝大多数是俘虏兵，排长副排长亦近半数，连长指导员各军中均有个别”（《彭德怀关于西北敌军动态及野战军部署致毛泽东电》（1949年2月8日），第一野战军战史编审委员会编《中国人民解放军第一野战军文献选编》第2册，第251页。）。

华东地区是解放战争时期全国的重点战场之一，战役频繁，越打越大，华东野战军利用俘虏不断补充自己。1947年7月，陈毅、粟裕、谭震林在给中共中央的报告中提到：“去年俘虏四十四万中参加野战军最低估计十万，与自愿参军数相等或超过，野战军俘虏兵比例百分之四十到八十。”（陈毅、粟裕、谭震林：《关于华东建军经验向中央的报告》（1947年7月19日），中国人民解放军政治学院政治工作教研室编《军队政治工作历史资料》第11册，中国人民解放军战士出版社1982年版，第11-12页。）几个月后，陈毅总结：“我们补兵员十分之三是翻身农民，十分之七是解放战士。”（《华东一年来自卫战争的初步总结》（1947年12月30日至1948年1月1日），《陈毅军事文选》，解放军出版社1996年版，第435页。）1948年4月，陈毅向华东野战军干部介绍西北野战军的情况：“西北野战军一年多没有补充解放区参军的新兵，主要是吸收解放战士，现在部队中解放战士成分也占到百分之七十到八十。争取解放战士参军的经验和我们差不多。”（《陈毅军长在团以上干部会上的讲话》（1948年4月5日），中国人民解放军政治学院政治工作教研室编《军队政治工作历史资料》第11册，第428页。）据这个“也”字，华东野战军的解放战士成分亦达到70%到80%。淮海战役中，华东野战军实行“即俘、即补、即教、即战”的政策，取得了一定成效。据粟裕介绍：“淮海战役开始，华野为三十六万九千人，战役过程中伤亡十万五千人，战役结束时达到五十五万一千人，这中间除整补了几个地方团外，补进的主要是解放战士。”（《粟裕文选》第3卷，军事科学出版社2004年版，第737页。）

中原野战军“千里跃进大别山”，转入外线作战后，也实行了“即俘即补”的政策，解放战士的数量和比重迅速提升。1948年，邓小平说：“现在前方部队，大约百分之七十是解放战士。”（转引自何启君：《情系延安》，新华出版社1998年版，第137页。）1949年7月，中原野战军前委在向中央军委的报告中指出：“部队在去年淮海战役后，

本来俘虏成分就普遍达百分之六十左右。现在则普遍的已达百分之八十左右。”（《二野前委关于部队情况向中央军委的综合报告》（1949年7月），中国人民解放军政治学院政治工作教研室编《军队政治工作历史资料》第13册，中国人民解放军战士出版社1982年版，第199页。）

东北野战军在解放战争最初一两年内，解放战士的规模比较小，这与它拥有广阔的根据地和丰富的后备兵源（翻身农民）有关。东北野战军各级将领在吸收俘虏入伍这个问题上没有其他野战军将领那么积极主动，导致东北的俘虏流失很大。1947年10月，罗荣桓感慨道：“夏季攻势共五万俘虏，现在补充到部队只有八千人，在后方训练的八千人，其余的不知何处去了。”（《关于部队建设的若干问题》（1947年10月），《罗荣桓军事文选》，解放军出版社1997年版，第389页。）1948年3月25日至4月16日，罗荣桓出席在哈尔滨召开的东北军区参谋工作会议，指出部队中存在的一个重要问题是“争取解放战士不够，研究经验、方法不够，没有将认识提高到将其看成政治任务上来”（黄瑶主编《罗荣桓年谱》，人民出版社2002年版，第538页。）。同年9月，他在《军队党的组织工作会议专题报告》中指出：“俘虏成分一般已占百分之十。”（《罗荣桓军事文选》，第458页。）这个比重在当时各野战军中是最小的，但是随之而来的辽沈战役使其大幅度上升。辽沈战役，打了52天，主力部队除一纵伤亡较小外，几乎都有近万人的伤亡。（参见马云鹏：《会战平津》，辽宁人民出版社1998年版，第22页。）战役结束后，东北野战军总共补充了17万新兵，其中解放战士11万人，翻身农民6万人。

（参见北京师范大学中共党史系编印《中共党史教学参考资料（新民主主义革命时期）》（四），1975年内部版，第446页。）部队的成分随之发生很大变化。以三纵为例，一般连队解放战士都占54%左右，有的连队甚至高达60%。（参见沈阳军区政治部研究室编印《沈阳军区历史资料选编（1945-1985年）》，1985年内部版，第103页。）

华北野战军最初也没有全力吸收俘虏入伍。1947年3月，罗瑞卿在晋察冀军区政治工作会议上甚至要求：“补充解放战士限制，不超过百分之四十到五十。”（中国人民解放军政治学院政治工作教研室编《军队政治工作历史资料》第10册，第627页。）同年6月，朱德向中央报告，晋察冀军区“战士中成分好，俘虏只占十分之一二”（《关于晋察冀区军事工作处理情况向中央的报告》（1947年6月1日），《朱德军事文选》，解放军出版社1997年版，第591页。）。不过，随着战事的紧张进行，对兵源需求量日益

增大。1948年2月，杨成武反思：“过去争取俘虏入伍太少。”（杨成武：《关于整顿纪律整顿制度问题》（1948年2月12日），中国人民解放军政治学院政治工作教研室编《军队政治工作历史资料》第11册，第341页。）同年3月，华北军区成立了补训兵团，专门负责训练翻身农民和解放战士。到1949年7月，共训练翻身农民8.36万名，解放战士6.19万名。（参见《华北军区关于补训团情况向军委总政治部、华北局的报告》（1949年11月），中国人民解放军政治学院政治工作教研室编《军队政治工作历史资料》第11册，第318页。）

就全军范围内解放战士的规模而言，1948年8月23日，朱德在人民解放军总部作战局战况汇报会上指出：“现在我们的军队有百分之六七十是解放战士。”（《朱德年谱》（新编本）（中），中央文献出版社2006年版，第1309页。）据统计，1948年6月，解放军总兵力发展到近280万人，其中野战军149万人。（军事科学院军事历史研究部编著《中国人民解放军全国解放战争史》第4卷，军事科学出版社1997年版，第5页。）如果“我们的军队”指中共全部军队，那么解放战士应有168万到196万人；如果仅仅指野战军，解放战士则有89.4万到104.3万人。另据统计，从1946年7月到1948年6月的两年间，中共俘虏国民党军的人数是163万。（参见《全国解放战争四年敌我兵力损失对比统计（1946年7月-1950年6月）》，军事科学院研究部编《中国人民解放军战史：全国解放战争时期》，军事科学出版社2000年版，附件之“战绩统计表”（八）。）据此推测，“我们的军队”指野战军。毛泽东在1948年10月10日发出的《中共中央关于九月会议的通知》中指出：“两年内……溶化了大约八十万左右从国民党军队来的俘虏兵，使他们变为解放战士，掉转枪口打国民党。”（《毛泽东军事文集》第5卷，第56页。）这里提到的“两年内”，根据上下文判断，指全面内战爆发后的两年内，即1946年7月到1948年6月。虽然毛、朱二人用的都是概数，但至少说明截至1948年，野战军已有半数以上是解放战士，若就全军而言，解放战士则占了30%左右。

随着三大战役的接连胜利，中共领导的人民军队中，解放战士的规模进一步扩大。1949年4月，周恩来指出：“我们的战士有很大部分是俘虏过来的，称为解放战士，有的部队，解放战士竟占百分之八十，少的也占百分之五十至六十，平均约占百分之六十五至七十。”（《周恩来选集》上卷，人民出版社1980年版，第315页。）同年7月，周恩来

又向众人介绍：“在这三年当中……在敌人所损失的五百六十九万人当中，被我们俘虏的人数达到百分之七十，即四百一十五万，而俘虏中又有二百八十万变成了解放军。”

（《周恩来选集》上卷，第346-347页。1949年1月，解放军的总兵力增加到358万余人，其中野战军218万余人。军事科学院军事历史研究部编著《中国人民解放军全国解放战争史》第5卷，军事科学出版社1997年版，第8页。）若把周恩来在4月提到的比重应用于1月，就全军范围而言，按“平均约占百分之六十五至七十”计算，解放战士有232.7万到250.6万人，再加上半年的上升空间，这与周恩来7月份提到的280万人是大致吻合的。由此可以判断，到1949年上半年，在全军范围内，解放战士已经占到了65%到70%。之后，这一数字仍有上升。解放战争结束后，1950年6月，周恩来在一次政务会议上说：“以军队的成分说，解放战士占百分之七十到八十。”（转引自《周恩来传（1898-1976）》（下），中央文献出版社2008年版，第884页。）

从土地革命时期开始，中共就已经从俘虏中吸收士兵入伍，以弥补兵员之不足。但总体来讲，土地革命时期和抗日战争时期，中共的俘虏政策着眼点是宣传自己、瓦解敌人，俘虏一般来说能够自由选择去留。解放战争时期，中共用“基本上不释放”取代自由选择去留，意味着中共的俘虏政策已日益发展成为一种相对独立的扩军政策。随着战争规模的扩大和战事的延续，中共越来越重视从俘虏中获得兵员补充，这使得俘虏政策的扩军性质更加凸显。在这一背景下，解放战士的数量不断膨胀，他们在中共领导的人民军队中的比重也节节攀升。解放战争中后期，中共领导下的人民军队中，越到基层，解放战士的比重越大。有些班、排甚至全部都是解放战士，区别仅在于“老解放”和“新解放”而已。解放战士的加入，充实了人民解放军的兵力。他们为中共赢得全国政权，为中国人民的解放事业作出了自己的贡献。

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DeepL Translation

Why did the PLA fight more and more in the War of Liberation? Reorganization absorbed 3 million Nationalist soldiers

Liberation fighters generally refer to "former soldiers of the Nationalist Army who were captured by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and liberated from the Kuomintang (KMT) reactionary army, who were educated, and who joined the PLA" (Mao Zedong's Military Collected Works, Volume 5, Military Science Publishing House, and the Central Literature Publishing House, 1993 edition, p. 61; Zhou Enlai's Military Selected Writings, vol. 3, People's Publishing House, 1997 edition, p. 636.) The name of the Chinese army was used by the Chinese government to refer to the Chinese army. But in fact this designation existed before the Liberation War, and it referred generally to soldiers from the former hostile camp who were captured by the CCP army and joined it. (According to the March 1945 "Bulletin of the Political Department of the Jin-Hei-Lu-Yu Military Region on the Political Work of a Field Hospital in the Taiyue Military Region," "A liberated soldier of the Thirteenth Brigade was caught deserting, and, after a brewing process, he confessed his faults in public and made a pledge. With the enthusiastic ideological support of the masses, he relieved some of the liberation fighters of the doubt that we were afraid of them, and at the same time, stabilized the minds of individual comrades who wanted to desert." (He Zhengqing, editor-in-chief, Selected Historical Materials on the Hygiene of the Liu Deng Army, Chengdu University of Science and Technology Press, 1991 edition, p. 38) This group also includes "liberated soldiers," "captive components," "liberated fighters," "liberated fighters," "liberated fighters," "liberated fighters," "liberated fighters," and "liberated fighters." ("Captive soldiers" sometimes refers to liberation fighters, i.e., captured soldiers formally integrated into the CCP army, but sometimes it refers to all captives in general.) They have been called "captive soldiers" ("俘虏兵") and other names. They played an important role in the liberation war and even made up the majority of the CCP's army for a certain period of time. However, over the years, little academic attention has been paid to this group, and from a single point of view, they have mostly been studied in terms of the experience of rehabilitating prisoners. How did the liberation fighters come into being? How large are they in the CCP-led People's Army? This is the main focus of this paper.

The emergence of the group of "liberation fighters" was closely related to the CCP's policy of taking prisoners. As early as February 18, 1928, Mao Zedong announced the prisoner policy of the

Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army at a general meeting of the people and the army held in front of the Panlong Academy in Maoping, Ninggang County, that "prisoners will not be beaten or scolded, those who are injured will be given medical treatment, those who wish to stay will be integrated into the army, and those who want to leave will be given money for their journey." (Mao Zedong's Chronicle (1893-1949), vol. 1, Central Literature Publishing House, 2002 edition, p. 235.) It is thought that the practice of sending off prisoners who did not want to stay by paying for their transportation originated here; between February and April 1928, the Red Army's policy of giving preferential treatment to prisoners had already taken initial shape (see Zuo Shuangwen, "A Test of the Red Army's Preferential Treatment of Prisoners of War", p. 23). (See Zuo Shuangwen, "The Formation of the Red Army's Policy of Preferential Treatment of Prisoners after the Three Great Uprisings," Journal of South China Normal University (Social Science Edition), No. 2, 1997). In December 1929, the Resolution of the Ninth Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army of the Communist Party of China (CPC), made at the Gutian Conference, pointed out: "The method of giving preferential treatment to captive soldiers is: firstly, not to search them for money and all other objects, and in the past, the behavior of Red Army soldiers in searching for the belongings of captive soldiers should be resolutely abolished. Secondly, we should welcome the captives with great warmth and make them feel joyful in spirit, and should not insult the captives with any words or actions. Thirdly, the captives should be given the same material equality as the veterans. Fourthly, for those who do not wish to stay, after propaganda, they will be sent back with travel expenses so that they can spread the influence of the Red Army among the White Army, and we are opposed to the idea that those who do not wish to stay will be forced to stay because of greed for more soldiers. All of the above applies to officers and chiefs who have been captured, except under special circumstances." The prisoner policy of this period existed mainly as a part of the propaganda policy against the enemy, which was elaborated in the Resolution under the subheading "Problems of propaganda work of the Red Army", and it was held that "giving preferential treatment to enemy prisoners is an extremely effective method of propagandizing against the enemy" (Collected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China). (Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, vol. 5, 1989 edition of the Party School Press of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, pp. 823-824). Of course, in the absence of consolidated revolutionary bases and with a serious shortage of troops, replenishing captives was also a contingency strategy to replenish the troops.

At the end of 1928, Mao Zedong mentioned in his report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that the source of the Red Army at the border "is the prisoners of the enemy, and without such supplementation, the number of soldiers will become a big problem" (Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Volume 1, People's Publishing House, 1991 edition, p. 63). On May 31, 1931, just after the end of the second anti-encirclement campaign, in order to cope with the ensuing third encirclement campaign, the Provisional General Front Committee of the Red Army of the Communist Party of China (CPC) decided that, in order to meet the urgent need of expanding the Red Army, not a single captive soldier should be let go, so as to replenish the Red Army. In order to expand the Red Army, it was decided that none of the captured soldiers would be let go, so as to replenish the Red Army, organize them into divisions in time for training, and then pick out the bad ones and send them away in the course of training. (See Mao Tse-tung's *Chronicle* (1893-1949), vol. 1, p. 346.) However, "not letting any of them go" was a special case and did not become a long-term policy of the Red Army.

Even though the CCP had financial difficulties, it still paid for the travel of prisoners who chose to leave, but the exact amount varied. In May 1930, Xiong Shouqi, who was then a member of the Red Army's military committee, acting secretary, and acting political commissar, said at a meeting of the National Conference of Soviet Regional Representatives and a meeting of the National Conference of Red Army Representatives, "Every time a captive was captured, the Political Department would propagandize to the prisoner, saying, "If the prisoner wants to stay in the Red Army, then stay here. If he was willing to stay in the Red Army, he would stay; if he was not, each person would be given five yuan (or more if he traveled a long distance) for the journey, and a farewell meeting would be held to send him back, and this was the propaganda for the captured soldiers. For captured and wounded soldiers, they were each given ten yuan, plus travel expenses, and they were given medicine and sent out by boat to comfort and publicize them." (Xiong Shouqi, "The Condition of the Red Army's Fourth Army (from July 1929 to April 1930)," *Party Literature*, No. 2, 1999.) On May 3, 1931, Mao Zedong and Zhu De issued the "Instruction on Various Fixed Matters Before the War" which mentioned, "With regard to the provisions for the repatriation of captive soldiers, it is provisionally stipulated that 2 yuan be paid." (Mao Zedong's *Economic Chronicle*, edited by Gu Longsheng, 1993 edition of the Party School Press of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of China, p. 54.) According to Xie Senfa, vice-chairman of the Ninggang County Soviet Government at the time, in the fall of 1933, the local armed forces in Ninggang County, where he was a member, "welcomed those who did not want to leave to join our army, and those who were willing to go home were given three pieces of ocean for their travel expenses" (Xie Senfa, "Footprints of Struggle, Difficult Course," Fuquan City Historical Records Compilation Committee Office, p. 54). Office edited and printed *The Long March of the Red Army across Pingyue*, internal edition 1999, p. 202). At that time, the standard for feeding the soldiers of the Fourth Red Army was "15 cents per person per day" (Xiong Shouqi, "The Condition of the Fourth Red Army (from July 1929 to April 1930)", *Party Literature*, No. 2, 1999), and the soldiers who participated in the "anti-Congress" campaign had to be fed by the Fourth Red Army, while the soldiers who participated in the "anti-Congress" campaign had to be fed by the Fourth Red Army. The CCP's "anti-Communist" troops were mostly from Jiangxi and its neighboring provinces, and it can be inferred that the travel expenses paid to the captives were sufficient to allow them to go home or return to their original units.

During the War of Resistance against Japan, the CCP's policy on prisoners remained basically unchanged from that of the Agrarian Revolution, as Zhu De mentioned in a talk in May 1940: "Our army's policy toward captured soldiers is that those who have no bad habits, are of good character, and who voluntarily stay in our army can be taken in; the rest are all sent back home. In this regard, it is better to have no prisoners than to have them." (*At the Side of the Giants of History: Memoirs of Shi Zhe* (revised edition), compiled by Li Haiwen, Central Literature Publishing House, 1995 edition, p. 190.) Zhu De emphasized "voluntarily", and it was clear that prisoners who did not want to stay could choose to leave. On October 12 of the same year, in order to retain the KMT officers and soldiers captured during the Huangqiao Battle and the large number of intellectuals who had been taken in, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang sent a message to Chen Yi, saying, "Only a few of the bad elements of the captured soldiers should be released, while the rest of the captured soldiers should replenish themselves, be trained, and enhance the fighting strength of the troops. Lower-level captive officers should also keep some of them with a little revolutionary spirit, and the rest of the officers and chiefs should be released with favorable treatment, without killing any of them (no matter how reactionary they may be)." (*Mao Zedong's Chronicle (1893-1949)*, Middle Volume, Central Literature Publishing House, 2002 edition, p. 210.) In this case, the decision on the

retention of prisoners was not in one's hands. However, the fact that this instruction was issued to the New Fourth Army and was only directed at the prisoners of the Battle of Huangqiao was still a special case; on May 1, 1941, Mao Zedong's "Outline of the Administration of the Shanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region," which had been revised several times and approved by the Political Bureau of the CCPB, was published, and Article 20 stipulated that: "The policy of leniency should be applied to the enemy soldiers and pseudo-military officers and men who have been taken prisoner in combat, irrespective of their situation. Those who are willing to participate in the war of resistance shall be taken in and given preferential treatment, and those who are unwilling shall be released, and shall not be killed, humiliated, forced to surrender, or compelled to write letters of repentance. Those who are released and then continuously captured shall be treated accordingly, regardless of the number of times they have been captured. If there are any attacks in China on the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army or any other anti-Japanese forces, they shall be dealt with in the same way." (Mao Tse-tung's Collected Works) (Mao Zedong's Collected Works, vol. 2, People's Publishing House, 1993 edition, p. 337.)

The above discussion shows that the CCP's policy of taking prisoners before the Liberation War was mainly for the purpose of propagandizing itself and disintegrating the enemy forces. Although under certain circumstances captured soldiers were used by the CCP to "replenish itself," in general, captives were free to choose whether to stay or go.

The large number of liberation fighters and the large proportion of them in the CCP's army were the result of the CCP's restructuring of its prisoner policy during the liberation war.

In October 1947, Mao Zedong personally drafted the Declaration of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), announcing the policy of "those who are the chief offenders will be dealt with, those who are coercive will not be questioned, and those who have made meritorious achievements will be rewarded," and at the same time declaring that "the army will not kill or humiliate any Chiang officer or soldier who lays down his arms, and will accept those who wish to

stay and send those who wish to go back to their homes. Those who wish to stay will be taken in, and those who wish to go will be sent back". (Mao Zedong, Selected Works, vol. 4, People's Publishing House, 1991 edition, p. 1238). However, in the liberation war, "those who wish to go will be sent back" was mainly a propaganda slogan, but the actual implementation was different.

In fact, the CCP's policy toward prisoners had already changed quietly, and on October 16, 1945, the "Instructions of the Central Committee on the Handling of Prisoners of War" clarified for the first time the CCP's policy toward prisoners of war during the War of Liberation: "In order to weaken the Kuomintang army, to increase the replenishment of our army, and for the purpose of exchanging our captured and arrested persons with the Kuomintang in the future, all Kuomintang troops and prisoners captured in battle and those captured by the Kuomintang will be sent back to the Kuomintang. (a) All able-bodied soldiers will be fought for and replenished to our troops. (b) All officers and rank-and-file personnel will be fought for, and those who are willing to serve in our army will be made to do so. Those who are unwilling to serve our troops or who are determined and stubbornly opposed to us shall be placed under guard and educated, and ordered to produce, and shall not be returned. If it is difficult to centralize the guards, they will be handed over to the local government for guarding, education and production. (c) All old, infirm and disabled persons will be exchanged with the Kuomintang at the end of the war. (c) All those who are old, weak, disabled, and useless to us and the enemy will be released after being educated and publicized. (d) For individual units whose soldiers have been deceived by recalcitrant officers and whose influence on our army is still shallow, and who have not yet understood our policy of taking prisoners, after capturing their officers and soldiers, they shall be given effective propaganda and education, and the best of them shall be appropriately dispersed to their original units, so as to expand the influence of our army; and reactionary officers and cadres may also be released to a few of their units after being taught to do so, so that they can prove the policy of our party of not killing prisoners." (Historical Materials on Political Work in the Army, edited by the Political Work Teaching and Research Department of the Political Academy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Vol. 10, Chinese People's Liberation Army Warriors' Publishing House, 1982 edition, p. 49.)

This captivity policy was very different from the CCP's captivity policy during the period of the Land Revolution and the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, whose basic foothold was to replenish itself and weaken the enemy. A year later, in reviewing the previous year's prisoner policy, the CCP summarized the characteristics of the policy by saying, "On the principle of the usefulness of my people, I basically refrained from releasing them". "Basically not releasing" meant that only a limited number of prisoners would be released, resulting in the enemy's arbitrary distortion of the CCP's capture policy and the KMT soldiers' stubborn resistance out of fear of being captured. This policy also meant that the CCP had to bear the burden of feeding, clothing, housing, and using the captives. In addition, some captives, especially officers and cadres, were not easy to reform, and the cost of their management and education was very large, which made them a burden to the liberated areas and a burden to the people and their finances. In view of this, the CPC Central Committee adjusted its previous prisoner policy: "General prisoners above brigade level will be educated, given special privileges, and given publicity and appeal work, but basically not released. Those above regiment and battalion level will be sent to military districts for education and training, and some of them will be used by us. Those who are more progressive and willing to go back will be given assignments and be released individually, except for those who are extremely stubborn and reactionary or those who are of exchange value, and then they will be released by installments. After a short period of training at company and platoon level, except for those who can be retained in service, they will be given a mission and released immediately. The old, the weak, the disabled, the soldier ruffians, and those with certain feudal ties who are not easy to educate are given preferential treatment, and after a simple education and complaint campaign, they are still released with a simple assignment; the rest of them are mostly sought to replenish our army, or a part of them is educated and then released to do the work of disintegration." (The CCP Central Committee's Response to the Capture of Soldiers). ("Instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Work with Prisoners" (November 14, 1946), Vol. 10 of Historical Materials on the Political Work of the Army, edited by the Political Work Teaching and Research Department of the Political Academy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, p. 421.)

This policy can be said to be the culmination of the CCP's historical captivity policy. On the one hand, it inherited the essence of the policy of taking prisoners during the period of the Land Revolution and the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, that is, using prisoners to

propagandize against the enemy and disintegrate the enemy; on the other hand, it inherited the policy of the early period of the War of Liberation, that is, using prisoners to replenish themselves and strengthen the revolutionary forces. From this time onwards, the prisoners were mainly officers who undertook the task of propaganda against the enemy, while the soldiers were used to replenish the CCP army.

When the war progressed to 1948, the pressure to support the front was generally felt to be very heavy in all the liberated areas because of the devastation of the war and the increasing demand for manpower and material resources at the front. Peng Dehuai reflected that in the Northwest Military Region, "the enemy's three-light policy had made it difficult for the people to recover from their losses for five years" (quoted in Wang Zhengzhu, "Chairman Mao and We Were on the Same Battlefield" (《毛主席和我们在一个战场》), in *Memory of Mao Zedong* (《缅怀毛泽东》), Central Literature Publishing House (中央文献出版社), 1993 edition, p. 240. Nie Rongzhen also reflected that the North China Military Region had "mobilized the maximum amount of manpower and material resources" (Report on the Problems of Army Construction (February 16, 1948), *Selected Military Writings of Nie Rongzhen*, PLA Press, 1992 edition, p. 280). Mao Zedong and other central leaders also Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Central Committee also believed that "the population of the countryside has been greatly reduced and that the expansion of the army in all districts (including the Northeast) has reached the saturation point", and therefore issued the following instruction: "This year, in addition to the original expansion plans of the districts in North, East, Northeast and Northwest China, all districts will be allowed to expand their armies. This year, North China, East China, Northeast China and Northwest China, with the exception of some places where the original expansion plan is allowed to be completed, the rest should not be expanded. In the future, the source of troops for the front line will rely entirely on prisoners and the upgrading of certain local units." (Mao Zedong's *Military Collected Works*, Volume 4, Military Science Publishing House, Central Literature Publishing House, 1993 edition, p. 530.)

At that time, the local CCP units were charged with the dual task of defending the liberated areas and participating in production, and the upgrading of the local units to field armies heading for the front line of combat inevitably demanded that a new source of soldiers be brought in to join the

local units. The "front-line source of troops depends entirely on prisoners and on the upgrading of certain local units", and ultimately it is necessary to plan for this group of prisoners. Therefore, the "Instructions of the Central Military Commission on the Supplementation of Soldier Sources" issued in August 1948 adjusted the captive policy once again: "Except for the captive officers and soldiers who are still handled in accordance with the guidelines decided by the Central Public Works Committee, who are given good education and released in batches to disintegrate the enemy, the captive soldiers should, in principle, not be released, and the majority of them should be used to replenish the troops, and the smallest portion should be used in the rear for production. Those who cannot serve as combat soldiers can also be used as stretcher bearers, supply wagons, or assigned to serve in the rear authorities, and young and strong men can be transferred to supplement those in the front. Generally speaking, those who are unable to perform military service should be assigned to employment in the liberated areas and participate in agricultural or other production, so as to strengthen the labor force in the liberated areas and reduce the labor force in the enemy areas." (Historical Materials on the Political Work of the Army, edited by the Political Work Teaching and Research Department of the Political Academy of the People's Liberation Army, Vol. 12, People's Liberation Army Warriors' Publishing House, 1982 edition, p. 85.)

From the above discussion, it is clear that in the War of Liberation, the "repatriation of those who wished to go" was not really practiced, which is also evidenced by the demobilization payments for prisoners. In the Northwest Military Region, for example, the "Standard of Provision for the Northwest Field Army of the People's Liberation Army for the Month of August 1948" stipulated that "the monthly average of prisoner severance pay for those who were sent out of the border area was 50,000 yuan." (The document also states that the Northwest Field Army "paid 200,000 yuan for each first-class casualty; 160,000 yuan for each second-class casualty; and 120,000 yuan for each third-class casualty.") (Fang Zhongru, edited by the Party History Research Office of the Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, Shaanxi People's Publishing House, 2002 edition, p. 172) According to some other sources, the supply standard of the Northwest Field Army in 1948 was "160,000 yuan for each first-class casualty, 120,000 yuan for each second-class casualty, and 80,000 yuan for each third-class casualty." The demobilization fee for prisoners was "30,000 yuan for each prisoner sent out of the border area." (Luochuan County Military Records, Sanqin Publishing House, 2009 edition, p. 148; Huanglong County Military Records, Sanqin Publishing

House, 2009 edition, p. 98)) This amount was calculated using the Northwest Farmers' Currency, which had been issued after the merger of the Shanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Bank and the Jinsui Border Region Peasants' Bank in January 1948, when the price of goods was "42,000 yuan for 1 catty of pork; Oil 1 catty 50,000 yuan; salt 1 catty 13,000 yuan; vegetables 1 catty 6,000 yuan; hard firewood 1 catty 800 yuan. At that time, the food standard of the Northwest Field Army was "1 yuan, 291,500 yuan for a troubled broom; 2 yuan, 291,500 yuan for a pump dome mealybug spade; 3 yuan, 474,000 yuan for a dead $\equiv$ fomenting spade; 4 yuan, 549,000 yuan for a dead couch spade; 5 yuan, 785,250 yuan for a nightmare operated by my operative while a dead couch; 6 yuan, 675,000 yuan for each of the wounded above the shelter; 7 yuan, 7 yuan for the wounded of the dead Kan Company; 7 yuan, 7 yuan for the wounded of the dead Kan Company; 7 yuan for the wounded of the dead Kan Company. The wounded who were killed in the Suga Company were each given 405,000 yuan per month;⁸ the wounded in the Sheltered Lip Hospital were given 84,000 yuan per injury;⁹ the wounded in the Bundu Nuns Coughing Ceremony were given 9,717 yuan;¹⁰ and the wounded in the Coin Communist Rabbit Coughing Ceremony were given 3,240 yuan." (Fang Zhongru, edited by the Party History Research Office of the CPC Shaanxi Provincial Committee, pp. 173, 170.) Most of the Kuomintang soldiers who fought against the CCP in the northwest were from the south Peng Dehuai mentioned in a document that "the absolute majority of the prisoners of the Northwest Field Army were Sichuanese", and after they were added to the army, the Northwest Field Army "basically became the army of the south. (See "Peng Dehuai's Message to Mao Zedong on the Dynamics of the Enemy Army in the Northwest and the Deployment of the Field Army" (February 8, 1949), First Field Army War History Compilation and Review Committee, Selected Documents of the First Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, vol. 2, PLA Publishing House, 2000 edition, p. 251.) , the distances traveled were so great that even by the lowest standards of survival, there was no way for demobilized prisoners to return home on severance pay.

How many prisoners actually joined the PLA? What was the proportion of liberation fighters in the People's Liberation Army? It was very difficult to fully clarify these questions, because even the leaders of the CPC Central Committee and the heads of the Central Bureaus and field armies in most cases knew only approximations, and rarely had accurate statistics. In 1951, Zhou Enlai said

helplessly at the national demobilization summary meeting: "Our troops have not been verified, and there is a very large false number of them. To this day the exact number of our troops cannot be counted." (Speech by Premier Zhou Enlai at the National Demobilization Work Summary Conference (February 12, 1951), Central Transitional Construction Committee, Compilation of Documents on the Demobilization Work of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (1950 - 1954), internal edition, 1958, p. 132.) Therefore, this paper can only try to grasp the general picture of the above issue by interpreting various sources.

During the Liberation War, starting from March 1947, the Kuomintang army began a focused attack after the all-out offensive. One key direction of attack was the northwest and the other was Shandong. As a result, the Northwest Field Army and the East China Field Army were two of the earlier units that engaged in large-scale fierce battles with the Kuomintang Army. These two field armies captured a large number of prisoners, and the composition of their units changed significantly as a result.

The Northwest Field Army was one of the five major field armies that liberated more than half of its fighters earlier. The land in the northwest was barren and sparsely populated, and the slightest war mobilization would reach the limit of the affordability of the liberated areas. At the beginning of 1947, the Jinsui sub-bureau in the northwest had already "mobilized six or seven tenths of the strongest soldiers" ("Decision of the Jinsui Sub-bureau on the Spring Expansion of Troops" (February 15, 1947), *The History of Political Work in the Military*, edited by the Political Work Department of the PLA Political Science College, vol. 10, p. 557), and from then on, "the new elements were mobilized in the early half of the field wars". From then on, "the replenishment of new components changed from relying mainly on the sons and daughters of soldiers in the past to liberating almost all of them from captured soldiers" (*Memoirs of Liao Hansheng*, Eighty-first Publishing House, 1993 edition, p. 392). In August 1947, He Long stated that "captive soldiers now account for 80 percent of the total" ("He Long's Report to the Joint Meeting of County Committee Secretaries of the Suide Sub-district" (August 10, 1947), *First Field Army War History Compilation and Review Committee, Selected Documents of the First Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army*, vol. 3, PLA Publishing House, 2000 edition, p. 20) 2000 edition, p. 20.) In

November of the same year, Peng Dehuai was arrested. In November of the same year, Peng Dehuai and Zhang Zongxun pointed out that "some of the troops had already taken more than 80 percent of the prisoners, some 60 percent, and the average should be about 70 percent." (Peng Dehuai and Zhang Zongxun on the Attack on Yu and the Rest and Reorganization of the Troops to the Military Commission and to He Long and Xi Zhongxun (November 27, 1947), First Field Army War History Compilation and Review Committee, Selected Literature of the First Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, vol. 1, PLA Press, 2000 edition, p. 576.) In February 1949, Peng Dehuai reported to Mao Zedong that the Northwest Field Army "now has 95,000 men Captive soldiers accounted for about 80 percent of the army, the proportion of the company is even greater, the vast majority of the squad leaders are captive soldiers, platoon commanders and deputy platoon commanders are nearly half, company commanders and instructors in the various armies there are individual " ("Peng Dehuai's Message to Mao Zedong on the Dynamics of the Enemy Army in the Northwest and the Deployment of the Field Army" (February 8, 1949), First Field Army War History Compilation and Review Committee, Selected Documents of the First Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, vol. 2, p. 251.) .

East China was one of the country's key battlefields during the Liberation War, with frequent battles that grew larger and larger, and the East China Field Army used prisoners to constantly replenish itself. in July 1947, Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin mentioned in a report to the CCP Central Committee that "the minimum estimate for participation in the Field Army of the four hundred and forty thousand prisoners taken last year was one hundred thousand, which is equal to or exceeds the number of those who voluntarily enlisted in the army, and the ratio of field army prisoners is between forty and eighty percent. ratio of forty to eighty percent." (Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin, "Report to the Central Committee on the Experience of Building the Army in East China" (July 19, 1947), Book 11 of Historical Materials on Political Work in the Army, edited by the Department of Political Work of the PLA Institute of Politics, PLA Warrior Press, 1982 edition, pp. 11-12.) A few months later, Chen Yi summarized, "Three-tenths of our replacement soldiers are turned peasants, and seven-tenths are liberation fighters." ("Preliminary Summary of the One-Year War of Self-Defense in East China" (December 30, 1947-January 1, 1948), Selected Military Writings of Chen Yi, PLA Press, 1996 edition, p. 435.) In April 1948, Chen Yi introduced the situation of the Northwest Field Army to the cadres of the East China Field Army: "For more than a year, the

Northwest Field Army has not been replenished with new recruits from the liberated areas who have joined the army, but has mainly absorbed liberated fighters, and the composition of liberated fighters in the army now accounts for seventy to eighty percent. The experience of enlisting liberated fighters in the army is similar to ours." ("Speech of Army Commander Chen Yi at a Meeting of Cadres Above the Regiment Level" (April 5, 1948), Historical Materials on Army Political Work, edited by the Political Work Teaching and Research Department of the Political Academy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, vol. 11, p. 428.) According to the word "also", the composition of liberation fighters in the East China Field Army also reached 70 to 80 percent. During the Huaihai Campaign, the East China Field Army practiced the policy of "capturing, mending, teaching, and fighting", which achieved certain results. According to Su Yu, "At the beginning of the Huaihai Campaign, there were 369,000 men in the East China Field, 105,000 casualties in the course of the campaign, and 551,000 at the end of the campaign, except for a few local regiments which were replenished, and those who were replenished were mainly liberation fighters." (Su Yu's Selected Writings) (Su Yu's Selected Writings, Volume 3, Military Science Press, 2004 edition, p. 737.)

After the Central Plains Field Army's "Thousand-Mile Leap into the Dabie Mountains" and its transition to external combat, it also implemented the policy of "immediate capture and replacement," and the number and proportion of liberated fighters increased rapidly. now, about seventy percent are liberation fighters." (Quoted in He Qijun, "Affection for Yan'an," Xinhua Publishing House, 1998 edition, p. 137.) In July 1949, the Front Committee of the Central Plains Field Army pointed out in its report to the Central Military Commission: "After the Huaihai Battle last year, the composition of the troops was generally about sixty percent captives. Now it has generally reached about 80 percent." (Comprehensive Report of the Second Field Front Committee on the Situation of the Troops to the Central Military Commission (July 1949), The Historical Materials on the Political Work of the Army, edited by the Department of Political Work of the Political Academy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Vol. 13, People's Liberation Army Warriors' Publishing House, 1982 edition, p. 199.)

The Northeast Field Army's relatively small scale of liberation fighters during the first one or two years of the liberation war was related to the fact that it had a vast base area and a rich source of

reserve soldiers (turned peasants). Generals at all levels of the Northeast Field Army were not as proactive as those of other field armies on the issue of absorbing prisoners into the army, resulting in a large loss of prisoners in the Northeast. In October 1947, Luo Ronghuan lamented, "There were a total of 50,000 prisoners taken in the summer offensive, but now only 8,000 have been replenished to the army, and 8,000 are being trained in the rear, while the rest have gone who knows where." ("Some Problems Concerning Troop Construction" (October 1947), Luo Ronghuan's Selected Military Writings, People's Liberation Army Publishing House, 1997 edition, p. 389; "The 'Troops' Training" (March 25 to March 31, 1948), p. 389)) From March 25 to April 16, 1948, Luo Ronghuan attended the Northeast Military Region Staff Work Conference held in Harbin, pointing out that one of the major problems in the army was that it was "not enough to fight for the liberation of the soldiers, not enough to study the experience and methods, and not enough to raise the awareness of the situation to the extent that it could be regarded as a political task" (Huang Yao, edited by Luo Ronghuan). (Huang Yao, edited by Luo Ronghuan, People's Publishing House, 2002 edition, p. 538). . In September of the same year, he pointed out in the Special Report of the Army Party Organization Conference that "the composition of the captives has generally accounted for ten percent." (Luo Ronghuan's Selected Military Writings, p. 458.) This proportion was the smallest among the field armies at that time, but the ensuing Liao-Shen Battle caused it to rise sharply. In the Liao-Shen Battle, which lasted 52 days, almost all the main forces suffered nearly 10,000 casualties, except for the first column, which suffered fewer. (See Ma Yunpeng, The Battle of Pingjin, Liaoning People's Publishing House, 1998 edition, p. 22.) After the battle, the Northeast Field Army had a total of 170,000 new recruits, including 110,000 liberated fighters and 60,000 turned peasants. (See Reference Materials for Teaching the History of the CPC (During the New Democratic Revolution) (IV), compiled and printed by the Department of History of the CPC of Beijing Normal University, 1975 internal edition, p. 446.) The composition of the troops then changed considerably. In the case of the three columns, for example, the liberated fighters of the average company accounted for about 54 percent, and in some cases even as high as 60 percent. (See Selected Historical Materials of the Shenyang Military Region (1945-1985), compiled and printed by the Research Office of the Political Department of the Shenyang Military Region, 1985 internal edition, p. 103.)

The North China Field Army also initially did not go all out to absorb prisoners into its ranks; in March 1947, Luo Ruiqing even demanded at the political work conference of the Jinchahi Military

Region that "the supplementation of liberated fighters should be limited to no more than forty to fifty percent." (The Political Work Teaching and Research Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Political Academy, Vol. 10, p. 627, Historical Materials on the Political Work of the Army.) In June of the same year, Zhu De reported to the Central Committee that in the Jinchahi Military Region "the composition of the fighters is good, and the captives account for only one-twelfth of one percent" (Report to the Central Committee on the Handling of Military Work in the Jinchahi Region (June 1, 1947), Selected Military Writings of Zhu De, People's Liberation Army Publishing House, 1997 edition, p. 591). . However, as the war intensified, the demand for soldiers grew. In February 1948, Yang Chengwu reflected, "In the past, too few prisoners were sought for enlistment." (Yang Chengwu, "On the Question of Rectifying Discipline and Rectifying the System" (February 12, 1948), Book 11 of Historical Materials on Political Work in the Army, edited by the Department of Political Work of the Political Academy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, p. 341.) In March of the same year, the North China Military Region set up a supplementary training corps specializing in the training of turned peasants and liberation fighters. By July 1949, a total of 83,600 farmers and 61,900 liberation fighters had been trained. (See Report of the North China Military Region to the General Political Department of the Military Commission and the North China Bureau on the Situation of the Mending Training Corps (November 1949), edited by the Political Work Teaching and Research Department of the PLA Political Science Institute, Historical Materials on the Political Work of the Army, vol. 11, p. 318.)

As far as the size of the liberation fighters within the scope of the whole army is concerned, on August 23, 1948, Zhu De pointed out at a briefing on the war situation by the Operations Bureau of the PLA Headquarters, "Now sixty to seventy percent of our army are liberation fighters." (Zhu De's Annals (New Edition) (in Chinese), Central Literature Publishing House, 2006 edition, p. 1309.) According to statistics, in June 1948, the total military strength of the PLA had grown to nearly 2.8 million, including 1.49 million field troops. (History of the National Liberation War of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, edited by the Military History Research Department of the Academy of Military Sciences, vol. 4, Military Science Press, 1997 edition, p. 5.) If "our army" refers to the entire CCP army, there should be between 1.68 million and 1.96 million liberation fighters; if it refers only to the field army, there should be between 894,000 and 1.043 million liberation fighters. According to other statistics, in the two years from July 1946 to June 1948, the CCP

captured 1.63 million KMT soldiers. (See "Statistics on the Comparison of Enemy Losses in the Four Years of the National Liberation War (July 1946-June 1950)," Research Department of the Academy of Military Sciences, "History of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: The Period of the National Liberation War," Military Science Publishing House, 2000 edition, Appendix "Statistical Tables of Battle Achievements" (viii)). It is assumed that "our army" refers to the field army. Mao Zedong pointed out in the Notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the September Meeting, issued on October 10, 1948, that "within two years had dissolved about 800,000 captive soldiers from the Kuomintang army, turning them into liberation fighters and turning their guns to fight the Kuomintang. " (Mao Tse-tung's Military Collected Works, vol. 5, p. 56.) The phrase "within two years," judging from the context, refers to the two years from July 1946 to June 1948, after the outbreak of the all-out civil war. Although both Mao and Zhu used approximations, it at least shows that by 1948, more than half of the field army had been liberated fighters, and for the army as a whole, the liberated fighters accounted for about 30 percent of the total.

With the successive victories in the three wars, the size of the liberated fighters in the CCP-led People's Army expanded further, and in April 1949, Zhou Enlai pointed out, "A large proportion of our fighters were captured and called liberated fighters, and in some units, liberated fighters accounted for as much as 80 percent of the fighters, and in some cases, the lesser ones accounted for 50-60 percent, with an average of about 65-70 percent. The average was about sixty-five to seventy percent." (Zhou Enlai's Selected Works, People's Publishing House, 1980 edition, p. 315.) In July of the same year, Zhou Enlai also introduced to the crowd: "In these three years among the five million six hundred and ninety-nine million people lost by the enemy, the number of people captured by us amounted to seventy percent, that is, four million one hundred and fifteen thousand people, and among the captives there are two million eight hundred thousand people who have become the People's Liberation Army. " (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, vol. 1, pp. 346-347. In January 1949, the total strength of the PLA increased to over 3,580,000 men, of whom over 2,180,000 were in the field army. (History of the National Liberation War of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, edited by the Military History Research Department of the Academy of Military Sciences, vol. 5, Military Science Press, 1997 edition, p. 8). If the proportion mentioned by Zhou Enlai in April is applied to January, the number of liberation fighters for the whole army would be

2,327,000 to 2,506,000 according to the calculation of "an average of about 65% to 70%", which, together with the room for increase in the first half of the year, would roughly coincide with the number of 2,800,000 mentioned by Zhou Enlai in July. It can be judged from this that by the first half of 1949, liberation fighters had accounted for 65 to 70 percent of the total number of fighters in the whole army. After that, the number continued to rise. After the end of the War of Liberation, in June 1950, Zhou Enlai said at a political conference, "In terms of the composition of the army, liberation fighters account for 70 to 80 percent." (Quoted in Zhou Enlai's Biography (1898-1976) (below), Central Literature Publishing House, 2008 edition, p. 884.)

Since the period of the Agrarian Revolution, the CCP had already absorbed soldiers from captives into the army to make up for the shortage of soldiers. Generally speaking, however, during the Agrarian Revolution and the War of Resistance Against Japan, the CCP's policy on prisoners was focused on propaganda and dismantling the enemy, and prisoners were generally free to choose whether to stay or go. During the War of Liberation, the CCP replaced free choice of stay with "basically no release," meaning that the CCP's prisoner policy had increasingly developed into a relatively independent policy of military expansion. As the scale of the war expanded and the fighting continued, the CCP increasingly emphasized the need to obtain additional soldiers from captives, which made the military expansion nature of the captivity policy even more pronounced. Against this background, the number of liberation fighters continued to expand, and their proportion in the CCP-led People's Army also rose. In the middle and late stages of the War of Liberation, the proportion of liberation fighters in the people's army under the leadership of the CCP increased the further down the line one went. Some squads and platoons even consisted entirely of liberation fighters, the only difference being between "old liberation fighters" and "new liberation fighters". The addition of liberation fighters enriched the PLA's strength. They made their own contribution to the CCP's winning of national power and the liberation of the Chinese people.

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