

《聂荣臻传》48章 从大同集宁之战到撤离张家口 Nie Rongzhen Biography, Chapter 48 - From Battle of Datong-Jining to the Evacuation of Zhangjiakou

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FN 38 – Nie Rongzhen Bio on North China Battles of 1946

1946年6月26日，全面内战爆发。当天，聂荣臻与萧克、刘澜涛、罗瑞卿一起，提出了晋察冀、晋绥、晋冀鲁豫三大战略区集中力量先打下山西，使三区连成一片的建议。为此，晋察冀拟采“西攻东防”的作战方针。两天后中央复电：“你们的战略意见是正确的。国民党大打后，你们的基本任务是保卫地方与夺取三路（平绥、同蒲、平汉路）四城（大同、太原、石家庄、保定），首先是打下平汉路和石家庄、保定。”^①聂荣臻提出，如无晋冀鲁豫的配合，执行中央的指示是困难的，建议先用半月时间，与晋绥配合打下大同。中央复电同意。看来，聂荣臻是考虑到平汉路和平津唐两线敌人共有8个军、21个师、5个总队，而山西太原以北地区敌人只有2个军、7个师，显然要弱得多。7月，为孤立大同，晋察冀与晋绥军区配合进行了晋北战役。晋察冀军区部队在40多天中解放了山阴、繁峙、原平、五台、定襄等城镇，歼敌8000多人，基本实现了预期目的。晋北战役后，接着与晋绥军区组织了大同、集宁战役。

8月2日，聂荣臻到阳高主持了大同战役作战会议。根据大同敌兵力不强，但城防坚固的特点，确定以5个旅围攻大同，先在外围各个歼敌，与围城同时，另部署4个旅打傅作义可能的增援，并组成前线指挥部，由晋绥野战军副司令员张宗逊任司令员、晋察冀军区副政委罗瑞卿任政委、第三纵队司令员杨成武任副司令员。7月31日战役开始。大同城坚，对此估计不足，未能按计划攻克。9月2日，傅作义3个师增援大同，这本在我意料之中。

傅部进到集宁，被包围。在敌人即将被歼时，傅作义又派一个师增援集宁。

由于前线指挥员指挥不当，不是集中全力先吃掉敌人3个师，而是掉头打敌人增援的一个师，兵力调整又组织不当，致使敌4个师会合，失去了歼敌良机。后来，聂荣臻在回忆录里总结教训时说：“发起大同战役，有考虑不当之处。因为，大同敌人的兵力虽不雄厚，而城防设施是颇为坚固的。当时，我军既没有重武器配备，又缺乏攻坚战经验，哪里有把握攻下大同？”^①在这种情况下，13日部队撤离集宁，16日撤围大同，加上8月28日放弃承德，至此，张家口东西两面受敌，形成被动态势。聂荣臻权衡利弊，认为我军一向以歼敌有生力量为主，不在一城一地的得失，决心能守则守，必要时主动放弃张家口。

关于撤出张家口的考虑，要追溯到绥远战役之后。那时，聂荣臻认为，未能消灭傅作义部主力，造成张家口两面受敌，总的形势不利。鉴于这种情况，他开始从张家口大量往北岳

山区转移作战物资，光 105 口径榴弹炮的炮弹就有几万发。解放战争中二野、三野把 105 炮的炮弹打光了，这批弹药起了重要的支援作用。绥远战役结束，离撤出张家口还有近一年的时间，即使在那个时候，聂荣臻已经预见到迟早要撤出张家口。因而搬运许多笨重物资从容不迫，重要的机器全运进山里，负责搬运工作的是察哈尔省主席张苏。

自 1946 年 7 月起，就往涞源山区疏散人口。

9 月份的一天，晋察冀军区作战科长杨尚德乘一架美国飞机由北平飞回张家口。杨尚德在北平军调部跟随叶剑英工作。对他的突然而至，聂荣臻感^①《毛泽东年谱》下卷，人民出版社、中央文献出版社 1993 年 12 月第 1 版，第 100 页。

^①《聂荣臻回忆录》，解放军出版社 1986 年 3 月第 2 版，第 631 页。

到诧异，问：

“你怎么回来了？”

“送情报。”

“情报在哪里？”

杨尚德从口袋里拿出一包顶球牌香烟，从里边抽出一支，从两头掰开，里边包着的是一张纸条，上面写满了蝇头小楷。杨尚德汇报说：这是打入国民党第十一战区地下工作人员提供的敌人进攻张家口的作战命令。字迹太小，聂荣臻看不清，马上派人整理出来，他看过后，又叫杨尚德作了详细汇报，在座的有罗瑞卿、萧克、刘澜涛、赵尔陆、耿飏。

敌人进攻张家口的部署是：东面，李文兵团第十六军、第五十三军沿平绥铁路向怀来进攻；十三军从承德到丰宁（大阁）、沽源作为配合；九十四军在北平作为预备队。西面，傅作义三十五军的 3 个师、新编骑兵第四师、暂编第三十八师集结于大同集宁一线。东西两面的敌军协同抢占张家口。

从北平地下工作系统送来的这个情报和军区掌握的敌情动态，全都证实了张家口的形势是严峻的。

对于坚守还是放弃张家口的问题，即使是在高级干部中，意见分歧也很大。大体是三种意见：一是认为守不住，弄不好可能被迫撤退，那损失就大了；一种认为西有晋绥军区和第三纵队等部队，东有冀热辽军区和第二纵队等部队，可以守住；更多的人是舍不得丢失张家口，这是抗日大反攻以来我军攻占的唯一大城市，怎么能舍得放弃呢？在那些日子里，来找聂荣臻的领导干部很多，有军队的也有地方的，众说纷坛。聂荣臻胸有成竹，对来找的人反复说明，我们要实事求是，能守住最好，实在守不住就要做放弃张家口的准备。

为了统一思想，聂荣臻主持召开了晋察冀中央局会议。萧克、刘澜涛、罗瑞卿等中央局多数领导人，都同意聂荣臻的意见，必要时应该放弃张家口。

中央局经过热烈讨论，作出了准备放弃张家口的决定。

9月15日，聂荣臻在晋察冀中央局干部大会上作了《不计一城一地得失，力争战胜敌人》^①的报告，指出：东线我军放弃承德，西线撤围大同，张家口两面受敌态势形成。“在万一不利的情况下，不作孤注一掷??比如张家口这个大城市，是压在我们肩上的大包袱，并非绝对不能放弃，但决不能轻易放弃。”针对敌人兵力不足的特点，“我们的战略方针是以大兵团的运动战为主，战役指导上是以速决战、歼灭战为原则”。9月16日，聂荣臻、萧克、刘澜涛、罗瑞卿，向中央军委报告了弃守张家口的问题，提出“坚守张家口或主动撤离张家口的两种方针??拟在敌人进攻时只进行掩护战斗，不作坚守”。18日中央军委复电：在保卫察哈尔的口号下，集中主力在适当地区歼灭进攻之敌一部，“以歼灭敌有生力量为主，不以保守个别地方为主，使主力行动自如”^②，同时秘密疏散张家口的机关和物资。

9月20日，聂荣臻发布了《关于保卫张家口战役部署的命令》。命令规定：以8个旅置于怀来、延庆地区，为主要防御方向，争取在运动中歼敌一两个团，再扩大战果。另一个纵队（欠一个旅）部署于西线柴沟堡地区，配合天镇、阳高地区的晋绥部队，防范傅作义、阎锡山部的进犯。另外，以6^①《聂荣臻军事文选，解放军出版社1992年7月第1版，第250页。

^②《毛泽东年谱》下卷，人民出版社、中央文献出版社1993年12月第1版，第135页。

个旅在平汉线北段实施进攻，作为钳制方向。在乎汉线北段指挥作战的是杨成武和王平。

聂荣臻判断，东面是敌人的主攻方向，故把兵力重点放在东面，投入这一战场的有第一纵队的第一、二、三旅，第二纵队的第四、五旅，第三纵队的第七旅，第四纵队的第十旅和独立第五旅，还动员了大量的民兵参战；并以萧克为司令员、罗瑞卿为政治委员，组成野战军指挥机关，直接到前线指挥作战，力争在撤离张家口之前，更多地歼灭敌人。当时担任二纵队五旅旅长的萧文玖回忆道：聂荣臻司令到二纵队时曾对部队干部动员说：“来者不善，善者不来，你们必须在这里准备打恶仗，打大仗，顶住敌人的一切进攻，以保卫张家口。”

他还命令冀热辽军区的部队钳制敌人的第十二军，冀察军区地方部队全面开展游击战，配合主力作战。

9月29日，张家口东面的战斗打响，敌人4个师的兵力开始向怀来地区进攻。战至10月2日，敌进占东、西花园等地。3日，李文投进第二梯队两个师企图突破火烧营阵地、夺取怀来，受挫后撤回东、西花园等地。蒋介石亲自派他的参谋总长陈诚到南口部署从侧面迂回怀来。7日，敌人第九十四军以2个师从怀来东南方向迂回。野战军司令部识破敌人

企图，以第一纵队全部和另外 2 个旅、1 个团在马刨泉地区设伏。对于这一地区，聂荣臻除在春天时带领作战处长实地勘察外，战前曾带领郭天民等纵队领导看过地形，做过具体部署。他一直到晚年还能清晰地记得那里的地形地貌。“作为防御，那不是很好的地形吗？在那里筑点工事，打击他呀！”他这样描述了那个预设阵地。在这里基本上消灭了全部美式机械化装备的敌人 1 个团。接着，在南石岭、镇边城又打两仗，共歼敌 1600 余人。至此，粉碎了敌人迂回怀来的企图。在东线共消灭敌人 1 万多人，把敌人 6 个师挡住了。

在平汉路北段，杨成武、王平指挥 6 个旅连克 4 座县城，控制了 125 公里铁路，攻占沿线全部车站，歼敌 8300 多人。他们采取野战军与地方部队、民兵相配合，先对保定南北的平汉路进行大破袭，使平汉路被截断。同时集中优势兵力，对平汉路两侧及敌兵力薄弱的据点出击，歼敌几十、几百到上千人，频频得手。平汉路北段战役的胜利，被延安《解放日报》誉之为“南北两捷”的一捷，与华东人民解放军“七战七捷”联系在一起。

倘若在张家口北面不突然出现傅作义的部队，聂荣臻是可以完全实现其利用保卫张家口作钓饵，更多地歼灭敌人有生力量的战役目的的。

当李文兵团在东线受阻，蒋介石玩弄了一个“以利诱之”的惯伎，下令把张家口划归第十二战区，这样就大大刺激了傅作义的积极性。于是，他调集 2 万兵力避开西线晋察冀部队设防地区，从集宁向东穿过几百里草原，突然出现在张家口北面的张北地区，于 10 月 8 日占领大清沟、张北。对于敌人的这一偷袭，情报部门也没能发现。司令部二局局长彭富九对于没有破译傅作义偷袭张北的行动一直不释于怀，北乎和平解放后，他找到原来傅作义的办公室主任，作了详细的了解，从中得知：傅作义怕失密，内部没有用蒋介石统一的密码，他自己另有一套，蒋的电报正规，而傅的电报故意搞得颠来倒去，把时间和签名插在电文里边，致使破译十分困难。彭富九还了解到：傅作义没有破译机构，但架了几部电台测向，听无线电的方向和声音大小，以此得知解放军在张家口西南面有主力，而在张北方向空虚。应该说，聂荣臻在张北方向是个失着，他只部署了一个团在万全地区警戒，要张北的地方部队“注意西面敌骑兵之扰乱”。后来，聂荣臻检讨说：“我们对傅作义经丰镇、大同、阳高东进策应怀来是有准备的，但对他从集宁、尚义直插张北估计不足。”^①因此，使得东线的歼敌计划没有全部实现。傅作义的偷袭，比起李文来要高出一筹。

当时，置于西线的部队一时调不到北线，在张北阻敌的只是少数的地方部队，而傅作义又以骑兵为主，行动迅速。

这天，张家口上空有 6 架敌机轰炸、扫射。聂荣臻在东山坡司令部的坑道里指挥战斗。敌人的突然袭击并没有引起他的失措。

他打电话给张家口卫戍区司令员郑维山作了应急布置。

郑维山回忆当时的情景时说：

傅作义乘我张家口西北方向空虚，用少数部队朝兴和方向佯动，调集主力步骑两万余众，先头于10月8日占我南壕堑（尚义）、大清沟。在张北担任警戒的第七军分区部队，误以为是小股敌人窜扰，即派骑兵两个团绕路出发，围歼该敌，张北只留一个连驻守。同日，敌两千余骑（兵）乘虚直插张北，使张家口的形势顿时紧张起来。此时，正好我派警卫团团团长李金石带一个营前去张北警戒，以防小股敌人袭扰，不想一到竟发现敌人主力，便同七分区部队一起拼死奋战。我得知此情况，又派警卫团主力急速奔赴张北。但油于沿途遭到敌机轰炸、扫射而迟滞了时间，到达张北时，敌大部队已陆续到达，与敌激战后被迫撤退。形势更加严重了。聂总命我立即派参加集宁战役刚刚归建的教导旅，火速赶往张北与张家口之间的狼窝沟一线抗击敌人，掩护领导机关转移。

蒋介石下令10月11日攻占张家口。截至10日晚，聂荣臻还在张家口。

各级政府、机关、工厂以及部队留守处在做最后的转移。这一夜星光灿烂，敌人的轰炸机嗡嗡了一天，天黑前飞走了，空气骤然沉寂下来。大路上的汽车为数不多，更多的是大车和毛驴驮子，载运着票子、布匹、药品、盐巴、罐头，比较笨重的物资早就转移到北岳山区，现在载运的多是生活用品。

晚上八九点钟的样子，一辆吉普车从东山坡司令部大院开出，驶上宣化大道。

聂荣臻撤出张家口的那天晚上，一轮明月悬在天上，好似也有送别之情。

各机关部队都安全撤完了，只留教导旅在最后阻击敌人，聂荣臻才在明亮的月色中，告别了这座塞外山城。

他走后不久，从司令部大院开出一辆卡车。押车的是作战处长唐永剑车上有一部综合电台，伴着这部电台的是台长马萍。这辆车后面留下了洒满月光的空寂的大院。对于聂荣臻这么晚才撤退，很多人不放心，不断打电话询问、催促。

郑维山指挥教导旅抗击着傅作义部队的进攻。11日9时，傅作义集中4个师的兵力倾全力向狼窝沟阵地进攻，教导旅与敌激战终日，在完成任务后，当晚撤出阵地。他们是最后离开张家口的部队。

傅作义部占领张家口，蒋介石兴高采烈，下令第二天召开伪国民大会，通过伪宪法。国民党宣传机构叫嚣：“共军已总崩溃”，“可在三个月至五个月内完成以军事解决问题”。可聂荣臻却说：对于张家口及其附近地区的各种建筑设施，例如下花园发电厂、张家口飞机场等等，告诉部队不要破坏，①《聂荣臻回忆录》，解放军出版社1986年3月第2版，第639页。

一来还有人民群众，二来撤出来只是暂时的，用不了多久红旗就会重新飘扬在大境门的城楼上。

不过，下花园的发电厂还是被破坏了。当年察哈尔省主席张苏回忆说：“我和省委的牛树材到下花园，看见下花园发电厂被破坏，那是工人搞的。

因为工人思想不通，他们不愿留给敌人。”山城突然之间灯火全部熄灭。

敌人在进攻张家口的时候，以 10 万兵力向冀东解放区进攻。冀热辽军区组织部队进行了 70 多天的防御战，歼敌 7000 多人，还占领了冀东不少县城。

在撤出张家口以后，聂荣臻考虑到，当时东北民主联军在敌人重兵的压迫下，退到南满、北满，沈阳、四平、长春、吉林等城市及广大地区被敌人占领，财源和兵源都发生了困难，加上承德、张家口先后被敌占领，冀察热辽地区与晋察冀的联系实际上已被隔断。在这种形势下，他主动向中共中央建议，把冀察热辽军区划归东北民主联军。1947 年 3 月，中共中央批准了这一建议。

这样，就为东北民主联军的发展及满足财政需求，提供了一个十分重要的基地。

10 月 22 日，晋察冀中央局召开了涞源会议。在撤出张家口之前，虽然作出了撤出张家口的决定，但有些人在认识上并没有完全解决问题，在感情上更是转不过弯来。有人说：“我们艰苦奋斗抗战八年，钻了八年山沟，刚进张家口一年多点儿，为什么又把它让给敌人了？”还有人事后诸葛亮，对于弃守张家口说长道短，大发议论。

聂荣臻主持了这次会议，并在会上作了重要讲话。他具体分析了当时张家口的形势，指出敌人集中那么多兵力，东西夹击，敌强我弱，即使付出大的代价也还是守不祝如果硬守的话，势必造成要守守不住，要走走不脱，那个后果将是十分严峻的。我们主动撤离，就摆脱了被动，争取了主动，取得了行动自由，可以在运动中消灭敌人，使战争形势逐渐向有利于我们的方向转化，达到最后完全主动。他最后说：“从战争的全局来看，从敌强我弱的形势来看，我们应该审时度势，着眼于未来，不计较一城一地的得失，应以歼灭敌人的有生力量为目标。可许多同志看不到这一点。把丢掉张家口看得过重。实际上，我们暂时的放弃张家口??没有什么了不得！当年的日本侵略者，也是横行霸道，不可一世，我们同它较量了八年，结果怎么样呢，还不是我们胜利了吗？蒋介石也不例外，反动势力终究是要失败的，这是历史的必然，不可抗拒。”

萧克后来说：“放弃张家口，中央局开会表决，我首先表示同意。党内的思想工作难做，有人战略眼光差，就事论事。因为放弃了平绥线，才能到平汉线上打击敌人的弱点。我和聂荣臻同志是看到了这一点的。这是个正确的措施。”

通过这次会议，大家提高了认识，总结了经验教训，澄清了糊涂观念，克服了悲观失望情绪，树立了战胜敌人的信心。

会议还作出了《关于张垣失守后的形势与任务的决定》。这个决定，根据聂荣臻在会议上的讲话精神，强调指出：只要我们按照中央指示，进一步团结群众，发动群众，动员一切力量来坚持长期自卫战争，坚持运动战、歼灭战的方针，更加主动地大量歼灭敌人有生力

量，就能从根本上转变晋察冀地区的军事形势。同时对放弃张家口的教训也作了检讨：开始时，对国内和平估计过高，战争准备不足；平绥、平汉线的作战，未能发展成战役胜利；对傅作义部经张北迂回张家口的主要进攻方向判断错误。

涞源会议之后，逐渐统一了大家的思想，消除了张家口撤退后的埋怨情绪，士气又重新振奋起来。与此同时，又大力加强了野战军的建设，动员了三四万群众参军，补充了野战军，各纵队由原来的2个旅增加为3个旅。这时，一纵队归还晋冀鲁豫军区建制，晋察冀野战军辖二、三、四纵队，萧克任司令员，罗瑞卿任政治委员，耿飚任参谋长，潘自力任政治部主任。大家一心为转变晋察冀的战局而努力。

DeepL Translation

Nie Rongzhen's Biography, Chapter 48 From the Battle of Datong and Jining to the Evacuation of Zhangjiakou

On June 26, 1946, total civil war broke out. On that day, Nie Rongzhen, together with Xiao Ke, Liu Lantao and Luo Ruiqing, put forward the proposal that the three strategic areas of Jinchahi, Jinsui and Jinji Luyu should concentrate their efforts on fighting Shanxi first, so that the three areas could be linked together. To this end, Jinchahi proposed to adopt the advised west attack east defense “combat policy. Two days later, the central government replied: “your strategic views are correct. After the Kuomintang's big fight, your basic task is to defend the place and capture three roads (Ping Sui, Tong Pu, Ping Han Road) and four cities (Datong, Taiyuan, Shijiazhuang, Baoding), the first thing is to hit the Ping Han Road and Shijiazhuang, Baoding.” (1) Nie Rongzhen suggests that without the cooperation of Jin, Hebei, Luhu and Yu, it will be difficult to carry out the instructions of the Central Committee, and suggests that half a month should first be spent in cooperating with Jinsui to knock down Datong. The Central Committee replied in agreement. It seems that Nie Rongzhen was considering the fact that the enemy on the Pinghan Road and Pingjin-Tang line had a total of 8 armies, 21 divisions and 5 general units, while the enemy in the area north of Taiyuan in Shanxi had only 2 armies and 7 divisions, which was obviously much weaker. In July, in order to isolate Datong, the Jinchahi and Jingsu Military Regions cooperated in the battle of Jinbei. The troops of the Jinchahi Military Region liberated the towns of Shanyin, Fanchi, Yuanping, Wutai, and

Dingxiang in more than 40 days, destroying more than 8,000 enemies and basically realizing the expected purpose. After the Battle of Jinbei, they then organized the Battles of Datong and Jining with the Jinsui Military Region.

On August 2, Nie Rongzhen went to Yanggao to preside over the Datong Battle Combat Conference. According to the Datong enemy strength is not strong, but the characteristics of the city defense, determined to 5 brigades siege Datong, first in the periphery of the enemy, and siege at the same time, another deployment of 4 brigades to fight Fu Zuoyi's possible reinforcements, and the formation of the front command, by the Jinsui field army deputy commander Zhang Zongxun as commander, Jinchaji military region, deputy political commissar Luo Ruiqing political commissar, the commander of the third column of the commander of the Yang Chenggongwu deputy commander. 31 July battle began. Tatung city firm, this is not enough to estimate, failed to attack according to plan. September 2, Fu Zuoyi 3 divisions to reinforce Tatung, which was expected.

Fu's division entered Jining and was surrounded. When the enemy was about to be annihilated, Fu Zuoyi sent another division to reinforce Jining.

Due to the improper command of the front-line commanders, instead of focusing all efforts to eat the enemy's three divisions, but turned around to fight the enemy's reinforcement of a division, force adjustment and improper organization, resulting in the enemy's four divisions will be joined, losing a good opportunity to annihilate the enemy. Later, Nie Rongzhen summarized the lessons learned in his memoirs, saying: “The launching of the Datong campaign was improperly considered. Because, although the enemy's strength in Datong was not strong, the city's defense facilities were quite strong. At that time, our army was not equipped with heavy weapons and lacked experience in offensive warfare, so how could we be sure of capturing Datong?” ① Under these circumstances, the troops withdrew from Jining on the 13th and from Datong on the 16th, together with the abandonment of Chengde on August 28th, Zhangjiakou was now attacked on both sides, forming a passive situation. Nie Rongzhen weighed the pros and cons, that our army has always been to annihilate the enemy's vital forces as the main, not in a city or a place of gain or loss, determined to be able to code to defend, if necessary, to take the initiative to give up Zhangjiakou.

On the withdrawal of Zhangjiakou considerations, to be traced back to the Suiyuan campaign after. At that time, Nie Rongzhen believed that the failure to eliminate Fu Zuoyi's main force, resulting in Zhangjiakou on both sides of the enemy, the overall situation is unfavorable. In view of this situation, he began to Zhangjiakou from a large number of Beiyue mountainous area to transfer combat supplies, light 105 caliber howitzer shells have tens of thousands of rounds. In the war of liberation, the second and third fields ran out of shells for the 105-caliber guns, and this batch of ammunition played an important supporting role. At the end of the Suiyuan Campaign, there was still nearly a year before the evacuation of Zhangjiakou, and even at that time, Nie Rongzhen had already foreseen that he would have to evacuate Zhangjiakou sooner or later. Consequently, the moving of many bulky materials was carried out with ease, and all the important machinery was transported into the mountains, and the person in charge of the moving work was Zhang Su, Chairman of Chahar Province.

Since July 1946, the population was evacuated to the Laiyuan mountains.

One day in September, Yang Shangde, chief of the operations section of the Jinchahar-Hebei Military Region, flew back to Zhangjiakou from Peking on an American airplane. Yang Shangde worked under Ye Jianying at the Military Coordination Department in Peking. At his sudden arrival, Nie Rongzhen felt ① Mao Zedong's Chronicle, next volume, People's Publishing House, Central Literature Publishing House, December 1993, 1st edition, p. 100

Nie Rongzhen's Memoirs, People's Liberation Army Publishing House, 2nd edition, March 1986, p. 631.

to amazement, asking:

“Why have you come back?”

“To deliver intelligence.”

“Where is the intelligence?”

Yang Shangde took out a pack of Top Ball brand cigarettes from his pocket, pulled one out from the inside, broke it open from both ends, and wrapped inside was a slip of paper filled with fly-letters. Yang Shangde reported: this is to penetrate the underground staff of the Kuomintang eleventh war zone to provide the enemy attack Zhangjiakou combat orders. The handwriting was too small for Nie Rongzhen to read, and he immediately sent someone to sort it out. After he read it, he asked Yang Shangde to give a detailed report, and there were Luo Ruiqing, Xiao Ke, Liu Lantao, Zhao Erlu, and Geng Biao in the audience.

The enemy's deployment to attack Zhangjiakou was: to the east, Li Wen Corps 16th Army and 53rd Army attacked Huailai along the Pingsui Railway; the 13th Army went from Chengde to Fengning (Daguo) and Guyuan as a tie-in; and the 94th Army served as a reserve in Beiping. To the west, three divisions of Fu Zuoyi's Thirty-fifth Army, the Fourth Division of Newly Organized Cavalry, and the Thirty-eighth Division of Provisional Organizations assembled on the Datong Jining line. The enemy forces in the east and west coordinated to seize Zhangjiakou.

The information sent from the underground work system in Peking and the enemy situation in the military region all confirmed that the situation in Zhangjiakou was serious.

On the question of whether to hold on or give up Zhangjiakou, even among the senior cadres, there is a great difference of opinion. Roughly three kinds of opinions: one is that can not be defended, may be forced to retreat, then the loss of a large; a view that the west of the Jinsui Military Region and the third column and other forces, the east of the Jijieliao Military Region and the second column and other forces, can be defended; more people can not afford to lose Zhangjiakou, this is

the anti-Japanese counter-offensive since the capture of the only big city, how can I afford to give up it? In those days, Nie Rongzhen to find a lot of leading cadres, both military and local, a variety of opinions. Nie Rongzhen has a good idea of what to do, to find people repeatedly explained, we have to be realistic, can hold the best, really can not be done to give up Zhangjiakou preparations.

In order to unify thinking, Nie Rongzhen hosted a meeting of the Central Bureau of Jinchahi. Xiao Ke, Liu Lantao, Luo Ruiqing and most of the other leaders of the Central Bureau agreed with Nie Rongzhen that Zhangjiakou should be abandoned if necessary.

After heated discussions, the Central Bureau made the decision to prepare to give up Zhangjiakou.

On September 15, Nie Rongzhen made a report entitled “Strive for Victory over the Enemy without Regard to the Gains and Losses of a City or a Place ‘1 at the cadres’ conference of the Central Bureau of Jinchahi, pointing out that, with our troops abandoning Chengde on the eastern front and withdrawing from the siege of Datong on the western front, the situation of Zhangjiakou being attacked by the enemy on two sides had taken shape. “In the unlikely event of an unfavorable situation, do not make a desperate attempt??? For example, Zhangjiakou, a big city, is a big burden on our shoulders, not absolutely can not give up, but must not be easily given up.” In response to the characteristics of the enemy's insufficient troops, “our strategic policy is to large regiments of movement warfare, battle guidance is to the principle of quick decision, annihilation war.” September 16, Nie Rongzhen, Xiao Ke, Liu Lantao, Luo Ruiqing, reported to the Central Military Commission to abandon Zhangjiakou, put forward, “hold on to Zhangjiakou or take the initiative to evacuate Zhangjiakou, but not to give up. Zhangjiakou or take the initiative to evacuate Zhangjiakou? The Central Military Commission replied on the 18th that under the slogan of defending Chahar, the main force should be concentrated in the appropriate areas to annihilate the attacking enemy, “to annihilate the enemy's vital forces, not to conserve individual places, so as to make the main force free to act” ②, while secretly evacuating the organs of Zhangjiakou. At the same time, he secretly evacuated the organs and materials in Zhangjiakou.

On September 20, Nie Rongzhen issued the Order on the Deployment of the Battle of Zhangjiakou. The order stipulated that 8 brigades would be placed in the area of Huailai and Yanqing as the main direction of defense, striving to annihilate one or two regiments of the enemy in the movement and then expanding the results of the battle. Another column (owing one brigade) was deployed in the Chai Gou Bao area on the western front to cooperate with the Jinsui forces in the Tianzhen and Yanggao areas and to guard against the advance of Fu Zuoyi's and Yan Xishan's forces. In addition, with 6 ① Nie Rongzhen's Military Wenxun, PLA Press, July 1992, 1st edition, p. 250

② Mao Zedong's Annals, Next Volume, People's Publishing House and Central Literature Publishing House, 1st edition, December 1993, p. 135.

The attack on the northern section of the Pinghan Line was carried out by a number of brigades as a pincer direction. Commanding the operation on the northern section of the Pinghan Line were Yang Chengwu and Wang Ping.

Nie Rongzhen judged that the east was the enemy's main direction of attack, so he focused his forces on the east, and threw into this battlefield the First, Second and Third Brigades of the First Column, the Fourth and Fifth Brigades of the Second Column, the Seventh Brigade of the Third Column, the Tenth Brigade of the Fourth Column, and the Fifth Independent Brigade, and mobilized a large number of militia to participate in the war; he also formed the command organ of the Field Army with Xiao Ke as the Commander, Luo Ruiqing as the Political Commissar, and went to the front line to directly Commanding the battle, and striving to annihilate more of the enemy before withdrawing from Zhangjiakou. Xiao Wenjiu, who was the commander of the Fifth Brigade of the Second Column at that time, recalled that Commander Nie Rongzhen had mobilized the cadres of the troops when he arrived at the Second Column, saying, “The one who comes is not good, and the one who is good is not coming, you must be prepared to fight a bad battle and a big battle here, and to hold off all the attacks of the enemy in order to defend Zhangjiakou.”

He also ordered the troops of the Jijieliao Military Region to clamp down on the enemy's Twelfth Army, and the local troops of the Jicha Military Region to carry out a full-scale guerrilla warfare to cooperate with the main force.

On September 29, the battle to the east of Zhangjiakou began, and the enemy's four divisions began to attack the Huailai area. Battle to October 2, the enemy into the occupation of East and West Garden and other places. 3, Li Wen threw into the second echelon of two divisions attempted to break through the fire camp positions, capture Huailai, frustrated and withdrew to the East and West Garden and other places. Chiang Kai-shek personally sent his Chief of Staff Chen Cheng to Nankou to deploy a flanking detour to Huailai. 7, the enemy 94th Army with two divisions from the southeast direction of Huailai detour. The Field Army Command recognized the enemy's attempt and set up an ambush with the entire First Column and two other brigades and one regiment in the area of Ma Chuanquan. Nie Rongzhen had led Guo Tianmin and other column leaders to look at the terrain and make specific deployments before the war, in addition to leading the chief of operations to investigate the area in the spring. He was able to remember the terrain there clearly until his later years. “As a defense, isn't that good terrain? Build some fortifications there and strike him ah!” That's how he described that pre-established position. One regiment of the enemy with all American mechanized equipment was basically eliminated here. Then two more battles were fought at Nanshiling and Zhenbiancheng, destroying more than 1,600 enemy men. Thus, the enemy's attempt to detour to Huailai was crushed. On the eastern front, a total of more than 10,000 enemy were annihilated and 6 enemy divisions were held back.

In the northern section of the Pinghan Road, Yang Chengwu and Wang Ping commanded 6 brigades to conquer 4 counties in a row, control 125 kilometers of railroad, capture all stations along the line, and annihilate more than 8,300 enemies. They took the field army to coordinate with local troops and militia, and first made a big breakthrough attack on Pinghan Road north and south of Baoding, so that the Pinghan Road was cut off. At the same time, they concentrated their superior forces on both sides of the Pinghan Road and the strongholds where the enemy's strength was weak, and annihilated dozens, hundreds to thousands of the enemy, and frequently won the battle. The victory of the northern section of the Pinghan Road was honored by the Yan'an Liberation Daily as

one of the “two victories in the north and south” , and linked with the “seven victories in seven battles” of the People's Liberation Army in East China.

If Fu Zuoyi's troops had not suddenly appeared in the north of Zhangjiakou, Nie Rongzhen would have been able to fully realize his aim of using the defense of Zhangjiakou as a bait to annihilate more of the enemy's vital forces.

When Li Wen Corps was blocked on the Eastern Front, Chiang Kai-shek played a “lure” the usual trick, ordered Zhangjiakou to the twelfth war zone, which greatly stimulated Fu Zuoyi's motivation. So, he mobilized 20,000 troops to avoid the western line of the Jinchahi forces fortified areas, from Jining eastward across hundreds of miles of grassland, suddenly appeared in Zhangjiakou north of Zhangbei area, on October 8 to occupy the dachigou, Zhangbei. The intelligence department also failed to discover this sneak attack by the enemy. Command Second Bureau Director Peng Fu Jiu for did not decipher Fu Zuoyi's sneak attack Zhangbei action has not been relieved, after the peaceful liberation of Beihu, he found the original Fu Zuoyi's chief of staff, made a detailed understanding of the situation, from which I learned that: Fu Zuoyi afraid of loss of confidentiality, the internal did not use Chiang Kai-shek's unified code, he has another set of Chiang's telegrams are regular, and Fu's telegrams intentionally make the upside down, to the time and the signatures inserted in the message, making it very difficult to decipher. The time and signature were inserted in the message, making it very difficult to decipher. Peng Fu Jiu also learned that: Fu Zuoyi did not have a deciphering organization, but set up a few radios to measure the direction, listen to the direction of the radio and the size of the sound, so as to know that the People's Liberation Army in the south-west of Zhangjiakou has the main force, while in the direction of Zhangbei empty. It should be said, Nie Rongzhen in the direction of Zhangbei is a miss, he only deployed a regiment in the area of Wanquan alert, to Zhangbei local troops “attention to the west of the enemy cavalry of the disturbance” . Later, Nie Rongzhen reviewed: “We were prepared for Fu Zuoyi's response to Huailai through Fengzhen, Datong, and Yanggao, but underestimated his direct insertion into Zhangbei from Jining and Shangyi.” ① Thus, it made the plan of annihilation on the eastern front not fully realized. Fu Zuoyi's sneak attack was a step above Li Wen.

At that time, the troops placed on the western front could not be transferred to the northern front for a while, and only a few local troops were blocking the enemy in Zhangbei, while Fu Zuoyi, who was mainly a cavalryman, acted quickly.

On this day, there were six enemy planes bombing and strafing over Zhangjiakou. Nie Rongzhen commanded the battle from the pit of his command headquarters at Dongshanpo. The sudden enemy attack did not cause him to lose his head.

He called Zheng Weishan, commander of the Zhangjiakou Garrison, to make emergency arrangements.

Recalling the scene, Zheng Weishan said:

Fu Zuoyi took advantage of my Zhangjiakou northwest direction of the emptiness, with a few troops towards the direction of Xinghe feint, mobilized the main force of foot and horseback more than 20,000 people, the first on October 8 to occupy my south trench moat (Shangyi), Dachigou. In zhangbei as guard troops of the seventh military sub-district, mistakenly thought it was a small group of the enemy scurrying, that is, sent two regiments of cavalry set off around the road, surrounded and destroyed the enemy, zhangbei only left a company stationed. On the same day, the enemy more than two thousand cavalry (soldiers) to take advantage of the weakness directly into the Zhangbei, so that the situation in Zhangjiakou suddenly tense up. At this time, just I sent guard regiment chief Li Jinshi with a battalion went to Zhangbei guard, in case of small enemy attacks, do not want to find the enemy's main force, will be with the seven sub-area troops together with the fight to the death. I learned of this situation, and sent the main force of the Security Corps rushed to Zhangbei. But the oil along the way was bombed by enemy planes, strafing and delayed the time to arrive in Zhangbei, the enemy forces have arrived one after another, and the enemy was forced to retreat after a fierce battle. The situation became even more serious. Mr. Nie ordered me to immediately send the Instruction Brigade, which had just returned from the Battle of Jining, to rush

to the line of Wolf's Nest between Zhangbei and Zhangjiakou to fight against the enemy and cover the transfer of the leading organs.

Chiang Kai-shek ordered the capture of Zhangjiakou on October 11th. As of the evening of the 10th, Nie Rongzhen was still in Zhangjiakou.

All levels of government, organs, factories and troops left behind were making their final transfer. It was a starry night, the enemy bombers buzzed all day and flew away before dark, and the air suddenly fell silent. There were few automobiles on the main road, but more big wagons and donkey packs, carrying tickets, cloth, medicine, salt, canned goods, the more bulky supplies had long ago been transferred to the Beiyue mountains, and now carried mostly household goods.

At eight or nine o'clock in the evening, a jeep from the east slope of the command compound, driving on Xuanhua Avenue.

Nie Rongzhen withdrew from Zhangjiakou that night, a round of bright moon hanging in the sky, as if there is also the feeling of farewell.

All the organs and troops are safely withdrawn, leaving only the teaching brigade in the last blockade of the enemy, Nie Rongzhen only in the bright moonlight, bid farewell to this mountain city outside the city.

Soon after he left, a truck drove out of the headquarters compound. Escorting the truck was Tang Yongjian, the chief of operations, who had a composite radio in the car, accompanied by Ma Ping, the station chief. Behind this vehicle was left an empty and silent compound sprinkled with moonlight. For Nie Rongzhen to retreat so late, many people are uneasy, constantly calling to ask, urging.

Zheng Weishan commanded the teaching brigade to resist the attack of Fu Zuoyi's troops. 9:00 on the 11th, Fu Zuoyi concentrated four divisions of troops poured all their strength to the Wolf Wo ditch position, the teaching brigade and the enemy fought for the whole day, after completing the task, the night withdrew from the position. They were the last troops to leave Zhangjiakou.

Fu Zuoyi's department occupied Zhangjiakou, Chiang Kai-shek was so elated that he ordered the pseudo-national convention to be held the next day to adopt a pseudo-constitution. The Kuomintang propaganda agency clamored: "The Communist army has collapsed in total" and "the military solution to the problem can be completed in three to five months" . But Nie Rongzhen said: for the various buildings and facilities in Zhangjiakou and its vicinity, such as the Xiahuyuan power plant, Zhangjiakou airfield, etc., the troops were told not to destroy them, ① Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen, PLA Publishing House, 2nd edition, March 1986, p. 639.

For one thing, there were still the masses of the people, and for another, the withdrawal was only temporary, and it would not be long before the red flag would be fluttering again on the citadel of Dajingmen.

Nevertheless, the power plant in the Lower Garden was destroyed. Zhang Su, the chairman of Chahar province, recalled: "Niu Shuzai of the provincial party committee and I went to Xiahuyuan and saw the destruction of the power plant, which was done by the workers.

Because the workers were not thinking straight, they did not want to leave it to the enemy." All of a sudden the lights went out in the mountain town.

While attacking Zhangjiakou, the enemy attacked the Jidong Liberation Area with 100,000 troops. The Jijieliao Military Region organized its troops to fight a defensive battle for more than 70 days, wiping out more than 7,000 of the enemy and occupying many counties in eastern Jidong.

After withdrawing from Zhangjiakou, Nie Rongzhen took into consideration that at that time, the Northeast Democratic Allied Forces retreated to South Manchuria and North Manchuria under the oppression of the enemy's heavy forces, and the cities of Shenyang, Siping, Changchun, Jilin and other vast areas were occupied by the enemy, so that difficulties in the sources of finance and troops occurred, and together with the fact that Chengde and Zhangjiakou had been successively occupied by the enemy, the connection between the Jizhazhéliao area and Jinchahijie was practically cut off. In this situation, he took the initiative to suggest to the CPC Central Committee that the Jichajioliao Military Region be transferred to the Northeast Democratic Allied Army, and in March 1947, the CPC Central Committee approved this suggestion.

This provided a very important base for the development of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army and the fulfillment of its financial needs.

On October 22, the Central Bureau of Jinchaji held the Laiyuan Conference. Before withdrawing from Zhangjiakou, although the decision to withdraw from Zhangjiakou was made, some people did not completely solve the problem in terms of cognition, and were even more emotionally unable to turn the corner. Some people said, “We fought hard against the war for eight years, drilled the ravine for eight years, and just entered Zhangjiakou a little more than a year, why give it up to the enemy again?” Others have the benefit of hindsight, for the abandonment of Zhangjiakou to talk about the long and loud.

Nie Rongzhen presided over this meeting, and made an important speech at the meeting. He specifically analyzed the situation in Zhangjiakou at that time, pointed out that the enemy concentrated so many troops, east and west pincer attack, the enemy is strong and I am weak, even if we pay a big price is still guarded not to wish that if hard to defend, will inevitably lead to to guard can not be guarded to go away from the consequences of that will be very serious. We take the initiative to withdraw, we get rid of the passive, to fight for the initiative, to obtain the freedom of action, can destroy the enemy in the movement, so that the war situation gradually to the direction favorable to us, to achieve the final complete initiative. He concluded: “From the overall perspective of the war, from the perspective of the situation of the enemy's strength and our

weakness, we should take stock of the situation and look to the future, not caring about the gain or loss of a city or a place, and should aim at annihilating the enemy's vital forces. But many comrades do not see this point. The loss of Zhangjiakou is taken too seriously. In fact, our temporary abandonment of Zhangjiakou? There is nothing wrong with it! The Japanese invaders of that year, also rampant, unbeatable, we fought with it for eight years, what is the result, but not our victory? Chiang Kai-shek is no exception, the reactionary forces will eventually fail, this is the inevitable, irresistible history.”

Xiao Ke later said, “To give up Zhangjiakou, the Central Bureau met and voted, and I first expressed my agreement. It is difficult to do ideological work within the Party, and some people have poor strategic vision and discuss things as they are. It was because the Pingsui line was abandoned in order to get to the Pinghan line to strike at the enemy's weakness. Comrade Nie Rongzhen and I see this. This is a correct measure.”

Through this meeting, everyone raised their awareness, summarized the lessons learned, clarified muddled concepts, overcame pessimism and despair, and built up confidence in overcoming the enemy.

The meeting also made the Decision on the Situation and Tasks after the Loss of Zhang Yuan. This decision, according to the spirit of Nie Rongzhen's speech at the meeting, stressed that: as long as we follow the instructions of the Central Committee, further unite the masses, mobilize the masses, mobilize all forces to adhere to the long-term war of self-defense, adhering to the principle of war of movement, war of annihilation, and more proactive mass annihilation of the enemy's vital forces, we can fundamentally change the military situation in the Jinchahi region. At the same time, the lessons of giving up Zhangjiakou were also reviewed: at the beginning, the estimation of domestic peace was too high, and the preparation for war was insufficient; the operations on Pingsui and Pinghan lines failed to develop into battle victories; and the main direction of attack of Fu Zuoyi's ministry was wrongly judged to be a detour to Zhangjiakou via Zhangbei.

After the Laiyuan meeting, gradually unified the thinking of everyone, eliminated the grievances after the retreat from Zhangjiakou, and morale was revitalized. At the same time, the construction of the field army was vigorously strengthened, 30,000 to 40,000 people were mobilized to join the army, the field army was replenished, and the number of each column was increased from the original 2 brigades to 3 brigades. At this time, the first column was returned to the Jin-Ji Lu-Yu Military Region, and the Jinchahi-Hebei Field Army governed the second, third and fourth columns, with Xiao Ke as the commander, Luo Ruiqing as the political commissar, Geng Biao as the chief of staff, and Pan Zili as the director of the political department. Everyone was united in their efforts to transform the war situation in Jinchahi.