

## 杨奎松：西安事变是中国历史的转折点 Yang Kuisong: The Xi' an Incident was an historic turning point in Chinese History

发布时间：2014-12-29 20:50 作者：杨奎松 浏览：44 次

New url: <http://w.hybsl.cn/article/13/50140>, accessed September 24, 2023

Also at

[https://www.sxlib.org.cn/dfzy/xasb/tslz/lwzj\\_18892/xasbyessjzgsbq\\_18898/201705/t20170525\\_722591.html](https://www.sxlib.org.cn/dfzy/xasb/tslz/lwzj_18892/xasbyessjzgsbq_18898/201705/t20170525_722591.html), accessed May 28, 2024

### FN 3 – Yang Kuisong on Xi' an Incident as Turning Point

1996年杨瀚生起在台湾为祖父杨虎城平反的念头，并在2005年付诸行动，他的作为虽然掀起舆论热潮，甚至引起时任国民党主席马英九的注意，但终究没有下文。笔者曾在台北国民党党史馆采访馆长邵铭煌，他提到杨瀚还专门与他讨论过这个问题。邵铭煌的立场是：没有任何一个国家会认定将领杀死领袖随从，并将领袖扣押的行为是合法的，让国民党为杨虎城在西安事变的行动平反，根本不可能。

邵铭煌的态度，决定了国民党短期内不可能为杨虎城和西安事变平反。这显示出国共两党对西安事变的立场差异。在中共的评价体系中，杨虎城和张学良是民族英雄，但国民党并不作如是判定，张、杨此后被软禁或暗杀的结局，充分说明了这一点。两蒋统治时期，国民党党史一直都刻意回避那一段历史。杨瀚此番并不顾及国民党的尴尬，要为自己祖父和西安事变“平反昭雪”，和国共开始第三次握手有关。而邵铭煌对笔者表示，可以为杨虎城被非法杀害道歉，但不能平反，因为平反涉及对西安事变的评价问题。国民党对西安事变持批判态度，这种评价迄今没有变过。

发生在七十多年前的西安事变，在中国近代史上具有重要意义。它虽然促成了国共的第二次合作，但这种合作并不长久。抗日战争胜利后，内战爆发，历史的主流开始从国民党手中滑向共产党。西安事变促成了这次转折，至今，它仍是国民党心中无法抹平的伤痛。

随着国共两党自 2005 年始出现和解迹象，中共对西安事变的纪念也发生微妙变化。1996 年西安事变 60 周年之际，江泽民总书记发表讲话；而在 2006 年，只是中央政治局常委、全国政协主席贾庆林在纪念西安事变 70 周年座谈会上发言。纪念规模明显降低。

随着相关档案的陆续公开，中国大陆学界对西安事变的研究也有了更多新的进展，我们需要超越被意识形态与党派利益遮蔽的新视角。为此，笔者采访了杨奎松教授。他的著作《西安事变新探》被国内外学界认为是该研究领域的扛鼎之作。

### 宋子文不可能陷害杨虎城

韩福东：杨虎城的孙子杨瀚要国民党为他祖父平反，国民党党史馆提出两个问题，出国的杨虎城当时为何回国，被拘禁起来？1949 年是谁下令杀害杨虎城？现在大陆方面关于西安事变的研究，对此有无新的发现？有没有证据表明，杨虎城被杀害是蒋介石下令？按常理来推，保密局自行决定和蒋介石下令两种可能性都存在。

杨奎松：目前没有更新的证据，解释基本上和过去差不太多。沈醉的回忆录实际也提到了，没有上级的手谕，他提到这件事情可能和毛人凤这些人有关，但具体由谁下令，他也不清楚。

韩福东：杨虎城抗战后为何回国？杨瀚在《杨虎城大传》里提到，米暂沉（曾任杨虎城秘书）后人米鹤都那有宋子文让杨虎城回国的电报。杨瀚认为是国民党引诱杨虎城回来的。但国民党党史馆馆长邵铭煌对电报的真实性怀疑，因为宋子文在西安事变后对张、杨都是比较保护的。

杨奎松：宋子文对张肯定是比较保护的，对杨没有这样一个承诺。我觉得，有电报没电报和阴谋都没有太大关系。蒋通过什么方式希望杨虎城回国，也是可能的，但是和宋子文的阴谋没有什么关系。因为根据对宋子文的研究，从来没有发现他在这方面跟蒋串通一气，要害杨虎城。这是不可能的。

韩福东：按以往的说法，杨虎城为何回国？

杨奎松：以往的说法是，他自己回来的。抗战全面爆发了，他自己要回来抗日。实际他是公开回来的，回来后被拘禁了。

韩福东：国民党方面也很在意杨虎城在西安事变前与中共的关系问题。流传的说法是，杨虎城最初想要入共产党，但中共没有同意。1928年同意他入党时，他已经离开日本了。但杨瀚说，实际情况是，他从日本回国后，收到准许他入党的函件了，但他那时向右转了，拒绝加入。

杨奎松：这个完全有可能，因为实际上他后来对共产党并不信任。包括西安事变之前，中共跟张学良建立关系很容易，张自己很主动，但杨虎城在这些方面始终跟中共中央保持距离。

韩福东：可是，杨虎城的部下，包括他的夫人，有很多都是共产党员。

杨奎松：这种说法不准确。他的部队里面有很多共产党员，但是那些共产党员，按照后来中共的正式说法，大都是脱党分子。他们不是有组织的党员，不是渗透进去的，没有真正意义上的共产党派进去的党员。杨虎城的夫人也不是。

韩福东：杨虎城知道他们是脱党分子吗？

杨奎松：他知道。正是因为他知道，所以他愿意用他们，他认为这些人很能干。东北军的作战能力不行

韩福东：西安事变前，张学良、杨虎城和中共打过几次，都失败了。

杨奎松：那是 1935 年的事情（1936 年西安事变前则不同，蒋刚刚取得了对红军在甘肃黄河沿岸作战的胜利，把红军主力逼到了甘北一隅）。那时因为东北军作战接连失利，张学良又得知南京方面正在与中共秘密接触，他当然会想，你蒋介石能跟中共谈判，我为什么要牺牲东北军跟中共打仗？

韩福东：张学良发动西安事变，确实是跟作战失利有一定的关系？

杨奎松：当然有一定的关系了。他在 1935 年之前跟中共中央没什么关系，想加入共产党也是 1936 年 6 月的事情。东北军当时的作战能力不行，完全不可能跟红军交手。

韩福东：蒋介石当时没有意识到东北军的作战能力问题吗？他为什么不调更强大一点的军队去剿共？

杨奎松：蒋介石派张学良，是因为当时中共到陕北的红军只有几千人，蒋介石根本不重视，他那时的重心放在西南，因为西南是独立的。他想把西南弄到手，变成他抗日的后方。另外，因为中共的主力部队（五六万人）都在川康地区，所以当时他把重心放在那边。没想到实际上中共中央在这边，而且利用这边靠近边境接通了跟苏联的关系，这是蒋介石没有想到的。西安事变不可能是杨虎城主导

韩福东：台湾学者多认为，在西安事变中，杨虎城比张学良强硬得多。

杨奎松：实际上两个人的态度差不多。只是在 12 月 25 号最后放蒋的时候，要不要蒋写一个书面的承诺，双方才有分歧。包括放蒋，杨虎城也是同意的。要蒋的书面承诺是中共中央先提出来的。中共中央提出来以后，杨虎城就觉得中共中央提的是对的，既然中共都这么坚持，就应该坚持。

韩福东：杨瀚认为，杨虎城在西安事变中起了主要作用。另外，上世纪 90 年代，张学良在回答张之丙姐妹的访谈时说：“那西安事变……那可以说他是主角哇，不过名义是我，我是主角了。当然由我负责任。”根据你的研究，西安事变中杨、张他俩谁更主要一些呢？

杨奎松：我觉得这个访谈不太准确，张之丙给张学良做的口述当中，很多问题提的都不太准确，记录也不准确。这个很难相信的。因为无论是从中共保存的双方接触交涉的档案资料看，还是从张学良自己五十年代写的回忆录看，这一点都很清楚。肯定是张学良一直在主导这件事，杨虎城与中共的交涉一直十分谨慎，与中共结盟的时间也比张晚得多。张学良 1936 年 4 月底就有与蒋撕破脸的想法了，中共的西北大联合计划就是建立在与张学良合作之上的，最初所有计划都没有提到杨虎城和十七路军。当然，就后来西安事变的具体方法而言，确是杨虎城出了一个主意，主张利用蒋来西安视察，把蒋捉起来，这也有档案可以作证明。

韩福东：是杨虎城先起意发动西安事变的？

杨奎松：张学良当时觉得，已经无法劝蒋停止剿共了，杨虎城说还是有可能的：你如果是真心干的话，就趁蒋介石来的时候把他捉起来。不过，在这之前，张学良跟中共在 4 月下旬就已经谈得很清楚了。他要反蒋，无非就是时间问题，他想等半年。半年之内他准备一些工作，等苏联的态度。红军当时在陕北有 1 万多人，东北军有十几万。这才是后来会发生西安事变最主要的前提。

张学良想联合苏联

韩福东：苏联在西安事变中是一个什么样的角色？发动之前苏联介入了吗？

杨奎松：没有。苏联对张学良不信任，因为 1927 年在北京抄苏联大使馆、杀李大钊，是张学良父亲干的。1929 年在东北抄苏联领事馆、收中东铁路，是张学良干的。而且，在中国当时的情况下，苏联重视的是谁能够领导中国抗日，这只能是蒋介石，靠张学良的部队是绝对不行的。因此他们坚持共产党要跟蒋介石去谈判。

韩福东：张学良想加入共产党未获批准，主要也是苏联的一个决定。

杨奎松：那当然了。

韩福东：张学良为什么发起西安事变？除了不想内战，想抗日外，有没有其他原因？

杨奎松：主要是跟中共中央的关系问题。因为他发动事变前的 1936 年 11 月，中共接取苏联援助武器装备的宁夏战役刚刚失利，损失很大，处在非常危险的状态。当时红军三个方面军已会合在甘肃北部，但国民党中央军也围追堵截过来，把红军逼到很小的一块地方，已无法继续再生存了，中共中央只好决定再来一次长征，突破包围圈后想办法进山西、河南、陕西，经过一年左右再转回来。张学良跟中共中央已经密谋合作了很长时间，想要通过中共联合苏联。如果中共走了，张学良的这个计划也就彻底泡汤了。

韩福东：张学良要联合苏联的目的是什么呢？

杨奎松：当然是要抗日，东北军拖家带口、离乡背井，跑到西北来能呆多久，整个东北人都想回东北啊。但靠蒋介石能打回东北吗？这一点张学良非常明白，蒋介石自己也讲得很明白，东北问题不是靠中国自己能解决的。张学良当时要想回东北，唯一可以指望的，只有苏联。因此，发动西安事变不是张学良单纯地想要逼蒋抗日的问题，最直接刺激他的原因是红军要走，他必须要把中共中央和红军留下来。因为张学良抗日必须要联苏，而联苏他除了找中共，别无他途。如果红军自己跑掉了，回不来，或者蒋介石把共产党消灭了，他也就没有联苏的希望了。另外，张学良这些人真的会天真到以为只要把蒋扣起来，用枪指着蒋介石的脑袋，蒋介石就会答应他的条件吗？不可能吧。张学良扣蒋实际上就已经做

好了和蒋彻底翻脸的准备。他事变当天在给中共中央的第一封电报里第一句话讲的就是：“蒋介石反革命面目已毕现”。以后他在给毛泽东去电要求知道苏联政府的态度时，问的也是苏联对他的“一二一二革命”（即西安事变）有何意见。由此可知，张学良发动事变时其实就表明了站到中共和苏联一边，参加“革命”了。这已经超出打回东北老家去的目标了。

西安事变前，蒋介石抗日是肯定的

韩福东：之前流传一种说法，认为张学良放弃东北不抵抗，是蒋介石下的令。但现在史学界已经把这个案子给翻过来了。

杨奎松：张学良自己就否定了。指挥当然是他自己指挥的，蒋介石当时没有什么专门的密令。但是问题不在这，问题在于当时的情况下，无论张学良还是蒋介石，在这个事件之前，都讲过类似的话：不能够抵抗，不能够挑动跟日本之间的冲突。因为你挑动的话，关东军马上就能够占领东北。他们对冲突的结果都很清楚，所以内心都知道即使日本挑衅也一定不能够打，要通过外交手段来解决。张和蒋在这点上是一致的，各种各样的文件电报在这之前就有。

韩福东：这是不是意味着，当日军真的对东北进行占领时，也不抵抗？

杨奎松：这就要具体分析了。张学良后来讲过，他当时的问题是没有想到日军会借着一个沈阳的局部冲突乘机大规模地占领整个东北，他开始认为是个局部事件。东北这样的局部性事件多了。包括前面发生的好几起事件，像万宝山事件、中村事件等，都是局部性的。

韩福东：但是等到东北军撤出东北，是不是基本上也没有放一枪？

杨奎松：也不能那么说。后来马占山部在黑龙江不就抵抗过吗？但第一，东北军的作战能力肯定不行。第二，张学良也害怕硬拼会把整个东北军全部牺牲掉。张学良毕竟还是一介军阀，在当时中国的情形就是这样，如果你没有部队你就一钱不值了，如果还有较多的本钱，万一日本在当时国联的干预下撤回南满铁路附近去呢，他不就又可以回东北了吗？第三，他早就归顺了中央，东北丢了也不是他东北人自己的事，是整个中国的事，因此他也一直寄希望中央帮助他，中央当时也一直在向国联控告，国联也一直在压日本撤军。这也是他不愿意东北军自己去打的一个原因。

韩福东：那么在西安事变之前蒋介石对日的思路是什么？可以说他不抵抗吗？

杨奎松：也不是，蒋介石其实一直在暗中准备抵抗。这是肯定的，他做了大量的准备工作。问题是无论九一八事变之前，还是之后，中国其实都没有能够真正统一起来，南京中央政府一直在和各种分裂、分立势力打内战。九一八前后光是分裂的中央政府和分立的国家就有好几个。1930 年是与北平的国民政府对抗，1931 年是与广东的国民政府对抗，1931 年还有一个中华苏维埃共和国在江西宣告成立，1934 年又有一个中华共和国在福建宣告成立。蒋介石当年可以说是分身乏术，今天打这个，明天打那个，因此他的准备工作很困难。另外，当时中日两国各方面条件相差很远，经济和实力都无法和日本对抗。蒋在 1932 年指挥过上海抗战，1933 年指挥过长城抗战，知道仅仅是军事上两军的对抗，中方只能取守势，而且无法守得住。这也是为何他一直希望通过外交的方式，包括想要采取联合苏联的方式来解决问题的原因所在。

韩福东：蒋介石当时的思路是，先把共产党解决了，再抗日？

杨奎松：蒋的国策“攘外必先安内”，安内是前提，但安内不只是对共产党，包括对国内各种地方割据势力。像今天大家所熟知的西南几省军阀，国民党中央军就是通过追剿中央红军乘机解决的，抗日战争爆发后中国政府能够退守西南，坚持 8 年，这就是蒋当年谋略的一个成功之处。今天看蒋介石 1934-1935 年的一些文献，他确实在当时就已经把西南几省当做中国对日作战的战略后方来经营了。从这一点也可以看出，关键是日本进攻不进攻，日本如果进攻，他肯定要打。西南几省拿下来之后，他就已经在 1935 年和 1936 年国

民党中央全会和五大上发表了很强硬的关于“最后关头”的讲话，对日政策最后的底线就是华北不能丢。日本如果在华北发动进攻，他一定打。

中共承认公开蒋介石六项承诺很幼稚

韩福东：张、杨发动西安事变之前，确实没有通知中共吗？说中共中央没有参与策划，这方面资料充分吗？

杨奎松：当然没参与，资料很充分。从当年留下来的电报资料看，张学良曾经在事变前几天打电报给中共中央，急召中共中央负责和他联络的代表叶剑英来西安。中共中央光看到12月7号张让叶剑英赶快过去，说是有重要事情相商，但并不知道重要的事情是什么，所以就没有让叶剑英马上走，而是让他等了几天，等因病准备去苏联的王稼祥讲，这个说法不太准确。和平解决是中共从一开始就主张的，它并不希望因为西安事变造成全国内战。在这一点上，中共中央内部没有什么争议。有争议的是，用什么方法来实现和平解决。因为中共中央领导人当时多数都想乘机把蒋除掉，只有张闻天等少数人对此有保留。

韩福东：问题是，把蒋除掉后，西安事变能够和平解决吗？

杨奎松：对，这恰恰是最大的一个问题。当初中共中央领导人都认为，蒋介石是不可能同意和红军达成妥协的。既然把蒋捉起来，当然就要把他除掉，至少也要搞个公审什么的，把蒋从南京政府中排除掉。当时就有人认为，这样南京军队就会群龙无首，全国反蒋派一响应，事情就和平解决了。实际上无论是中共中央，还是张学良、杨虎城，他们当时对蒋介石在国内民众心目中的威信和蒋作为中国中央政府最高权力形象的作用估计，都大大脱离了实际。他们完全没有想到西安事变会引起全国各界那样强烈的反感。

韩福东：后来决定放蒋，那个时候有没有担心蒋可能不会遵守诺言？

杨奎松：当然有担心。这就是为什么在 12 月 25 号决定放蒋的时候，中共中央专门有一个电报，要求无论如何要蒋留个字据。

韩福东：张学良确实是没有通过中共，就在蒋没立字据的情况下，把蒋放走了？

杨奎松：当然。蒋就这样走了，中共和杨虎城等其实都比较紧张，这也是为什么他们接二连三地出来公布所谓蒋的六项承诺，毛选里专门有一篇文章就讲蒋介石承诺这个问题。实际上这是一个非常不策略的做法。因为蒋是非常要面子的一个人，何况他又是全国的最高领袖，无论他的性格还是他当时的地位和身份，他都不会公开承认自己在被扣押期间承诺了什么样的条件。何况蒋介石根本就没有和中共及张、杨进行过什么谈判，都是两宋出的面，他也无须承认自己在枪口下答应了什么，即使答应了，如此胁迫情况下的承诺也是可以推翻的。所以苏联在这个问题上很恼火，得知中共公布所谓蒋承诺后，马上来电斥责中共中央的做法很愚蠢。中共中央后来在 1937 年 2 月开会的时候，也承认自己当时这样做在政治上非常幼稚。

韩福东：但是，抛出来之后，蒋也遵守了。

杨奎松：以蒋介石的性格，以及当时他身边人的影响看，蒋本来也是会按照承诺去做的。你可以说蒋很笨，但这恰恰就是蒋介石为人处事有时候所表现出来的一个特点，或者叫弱点。当然，蒋并不是所有条件都严格遵守了，像改组政府就没做。有些东西在他当时那种情况下其实也是做不成的，他也不能做。而且你把这个条件一公布，他就更受牵制了，有的事情即使能做反而也不能做了。这个道理很简单。

西安事变前，中共军事失利，条件已放低

韩福东：西安事变前，共产党东征，打到过山西阎锡山的地盘上。中华书局版李新主编的《中华民国史》中说，张学良在和李克农会谈的时候，建议他们走宁、绥，因为宁夏接近绥远前线，又靠近苏联，阻力小，认为山西阎锡山的势力大，东征山西恐难顺利行进。李

克农说，出山西主要是从政治上考虑，政治影响大，有利于推动抗日民族统一战线的形成。《剑桥中华民国史》也说，“东征”的一个后果是，西北地方军事领导人，包括张学良在内，开始相信中共的爱国主义诺言。这种说法对吗？

杨奎松：完全不对。当时中共争取国人同情的一个最主要政治口号是“停止内战，一致对外”，主张“中国人不打中国人”。你去打山西，明摆着是打内战，是打中国人嘛，怎么能说是为了推动抗日？你把阎锡山打了，阎锡山就认为你爱国了？不错，打山西时红军是提出了一个口号，叫做“打通抗日路线”，说阎锡山是日本走狗，阻拦红军去河北打日军。但这其实只是一个宣传口号。打山西的下一步是转进绥远，然后接通外蒙，打通国际路线，即是要接通与苏联的联系，取得苏联的军事援助。当然这一步后来没有实现，但东征山西的目的基本上还是实现了。东征山西主要目的是什么呢？是为了解决粮食和兵源的问题。你想，当年陕北苏区才有多大，原来在那里就有一支万人左右的红军，1935年秋冬突然又增加了六七千人，陕北那一小块地方，沟壑纵横，几乎寸草不生，哪有多少粮食可以供应这么多人口，老百姓也没有几个。因此，红军生存必须要满足的征粮和招兵都根本不可能做到。韩福东：山西阎锡山的势力很强大，为了粮食和兵源为何不去宁夏、甘肃？

杨奎松：宁夏、甘肃都是少数民族地区，汉人红军去那里更不容易生存。红军一路长征过来，对此有很多经验和教训，不到万不得已是不会去的，后来红军西路军2万多人全军覆没，就是因为跑到那个地方去，连块根据地都建不起来。何况，那两个地方也不比陕北强多少，一样也没有多少粮食和人。从陕北去山西就完全不同了，跨过黄河，就是河套地区，粮食多，人口也很稠密，很富饶，因此东征从征粮和扩军来说肯定是最好的选择。红军东征连捉俘虏带征丁，一下子就扩充了3000多人。

韩福东：历史不能假设，但我们不妨假设一下。没有西安事变，全面抗战会延后吗？中国未来的格局会不一样吗？西安事变的意义到底有多大？

杨奎松：过去在美国有一个叫吴天威的教授，写过一本书叫《西安事变——中国现代历史的转折》，他的这个书名应该说比较准确地说明了西安事变的历史作用。多少年来，国民

党的说法就是，西安事变是国民党开始从成功走向失败的一个转折点。他们认为，国民党的失败都是因为西安事变，所以他们对张学良、杨虎城恨得要死。从中共角度来讲，毛泽东他们这一代领导人之所以一直将张学良、杨虎城称作“民族英雄”，也是因为对张、杨确实存在一种感恩的心情。因为如果没有西安事变，毛泽东讲得很清楚，即我们剩下的这些领导人搞不好都会进监狱。毛的原话是西安事变“把我们从牢狱之灾中解救了出来”，这并不是夸大其词。因为当时红军的处境确实非常危险，红军虽然有计划再搞一次长征，但试想一下，中央红军从江西出来一直往西打，走的是地方军阀控制的几省交界的地方，基本上没有和中央军正面交过手，就这样转了几个月到四川时，只剩下1万多人。到了陕北，只剩下6000多人，损失减员百分之九十以上。中央红军当年从江西出来的时候，准备了好几个月，人强马壮。1936年11月的时候，二、四两个方面军都已残缺不全，二方面军1万多人基本上失去了战斗力，几乎不能打仗，四方面军2万多人过了黄河，进了甘肃，后来全军覆没，剩下的两三万人大冬天还穿着短裤短衫。整个部队粮草、被服全无来源，枪弹也严重不足，中央军已经和红军正面交锋，要想再打到已有中央军严防死守的山西、河南、陕西这些地方去，恐怕打回来的可能都没有。这也是毛泽东讲等着他们的可能是牢狱之灾的原因所在。

韩福东：即便没有西安事变，中共有统战的策略，又有苏联的影响，就不可能与国民党达成统一抗日的协议吗？

杨奎松：在西安事变前夕已经不可能了。蒋介石本来是想要用政治方法解决共产党问题的，他在1936年初就提出了红军改编、苏维埃改制的条件，就是想要通过收降地方军阀的办法，把红军改编成国民革命军，把中共苏维埃政权取消，给中共一小块地方，搞一个地方政府。如能解决，就好腾出手来对付日本人了。中共最初不同意蒋的办法，要和蒋搞联合政府，要南京与中共，加上地方实力派，共同组成国防政府和抗日联军。双方多次谈判都谈不拢，直到共产国际出面干预，改变策略，到1936年11月红军已经极端困难的情况下，中共中央才同意按照蒋的办法做。但蒋介石眼看红军三个方面军都集中到甘肃来，中央军很容易集中消灭红军了，他的要价又高了，要收编红军，并要求毛、朱离开军队，到南京做官或出洋。中共当然也很难接受。当时在蒋介石看来，就是他对张学良所说的那句名言，即“最后五分钟的努力”。他已经看不出为什么还要和中共谈判了，干脆用武力

的方法来解决好了，双方还怎么可能再去达成什么协议？结果很清楚，如果没有西安事变，中共很可能会失败，但问题是，蒋介石太失算了，他完全没有想到张学良会背叛他。

DeepL Translation

Yang Kuisong: Xi'an Incident is a turning point in Chinese history

Published: 2014-12-29 20:50 Author: Yang Kuisong Browsing: 44 times

In 1996, Yang Han had the idea of vindicating his grandfather Yang Hucheng in Taiwan and put it into action in 2005, and although his action set off a public opinion frenzy and even drew the attention of the then KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou, there was no follow-up after all. The author once interviewed Shao Ming-huang, the curator of the KMT Party History Museum in Taipei, who mentioned that Yang Han had even discussed the issue with him specifically. Shao Ming-huang's position was that no country would recognize the act of a general killing the leader's entourage and holding the leader in custody as legal, and that it was simply impossible for the KMT to vindicate Yang Hucheng's actions in the Xi'an Incident.

Shao Minghuang's attitude determined that it was impossible for the KMT to vindicate Yang Hucheng and the Xi'an Incident in the short term. This shows the difference in the stance of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party towards the Xi'an Incident. In the evaluation system of the CPC, Yang Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang were national heroes, but the KMT did not judge them as such. The fact that Zhang and Yang were thereafter put under house arrest or assassinated amply illustrates this point. During the period of Chiang's rule, the KMT party history has always deliberately avoided that part of history. Yang Han's attempt to "vindicate" his grandfather and the Xi'an Incident, regardless of the KMT's embarrassment, is related to the beginning of the third handshake between China and the Communist Party. Shao Minghuang told the author that he could apologize for Yang Hucheng's unlawful killing, but could not vindicate him because the vindication involved the evaluation of the Xi'an Incident. The KMT was critical of the Xi'an Incident, and this evaluation has not changed so far.

The Xi'an Incident, which took place more than 70 years ago, is of great significance in China's modern history. Although it led to the second cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, this cooperation did not last long. After the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, civil war broke out and the mainstream of history began to slip from the hands of the Kuomintang to the Communists. The Xi'an Incident contributed to this turn of events, and to this day, it remains a wound in the heart of the Kuomintang that cannot be erased.

With signs of reconciliation between the KMT and the CCP beginning in 2005, the CCP's commemoration of the Xi'an Incident has also undergone a subtle change: in 1996, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Xi'an Incident, General Secretary Jiang Zemin delivered a speech; in 2006, it was only Jia Qinglin, a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Politburo and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), who made a statement at a symposium on the 70th anniversary of the Xi'an Incident. The scale of the commemoration was significantly reduced.

With the successive release of the relevant archives, there have been many new developments in the study of the Xi'an Incident in mainland China's academic circles, and we need to go beyond the new perspectives that have been obscured by ideology and partisan interests. For this reason, the author interviewed Prof. Yang Kuisong. His book "A New Inquiry into the Xi'an Incident" is considered by domestic and international academics to be a masterpiece in this field of study.

Song Ziwen Could Not Have Framed Yang Hucheng

Han Fudong: Yang Hucheng's grandson, Yang Han, wanted the KMT to vindicate his grandfather, and the KMT's Party History Center raised two questions: Why did Yang Hucheng, who had gone abroad, return home and be detained at that time, and who ordered Yang Hucheng's death in 1949? Is there any new discovery about the Xi'an Incident in the mainland research? Is there any evidence

that Yang Hucheng's murder was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek? Common sense suggests that both the Secret Service's own decision and Chiang Kai-shek's order are possibilities.

Yang Queisong: There is no newer evidence, and the explanation is basically not too far from the past. Shen Drunk's memoirs actually mention that there was no higher-level oracle, and he mentions that this matter may have been related to Mao Renfeng and these people, but he is not sure exactly who ordered it.

Han Fudong: Why did Yang Hucheng return to China after the war? Yang Han mentioned in "Yang Hucheng's Great Biography" that Mi Hedun, a descendant of Mi Tengshen (who was Yang Hucheng's secretary), had a telegram from Song Ziwen telling Yang Hucheng to return to China. Yang Han believed that the KMT lured Yang Hucheng back. However, Shao Minghuang, director of the KMT's Party History Center, doubted the authenticity of the telegram because Song Ziwen was more protective of both Zhang and Yang after the Xi'an Incident.

YANG KUISONG: Song Ziwen was definitely more protective of Zhang and did not have such a commitment to Yang. I don't think that having a telegram or not having a telegram has much to do with the conspiracy. It is possible that Chiang wanted Yang Hucheng to return to China by whatever means, but it has nothing to do with Song Ziwen's conspiracy. Because according to the study of Song Ziwen, it has never been found that he conspired with Chiang in this regard to harm Yang Hucheng. This is impossible.

Han Fudong: According to previous accounts, why did Yang Hucheng return to China?

YANG KUISONG: The past statement was that he came back on his own. The war of resistance was in full swing, and he himself wanted to come back to fight the Japanese. In actuality, he came back openly, and was detained after he came back.

Han Fudong: The KMT side was also concerned about the issue of Yang Hucheng's relationship with the CCP before the Xi'an Incident. The story that circulated was that Yang Hucheng initially wanted to join the Communist Party, but the CCP didn't agree. by the time they agreed to let him join in 1928, he had already left Japan. But Yang Han said that in reality, he received a letter granting him permission to join the party after he returned from Japan, but he turned right then and refused to join.

YANG QUISONG: This is entirely possible, because actually he didn't trust the Communist Party afterwards. Including before the Xi'an Incident, it was easy for the CCP to establish a relationship with Zhang Xueliang, and Zhang himself took the initiative, but Yang Hucheng always distanced himself from the CCP Central Committee in these respects.

Han Fudong: However, many of Yang Hucheng's subordinates, including his wife, were members of the Communist Party.

YANG QUISONG: This statement is not accurate. There were a lot of communists inside his troops, but those communists, according to the later official statement of the CCP, were mostly defectors. They were not organized party members, they were not infiltrated, there was no real sense that the Communist Party sent in party members. Neither was Yang Hucheng's wife.

Han Fudong: Did Yang Hucheng know that they were defectors?

YANG QUISONG: He knew. It was because he knew that he was willing to use them, and he thought they were very capable. The Northeast Army is not capable of fighting

Han Fudong: Before the Xi'an Incident, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng fought with the CCP a few times, and they all failed.

Yang Kuisong: That was in 1935 (before the Xi'an Incident in 1936 was different, Chiang had just gained a victory against the Red Army fighting along the Yellow River in Gansu, forcing the main force of the Red Army to the northern part of Gan). At that time, because of the successive defeats of the Northeast Army in battle, and Zhang Xueliang learned that Nanjing was secretly in contact with the CCP, he would of course think, "If you, Chiang Kai-shek, can negotiate with the CCP, why should I sacrifice the Northeast Army to fight with the CCP?"

Han Fudong: Did Zhang Xueliang's launching of the Xi'an Incident have something to do with the loss of battle?

Yang Queisong: Of course it had something to do with it. He had nothing to do with the CCP before 1935, and it was only in June 1936 that he wanted to join the Communist Party. The Northeast Army was not capable of fighting at that time, and it was totally impossible to fight the Red Army.

Han Fudong: Didn't Chiang Kai-shek realize the problem of the Northeast Army's combat capability at that time? Why didn't he transfer a little stronger army to fight the Communists?

Yang Kuisong: Chiang Kai-shek sent Zhang Xueliang because at that time the CCP had only a few thousand Red Army soldiers in northern Shaanxi, and Chiang Kai-shek didn't pay any attention to it at all; his focus at that time was on Southwest China because Southwest China was independent. He wanted to get the Southwest and turn it into his rear of the anti-Japanese. In addition, because the main force of the CPC (50,000 to 60,000 men) were in the Sichuan-Kangzhou area, he put his center of gravity over there at that time. He didn't realize that the CPC Central Committee was actually over there, and used the proximity of this area to the border to connect with the Soviet Union, which Chiang Kai-shek didn't expect. The Xi'an Incident could not have been led by Yang Hucheng.

Han Fudong: Most Taiwanese scholars believe that Yang Hucheng was much tougher than Zhang Xueliang in the Xi'an Incident.

YANG QUISONG: In fact, the attitude of the two men was more or less the same. It was only when it came to the final release of Chiang on December 25th, whether or not Chiang had to write a written commitment that the two sides disagreed. Including the release of Chiang, Yang Hucheng also agreed. It was the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that first proposed the idea of a written undertaking by Chiang. After the CCP Central Committee raised it, Yang Hucheng felt that the CCP Central Committee was right to raise it, and since the CCP had insisted on it, it should be adhered to.

Han Fudong: Yang Han believes that Yang Hucheng played a major role in the Xi'an Incident. In addition, in the 1990s, Zhang Xueliang said in response to an interview with Zhang Zhi Bing's sisters, "Then the Xi'an Incident ..... that can be said that he is the main character wow, but the name is me, I am the main character now. Of course I am responsible for it." According to your research, who was more dominant in the Xi'an Incident, Yang or Zhang?

Yang Queisong: I think this interview is not very accurate, in the dictation that Zhang Zhi Bing gave to Zhang Xueliang, a lot of questions are not very accurate, and the records are not accurate. This is hard to believe. This is because it is very clear, both from the archives kept by the CCP on the contacts and negotiations between the two sides, and from Zhang Xueliang's own memoirs written in the 1950s. It must have been Zhang Xueliang who had been leading the affair, and Yang Hucheng had been very cautious in his dealings with the CCP, and had allied himself with the CCP much later than Zhang. Zhang Xueliang had the idea of tearing himself away from Chiang by the end of April 1936, and the CCP's plan for a grand alliance in the Northwest was based on cooperation with Zhang Xueliang, and all the plans initially made no mention of Yang Hucheng or the 17th Route Army. Of course, as far as the specific method of the Xi'an Incident is concerned, it was Yang Hucheng who had the idea of utilizing Chiang's visit to Xi'an to arrest him, and this is also proved by the archives.

Han Fudong: Did Yang Hucheng first initiate the Xi'an Incident?

YANG QUISONG: Zhang Xueliang felt at that time that it was no longer possible to persuade Chiang to stop the suppression of the Communists, and Yang Hucheng said that it was still possible: if you are sincere in doing this, catch Chiang Kai-shek while he is here. However, before that, Zhang Xueliang and the CCP had talked clearly in late April. If he wanted to oppose Chiang, it was just a matter of time, and he wanted to wait for half a year. Within half a year he prepared some work and waited for the attitude of the Soviet Union. The Red Army had more than 10,000 men in Shaanxi at that time, and the Northeastern Army had more than 100,000 men. That was the main premise that the Xi'an Incident would happen later.

Zhang Xueliang wanted to unite with the Soviet Union

Han Fudong: What was the role of the Soviet Union in the Xi'an Incident? Did the Soviet Union intervene before launching it?

YANG Kuisong: No. The Soviet Union did not trust Zhang Xueliang. The Soviet Union didn't trust Zhang Xueliang because it was Zhang Xueliang's father who raided the Soviet embassy in Beijing in 1927 and killed Li Dazhao, and it was Zhang Xueliang who raided the Soviet consulate in Northeast China in 1929 and took over the Middle East Railway. Moreover, under the circumstances in China at that time, the Soviet Union valued who could lead China against the Japanese, which could only be Chiang Kai-shek, and relying on Zhang Xueliang's troops would never work. So they insisted that the Communists go and negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek.

HAN Fudong: The fact that Zhang Xueliang's attempt to join the Communist Party was not approved was also mainly a decision of the Soviet Union.

YANG Kuesong: That's certainly true.

Han Fudong: Why did Zhang Xueliang initiate the Xi'an Incident? Besides not wanting a civil war and wanting to resist Japan, were there any other reasons?

YANG Kuisong: It was mainly a matter of relationship with the CCP Central Committee. Because before he started the Incident, in November 1936, the CPC had just lost the battle of Ningxia, in which the CPC received Soviet aid for weapons and equipment, and had suffered great losses and was in a very dangerous state. At that time, the Red Army's three front armies had already converged in northern Gansu, but the Kuomintang Central Army was also chasing and intercepting them, forcing the Red Army to a very small piece of land, where it could not continue to survive any longer, so the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) had to decide to go on another Long March, break through the encirclement and then try to find a way to enter Shanxi, Henan, and Shanxi, and then turn back again after a year or so. Zhang Xueliang and the CPC Central Committee had been conspiring to work together for a long time, wanting to unite the Soviet Union through the CPC. If the CPC left, this plan of Zhang Xueliang would be completely lost.

Han Fudong: What was Zhang Xueliang's purpose in trying to unite with the Soviet Union?

Yang Kuisong: Of course it is to fight against the Japanese, the Northeast Army dragged their families and left their homes, how long can they stay in the Northwest, the whole Northeast people want to go back to the Northeast ah. But can we rely on Chiang Kai-shek to fight our way back to the Northeast? This point Zhang Xueliang understand very well, Chiang Kai-shek himself also said very clearly, the Northeast problem can not be solved by China itself. The only thing Zhang Xueliang could count on at that time to return to the Northeast was the Soviet Union. Therefore, the launching of the Xi'an Incident was not a matter of Zhang Xueliang simply wanting to force Chiang to resist the Japanese; the most direct stimulus to him was that the Red Army was going to leave, and he had to leave the CPC Central Committee and the Red Army behind. Because Zhang

Xueliang's anti-Japanese resistance had to unite with the Soviet Union, and to unite with the Soviet Union he had no alternative but to seek out the CCP. If the Red Army ran away by itself and could not come back, or if Chiang Kai-shek wiped out the CPC, he would have no hope of uniting with the Soviet Union. Besides, would people like Zhang Xueliang really be so naive as to think that Chiang would agree to his terms just by holding Chiang up and holding a gun to his head? No way. By detaining Chiang, Zhang Xueliang was actually prepared to completely turn his back on Chiang. The first sentence of his first telegram to the CPC Central Committee on the day of the incident was: "The counter-revolutionary face of Chiang Kai-shek has been revealed". Later, when he sent a telegram to Mao Zedong asking for the attitude of the Soviet government, he also asked what the Soviet Union thought of his "1212 Revolution" (i.e. the Xi'an Incident). From this, we can see that when Zhang Xueliang started the Incident, he actually indicated that he would side with the CCP and the USSR and participate in the "revolution". This went beyond the goal of fighting back home in the Northeast.

Before the Xi'an Incident, Chiang Kai-shek's resistance to the Japanese was certain.

Han Fudong: Previously, there was a rumor that Chiang Kai-shek ordered Zhang Xueliang to abandon the Northeast without resistance. But now the historians have turned the case over.

YANG QUISONG: Zhang Xueliang himself denied it. The command was of course his own command, and Chiang Kai-shek did not have any special secret orders at that time. But the problem is not that, the problem is that at that time, both Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek, before this incident, both said similar words: not to resist, not to provoke the conflict with Japan. Because if you do, the Kwantung Army will be able to take over the Northeast immediately. They both knew the outcome of the conflict very well, so they knew in their hearts that even if Japan provoked the conflict, they must not fight, but solve it through diplomatic means. Zhang and Chiang were in common on this point, and all sorts of documents and telegrams preceded this.

Han Fudong: Does this mean that when the Japanese army did occupy the Northeast, it also did not resist?

YANG QUISONG: This has to be analyzed specifically. Zhang Xueliang later said that his problem at that time was that he did not think that the Japanese would take advantage of a localized conflict in Shenyang to take advantage of a large-scale occupation of the entire Northeast, and he began to think that it was a localized event. There were many such localized incidents in the Northeast. Including several incidents that happened earlier, like the Wanbaoshan Incident and the Nakamura Incident, all of which were localized.

Han Fudong: But by the time the Northeast Army withdrew from the Northeast, was it basically without firing a single shot as well?

YANG QUISONG: You can't say that. Didn't Ma Zhanshan's division later resist in Heilongjiang? But first, the Northeast Army's combat capability is certainly not. Secondly, Zhang Xueliang is also afraid of hard fighting will be the entire Northeast Army all sacrificed. After all, Zhang Xueliang is still a warlord, at that time the situation in China is like this, if you do not have troops you are worthless, if there is still more money, in case Japan in the intervention of the League of Nations at that time to withdraw near the South Manchuria Railway to go, he can not go back to the Northeast again? Thirdly, he had long ago submitted to the Central Authorities, and the loss of the Northeast was not his own business, but the business of the whole of China. Therefore, he had also been counting on the Central Authorities to help him, and the Central Authorities had been complaining to the League of Nations at that time, and the League of Nations had been pressing Japan to withdraw its troops. That was one of the reasons why he didn't want the Northeastern Army to fight on its own.

Han Fudong: So what was Chiang Kai-shek's thinking about Japan before the Xi'an Incident? Is it fair to say that he did not resist?

YANG QUISONG: Not really, Chiang Kai-shek had actually been secretly preparing for resistance. That's for sure, he did a lot of preparatory work. The problem is that both before and after the September 18th Incident, China was not really able to unify, and the central government in Nanjing had been fighting a civil war against all kinds of divisive and separatist forces. Before and after the September 18th Incident, there were several divided central governments and separate states, in 1930 against the national government in Beijing, in 1931 against the national government in Guangdong, in 1931 a Chinese Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Jiangxi, and in 1934 a Chinese Republic was proclaimed in Fujian. It could be said that Chiang Kai-shek was divided in those years, fighting this one day and that the next, so his preparations were difficult. In addition, at that time, the conditions of China and Japan were far apart in all aspects, and they were unable to fight against Japan in terms of economy and strength. Having commanded the Shanghai Resistance War in 1932 and the Great Wall Resistance War in 1933, Chiang knew that in a mere military confrontation between the two armies, China could only take a defensive position and could not hold it. That's why he always hoped to solve the problem through diplomatic means, including trying to take the approach of uniting with the Soviet Union.

Han Fudong: Chiang Kai-shek's thinking at that time was to settle the Communists first, and then resist the Japanese?

Yang Kuisong: Chiang's national policy was "to seize the outside world before settling the inside world," and settling the inside world was a prerequisite, but settling the inside world was not only for the Communists, but also for the various local forces in the country. Like the warlords in the southwestern provinces that we all know today, the Central Army of the Kuomintang took the opportunity to solve the problem by pursuing and annihilating the Central Red Army, and after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Chinese government was able to retreat to the southwestern part of the country and hold out for eight years, which was one of the successes of Chiang's strategy back in those days. Today, looking at some of Chiang Kai-shek's documents from 1934-1935, he had indeed operated the southwestern provinces as China's strategic rear for the war against Japan at that time. From this we can also see that the key is whether Japan attacked or not, if Japan attacked, he definitely wanted to fight. After the southwestern provinces

down, he has been in 1935 and 1936 KMT Central Committee Plenum and the Fifth Congress made a very strong speech on the "final hurdle" speech, the final bottom line of the policy towards Japan is that North China can not be lost. If Japan launched an attack in North China, he would definitely fight.

The CPC admitted that it was naive to disclose Chiang Kai-shek's six promises.

Han Fudong: Is it true that Zhang and Yang did not inform the CCP before they launched the Xi'an Incident? Is there enough information to say that the CCP Central Committee was not involved in the planning?

Yang Kuisong: Of course not, the information is sufficient. According to the telegrams left behind, Zhang Xueliang telegraphed the CPC Central Committee a few days before the Incident, urgently summoning Ye Jianying, the representative of the CPC Central Committee in charge of liaison with him, to come to Xi'an. The CPC Central Committee just saw that Zhang told Ye Jianying to hurry over on December 7, saying that he had something important to discuss, but did not know what the important thing was, so he did not let Ye Jianying go right away, but asked him to wait for a few days for Wang Jiaxiang, who was preparing to go to the USSR due to his illness, to speak, which is not quite accurate. Peaceful settlement was what the CCP had advocated from the very beginning, and it did not want a national civil war to result from the Xi'an Incident. On this point, there was no dispute within the CCP Central Committee. What was in dispute was the method to be used to realize a peaceful settlement. Because most of the leaders of the CCP Central Committee at that time wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to get rid of Chiang, and only a few, such as Zhang Wentian, had reservations about it.

Han Fudong: The question is, after getting rid of Chiang, could the Xi'an Incident be resolved peacefully?

YANG Kuisong: Yes, this was precisely the biggest problem. At the beginning, the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China all believed that it was impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to agree to a compromise with the Red Army. Since they had caught Chiang, of course they had to get rid of him, or at least have a public trial or something to exclude Chiang from the Nanking government. At that time, there were people who thought that in this way the Nanking army would be leaderless, and once the anti-Chiang faction of the whole country responded, things would be resolved peacefully. In fact, whether it was the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, or Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, their estimation at that time of Chiang Kai-shek's prestige in the minds of the domestic public and Chiang's role as the image of supreme power in the Chinese central government were greatly detached from reality. They did not expect at all that the Xi'an Incident would arouse such strong resentment from all sectors of the country.

Han Fudong: When the decision was made to release Chiang, was there any concern at that time that Chiang might not keep his promise?

YANG KUISONG: Of course there was concern. That's why when the decision was made to release Chiang on December 25th, there was a special telegram from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China requesting that Chiang should leave a note no matter what.

Han Fudong: Zhang Xueliang did release Chiang without a note without going through the CCP?

YANG QUISONG: Of course. When Chiang left like that, the CCP and Yang Hucheng and so on were actually quite nervous, and that's why they came out one after another to announce the so-called Chiang's six promises, and there's a special article in the Mao Selection that talks about Chiang's promises on this issue. This is actually a very un-strategic approach. Because Chiang is a person who is very anxious to save face, not to mention the fact that he is the supreme leader of the whole country, and no matter whether it is in his character or in his position and status at that time, he would not openly admit to what kind of conditions he had committed himself to during the period of his detention. What is more, Chiang Kai-shek did not have any negotiation with the CPC

or with Zhang and Yang at all, it was the two Songs who came out, and he did not have to admit what he had promised at gunpoint, and even if he did, a promise made under such coercive circumstances could be overturned. Therefore, the Soviet Union was very annoyed on this issue. Upon learning that the CPC had publicized the so-called Chiang's promise, it immediately called to reprimand the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) for its stupidity. The CCP Central Committee, when it met later in February 1937, also admitted that it was politically very naive to do so at that time.

Han Fudong: However, after throwing it out, Chiang complied with it.

YANG QUISONG: Given Chiang's character, and the influence of those around him at the time, Chiang would have followed through on his promise. You can say that Chiang was very stupid, but this is exactly a characteristic, or weakness, that Chiang sometimes showed in dealing with people. Of course, Chiang did not strictly follow all the conditions, like reorganizing the government was not done. There were some things that actually couldn't be done under the kind of circumstances he was in, and he couldn't do them. And once you publicized this condition, he was even more constrained, and there were things that even if he could do them instead, he couldn't do them. The reason is very simple.

Before the Xi'an Incident, the CCP had suffered a military defeat and had lowered its conditions.

Han Fudong: Before the Xi'an Incident, the Communists went on an eastward expedition and fought in Yan Xishan's territory in Shanxi. China Bookstore edition of Li Xin's edited "History of the Republic of China" says that Zhang Xueliang, in his talks with Li Kenong, suggested that they go to Ning and Sui because Ningxia was close to the Suiyuan front, and close to the Soviet Union, and there was little resistance, and thought that Shanxi Yan Xishan's power was large, and that it would be difficult to march smoothly on the eastward expedition to Shanxi. Li Kennon said, out of Shanxi is mainly from political considerations, political influence, is conducive to promoting the formation of the anti-Japanese national united front. The Cambridge History of the Republic of China also says

that one of the consequences of the Eastern Expedition was that local military leaders in the northwest, including Zhang Xueliang, began to believe in the patriotic promises of the CCP. Is that correct?

Yang Queisong: Not at all. At that time, one of the most important political slogans of the CPC to win the sympathy of the Chinese people was "Stop the civil war, unite with the outside world", and advocated that "Chinese people do not fight Chinese people". If you went to fight in Shanxi, you were obviously fighting a civil war against the Chinese, how could you say that it was for the purpose of promoting anti-Japanese resistance? How can you say that it is to promote the anti-Japanese? You beat Yan Xishan, Yan Xishan think you are patriotic? Yes, when fighting in Shanxi, the Red Army put forward a slogan called "open the anti-Japanese route", saying that Yan Xishan is a Japanese lackey, blocking the Red Army to go to Hebei to fight the Japanese. But this is actually just a propaganda slogan. The next step of fighting Shanxi was to move into Suiyuan, then connect to Mongolia, and open up the international route, that is, to connect with the Soviet Union and obtain the Soviet Union's military assistance. Of course, this step was not realized later, but the purpose of the Eastern Expedition to Shanxi was basically realized. What was the main purpose of the Eastern Expedition to Shanxi? It was to solve the problems of food and troop supply. You think, when the northern Shaanxi Soviet area is only how big, the original there is a 10,000 people in the Red Army, the fall and winter of 1935 suddenly added six or seven thousand people, that small piece of land in northern Shaanxi, gullies and ravines, almost no grass, which can be how much food to supply such a large number of people, the people do not have a few. As a result, both grain collection and recruitment, which the Red Army had to fulfill to survive, were simply impossible.

Han Fudong: Shanxi Yan Xishan was very powerful, why didn't he go to Ningxia and Gansu for food and soldiers?

Yang Kuisong: Ningxia and Gansu are ethnic minority areas, and it was even less likely for the Han Chinese Red Army to survive there. The Red Army all the way to the Long March over, there are many experiences and lessons learned, not as a last resort is not going to go, and then the Red Army West Road Army, more than 20,000 people were wiped out, is because of the run to that place to go, even a piece of the base can not be built up. Moreover, those two places are not much stronger

than the north of Shaanxi, the same not much food and people. From northern Shaanxi to Shanxi is completely different, across the Yellow River, is the river-loop area, food, population is also very dense, very rich, so the eastward march from the collection of food and expansion of the army is certainly the best choice. The Red Army's eastward march even captured prisoners with conscripts, expanding the army by more than 3,000 people at once.

Han Fudong: History cannot be hypothesized, but we might as well hypothesize. Without the Xi'an Incident, would the total war of resistance have been delayed? Would China's future pattern have been different? How significant is the Xi'an Incident?

Yang Kuisong: In the past, there was a professor named Wu Tianwei in the United States who wrote a book called "The Xi'an Incident - A Turning Point in Modern Chinese History", and the title of his book should be said to be a more accurate description of the historical role of the Xi'an Incident. For many years, the argument of the Kuomintang was that the Xi'an Incident was a turning point when the Kuomintang began to move from success to failure. They believed that the KMT's failure was all because of the Xi'an Incident, so they hated Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng to death. From the point of view of the CCP, the reason why Mao Zedong and his generation of leaders always called Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng "national heroes" was because there was indeed a feeling of gratitude towards Zhang and Yang. Because without the Xi'an Incident, Mao Zedong made it very clear that the rest of our leaders would have gone to jail. Mao's words that the Xi'an Incident "saved us from the plague of imprisonment" were not an exaggeration. Because the situation of the Red Army was indeed very dangerous, although the Red Army has a plan to engage in another Long March, but imagine, the Central Red Army from Jiangxi has been to the west to fight, to go to the local warlords control of the junction of several provinces, basically did not and the Central Army frontal fighting, so the turn of the months to Sichuan, only more than 10,000 people left. To the north of Shaanxi, only 6,000 people left, the loss of more than ninety percent attrition. The central red army from jiangxi when out, prepared for several months, people strong horse. 1936 in november time, two, four two front army has been crippled, two front army more than 10,000 people basically lost combat effectiveness, almost can not fight, four front army more than 20,000 people across the yellow river, into gansu, and then all the army, the remaining 20,000

or 30,000 people in the winter is still wearing shorts short shirts. The whole army has no source of food, clothing and ammunition, and the Central Army has already fought with the Red Army head-on, and I'm afraid that if we want to fight to Shanxi, Henan and Shaanxi, which have already been heavily defended by the Central Army, we may not be able to fight back. This is also the reason why Mao Zedong said that what was waiting for them might be imprisonment.

Han Fudong: Even without the Xi'an Incident, with the CCP's strategy of united front and the influence of the Soviet Union, would it have been impossible to reach an agreement with the KMT to unify against the Japanese?

Yang Kuisong: It was no longer possible on the eve of the Xi'an Incident. Chiang Kai-shek originally wanted to solve the Communist Party problem by political means, and he put forward the conditions for the reorganization of the Red Army and the reorganization of the soviets at the beginning of 1936, that is to say, he wanted to reorganize the Red Army into the National Revolutionary Army by reining in the local warlords, and to abolish the CCP's soviet regime by giving the CCP a small piece of land and a local government. If this could be resolved, it would free up their hands to deal with the Japanese. The CCP initially disagreed with Chiang's approach and wanted to engage in a coalition government with Chiang, asking Nanking and the CCP, together with local powerhouses, to form a national defense government and anti-Japanese allied forces. Both sides failed to reach an agreement in many negotiations, until the Comintern intervened and changed its strategy, and only in November 1936, when the Red Army was already in extreme difficulty, did the CCP agree to do it Chiang's way. However, Chiang Kai-shek saw that the Red Army's three front armies were all concentrated in Gansu, and it was easy for the Central Army to concentrate on destroying the Red Army. His asking price was high again, and he wanted to integrate the Red Army, and asked Mao and Zhu to leave the army and take up an official post in Nanjing or go abroad. The CCP, of course, had a hard time accepting this. At that time, it seemed to Chiang Kai-shek that it was the "last five minutes of effort", as he famously said to Zhang Xueliang. He could no longer see why there should be any negotiation with the CPC, and it would be better to settle the matter by force, so how could the two sides possibly come to any agreement? The result was clear: without the

Xi'an Incident, the CCP would probably have failed, but the problem was that Chiang Kai-shek had miscalculated too much, and he did not expect Zhang Xueliang to betray him at all.