

姚监复：徐向前回忆 30 年代的苏区“大肃反” Yao Jianfu: Xu Xiangqian Recalls the Great Purges in Soviet Areas in the 30sd

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FN 36 – Yao Jianfu on Xu Xiangqian on the Soviet Area Purges in the 30s

《徐向前元帅回忆录》是 2005 年 8 月由解放军出版社公开出版发行，根据徐向前本人口述而成的著作，具有重要的史料价值，提供了许多党史中重要的关键史实，特别是徐向前回忆 20 世纪 30 年代中国共产党领导下的苏区“大肃反”的过程、原因和残酷的斗争方式，令我们不寒而栗，也使人们进一步认识到 1966 年开始的“文化大革命”，早在 30 年代苏区“大肃反”中就预演了、实习了，到了文革中，不过是把反 AB 团的肃反扩大化，再在中国 960 万平方公里的土地上更为扩大化，扩大到 10 亿人认认真真地你死我活地互相内斗了十年。悲剧一定有悲剧的序幕和内在原因。从徐向前元帅的回忆中可以获得许多深刻的启示。

一、为了收集“暗地地审查徐向前”的材料，徐向前元帅的夫人程训宣在肃反中被“抓去杀了”，“打得不成样子”。

30 年代鄂豫皖革命根据地的红军由徐向前任红四军军长，陈昌浩接替曾中生任军政委，张国焘是鄂豫皖中央分局书记兼军委主席，沈泽民兼省委书记，曾中生、旷继勋为军委副主席。

徐向前在《回忆录》中痛苦地回忆：“我爱人程训宣在‘肃反’的遭遇”。“附带说一下我爱人程训宣在‘肃反’中的遭遇。这段叙述，也是我对她的悼念。我和程训宣同志是一九二九年底结婚的。她是黄安人，家住檀树岗程伍德村，妇女工作干部。我老在前方打仗，她在后方工作，我们难得有见面团聚的机会。一九三二年反四次‘围剿’时我在七里坪一带打仗，战局很紧张，我无法回家看她，让警卫员把袜子拿给她补一补，好行军作战。警卫员回来悄悄地对我说：程训宣被抓走了，人家说她是改组派！她的命运如何，我不得而知，也不便过问，听候组织‘审查’就是了，还是打我的仗。

部队撤离鄂豫皖根据地后，我一直打听她的消息。没有人知道，也没有人告诉我。一九三七年到延安，才听说她和王树声的妹妹等一批人，都被杀害了。我就问周纯全，为什么把我老婆抓去杀了，她有什么罪过？周说：‘没什么罪过，抓她就是为了搞你的材料嘛！’

她家里弟兄姐妹五个，全都参加了革命，对党忠心耿耿。大哥程启光，共产党员，我们的特务队长；二哥当教员，也是共产党员；三哥任过基层的苏维埃主席，被敌人杀害；弟

弟在我们司令部当警卫员，以后在红二十五军，也被肃掉了。她被抓走后，究竟受过什么刑罚，我不清楚，听说是打得不成样子，没什么口供，相当坚强。

一场革命，人民群众的牺牲是巨大的。不仅对敌斗争要付出血的代价，在党的路线发生错误时，同样会付出血的代价。由此不难理解，坚持党的马克思主义的路线，是多么重要！

当时内部杀了那么多的人，也没有把我们党搞垮，把红军搞垮。人心向着共产党，向着红军。不革命，人民没有出路。干部被抓一批换一批，再抓一批再换一批。被肃掉的同志，难以计数。队伍就是不垮，极少有人叛变投敌。原因是我们党领导的反帝反封建的革命，代表了人民的利益；红军指战员，工农出身的占百分之九十以上，与帝国主义、封建主义、官僚资本主义，有血海深仇。历史证明，我们的党尽管多灾多难，但力量却是无穷无尽的。”（《徐向前元帅回忆录》，115—116页）

红四军军长徐向前本人被暗地审查，为了搞他的莫须有材料，把徐向前夫人程训宣残酷折磨至死，“打得不成样子”，仍然很坚强，坚持事实，没给张国焘、陈昌浩所要的诬陷材料，结果惨死于自己人制造的“大肃反”中。军长连自己的夫人都保不住，何况其下属呢？只有更悲惨的命运。

二、三个月肃反，杀害 2500 名红军指战员，70%的团以上干部被捕杀。

徐向前回忆道：“白雀园‘大肃反’，是鄂豫皖根据地历史上最令人痛心的一页。将近三个月的‘肃反’，肃掉了两千五百名以上的红军指战员，十之六七的团以上干部被逮捕、杀害，极大削弱了红军的战斗力。”（《徐向前元帅回忆录》，108—109页。）

“许继慎一案，是张国焘作文章的借口。他们把一些人抓起来，逼、供、信，宣称许继慎组织了反革命集团，要利用南下带上部队投降蒋介石；所谓在英山活捉的敌团长张汉全，亦被许继慎放走；曾中生包庇他，所以才被撤职。有鼻子有眼，以证明张国焘东出方针的正确和‘肃反’的必要性。他一手拿着中央的肃反指示，一手抓着许继慎等人的‘证据’，谁还能说话呀！张国焘这人不是没有能力，但品质不好，他是借口肃反，剪除异己，建立个人统治。不仅搞军队，也搞地方。被肃掉的大都是有能力和战斗经验、和群众有密切联系的领导骨干。最早革命的一些领导人，如徐朋人、戴克敏、曹学楷、陈定侯、肖方、周维炯、姜镜堂，以及许继慎、熊受暄、陈奇、王培吾、李荣桂、柯柏园、庞永俊、潘皈佛、罗炳刚、查子清、李奚石、高建斗、封俊、江子英、黄钢、程绍山、王长先、袁皋甫、吴荆赤、王明、魏孟贤、任难、廖业祺等团以上干部，均先后被逮捕、杀害，令人痛心。营以下的干部、战士和地方上的干部、群众不知名的，更不知有多少！部队纪律严

格，抓就抓吧，杀就杀吧。地方上把群众搞翻了，黄安五区的人民起来反对保卫局，群众贴标语、喊口号：‘打倒张国焘帝国主义！’群众把张国焘比作杀人不眨眼的帝国主义，不是没有点道理。像张国焘这种品质不好的人，搞家长制统治的人，根本就不该派来鄂豫皖当一把手。这是第一条教训。”（《徐向前元帅回忆录》，113—114页。）

三、从思想意识、观念中“找反革命线索”

徐向前认为“第二条教训是，一些领导同志害了‘左’倾幼稚病。像沈泽民同志，是好人，但‘左’得很。他不仅积极搞‘肃反’，还有套理论，提出要‘从那些思想意识不好与非无产阶级观念的分子中找反革命线索’。主观上认定必有反革命，非打着灯笼找出来不可，幼稚得很。其实，哪个人的思想百分之百的正确，没有一点毛病呢？‘人无完人，金无足赤’，毛泽东同志说过这句话，就是要我们用一分为二的观点，即辩证的观点，看待同志，看待事物。天底下没有一贯正确的人。人，总会有缺点和错误。有了缺点或错误，有非无产阶级观念，就变成找寻反革命的线索、依据，行吗？革命和反革命，是有界限的。把一般思想认识问题与反革命混同起来，势必搞扩大化。陈昌浩同志就更凶喽，捕杀高级干部，有时连口供都不要。这个人干劲十足，但容易狂热。记得围黄安时，有个农民领袖、红军团长叫黄钢，被当作改组派抓起来。他不服，自杀了。陈昌浩回来说：‘你看黄钢反革命多么坚决，他剖腹自杀！’认定人家是改组派，没有证据也信以为真。指导思想上‘左’到那么严重的程度，冤死了多少革命好同志噢！”（《徐向前元帅回忆录》，114页。）

“白雀园‘肃反’，闹得真凶。张国焘亲自审讯。开始还让参加会议，因为我提了些不同意见，保人，说我刚来鄂豫边时廖荣坤等同志就是营长、连长，打仗好等，以后就干脆把我甩到一边，连会也不让参加，甚至暗地里审查我。“肃反”的对象，主要有三种人：一是从白军中过来的，不论是起义、投诚的还是被俘的，不论有无反革命活动，要审查；二是地主富农家庭出身的，不论表现如何，要审查；三是知识分子和青年学生，凡是读过几年书的，也要审查。重则杀头，轻则清洗。为了防止部队发生异动，张国焘等分局领导人还决定，以营为单位拆散混编；中央分局和鄂豫皖省委组成巡视团，派到各师，监督‘肃反’。弄得人人自危，熟人见了面都不敢说话，生怕被说成是‘秘密组织’、‘反革命活动’。就连王树声、倪志亮这些老同志见到我，都不敢说什么。真是一片白色恐怖的气氛！”（《徐向前元帅回忆录》，112—113页）

从反右到文革进一步将沈泽民的观点发挥了“思想领域的阶级斗争”的理论，抓思想上的反革命、右派、右倾机会主义分子、修正主义分子，以“反毛泽东思想”定为反革命分子的判罪依据与罪证，杀害了多少位遇罗克、张志新、王申酉、林昭等好同志，“冤死了多少革命好同志噢！”

四、“逼、供、信确实害死人”，“杀人不讲证据，全凭口供”。

徐向前沉痛地总结了功区大肃反的教训是：“第三条，逼供信确实害死人”。

陈昌浩接任红四军政委后，“在部队中搞‘肃反’。他到麻埠后，就立即逮捕了十师参谋主任柯柏元、二十八团团长沙佛、范沱等二十多人。说这些人是四军中的反革命，要举行兵变，拖走红军去投降国民党。开始，我将信将疑。一方面，在‘赤白对立’的那种严重形势下，敌人派特务、探子、狗腿子来根据地内部进行破坏、策反，屡见不鲜，我们过去就处理过这类的事。而且，中央不断有指示来，强调肃清混入我党我军内部的改组派、第三党、AB团等反革命组织。说我一点都不相信，那是假话。但是，另一方面，我有怀疑，也是真的。因为陈昌浩同志抓起来的那些红军干部，都是跟我们一起打游击走过来的，作战勇敢，平时没有什么异常表现，一夜之间就成了改组派、AB团，使人不可理解。我们一边行军、打仗，他就一边抓人，越抓越多，给了我很大的震动。”

“有天，部队走到商城以西的余家集，我正站在路边的山坡上看着队伍行进，陈昌浩也在。队伍里抬着两副担架，上面蒙着白布，我就问他：‘谁负伤了，抬的什么人？’他看了我一眼说：‘没有谁负伤，那是许继慎、周维炯，反革命，逮捕了！’的大吃一惊。许继慎、周维炯都是师长，也成了反革命啦？！我说：‘怎么搞的，把师长抓起来，也不和我说一下！’他知道我不满意，但没再说什么。按照那时的规定，‘肃反’是单线领导，决定权在政治委员。捕人他有这个权力，相反，你要过问，便是越职擅权，不允许的。搬的是苏联的那一套，有什么办法呀！说许继慎是反革命，当时就难以令人信服。”（《徐向前元帅回忆录》，110页。）

徐向前总结说：“第三条，逼、供、信，确实害死人。逼、供、信这东西，奴隶社会、封建社会司空见惯，是剥削阶级司法制度的产物。看京戏，那里面的青天大老爷把惊堂木一拍，动不动就上大刑，被屈打成招的事可不少。《苏三起解》里的老解子，见到冤案太多，才发出‘公道不公道，只有天知道’的感叹。我们的‘肃反’，把封建主义的东西搬来了。一逼、二供、三相信。捕人、杀人不讲证据，全凭口供。许多刑罚骇人听闻。一些基层干部和战士，连AB团、改组派、第三党是什么名堂都不懂，更想不到那是掉脑袋的罪名。你说他是，就承认。承认了还不行，得说出‘同党’来。说吧，无非是些要好的同志、同乡，在一块议论过什么事，便成了‘同党’、‘反革命组织’。就这样，一株连一大片。逼供信，冤假错案，在我们党的历史上一再发生，共产主义运动中也不鲜见，很值得研究。”（《徐向前元帅回忆录》，114—115页）

文革中不又是大大小小的“白雀园大肃反”逼供信的翻版怪吗？徐向前认为，很值得研究，但是，研究的难度很大，开放度很小，有徐向前这样认识深度的人太少了。

五、各地大肃反不是孤立的，是教条主义者统治中央的结果。

徐向前认为还有一条重要教训：“最后一条，鄂豫皖根据地的‘大肃反’，不是孤立的。那个时候，是教条主义者统治中央的时候。教条主义、主观主义、宗派主义搅在一起，在全党，在各个根据地，搞‘肃反’，搞扩大化。他们把中央革命根据地挖 AB 团的经验，推广到鄂豫皖来，又把鄂豫皖、湘鄂西的‘肃反’经验推广到别的根据地去，来回折腾，大搞特搞，造成特别令人痛心的损失。党的六届七中全会《关于若干历史问题的决议》，对此专门作过总结，这里不必多谈。历史的教训，值得注意。我们的子孙后代，一定不要再重演。”（《徐向前元帅回忆录》，115 页。）徐向前希望，鄂豫皖根据地和中央苏区的教训，“子孙后代，一定不要再重演。”

但是，文革不是又重演了吗？为什么值得注意的历史教训，没有引起注意？子孙后代，如果不了解、不懂得甚至不知道中国的肃反扩大化、文化大革命。那么，历史悲剧必然会一再重演，给人民、党和民族带来无穷的灾难。不接受历史教训，第一次以可知第二次无产阶级文化大革命的发生就具有历史的必然性。不否定甚至不承认错误的悲惨的历史，企图掩饰、遗忘，那么历史的继承性必然会出现历史的必然性。“不必多谈”，就会惨剧重演！因此，徐向前谈了一点点“这里不必多谈”，他老人家是不是哪里多谈了一些呢？他是不是把心里话全讲出来了，真正讲透了呢？“这里不必多谈”，是不是一种留有余地的令人深思的富有哲理的期望？

Yao Jianfu: Xu Xiangqian Recalls the "Great Purge" in the Soviet Area in the 1930s

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The Memoirs of Marshal Xu Xiangqian was published by the People's Liberation Army Publishing House in August, 2005, based on Xu Xiangqian's own oral account of the work, with an important historical value, providing many important key facts in Party history, especially Xu Xiangqian recalled the 1930s under the leadership of the Communist Party of China in the Soviet Union, "the Great Purges" the process, causes and brutal way of struggle. In particular, Xu Xiangqian's recollections of the process, reasons and brutal methods of struggle under the leadership of the Communist Party of China in the Soviet Union in the 1930s sent shivers down our spines, and further made people realize that the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966, had been previewed and practiced as early as the Great Purge of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and that the Cultural Revolution had merely expanded the purge of the AB Groups. In the Cultural Revolution, it was just a matter of expanding the anti-AB group purge, and then expanding it even more in the 9.6 million square kilometers of China, expanding it to the extent that one billion people seriously fought each other internally for ten years, both to the death and to the death. Tragedy must have its prologue and inner causes. From Marshal Xu Xiangqian's memories, we can gain many profound insights.

First, in order to collect materials for "secretly examining Xu Xiangqian," Marshal Xu Xiangqian's wife Cheng Xunxuan was "arrested and killed" and "beaten beyond recognition" in the purge.

In the 1930s, the Red Army in the revolutionary base of EYA was led by Xu Xiangqian as the commander of the Fourth Red Army, Chen Changhao succeeded Zeng Shengxuan as the political commissar of the Red Army, Zhang Guotao was the secretary of the Central Bureau of the EYA and the chairman of the Military Commission, Shen Zemin was the secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, and Zeng Shengxuan and Kuang Jixun were the vice-chairmen of the Military Commission.

"What happened to my beloved Cheng Xunxuan in the 'purgues'," Xu Xiangqian painfully recalled in his Memoirs. "Incidentally, I would like to say a few words about what happened to my beloved Cheng Xunxuan in the 'purgues'. This narrative is also my tribute to her. Comrade Cheng Xunxuan and I were married at the end of 1929. She was a native of Huang'an, living in Chengwude Village, Tanshugang, and was a women's work cadre. I was always fighting in the front, she was working in the rear, and it was rare for us to meet and reunite. In 1932, when I was fighting in the area of Qiliping during the Four Sieges, the situation was so tense that I couldn't go home to see her, so I asked the guard to bring her socks to mend them so that she could march and fight. The guard came back and whispered to me: Cheng Xunxuan had been captured, and people said she was a reorganizationist! How her fate, I do not know, it is not convenient to ask, wait for the organization 'review' is, or fight my battle.

After the troops withdrew from the EYA base, I kept asking for news of her. No one knew, and no one told me. It was only when I arrived in Yan'an in 1937 that I heard that she and Wang Shusheng's sister and a group of others had been killed. I then asked Zhou Chunquan why he had taken my wife and killed her, and what her crime was. Zhou said, 'No offense, she was arrested just to get your materials!

There were five brothers and sisters in her family, all of whom joined the revolution and were loyal to the Party. The eldest brother, Cheng Qiguang, was a communist and our secret agent; the second brother was a teacher and also a communist; the third brother was the chairman of the Soviet at the grass-roots level, but was killed by the enemy; the younger brother was a security guard at our headquarters, and later in the Red Army of the Twenty-fifth Army, but he was also purged. What kind of punishment she suffered after she was taken, I am not sure, I heard that she was beaten beyond recognition, with little confession, and was quite strong.

In a revolution, the sacrifices of the people are enormous. Not only does the struggle against the enemy cost blood, but the same price is paid in the event of a mistake in the Party line. From this it is easy to understand how important it is to stick to the Party's Marxist line!

So many people were killed internally at that time, and it did not bring down our Party or the Red Army. People's hearts turned toward the Communist Party and the Red Army. Without revolution, the people have no way out. Cadres were arrested and replaced, then arrested and replaced again. It is hard to count the number of comrades who have been purged. However, the army never collapsed, and very few people defected to the enemy. The reason is that the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution led by our Party represents the interests of the people; more than 90 percent of the Red Army commanders are from the labor and peasant backgrounds, and they have deep blood feuds with imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. History has proved that our Party, despite its many disasters and difficulties, has infinite strength." (Memoirs of Marshal Xu Xiangqian, 115-116)

Xu Xiangqian, the commander of the Fourth Red Army, was secretly censored, and in order to get his unfounded materials, Xu Xiangqian's wife, Cheng Xunxuan, was brutally tortured to death and "beaten beyond recognition", but he was still very strong and insisted on the facts, and didn't give Zhang Guotao and Chen Changhao the falsely-accused materials they wanted, and as a result, he died tragically in the "Great Purge" made by his own people. The result was a tragic death in the "Great Purge" created by his own people. Army commander even his own wife can not keep, let alone his subordinates? Only a more tragic fate.

In two or three months of purges, 2,500 Red Army combatants were killed, and 70% of the cadres above the regiment were arrested and killed.

Xu Xiangqian recalled: "The 'Great Purging' in Baiqiyuan is the most heartbreaking page in the history of the base area of EYA. Nearly three months of the 'purge', purged more than 2,500 Red Army commanders, six or seven of ten cadres above the regiment were arrested and killed, greatly weakening the fighting strength of the Red Army." (Memoirs of Marshal Xu Xiangqian, 108-109.)

"Xu Jishen's case was a pretext for Zhang Guotao to make an article. They arrested some people, forced, confessed, and wrote letters, claiming that Xu Jishen had organized a counter-revolutionary group and wanted to use the troops brought south to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek; that the so-called enemy regimental commander Zhang Hanquan, who had been captured alive in Yingshan, had also been released by Xu Jishen; and that Zeng Shengshang had

harbored him, and that was why he had been removed from his post. There were noses and eyes to prove the correctness of Zhang Guotao's eastward policy and the necessity of the 'purges'. He held the Central Committee's purging instructions in one hand and the 'evidence' of Xu Jishen and others in the other, so who could speak! Zhang Guotao was not a man without ability, but his qualities were not good. He was using the pretext of purges to cut out dissidents and establish personal rule. Not only the army, but also the localities. Most of those who were purged were capable, experienced in combat and in close contact with the masses. Some of the leaders of the earliest revolution, such as Xu Pengren, Dai Kemin, Cao Xuekai, Chen Dinghou, Xiao Fang, Zhou Weijiong, Jiang Jingtang, as well as Xu Jishen, Xiong Shouxuan, Chen Qi, Wang Peiwu, Li Ronggui, Ke Baoyuan, Pang Yongjun, Pan Xuanfo, Luo Binggang, Zha Ziqing, Li Xi Shi, Gao Jiandou, Feng Jun, Jiang Ziying, Huang Gang, Cheng Shaoshan, Wang Changxian, Yuan Gaofu, Wu Jingzhi, Wang Ming, Wei Menghsian, Ren Nanyan, Liao Yeqi, etc., were all successively arrested. Cadres above the battalion have been arrested and killed, which is heartbreaking. The number of unknown cadres and soldiers below the battalion, as well as local cadres and people, is unknown! The troops were strictly disciplined, so they arrested and killed as they pleased. The localities have turned the masses upside down. The people of the five districts of Huang'an rose up against the Defense Bureau; the masses put up slogans and shouted slogans: 'Down with Zhang Guotao's imperialism!' The masses compared Zhang Guotao to a murderous imperialist, not without some justification. A person of Zhang Guotao's bad qualities, someone who engages in patriarchal rule, should never have been sent to the EYA as a hand. This is the first lesson." (Memoirs of Marshal Xu Xiangqian, 113-114.)

Third, "Finding Counter-Revolutionary Clues" in Ideology and Concepts

According to Xu Xiangqian, "The second lesson is that some leading comrades have fallen victim to the 'left' childishness. Comrade Shen Zemin, for example, is a good man, but he is very 'leftist'. He not only actively engaged in 'purges', but also had a theory that 'we should look for counter-revolutionary clues from those with bad ideology and non-proletarian concepts'. The subjective belief that there must be counter-revolutionary elements and that they must be found out by beating the lanterns is very naive. In fact, which person's thinking is 100 percent correct, without a single fault? Comrade Mao Zedong said, 'No one is perfect, no gold is perfect', which means that we should look at our comrades and things from a two-sided point of view, that is, a dialectical point of view. There is no consistently right person under the sky. People, invariably, have shortcomings and mistakes. With shortcomings or mistakes, with non-proletarian concepts, it becomes a clue, a basis for finding counter-revolution, OK? There is a line between revolution and counter-revolution. To confuse the general problem of ideological understanding with counter-revolution is bound to lead to expansion. Comrade Chen Changhao is even more ferocious. He hunts down and kills high-ranking cadres, sometimes without even a confession. This person is very energetic, but easy to fanaticism. I remember

during the siege of Huang'an, a peasant leader and Red Army chief named Huang Gang was arrested as a reorganizationist. He resisted and committed suicide. Chen Changhao came back and said, 'Look how determined Huang Gang was to counter-revolution, he committed suicide by disemboweling himself! He believed that he was a reorganizationist, even without evidence. The guiding ideology was 'left' to such a serious degree that how many good revolutionary comrades were wrongfully killed!' (Memoirs of Marshal Xu Xiangqian, 114.)

"The White Sparrow Garden 'purge' was really fierce. Zhang Guotao personally interrogated me. The beginning of the meeting, because I raised some different opinions, Paul, said I just came to EYB when Liao Rongkun and other comrades are battalion commanders, company commanders, fighting a good war, etc., and then simply throw me to the side, and will not even allow to participate in the meeting, and even secretly censor me. The object of the "purge", there are mainly three kinds of people: one is from the White Army, whether it is the uprising, defection or captured, regardless of whether there is counter-revolutionary activities, to be examined; the second is the landlords and rich peasants from the family, regardless of how the performance, to be examined; the third is the intellectuals and young students, who have read a few years of schooling, but also to be examined. Heavy is killed, light is cleaned. In order to prevent the troops from moving, Zhang Guotao and other leaders of the bureau also decided that the battalion as a unit to break up and mix; the Central Bureau and the Anhui Provincial Party Committee of the EYA formed a tour group, sent to the divisions, supervise the 'purge'. So that everyone is in danger, acquaintances do not dare to speak, for fear of being said to be a 'secret organization', 'counter-revolutionary activities'. Even old comrades like Wang Shusheng and Ni Zhiliang didn't dare to say anything when they saw me. It was really an atmosphere of white terror!" (Memoirs of Marshal Xu Xiangqian, 112-113)

From the Anti-Rightist Movement to the Cultural Revolution, Shen Zemin's views were further developed into the theory of "class struggle in the realm of thought," and ideological counter-revolutionaries, rightists, right-leaning opportunists, and revisionists were arrested and convicted as counter-revolutionaries on the basis of "opposing Mao Zedong Thought". The basis and evidence of their crimes, how many good comrades such as Yu Luo, Zhang Zhixin, Wang Shenyong, Lin Zhao, etc. were killed, and "how many good revolutionary comrades were unjustly killed!

Fourth, "forcing, confession, letter really killed people", "killing people without evidence, all rely on confessions".

Xu Xiangqian sadly summarized the lessons of the Great Purge in Gong District as follows: "Third, forced confessions and letters do kill people."

After Chen Changhao took over as political commissar of the Red Fourth Army, he "engaged in a 'purge' among the troops. After he arrived in Mabu, he immediately arrested the tenth division staff director Ke Baiyuan, twenty-eight regiment commander Pan Xianfo, Fan Tuo and more than twenty people. He said that these people were counter-revolutionaries in the Fourth Army, and that they wanted to hold a mutiny and drag away the Red Army to surrender to the Kuomintang. At first, I was skeptical. On the one hand, under the serious situation of 'red-white antagonism', it was not uncommon for the enemy to send agents, spies, and lackeys to carry out sabotage and counter-insurgency inside the base areas, and we had dealt with such matters in the past. Moreover, the Central Committee is constantly issuing instructions emphasizing the purging of counter-revolutionary organizations such as the Reorganization Faction, the Third Party, and the AB Group, which have infiltrated our Party and our army. It would be a lie to say that I don't believe this at all. But, on the other hand, it is also true that I have doubts. Because those Red Army cadres whom Comrade Chen Changhao captured, all of whom came from guerrilla warfare with us and who fought bravely, and who usually did not show any unusual behavior, became reorganizationists and AB groups overnight, which is incomprehensible. While we were marching and fighting, he was arresting people, more and more, which gave me a great shock."

"One day, when the troops went to Yu Jiaji, west of Shangcheng, I was standing on a hillside by the roadside watching the procession marching, and Chen Changhao was there. The team was carrying two stretchers, covered with white cloth, so I asked him: 'Who is wounded, what person is carrying?' He looked at me and said: 'No one is wounded, that's Xu Jishen and Zhou Weijiong, counter-revolutionary, arrested! He was shocked. Xu Jishen, Zhou Weijiong are divisional commanders, also became a counter-revolutionary! I said, 'What's wrong with you, arresting the division commander without saying anything to me? He knew I was dissatisfied, but said nothing more. According to the rules at that time, the 'purges' were led on a single line, with the decision resting with the political commissar. He had the power to arrest people; on the contrary, if you wanted to ask about it, you were overstepping your authority and were not allowed to do so. It's the Soviet Union's way of doing things, so what can we do? To say that Xu Jishen was a counterrevolutionary was unconvincing at the time.'" (Memoirs of Marshal Xu Xiangqian, 110.)

Xu Xiangqian summarized, "The third rule, forcing, confession, and belief, really kills people. Forced confessions and letters are commonplace in slave and feudal societies and are the product of the judicial system of the exploiting class. When we watch Beijing opera, there are quite a number of cases in which the great lords of heaven slapped the wood of the hall and put them to death at the drop of a hat, and they were beaten into confessions. In Su San Qi Xie, the old Xie Zi, who saw too many cases of injustice, exclaimed, 'Only God knows whether

it is fair or not'. Our 'purges' have brought in feudalism. One forced, two confessed, three believed. Capture and kill without evidence, all based on confessions. Many of the punishments were appalling. Some grass-roots cadres and soldiers didn't even know what the AB Group, the Reorganization Faction, or the Third Party were, much less realize that they were head-scratching crimes. If you say he is, you admit it. If you say he is, he admits it. If he admits it, he has to name his 'fellow party members'. If you say so, they are just some close comrades or fellow countrymen who have discussed something together, and then they become 'accomplices' or 'counter-revolutionary organizations'. In this way, a large number of people are implicated. Letters of forced confession, cases of injustice and falsehood, which have occurred again and again in the history of our Party and are not uncommon in the Communist movement, are well worth studying." (Memoirs of Marshal Xu Xiangqian, 114-115)

Wasn't the Cultural Revolution another replica of the "Great Purges of White Sparrow Park", both large and small, in which confessions were forced? Xu Xiangqian believes that it is worth studying, but the difficulty of the study is very great, the degree of openness is very small, and there are too few people who have such a depth of understanding as Xu Xiangqian.

Fifth, the great purges around the world are not isolated, is the result of the dogmatists ruling the central government.

Xu Xiangqian believes that there is another important lesson: "The last one is that the 'Great Purge' in the base area of EYA was not an isolated one. At that time, it was the time when the dogmatists ruled the center. Dogmatism, subjectivism, and sectarianism were mixed together to carry out 'purges' and enlargement in the whole Party and in the various base areas. They took the experience of digging out the AB group in the Central Revolutionary Base and extended it to the EYUAN, and then extended the experience of the 'purges' in the EYUAN and Xiang'xi to other bases, tossing it back and forth, making a big fuss about it, causing particularly heartbreaking losses. The Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), "Resolution on Several Historical Issues", specifically summarized this, and there is no need to talk about it here. The lessons of history are worth noting. Our children and grandchildren must not repeat it." (Memoirs of Marshal Xu Xiangqian, 115.) Xu Xiangqian hoped that the lessons of the EYUAN base area and the Central Soviet Area "must not be repeated for future generations."

But didn't the Cultural Revolution repeat itself again? Why is it that the noteworthy lessons of history have not been heeded? Future generations, if they do not understand, appreciate or even know about China's expanded purges and the Cultural Revolution. Then the historical tragedy is bound to repeat itself again and again, bringing endless disasters to the people, the

Party and the nation. Without accepting the lessons of history, for the first time the occurrence of the second proletarian cultural revolution will have a historical inevitability. Without denying or even recognizing the tragic history of mistakes, attempting to cover up and forget, then the inheritance of history will inevitably appear as a historical inevitability. "There is no need to talk much about it," and the tragedy will repeat itself! Therefore, Xu Xiangqian talked a little bit about "there is no need to talk about it here"; did his old man talk about it some more? Did he speak from his heart, really speak through? "There is no need to talk more here", is it a kind of philosophical expectation that leaves room for deep thought?