

## 高华：“肃 AB 团”事件的历史考察

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FN 32 - Gao Hua on Purging the AB League

距今 69 年前，一场大规模的革命恐怖浪潮席卷中共领导的江西苏区。在一轮名曰“肃 AB 团”的大清洗中，几千名红军官兵和根据地内的党团员及普通群众惨遭杀害[1]。干此事的并非中共的死敌——蒋介石和国民党，而是根据地的中共党组织和由毛泽东亲自指挥的红一方面军总前委。这段史实以后随着毛泽东在中共党内地位的上升被完全改写。直至 80-90 年代，在撇开毛的个人责任的前提下，当年这场事件的大致轮廓才初步显现，但仍有许多晦暗不明之处。本文所要研究的是：毛泽东为何要在红军和根据地内发起“打 AB 团”？毛为大清洗寻找的依据是什么？大恐怖与建立新社会有什么关系？为甚么毛在掌握中共实权后不再采用“打 AB 团”的方式解决党内矛盾？

事件的起因：以暴力维护领导权威

毛泽东在中国共产革命运动中声誉鹊起始于 1927 年国共分裂后，最先走上武装反抗国民党的道路，从此成为中共武装革命的著名领导人。在这之前，毛虽是中共建党元老之一，但是在 1921-27 年，党的声光全被陈独秀等所占，尽管毛被公认为农运专家，然而还是属于年轻一辈，对党的决策不起任何主导作用。

国共分家，中共潜入地下，革命的中心地带逐渐从城市转向农村，党的斗争形式、组织构成和党的性格均发生了深刻变化。由于中共已从合法政党转变为秘密政党，列宁主义党的民主集中制已完全制度化，中共中央作为领导中国革命的司令部的权威也基本确立，由此中共开始了军事共产革命阶段。

进入军事共产革命阶段的主要标志在于 1927 年后，中共破天荒地有了自己控制的地盘——红色区域，从此中共可以在这些地域公开推行自己改造中国的革命政纲，这是中共自成立以来从未遭遇过的新情况，毛泽东就是在这样的形势下崭露头角、声名大振，使党的声光逐渐聚于其身。

毛泽东无疑为中共革命立下最大的功勋，他在江西农村的努力及其实践为中共开辟了一条新路。但是在 20 年代末至 30 年代初，毛只是党领导下的武装同志，必须接受来自上海的中共中央的领导，在一段相当长的时期内，毛不仅不是党的名正言顺的领袖，甚至在江西苏区，毛的个人权威也还未彻底巩固。

毛泽东在中共党内是靠熟悉农村和农民情况、善于领导军事斗争起家的，然而中国现代革命战争与历代农民战争有一个重大区别，即反抗国民党的武装革命是受共产党直接领导的。党为武装革命提供了意识形态的义理系统，并拥有对这套义理系统的充分解释权。党还为武装革命提供组织框架和干部来源，党不仅有建立革命武装的发号施令权，也有任命干部、调动干部的组织指挥权。尽管毛在创建红军、开辟红色根据地方面功劳盖世，但他仍受到党的制约。

1927-29 年，毛泽东在江西辛勤开拓，对受制于上海中央虽多有不满，但基本上对中央持顺从的态度。毛在理论方面虽不时有越轨之举，但其言论大致均在中共中央意识形态的框架之内。毛在组织关系上，也未有明显的越权行为。毛经常向上级党委和中共中央书面汇报根据地的斗争情况。

中共中央是以颇为欣赏的态度看待毛泽东在江西创造的这番事业的。1928 年中共在莫斯科召开六大，在毛未出席的情况下，将毛选入中央委员会。总的来说，上海中央对毛的活动，包括毛在江西红军中的领导地位是乐观其成的，尤其在 1929 年发生的朱德与毛泽东的争论中，中央表态明确支持毛，促成了毛在江西苏区领导地位的确立。

1929年古田会议后，毛泽东在江西苏区的权威已经初步形成，促成毛领导权威形成的两个最重要条件都已具备：一、中共中央对毛的明确支持为毛的权威提供了法理基础；二、毛的事功突出，在他的领导下，根据地地盘扩大，人口增加。一度与毛意见相左的朱德，因军事失利，威望有所损失，毛的军事成功则为毛的权威提供了事实基础。作为毛领导权威的具体体现，1930年，毛担任了红一方面军总政委和总前委书记，在统一的苏区党领导机构尚未建立的形势下，毛所领导的红一方面军总前委成为江西苏区最高领导机构。在战争环境下，军队是维系苏区存在的最重要的柱石，军-党-苏维埃政权，已实现高度的一体化，毛于是成为江西根据地的最高领导，上海中央的指示只有通过毛才得以在苏区贯彻。毛所具有的这种特殊地位，使其获得了很大自由——毛从此拥有对中央指示的灵活解释权，毛完全可以把自已的意见与中央的意见合而为一，以中央的名义强制推行。然而毛毕竟不是中共中央，在苏区内部仍有部分红军和党组织援引中共中央来消极对抗毛的新权威。

20年代末至30年代初是中共武装革命的草创年代，一时英雄四起，在反抗国民党的大目标下，革命阵营内部的矛盾被暂时掩盖。但根据地内，外来干部与本地干部的矛盾、留苏干部与国内干部的矛盾、知识分子干部与农民出身的干部的矛盾仍然存在，使之可以凝聚的唯一力量来自于中共中央的权威，包括中央提供的意识形态义理系统的理论权威。只是此时的中共中央远离乡村，城市中央对根据地的领导必须通过毛泽东来体现，因此，毛个人的识见、智能、人格因素和作风态度就显得特别重要了。

毛是江西苏区所有武装同志中最具政治眼光、意志最为刚强的，且最善用兵打仗，但其人作风专断，使许多军中同志对其“敬而畏之” [2]。在1929年的朱、毛纷争中，朱德因其为人宽厚、作风民主，得到红四军（红一方面军前身）多数干部的同情和支持。1929年7月陈毅赴上海汇报请示中央对朱、毛纷争的意见，中共中央明确表态支持毛。陈毅返赣后，亲自请毛出山，朱德、陈毅为忠诚的共产党员，一切服从中央，重新理顺了与毛的关系，使红四军内部的分歧和矛盾得以化解。但是，毛与赣西南地方红军和党组织的分歧却因各种原因而尖锐化了。

正是在这种情况下，才发生了毛泽东“打AB团”的大清洗。这场事变的直接原因是，毛在江西苏区的权威刚刚建立，却遭到以李文林为首的赣西南地方红军和党组织的挑战，毛

不能容忍在他鼻子底下有任何违抗自己权威与意志的有组织的反对力量，而不管这种反对力量是来自红军内部或是地方党组织。为了维护自己在根据地的权威，毛一举挣脱党道德和党伦理的约束，不惜采用极端手段镇压被他怀疑为异己力量的党内同志。

毛泽东用流血的超常规手段解决党内纷争，究竟要达到甚么目标？一言以蔽之，毛要做江西苏区的列宁，由于此时毛尚未成为中国党的列宁，不具号令全党的法理权威，他才不惜采用极端手段镇压党内的反侧。

镇压“反革命”，何愧之有？

将大规模的恐怖施之于党内和军内，与党道德和党伦理存在巨大冲突，如何解决这个矛盾？毛泽东自有办法。他声称：以李文林为首的赣西南党和红军已被机会主义和富农路线所控制，为了挽救革命，必须对之进行彻底改造，这样，毛的镇压就有了思想的旗帜。

李文林是知识分子出身的赣西南党与红军的创始人之一，与毛泽东及红四军的关系一度十分密切。但是到了1930年初，经历多次组合的江西地方红军和赣西南党团机构在若干问题上与毛泽东产生了意见分歧，和毛泽东的关系也日趋紧张。

赣西南方面与毛泽东的分歧主要集中在两个问题上：（1）土改政策问题。赣西南方面主张执行中共六大关于“没收豪绅地主土地”的决定，反对毛泽东提出的“没收一切土地”的主张。（2）军队及地方党机构的归属及人员配置问题。

1929年11月底，毛泽东提出合并赣西、湘赣边界两特委，成立新的赣西特委，毛并决定将李文林领导的红二、四团合并到彭德怀部另成立红六军。赣西南方面则认为此决定须经中共中央及中共江西省委批准才能生效。1930年1月，毛泽东任命红四军干部刘士奇、曾山组成赣西特委作为领导赣西南等地的最高机构，但是却受到赣西南方面的抵制。

为了解决与赣西南地方红军、党团机构的矛盾，毛泽东于1930年2月6-9日，在赣西特委所在地吉安县陂头村召开了由红四军前委和赣西南方面负责人参加的联席会议，江汉波也以中共江西省委巡视员身份参加会议，刘士奇等作为助手配合毛泽东组织了这次会议。

在“二·七”会议上，两个月前经中共中央批准恢复了对红四军领导权的毛泽东，在刘士奇、曾山的帮助下，发动了一场对赣西南地方红军和党团机构负责人的激烈斗争，这场斗争为日后掀起“肃AB团”运动埋下了火种。

毛泽东等列举的赣西南地方红军和党团机构负责人的“严重政治错误”主要有两项：

(1) 毛等批评赣西南负责人江汉波、李文林提出的仅“没收豪绅地主土地”的主张，是“完全走向农村资产阶级（富农）的路线”，指出“由此发展下去势必根本取消工人阶级争取农民的策略，走上托拉茨基陈独秀的道路，根本取消土地革命全部”。(2) 毛等指责江汉波等用“非政治的琐碎话，煽动同志反对正确路线的党的领袖”[3]——这里所提到的“党的领袖”，是指毛泽东派任赣西特委书记的刘士奇。

由毛泽东主持的“二·七”会议将赣西南方面的负责人扣上“富农份子”的帽子，宣布开除江汉波的党籍，李文林被调离出主力部队，转任地方工作。2月16日，由毛任书记的红四军总前委发出《前委通告第一号》，正式宣布开展“肃清地主富农”的斗争，通告指出[4]：

赣西南党内有一严重的危机，即地主富农充塞党的各级地方指导机关，党的政策完全是机会主义的政策，若不彻底肃清，不但不能执行党的伟大的政治任务，而且革命根本要遭失败。联席会议号召党内革命同志起来，打倒机会主义的政治领导，开除地主富农出党，使党迅速的布尔塞维克化。

“打倒机会主义领导”在此前还是一个党内斗争的概念，这个1927年“八·七会议”前后始出现的概念，也只是宣布改变陈独秀的路线并中止其在中央的领导职务。在这之后，中共虽已愈益强调思想统一，但党内还保留了若干大革命时期民主传统的痕迹。依那时的

党道德和党伦理，不同意见仍可在党内争论，中共中央或莫斯科共产国际总部则拥有最终裁判权，未闻有将持不同意见的党内同志予以肉体消灭的事例，但是到了1930年，毛却将“打倒机会主义领导”与肉体消灭结合起来。

将一个党内斗争的概念转变成一个对敌斗争的概念，这中间需要过渡和转换，毛泽东轻而易举就找到了这个中介环节。他宣布，党内机会主义领导本身就是地富反革命份子，从而将对敌斗争的口号——打倒国民党、消灭地富反革命，与党内斗争的概念“打倒机会主义领导”顺利地衔接起来，一举获得了镇压的正当性，所谓镇压有据，消灭有理。1930年春，在苏区内已流传国民党“AB团”进行渗透破坏，其组织已被陆续破获的消息，根据地的对敌警惕气氛空前高涨，在这样的形势下，毛完全可以用“镇压反革命”来要求红军和根据地的党组织、苏维埃政权全力支持和服从镇压“AB团”的政策。

1930年“二·七”会议后，革命恐怖的气氛在江西苏区已逐渐形成。赣西南特委在书记刘士奇的领导下，遵照红四军前委《第一号通告》的精神，率先发动“肃AB团”的宣传攻势。6月25日，中共赣西南特委西路行委印发了《反改组派AB团宣传大纲》，命令各级组织：

如发现群众中有动摇表现不好的份子，应捉拿交苏（维埃）政府究办，凡出来生疏的经过赤色区域必须严格检查，如有嫌疑应即拘捕交苏维埃政府，赤色区域内的民众流通应持所属苏维埃通行条子。

工农群众只有阶级之分，不要顾至亲戚朋友关系，凡是来到自己家里或发现其他地方有行动不对的人不论亲戚朋友，应报告苏维埃拿办。

《大纲》同时号召“实行赤色清乡”和“赤色恐怖”以“肃清红旗下的奸细”：“现在各级苏维埃应加紧肃清反革命的工作，捕杀豪绅地主反动富农份子以示警戒，但是杀人要有反动事实可证，严禁误杀。”[5]这份《大纲》虽然提到杀人要有证据，严禁误杀，但是恐怖大门一经打开，事态很快就失去控制。

1930年7、8月间，“肃AB团”迅速从基层清洗转移到上级机关。8月，李文林出任根据李立三攻打大城市命令而新成立的江西省行动委员会书记。在“打AB团”的积极性方面，李文林并不输于前任特委书记刘士奇，甚至有过之而无不及。赣西南特委在1930年9月24日印发的《紧急通告第20号——动员党员群众彻底肃清AB团》文件中宣布：“红旗社列宁青年社，赣西南政府，都有AB团的小组……所有混入在党团特委的赣西南政府的AB团份子全部破获。并将各县区的组织通通供报出来了。”

这份《紧急通告》还详细规定了“肃AB团”的审讯方法和处决人犯的基本原则：“AB团非常阴险狡猾、奸诈强硬，非用最残酷拷打，决不肯招供出来，必须要用软硬兼施的办法，去继续不断的严形（刑）审问，忖度其说话的来源，找出线索，跟迹追问，主要的要使供出AB团组织，以期根本消灭。”

一经发现“AB团”份子，下一步就是枪毙。《紧急通告》要求[6]：

对于首领当然采取非常手段处决，但须注意，在群众大会中由群众斩杀。……富农小资产阶级以上和流氓地痞的AB团杀无赦。……工农份子加入AB团有历史地位，而能力较活跃的杀无赦。

赣西南特委厉行“肃AB团”，到了10月，在赣西南三万多共产党员中已“开除的地主富农有一千多人”（“二·七”会议要求把“党内代表富农份子不论其阶级如何及过去工作如何，无情的坚决的开除出党”），消灭了一千多“AB团”[7]。赣西南苏维埃政府工作人员的1/4被打成“AB团”，也大多被杀[8]。

在赣西南特委大张旗鼓“肃AB团”时，毛因忙于主持军中事务，并没有直接插手地方的“打AB团”，进入10月后，毛的态度发生转变。1930年10月14日，毛泽东在江西吉安县城给中共中央写了一封信，通报他对赣西南党的状况的看法及准备采取的措施。毛在这封信中继续发展了他在“二·七”会议期间对赣西南党团机构的基本观点，指出：近来

赣西南党“呈一非常严重的危机，全党完全是富农路线领导，……党团两特委机关、赣西南苏维埃政府、红军学校发现大批 AB 团份子，各级指导机关，无论内外多数为 AB 团富农所充塞领导机关”。毛申明，为“挽救这一危机”，决定进行一场以“打 AB 团”为号召的肃反运动，以对赣西南的党团机构“来一番根本改造” [9]。

毛泽东真的相信有如此多的“AB 团”吗？答案是似信非信。1927 年后，为生存而奋斗的中共，长期处在被封锁和剿杀的极端残酷的环境下，作为一种自卫反应，毛习惯对国民党的反共行为给予严重的估计，在诸如国民党向共产党区域派遣破坏特务，国民党利用“自首政策”胁迫中共人员充当特务等问题上，毛看得尤其严重。

在激烈的国共斗争中，毛已形成一种思维定式：即对于国民党在共产党区域的活动，宁可信其有，不可信其无。若从“警惕性”方面而言，中共高级领导人当中未有超过毛泽东者。在另一方面，连李文林等人也大打“AB 团”，毛就更没有理由不相信有大批“AB 团”。

然而毛泽东又绝对是一个现实主义者，他十分清楚，苏区不可能有如此多的“AB 团”，既然恐怖闸门已开，正可顺势引导，将所有公开和潜在的反侧一并镇压下去，毛作出了一个惊人之举：在镇压李文林等赣西南领导人之前，率先在自己指挥的红一方面军（红一、三军团）进行大清洗，开展“打 AB 团”运动。

1930 年 10 月，毛率红一方面军攻占吉安，旋又退出，毛并动员彭德怀在打下长沙后退出。毛的这些举措引起部分红军指战员不满，军中一时思想混乱。为了消除军中的不稳定情绪，毛在率军退出吉安后，于 11 月下旬至 12 月中旬在一方面军迅速发动“快速整军”——其主要内容就是在师、团、营、连、排成立肃反组织，捕杀军中地富出身的党员和牢骚不满份子。在不到一个月的时间内，在四万多红军中肃出 4,400 余名“AB 团”份子 [10]，其中有“几十个总团长”（指“AB 团”总团长），这些人都遭处决。

红一方面军内部的“打 AB 团”极为惨烈，地富或知识分子出身的党员、过去曾与毛意见相左的同志，人人自危，朝不保夕。黄克诚当时任红三军团第三师政委，该师组织科长、政务科长都被当作“AB 团”被肃掉。宣传科长何笃才在大革命时期加入共产党，参加过南昌暴动，后随朱德上井冈山。只因何笃才在古田会议前的朱、毛争论中站在朱德一边，从此便不被毛重用，不久即被调出红一军团，在黄克诚手下当个宣传科长。何笃才与黄克诚交谊，“两人在一起无所不谈”。何笃才认为，毛泽东这个人了不起，论本事，还没有一个人能超过毛泽东，他的政治主张毫无疑问是最正确的。但毛的组织路线不对头，“毛泽东过于信用顺从自己的人，对持不同意见的人不能一视同仁，不及朱老总宽厚坦诚”。何笃才并举例说，一些品质很坏的人就是因为会顺从，受到毛的重用，被赋予很大的权力，干坏了事情也不被追究[11]。果其不然，这位聪颖过人、毫无过错的何笃才不久就被扣之以“AB 团”的恶名遭到杀害。

毛泽东既然对自己直接率领的红一方面军也大开杀戒，那么对一贯与自己唱反调的赣西南地方红军就更不会有丝毫顾惜了。如前所述，李文林在“肃 AB 团”问题上态度十分坚决，但是到了 1930 年 10 月，随着“肃 AB 团”中暴露出的乱打乱杀现象的日益严重，李文林的态度开始转趋冷静，10 月底，省行委发出通告，批评“肃 AB 团”斗争中存在的简单化错误，强调对工农群众扩大自首范围，对捉拿老同志更要小心谨慎，如案情重大，则必须将人犯押往省行委肃反委员会审理，解除了县以下基层组织的处决权[12]。令人奇怪的是，当李文林的肃反狂热降温时，毛泽东却开始升温了。

1930 年 11 月，毛泽东的“根本改造”的利刃终于刺向中共江西省行动委员会及其所辖的赣西南地方红军。此次行动更因李文林等坚持执行李立三中央的路线，反对弃攻南昌的主张而更加惨烈。

1930 年 5 月，赣西南代表李文林赴上海参加由李立三主持的全国苏维埃区域代表会议，此次会议要求集中攻打大城市，争取一省、数省的首先胜利。李文林返回后，于 8 月上旬主持召开了赣西南特委第二次全体委员会议，部署贯彻李立三的精神。“二全会”不指名地指责了毛的一系列的观点和做法，撤销了拥护毛的主张、被毛派至赣西南特委书记的刘士奇的职务，并建议上海中央开除其党籍。这一切惹起毛的极大愤怒，毛早已习惯以中

央在江西苏区最高代表行事，岂能容忍有人在自己眼皮下以拥护中央为名反对自己[13]？此时毛尚不知“立三路线”这个词语，于是认定“二全会”是“AB团取消派”的会议。

1930年10月，红一方面军攻下吉安，在国民党地方当局的文件中发现了一张据称是李文林的地主父亲用真名签字的便条[14]，虽然这张字条究竟内容如何已不得而知，然而将李文林与“AB团”联系在一起已经有了所谓证据。10月中旬和月底，李文林又在峡江会议和罗坊会议上公开反对毛提出的“诱敌深入”的军事作战方针，主张执行李立三有关攻打大城市的指示，与毛的冲突全面激化，由此毛认定李文林就是“AB团”首领。1930年底11月底，李文林在宁都县黄陂被拘押[15]，紧接着一批与李文林有工作联系的人相继被捕。毛泽东根据犯人被刑讯后的口供，于1930年12月3日写信给改组后的江西省行委，认定段良弼（省行委常委，赣西南团特委书记）、李白芳（省行委秘书长）等为“AB团”份子，命令“捕捉李白芳等并严搜赣西南的反革命线索，给以全部扑灭”。毛在这封信中要求省行委接到此信后“务必会同李同志（即李韶九）立即执行扑灭反革命的任务，不可有丝毫的犹豫”，对“各县各区须大捉富农流氓动摇份子，并大批把他们杀戮。凡那些不捉不杀的区域，那个区域的党与政府必是AB团，就可以把那地方的负责人捉了讯办”[16]。

李韶九携着毛泽东指示信于12月3日前往富田，5日毛又派两位红军战士将第二封指示信送给已出发的李韶九和省行委。毛在信中指示彼等要从已被捉人的线索中“找得更重要的人”，为了督促贯彻两封信的指示，毛又派出总前委秘书长古柏赶往富田“协助肃反”。

12月7日下午，时任红一方面军总政治部秘书长兼肃反委员会主席的李韶九代表总前委，到达江西省苏维埃政府所在地富田，向江西省苏维埃政府负责人面交了毛泽东的指示信，随即将省行委和红二十军八个主要领导人段良弼、李白芳、金万邦、周冕、谢汉昌、马铭等人予以逮捕。李韶九对这批同志施用了“打地雷公烧香火”等多种刑法，被打同志“皆体无完肤”、“手指折断，满身烧烂行动不得”。据当时资料记载，被害同志“哭声震天，不绝于耳，残酷严刑无所不用其极”。12月8日，李白芳、马铭、周冕的妻子来看被拘押中的丈夫，也被当作“AB团”抓起来，被施以严刑，“用地雷公打手，香火烧身，烧阴户，用小刀割乳”[17]。在惨酷的刑讯下，段良弼供出李文林、金万邦、刘敌、

周冕、马铭等“是 AB 团首领，并供出红军学校有大批 AB 团”。对于这次刑讯逼供，萧克将军在 1982 年曾回忆道，“即便过了半个世纪，也不能不令人惨然一叹。我们这些“过来人”也觉不堪回首”。[18]

12 月 7 日至 12 日晚，在短短的五天时间里，李韶九等坐镇富田，厉行肃反，抓出“AB 团”120 多名，要犯几十名，先后处决 40 余人[19]，其中李韶九在未动身前往东固前亲自布置将 25 人处决。李韶九等的残酷行动终于引发 1930 年 12 月 12 日震惊苏区的“富田事变”。

富田事变的爆发，造成江西苏区内部的严重危机，对毛泽东的声誉损害极大，毛亲自出马，毫无愧怍，于 1930 年 12 月 20 日草写〈总前委答辩的一封信〉为自己的行为辩解。在这封答辩信中，毛坚持“肃 AB 团”均是有根有据的。他说：红军中“AB 团”要犯的口供“多方证明省行委内安了江西 AB 团省总团部，段良弼、李白芳、谢汉昌为其首要”。毛认定段良弼等为“AB 团”首犯乃是证据确凿，他说：“如果段、李、金、谢等，是忠实革命同志，纵令其一时受屈，总有洗冤的一天，为甚么要乱供，陷害其它的同志呢？别人还可以乱供，段、李、谢这样负省行委及军政治部主任重责的，为甚么可以呢？”[20]毛明知将段等定为“AB 团”全靠刑讯逼供，却对刑讯逼供无只字批评，反而指责段等不能为革命一时受屈，而不能为革命受屈，就一定是心中有鬼。照毛的逻辑，只要段良弼等承认是“AB 团”头子，即可证明彼等是货真价实的“AB 团”——毛的这种逻辑和思维方式，成为日后极左的审干肃反的常规思路，是逼供信屡禁不绝的最重要思想根源。在这样的思路下，毛坚持“肃 AB 团”不仅无错，反而对革命的巨大贡献。他说：“AB 团已在红军中设置了 AB 团的总指挥、总司令、军师团长、五次定期暴动，制好了暴动旗，设不严厉扑灭，恐红军早已不存在了。”毛声称富田事变将“叛逆的原形完全现出来了”，号召对事变进行坚决镇压[21]。

毛泽东理直气壮乃是他认定自己就是红军和党的象征，毛就是根据地的中央，就是共产国际在中国的代表[22]，反毛即是“AB 团”，所杀的皆是反革命，何愧之有！在毛的眼里，只要目标崇高——扑灭“AB 团”就是保卫革命，即使手段严厉一些，也无关紧要。在大恐怖中，总前委和毛的个人权威完全确立，毛就在大恐怖中成了江西苏区的列宁！

## 革命恐怖与纯化新社会

毛泽东放纵“打 AB 团”是否还有其它目的？换言之，毛是否另有企图，即通过大恐怖来重建根据地的新社会？

从各方面资料分析，在 20 年代以后，毛泽东已成为马克思主义阶级斗争理论的忠实信奉者，毛领导开辟江西革命根据地本身就含有创建无产阶级新社会的明显目的，而创建这样一个新社会的首要前提就是要将旧世界打个落花流水。依照这种思想逻辑，旧世界的代表和象征——地主豪绅及其依附于他们的知识分子，就必然成为革命的对象，于是为工农打天下就和消灭地主豪绅反革命成为一体两面的事情。

在毛泽东的领导下，1930 年的赣南根据地有很大的发展，即将与闽西根据地连成一片，经过几年的经营，新社会的形貌已大致形成，其主要特征是，根据地内绝大多数地主都已逃亡或被清洗，但是为数尚多的富农及地富出身的共产党员仍在根据地内生活和工作。1930 年后，新社会改造的主要目标集中在政治和社会生活中全力打击残余的地富份子及其子弟，包括清洗党内出身于地富家庭的知识分子党员。

在“肃 AB 团”中，地富出身的党员首当其冲，成为被消灭的对象，即表明这种斗争所具有的“纯化”的性质。

在中共党内，毛泽东长期以反教条、反极左而闻名，并由此获得全党的拥戴。

但是在 30 年代初，毛却并非如此，在某些方面，毛的极左与共产国际不相上下，这尤其体现在对待富农的方针上。

1929年，共产国际开始推行“反富农”的新方针，随即迅速传至中国，毛泽东在苏区积极贯彻并发展了共产国际这项“反富农”的方针。1930年6月，毛主持制订了《富农问题决议案》，虽然强调了“抽多补少，抽肥减瘦”的分田原则，但是在对待富农的问题上，毛的态度与共产国际的有关方针并无任何差别，甚至更为激烈。毛猛烈抨击富农，宣称“富农的剥削比较地主更加残酷”，“这个阶级自始至终是反革命的”。毛甚至还将打击的矛头指向那些未出租土地、也不雇工的富裕中农，指称他们是“第三种富农”，号召“坚决赞助群众没收他们的土地，废除他们的债务”。更有甚者，毛居然发明了“富农共产党员”的概念，把赞成中共六大“没收豪绅地主土地”的同志，一律视为“党内的富农成分”，要求将他们从党内“洗刷出来”，“无条件地开除富农及一切富农路线的人出党” [23]。

这样看来，毛泽东决意发起“肃 AB 团”确实包含多重目的，镇压赣西南红军和党组织不仅在于翦灭组织上的离心势力，同时也是为了先行扫清党内的障碍，以推行毛的改造社会的理想。在毛的世界里，镇压是和“纯化”互为联系的，其最后目标是建立一个由毛主席的新天地。

毛泽东的这套思想逻辑究竟从何而来？就“纯化”的层面而言，毛应受到马克思主义阶级斗争、暴力革命理论的影响，尤其受到俄国十月革命经验的影响。1928年1月24日，毛亲自为遂川县工农兵政府成立大会书写了这样一幅对联：“想当年，你剥削工农，好就好，利中生利；到今日，我宰杀土劣，怕不怕，刀上加刀。” [24]若就清洗党内反对力量的“镇压”层次而言，则无法找到毛受苏联经验影响的直接证据，因为苏共镇压党内反对派的经验此时正在形成之中。20年代末至30年代初，斯大林对托洛茨基的斗争还未发展到肉体消灭阶段，斯大林发动大清洗还在以后几年。

可以得出的判断是，毛在党内大搞清洗，基本上源于他在打江山中获得的经验与体会，在这方面，毛似乎更多的受到历代农民造反经验和《水浒》一类的影响，或者根本就是毛自我体悟的产物。这样，毛就在国际共运中首次创造出了将对敌斗争方式用之于党内的模式，从这个意义上来说，“肃 AB 团”具有原创性。

遵义会议后，毛泽东重新回到红军和党的核心层，在新形势下，党内、军内的矛盾仍然十分突出，然而毛改变了策略，他已不再运用“肃 AB 团”那样极端的方式来解决党内和根据地内部的矛盾。难道毛泽东已认识并改正了自己过去的错误吗？实际情况可能并非如此简单。确实，毛在 1945 年中共七大的讲话中曾提到一句：“肃反，走了极痛苦的道路。反革命应当反对，党没成熟时，在这个问题上走了弯路，犯了错误” [25]，但毛从未就自己与“肃 AB 团”的关系问题作过详细的解释和“自我批评”，“肃 AB 团”不仅一直被肯定，富田事变也被作为“反革命暴动”的铁案，长期不得平反。尽管如此，在毛掌权后，确实已不在党内再搞“打 AB 团”一类的肉体消灭。

真正的原因乃是毛泽东已实际控制了中共中央，他已有了号令全党的合法性，已不再需用极端手段来维护自己的领袖权威。1935 年后，毛占据了中共中央领导层的核心地位；1938 年，毛又得到共产国际对他中共领袖地位的承认。随着毛在党内地位的加强，他的主张和意见也成为中共意识形态义理系统的重要组成部分，毛从而也获得了党的意识形态的法理性。现在，针对党内的革命恐怖更多是以威慑的形式出现，而较少诉诸赤裸裸的暴力。在一般情况下，革命恐怖只是作为配合毛的政治教育的一种辅助手段。在以后的岁月里，作为革命策略大师的毛泽东已能收放自如地掌握革命恐怖的机器，就像中药师配制药方一样，知道如何根据现实需要来调配这两方面的比重，在毛的操纵下，革命恐怖机器已具备了某种“智能性”。1944 年，毛果断地宣布中止延安和各根据地的抢救运动——那场运动曾经使根据地的许多老党员误以为又要再来一次“肃 AB 团”式的大清洗，但是他们错了，毛无意也不愿再重演当年的斗争，当毛的目标已基本实现后，针对党内的革命恐怖机器立刻停止运转。在刘少奇的支持和协助下，毛又掌握了一种新方法：通过在审干——抢救运动中建立的制度机制，动用党机构来洗刷共产党内部，从而使党永远处在一个不断被“纯化”的持续状态中。

如此看来，30 年代初的“肃 AB 团”已成绝响。从延安时期开始，毛不断重申“一个不杀，大部不捉”，可是毛终究难忘那如火如荼的“肃 AB 团”的紧张岁月，对当年的“肃 AB 团”，毛还是作出了他自己的“批判与继承”——在党内中止肉体消灭，同时保留、发扬群众性肃反的革命传统，从此镇压与“纯化”又有了新的形式，并与党机构的审干肃反措施紧密地结合在一起，于是，抢救运动之后，又有反右、文革。

注释：

[1] 江西苏区的“肃 AB 团”运动前后历经两个阶段：第一阶段，1930 年“二·七”会议后至 1931 年 1 月；第二阶段：1931 年 4 月至 1931 年末。在第一阶段“打 AB 团”的 1930 年 10 月至次年 1 月，毛泽东及其领导的红一方面军总前委在其中发挥了主导作用。据初步统计，在这一阶段，仅红一方面军被杀官兵就达 4500 人，而至 1930 年 10 月，赣西南特委已消灭“AB 团”份子 1000 余人，这一数目尚不包括在这之后根据地内党政机构被杀党员的人数。主持江西苏区“肃 AB 团”第二阶段的是以任弼时为首的中央代表团和毛泽东领导的红一方面军总前委，被杀对象主要是参加富田事变的赣西南红军的干部，以及赣西南地方政权的干部，具体的死亡人数不详。资料来源：一、毛泽东：给总前委的一封信（1930 年 12 月 20 日），载共军政治学院：《中共党史教学参考资料》，第 14 册（北京：共军政治学院，1985），页 634；二、萧克谈中国苏区初期的肃反运动，载中国革命博物馆编：《党史研究资料》，1982 年第 5 期；三、江西苏区中共省委工作总结报告（1932 年 5 月），载江西省档案馆、中共江西省委党校党史教研室编：《中央革命根据地史料选编》，上册（南昌：江西人民出版社，1983），页 477-78、480；四、赣西南会议记录——关于组织问题，载《中央革命根据地史料选编》，上册，页 631；五、廖盖隆 1981 年 9 月 23 日说：“红一方面军当时在苏区不过三、四万人，前后两次肃反，搞了六千多人，其中一半是杀掉了，就是说，十个红军中有一个被杀掉了，而且差不多都是干部”。廖盖隆在 1980 年 12 月 10 日又引用毛泽东的话：“毛主席说，我们杀了四千五百人，但我们保存了四万红军。”引自中共中央党史资料征集委员会、中共中央党史研究室编：《党史资料通讯》（1981 年合订本）（北京：中共中央党校出版社，1982），页 89、144。

[2] 龚楚：《龚楚将军回忆录》（香港：明报月刊社，1978），页 171、205-207、348、357。

[3] 前委开除江汉波党籍决议（1930 年 4 月 4 日），载《中央革命根据地史料选编》，上册，页 576-77。

[4] 前委通告第一号（1930 年 2 月 16 日），载《中央革命根据地史料选编》，中册，页 173。

[5] [6] [8] 《中央革命根据地史料选编》，下册，页 634-35；646；648-49；110。

[7] 《中央革命根据地史料选编》，上册，页 626、631。

[9] 中共中央文献研究室编：《毛泽东年谱（1893-1949）》，上卷（北京：中央文献出版社、人民出版社，1993），页 319。另参见戴向青、罗惠兰：《AB 团与富田事变始末》（郑州：河南人民出版社，1994），页 93。

[10] [20] [21] 同注[1] 毛泽东：总前委答辩的一封信

[11] 《黄克诚自述》（北京：人民出版社，1994），页 100-101。

[12] 赣西行委：通告西字第 7 号（1930 年 10 月 21 日），转引自陈永发：中共早期肃反的检讨——AB 团案，《中央研究院近代史研究所集刊》，第 17 期，上册（1988 年 6 月），页 203。

[13] 毛泽东：总前委答辩的一封信中强调“二全会议主要反对二七会议，开除刘士奇，就是反对二七会议，反对毛泽东。”

[14] 参见注[2]龚楚，页 353；但据 1987 年中共吉水县党史办的调查报告称，李文林的父亲只是富裕中农，且早在 1927 年 5 月就病故。参阅关于李文林被错杀情况的调查，载中共江西省党史资料征集委员会、中共江西省委党史研究室：《江西党史资料》，第 1 辑，页 326。

[15] 李文林在 1930 年 11 月底被总前委秘密逮捕，项英就任苏区中央局书记获释放，于 1931 年 2 月被派往万太河东肃反委员会工作。任弼时率领的中央代表团抵达后，推翻项英的决定，李文林于 1931 年 7 月再次被捕。1932 年 5 月 30 日，李文林被冠于“AB 团首犯”遭处决，至 1987 年尚未平反。

[16] 转引自注[9] 戴向青、罗惠兰，页 98。

[17] 省行委紧急通告第 9 号（1930 年 12 月 15 日），转引自上书，页 105。

[18] 见注[1] 萧克谈中国苏区初期的肃反运动。

[19] 曾山：为“富田事变”宣言（1931 年 1 月 14 日），转引自注[9] 戴向青、罗惠兰，页 105-106。

[22] 1931 年，毛泽东与从苏联返国的无线电技术干部涂作潮即如此说，参见涂作潮：我跟毛主席发的一次火，《百年潮》，1999 年第 5 期，页 25-27。

[23] 富农问题——1930 年 6 月前委、闽西特委联席会议决议，载《中央革命根据地史料选编》，下册，页 398-99，400、402、404、410、413。

[24] 转引自余伯流、夏道汉：《井冈山革命根据地研究》（南昌：江西人民出版社，1987），页 124。

[25] 参见中共中央党史研究室一室：《中国共产党历史（上卷）若干问题说明》（北京：中共党史出版社，1991），页 121。

DeepL Translation

### **Gao Hua: Historical Examination of the "Purging AB Group" Incident**

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Sixty-nine years ago, a large-scale wave of revolutionary terror swept through the CPC-led Jiangxi Soviet area. In a round of purges called "purging AB group", thousands of Red Army officers and soldiers and the base of the party members and ordinary people were killed [1]. It was not Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, the sworn enemies of the CPC, but the CPC organization in the base area and the General Front Committee of the Red Army under the command of Mao Zedong. This historical fact was later completely rewritten as Mao Zedong's position within the CCP rose. It was not until the 1980s and 1990s that the broad outlines of the events of that year, leaving aside Mao's personal responsibility, became apparent, but many obscurities remain. This article examines why Mao initiated the "fight against the AB" in the Red Army and in the base areas. What was Mao's rationale for the Great Purge? What is the relationship between the Great Terror and the establishment of a new society? Why did Mao stop using the "Fighting the AB Groups" method to solve internal conflicts after he had taken over the power of the CCP?

The cause of the incident: Violence to maintain leadership authority

Mao Zedong's reputation in the Chinese Communist Revolutionary Movement (CCRM) began in 1927 after the split of the Communist Party of China (CPC), when he was the first to take up armed resistance against the Kuomintang (KMT), and became a famous leader of the CCRM's armed revolution. Prior to this, although Mao was one of the founding fathers of the CCP, in 1921-27, the

party's reputation was dominated by Chen Duxiu and others, and although Mao was recognized as an expert in the agrarian movement, he was still of the younger generation, and did not have any dominant role to play in the party's decision-making.

With the separation of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the CCP went underground, and the center of the revolution gradually shifted from the cities to the countryside, the form of the party's struggle, its organizational composition, and its character all underwent profound changes. Since the CCP had transformed itself from a legal party to a secret party, the democratic centralism of the Leninist party had been fully institutionalized, and the authority of the CCP Central Committee as the commanding general of the Chinese revolution had been basically established, the CCP began the stage of military communist revolution.

The main sign of entering the stage of military communist revolution was that after 1927, the CCP unprecedentedly had its own territory under its control - the Red Zone - in which it could openly implement its revolutionary program of transforming China, which was a new situation that the CCP had never encountered since its establishment. It was in this situation that Mao Zedong came to prominence and gained a great deal of notoriety, and the party's reputation gradually came to rest on his shoulders.

Mao Zedong undoubtedly did the most good for the CCP revolution, and his efforts and practices in the Jiangxi countryside opened up a new path for the CCP. But in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Mao was only an armed comrade under the Party leadership, and had to accept the leadership of the CCP Central Committee from Shanghai. For a considerable period of time, not only was Mao not the rightful leader of the Party, but even in the Jiangxi Soviet, Mao's personal authority had not yet been thoroughly consolidated.

Mao Zedong got his start in the CCP by being familiar with the countryside and peasants and by being a good leader of military struggles, however, one major difference between modern Chinese revolutionary wars and peasant wars of all times is that armed revolutions against the Kuomintang

are under the direct leadership of the Communist Party. The Party provided the armed revolution with an ideological system of doctrine and possessed full power of interpretation of this system of doctrine. The Party also provided the organizational framework and the source of cadres for the armed revolution. The Party not only had the right to give orders for the establishment of the revolutionary army, but also had the right to organize and direct the appointment and mobilization of cadres. Despite Mao's great credit for creating the Red Army and opening up the Red Base Areas, he was still subject to the Party's constraints.

In 1927-29, Mao worked hard to pioneer in Jiangxi, and although he was dissatisfied with the constraints imposed on the central government in Shanghai, he was basically submissive to the central government. Although Mao's theories were occasionally out of line, his statements were generally within the ideological framework of the CCP Central Committee. Mao's organizational relations were also not obviously ultra vires. Mao often reported in writing to the higher party committees and the CPC Central Committee on the situation of the struggle in the base areas.

The CCP Central Committee viewed Mao's efforts in Jiangxi with considerable admiration, and at the Sixth Congress of the CCP held in Moscow in 1928, Mao was elected to the Central Committee without being present. In general, the Shanghai Central Committee was optimistic about Mao's activities, including Mao's leadership of the Red Army in Jiangxi, especially during the controversy between Zhu De and Mao Zedong that took place in 1929, the Central Committee took a clear stance in favor of Mao, which led to the establishment of Mao's leadership in the Jiangxi Soviet.

After the Gutian Conference in 1929, Mao Zedong's authority in the Jiangxi Soviet area had already been initially formed, and the two most important conditions contributing to the formation of Mao's leadership authority were already in place: first, the CCP Central Committee's explicit support for Mao provided a legal basis for Mao's authority; second, Mao's achievements were outstanding, and the territory of the base area expanded and the population increased under his leadership. Zhu De, who once disagreed with Mao, lost some of his prestige due to military defeats, while Mao's military successes provided a factual basis for Mao's authority. As a concrete manifestation of Mao's leadership authority, in 1930, Mao became the General Political Commissar of the First Red Army

and the Secretary of the General Front Committee. In the situation where the unified party leadership of the Soviet Union had not yet been established, the General Front Committee of the First Red Army under Mao's leadership became the supreme leadership organization of the Jiangxi Soviet Union. In the war environment, the army was the most important pillar to maintain the existence of the Soviet Union, and the army-party-soviet regime had realized a high degree of integration, so Mao became the supreme leader of the base area in Jiangxi, and the instructions of the Shanghai Central Committee could be implemented in the Soviet Union only through Mao. Mao's special position gave him a great deal of freedom - Mao had the right to interpret the Central Committee's instructions flexibly, and he could combine his own opinions with those of the Central Committee and enforce them in the name of the Central Committee. However, Mao was not the CCP Central Committee after all, and there were still some Red Army and Party organizations in the Soviet Union that invoked the CCP Central Committee to negatively counter Mao's new authority.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the CCP's armed revolution was in its infancy and the great heroes rose up in all directions, the contradictions within the revolutionary camp were temporarily covered up under the general goal of revolting against the Kuomintang. But within the base areas, the contradictions between foreign cadres and local cadres, between cadres who stayed in the Soviet Union and domestic cadres, and between intellectual cadres and cadres of peasant origin still existed, and the only force that made it possible to coalesce came from the authority of the Central Committee of the CCP, including the theoretical authority of the system of ideological justification provided by the Central Committee. It was only at this time that the CCP Central Committee was far away from the countryside, and the leadership of the city center over the base areas had to be manifested through Mao Zedong, so Mao's personal knowledge, intelligence, personality factors and style and attitude were of particular importance.

Mao is the most political vision of all the armed comrades in the Jiangxi Soviet Union, the strongest will, and the best use of soldiers to fight, but his style of arbitrariness, so that many of his comrades in the army "respect and fear" [2]. In 1929 Zhu, Mao dispute, Zhu De because of his generous, democratic style, get the Red Army (predecessor of the Red Army) most of the cadres of sympathy and support. 1929 July Chen Yi went to Shanghai to report on the Central Committee on Zhu, Mao

dispute, the CPC Central Committee explicitly expressed support for Mao. Chen Yi returned to Gan, personally invited Mao out of the mountain, Zhu De, Chen Yi for loyal Communists, all obeyed the Central Committee, re-straightened the relationship with Mao, so that the differences and contradictions within the Red Army can be resolved. However, the differences between Mao and the local Red Army and Party organizations in southwest Gansi sharpened for various reasons.

It was under these circumstances that Mao Zedong's purge of the "AB Group" took place. The immediate cause of this incident was that Mao's authority in the Jiangxi Soviet area had just been established, but it was challenged by the local Red Army and Party organizations in Gansinan, led by Li Wenlin, and Mao could not tolerate any organized opposition to his authority and will under his nose, regardless of whether it came from within the Red Army or from the local Party organizations. In order to assert his authority in the base areas, Mao broke free from the constraints of party morality and ethics and resorted to extreme measures to suppress party comrades whom he suspected of being dissenting forces.

What did Mao want to achieve by using bloodshed and unconventional means to resolve internal disputes within the Party? In a nutshell, Mao wanted to be the Lenin of the Jiangxi Soviet Union. Since Mao had not yet become the Lenin of the Chinese Party, and did not have the legal authority to command the whole Party, he resorted to extreme means to suppress internal dissent within the Party.

What shame is there in suppressing a "counter-revolution"?

How to resolve the conflict between the application of mass terror to the Party and the military, which was in great conflict with Party morality and ethics? Mao Zedong had his own solution. He claimed that the Party and the Red Army in southwest Gansi, led by Li Wenlin, had been dominated by opportunism and the rich-peasant line, and that in order to salvage the revolution they had to be completely reformed, so that Mao's repression would have an ideological banner.

Li Wenlin, one of the founders of the Party and Red Army in southwest Gansi who was an intellectual, was once very close to Mao and the Red Army. However, by the early 1930s, the local Red Army in Jiangxi, which had gone through many combinations, and the party organizations in western Gansi disagreed with Mao on a number of issues, and the relationship with Mao became increasingly strained.

The disagreement between the Gansinan side and Mao Zedong centered on two issues: (1) the issue of land reform policy. The Gansinan side advocated the implementation of the decision of the Sixth CPC National Congress on "confiscating the land of the gentry and landlords" and opposed Mao's proposal of "confiscating all land". (2) Attribution and staffing of the army and local party organizations.

At the end of November 1929, Mao Zedong proposed to merge the two special committees on the Ganxi and Xianggan borders to form a new Ganxi special committee, and Mao also decided to merge the 2nd and 4th Red Regiments led by Li Wenlin into Peng Dehuai's division to form the Red Sixth Army. In January 1930, Mao Zedong appointed Liu Shiqi and Zeng Shan, cadres of the Red Army, to form the Ganxi Special Committee as the supreme organization to lead Ganxi, but it was resisted by the Ganxi side.

In order to resolve the conflicts with the local Red Army and Party organizations in western Gan, Mao Zedong convened a joint meeting of the former committee of the Red Army and the leaders of western Gan at Peitou Village, Jian County, the seat of the Special Committee of western Gan, on February 6-9, 1930. Jiang Hanbo also participated in the meeting in his capacity as the inspector of the CPC Jiangxi Provincial Committee, and Liu Shiji and others cooperated with Mao Zedong in the organization of the meeting as his assistants.

At the "February 7th" meeting, Mao, who had been restored to the leadership of the Red Army two months earlier with the approval of the CPC Central Committee, with the help of Liu Shiqi and Zeng Shan, launched a fierce struggle against the heads of the local Red Army and party

organizations in southwest Gansan, which laid the groundwork for the "purge of the AB group" campaign later on. This struggle sowed the seeds for the later "purge of the AB Group" campaign.

Mao Zedong and others cited two major "serious political mistakes" made by the local Red Army and Party organizations in Gansinan: (1) Mao and others criticized Jiang Hanbo and Li Wenlin, the leaders of Gansinan, for proposing the idea of "confiscating the land of the gentry and landowners", which was a "complete move towards the rural bourgeoisie" and "a complete move towards the rural bourgeoisie". "completely heading towards the line of the rural bourgeoisie (rich peasants)", pointing out that "if this development goes on, it will inevitably lead to the total abolition of the working class strategy of fighting for the peasants, and to the path of Trotsky's Chen Duxiu, and the total abolition of the agrarian revolution". (2) Mao and others accused Jiang Hanbo and others of using "non-political trivialities to incite comrades to oppose the Party leaders of the correct line." [3] - The "Party leaders" mentioned here are The "Party leader" mentioned here was Liu Shiqi, who was sent by Mao Zedong as secretary of the Ganxi Special Committee.

On February 16, the General Committee of the Red Army of the Fourth Army, chaired by Mao Zedong, issued the "First Circular of the Front Committee" [3] - the first circular of the Front Committee, which referred to Liu Shiqi, the secretary of the Special Committee of Ganxi, sent by Mao Zedong. Front Committee issued "Front Committee Circular No. 1", officially announced the "purge of landlords and rich peasants" struggle, the circular pointed out [4]:

There is a serious crisis within the Party in western Gansi, namely, the landlords and rich peasants are filling up the Party's local guiding organs at all levels, and the Party's policies are entirely opportunistic; if they are not thoroughly purged, not only will they be unable to carry out the Party's great political task, but the revolution will also suffer a fundamental defeat. The joint meeting called upon the revolutionary comrades of the Party to rise up, overthrow the opportunist political leadership, expel the landlords and rich peasants from the Party, and rapidly Bolshevize the Party.

"The concept of "overthrowing the opportunist leadership" was still a concept of internal struggle, which appeared around the time of the August 7 Conference in 1927, and only announced the change of Chen Duxiu's line and the suspension of his leading position in the Central Committee. After that time, although the CCP emphasized more and more on ideological unity, there were still some traces of the democratic tradition of the Revolutionary period in the Party. According to the Party's morality and ethics at that time, dissenting views could still be debated within the Party, and the CCP Central Committee or the Comintern headquarters in Moscow had the final say, and there were no instances of physical elimination of dissenting Party comrades, but in 1930 Mao combined the "overthrowing of the opportunist leadership" with physical elimination.

Mao easily found the intermediary link in the transition from a concept of internal party struggle to a concept of struggle against the enemy. He declared that the opportunist leaders within the Party were themselves the rich counter-revolutionaries, thus smoothly connecting the slogan of the struggle against the enemy - down with the Kuomintang and eliminate the rich counter-revolutionaries - with the concept of the internal struggle, "down with the opportunist leaders", and obtaining the legitimacy of suppression in one fell swoop. In the spring of 1930, news was circulating in the Soviet area that the Kuomintang's "AB Group" had been infiltrating and sabotaging the area, and that its organizations had been uncovered one after another, and that the atmosphere of vigilance against the enemy in the base area was at an all-time high, so Mao could have used the term "suppress the counterrevolution" to demand that the Red Army should "suppress the counterrevolution". In such a situation, Mao could have used the term "suppressing counterrevolution" to demand that the Red Army and the Party organizations and soviets in the base areas give full support to and obey the policy of suppressing the "AB Group".

After the February 7 Conference in 1930, an atmosphere of revolutionary terror gradually developed in the Jiangxi Soviet. Under the leadership of Liu Shiqi, the secretary of the Gansinan Special Committee, the Committee took the lead in launching the propaganda campaign of "purging the AB Troupe" in accordance with the spirit of the No. 1 Circular of the Front Committee of the Red Army. 25 June, the West Road Committee of the Gansinan Special Committee of the Communist

Party of China issued the "Propaganda Outline of the Anti-Reorganization AB Troupe," ordering the organizations of all levels to:

If the masses are found to be shaken up by bad performers, they should be arrested and handed over to the Soviet government for investigation. Anyone who passes through the red areas must be strictly inspected and, if suspected, should be arrested and handed over to the Soviet government; the people circulating in the red areas should be held in the soviets to which they belonged.

The masses of workers and peasants were only divided by class, not by relatives or friends. Anyone who came to his home or found any wrongdoing elsewhere, regardless of relatives or friends, should be reported to the soviets for arrest.

At the same time, the Outline called for "red-colored purges of the countryside" and "red-colored terror" in order to "purge the traitors under the Red Flag": "At present, the soviets at all levels should step up their work of purging counter-revolutionaries. Now the soviets at all levels should intensify their work of purging counter-revolutionary elements and kill the reactionary rich peasants of the gentry and landlords as a warning, but the killings must be supported by facts of reaction and accidental killings are strictly forbidden." [5] Although this Outline mentioned that killings should be supported by evidence and that manslaughter was strictly forbidden, once the door to terror was opened, things quickly got out of control.

In July and August 1930, the "Purge of the AB Groups" quickly moved from the grassroots to the higher authorities, and in August, Li Wenlin became the secretary of the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee, which had been newly established under Li Lizan's order to attack the big cities. Li Wenlin was not inferior to Liu Shiqi, the former secretary of the Special Committee, in terms of his enthusiasm for "fighting the AB Group", and was even better than his predecessor. In the document "Emergency Circular No. 20 - Mobilizing Party Members and the Masses to Thoroughly Purge the AB Troupe," issued on September 24, 1930, the Special Committee of Ganxi South declared: "The Red Flag Society, the Lenin Youth Society, and the government of Ganxi South have AB Troupe

cells.... ...All the AB members of the Gansinan Government who were mixed in with the Party's Special Committee were uncovered. And all the organizations in the counties and districts have been reported."

The Emergency Circular also stipulated in detail the interrogation methods of the "AB Group" and the basic principles of execution: "The AB Group is very insidious, cunning, treacherous and tough, and will not confess unless it is tortured in the most brutal way, so it is necessary to use both soft and hard methods to continue the strict interrogation. We must use both soft and hard methods to continue to interrogate them severely, to guess the source of their words, to find out the clues, to follow the trail, and mainly to make them confess to the AB organization, with a view to eliminating it at all."

Once the "AB Tuan" members were found, the next step was to shoot them. The Emergency Circular demanded [6]:

The leaders will of course be executed by extraordinary means, but care must be taken that they are beheaded by the masses in mass meetings. .... The AB group of rich peasants above the petty bourgeoisie and hooligans and ruffians are to be killed without amnesty. .... Workers and peasants who have joined the AB and have a historical status and are more active in their activities are not to be killed.

The Gansinan Special Committee vigorously pursued the "purging of AB groups", and by October, among the more than 30,000 Communists in Gansinan, "more than 1,000 landlords and rich peasants had been expelled" (the "February 7th" meeting called for the expulsion of the AB groups from the Communist Party of China). The "February 7" conference called for the "merciless and resolute expulsion from the Party of those who represent the rich peasants, regardless of their class and past work"), eliminating more than 1,000 "AB Groups"[7]. One-fourth of the staff of the Gansinan Soviet Government were labeled as "AB Group" and most of them were killed [8].

While the Gansinan Special Committee was making a big fuss about "purging the AB", Mao was busy presiding over military affairs and did not directly intervene in the local "fight against the AB", but Mao's attitude changed after October 1930 when he wrote a letter to the CPC Central Committee in Ji'an County, Jiangxi Province. On October 14, 1930, Mao Zedong wrote a letter to the CCP Central Committee in Ji'an County, Jiangxi Province, informing it of his views on the situation of the Party in western Gansi and the measures he intended to take. In this letter, Mao continued to develop the basic views he had expressed during the February 7 meeting about the Party organization in western Gannan, pointing out that recently the Party in western Gannan "has been in a very serious crisis, with the whole Party being led entirely by the rich peasants' line. .... The organs of the two special committees of the Party, the Gansinan Soviet Government, and the Red Army School have found a large number of AB members, and most of the guiding organs at all levels, both internal and external, are filled with AB rich peasants as their leading organs. Mao affirmed that in order to "salvage this crisis", he had decided to carry out a purge called "Fight the AB Groups", in order to "fundamentally reform" the Party and League organizations in western Gannan[9]. Mao Zedong really believed that there were so many

Did Mao really believe that there were so many "AB groups"? After 1927, the CCP, struggling for survival, was under the extremely cruel environment of being blockaded and suppressed for a long time, and as a self-defense reaction, Mao used to give a serious estimation to the anti-communist behaviors of the KMT, such as sending sabotage agents to the communist areas, and the KMT's use of the "surrender policy" to force CCP members to serve as agents. Mao viewed such issues as the dispatch of sabotage agents to Communist areas and the KMT's use of the "surrender policy" to coerce CCP personnel to serve as agents as particularly serious.

During the fierce struggle between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, Mao had developed a mindset that it was better to believe in the activities of the Kuomintang in the Communist areas than to believe in nothing. In terms of "vigilance", there was no one among the senior leaders of the CCP who surpassed Mao Zedong. On the other hand, even Li Wenlin and others were fighting against the "AB Group", so Mao had no reason not to believe that there was a large number of "AB Groups".

However, Mao Zedong was definitely a realist, and he knew very well that there could not be so many "AB Troupes" in the Soviet area. Since the floodgates of terror had been opened, he could be guided by the trend of suppressing all open and potential opposition, and Mao made an amazing move: before suppressing Li Wenlin and other leaders of the Gansinan area, he took the lead in organizing the Red First Army (Red Army), which was commanded by Mao. Before cracking down on Li Wenlin and other leaders in Gansinan, Mao took the lead in carrying out a purge in the Red First Army (the First and Third Red Army Corps) under his own command by launching a campaign to "fight the AB Groups".

In October 1930, Mao led the First Red Army to capture Ji'an, then withdrew, and Mao mobilized Peng Dehuai to withdraw after taking Changsha. Mao's moves caused dissatisfaction among some of the Red Army commanders, which led to a moment of confusion in the army. In order to eliminate the instability in the army, Mao, after leading the army to withdraw from Ji'an, launched the "Rapid Reorganization of the Army" from late November to mid-December, the main content of which was to set up anti-rebellion organizations in the divisions, regiments, battalions, companies and platoons, and to hunt down and kill rich and disgruntled party members and members of the Red Army. The main content was to set up anti-revolutionary organizations in divisions, regiments, battalions, companies and platoons, and to hunt down and kill the rich and discontented members of the army. In less than a month, more than 4,400 "AB Regiment" members were purged out of more than 40,000 Red Army members [10], including "dozens of chiefs" (referring to the chiefs of the "AB Regiment"), who were all sentenced to death. The "AB" chiefs were all executed.

The "fight against the AB Group" within the Red Army was extremely tragic, and members of the Party who were rich or intellectuals, and comrades who had disagreed with Mao in the past, were in danger of losing their lives. Huang Kecheng was the political commissar of the Third Division of the Third Red Army Corps at the time, and the head of the division's organization section and the head of the division's political affairs section were all purged as "AB Groups". He Ducai, the head of the propaganda section, joined the Communist Party during the Revolution and participated in the Nanchang Riot before accompanying Zhu De to Jinggangshan. Because He Ducai sided with Zhu

De in the argument between Zhu and Mao before the Gutian Conference, he was not reused by Mao and was soon transferred out of the First Red Army Corps to work under Huang Kecheng as a propaganda chief. He Ducai and Huang Kecheng friendship, "two people together talk about everything". According to He Ducai, Mao Zedong was a remarkable man, no one could surpass him in terms of ability, and his political ideas were undoubtedly the most correct. However, Mao's organizational line was not correct: "Mao gave too much credit to those who obeyed him, and he could not treat those who held different opinions equally, and was not as generous and frank as General Zhu". He Ducai also cited the example that some people with very bad qualities were reused by Mao because of their obedience, and were given great power, and were not held accountable for their bad deeds [11]. If not, the brilliant and faultless He Ducai was soon murdered under the name of "AB Group".

Mao Zedong, since he also killed the Red First Front Army, which he directly led, he would not hesitate to kill the local Red Army in Gansinan, which had always been in opposition to him. As mentioned earlier, Li Wenlin was very resolute on the issue of "purging the AB Corps", but in October 1930, as the phenomenon of indiscriminate killing exposed in the "purging of the AB Corps" became more and more serious, Li Wenlin's attitude began to turn cooler, and at the end of October. At the end of October, the provincial line committee issued a circular criticizing the simplistic mistakes in the "Purging of AB Groups", emphasizing that the scope of the masses of workers and peasants to expand the scope of self-surrender, and to be more careful in arresting the old comrades, such as the case of the seriousness of the case, must be escorted to the Provincial Committee of the provincial line committee of the Purging of anti-revolutionary committee to hear the case, and to lift the right of execution of the grass-roots organizations of the county below [12]. Strangely enough, while Li Wenlin's purging fervor cooled, Mao's began to heat up.

In November 1930, the sharp edge of Mao's "fundamental transformation" was finally thrust at the CCP Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee and its local Red Army in southwest Gansi. This action was all the more disastrous because Li Wenlin and others insisted on implementing the line of Li Lisan's Central Committee and opposed the idea of abandoning the attack on Nanchang.

In May 1930, Li Wenlin, a representative of southwest Gansi, went to Shanghai to attend the National Conference of Soviet Regional Representatives presided over by Li Lisan, which called for focusing on attacking large cities and cities and striving for the first victory in one or several provinces. After his return, Li Wenlin presided over the second plenary meeting of the Gansinan Special Committee in early August, deploying and implementing Li Lisan's spirit. The "Second Plenary Meeting" accused Mao of a series of views and practices without naming him, dismissed Liu Shiqi, who supported Mao's ideas and had been sent by Mao to serve as secretary of the Special Committee for West Jiangxi, and recommended that the Shanghai Central Committee expel him from the Party. All this provoked great anger Mao, Mao has long been accustomed to the highest representative of the Central Committee in the Jiangxi Soviet Union to act, can not tolerate someone in their own eyes in the name of supporting the Central Committee against their own [13]? At this time, Mao did not yet know the term "Lishang Line", so he decided that the "Second Plenary Session" was a meeting of the "AB Group Abolitionists".

In October 1930, when the Red Army captured Ji'an, a note signed by Li Wenlin's landowner father under his real name was found among the documents of the local authorities of the Kuomintang[14] Although the content of this note is not known, there is evidence linking Li Wenlin to the "AB Tuan".<sup>10</sup> In the middle and end of October, Li Wenlin was arrested by the KMT and sentenced to three years in prison. In the middle and end of October, Li Wenlin openly opposed Mao's military policy of "luring the enemy deeper into the country" and advocated the implementation of Li Lisan's instructions about attacking big cities at the Xijiang and Luofang meetings, which intensified the conflict with Mao, who identified Li Wenlin as the leader of the "AB Troupe". "At the end of November 1930, Li Wenlin was detained in Huangpi, Ningdu County,[15] followed by the arrests of a number of people who had worked with Li Wenlin. Based on the prisoners' confessions, Mao Zedong wrote a letter to the reorganized Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee on December 3, 1930, identifying Duan Liangbi (member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee and secretary of the Special Committee of the Gansinan Regiment) and Li Baifang (secretary-general of the Provincial Party Committee) as members of the AB Group, and ordering that "Li Baifang and others be captured, and that the counter-revolutionary clues in Gansinan be strictly searched for"[16]. Mao ordered "the capture of Li Baifang and others, and a rigorous search for counter-revolutionary clues in Gansinan, with a view to extinguishing all of them". In this letter, Mao asked

the Provincial Executive Committee to "make sure that Comrade Li (i.e., Li Shaojiu) will immediately carry out the task of extinguishing the counter-revolutionaries without the slightest hesitation", and that "all counties and districts should capture the rich peasants, hooligans, and shakers and kill them in large numbers. Where those who are not captured and not killed in the region, the party and government of that region must be the AB group, so that the person in charge of that place can be arrested and interrogated"[16].

Li Shaojiu left for Futian on December 3 with Mao's letter of instruction, and on the 5th Mao sent two Red Army soldiers to deliver a second letter of instruction to Li Shaojiu and the provincial line committee, who had already left. Mao's letter instructed them to "find more important people" from the clues of those who had been arrested, in order to supervise the implementation of the instructions of the two letters, Mao also sent the General Front Committee Secretary General Gubai rushed to Futian "to assist in the purge".

The afternoon of December 7, then Secretary General of the General Political Department of the Red Army and Chairman of the Anti-Purge Committee, Li Shaojiu on behalf of the General Front Committee, arrived in Jiangxi Province, the seat of the Jiangxi Provincial Soviet Government Futian, the person in charge of the Jiangxi Provincial Soviet Government face to face with Mao Zedong's letter of instruction, and then immediately the Provincial Executive Committee and the Red 20 Army, the eight main leaders of the Duanliangbil, Li Baifang, Jin Wanbang, Zhou Guan, Xie Hanchang, Ma Mings, etc. to be arrested. Li Shaojiu on this group of comrades applied "hit the ground Lei Gong burning incense and fire" and other criminal law, beaten comrades "are all skinless", "broken fingers, burned body action can not". According to the information recorded at the time, the comrades killed "cries of the sky, endless, cruel and severe punishment of all kinds". December 8, Li Baifang, Ma Ming, Zhou Coronation's wife to see their husbands in custody, was also taken as "AB Tuan" arrested, was severely tortured, "the ground Leigong beaters," "burning incense" and other kinds of criminal law, such as beating comrades "are body and soul", "broken fingers, burned all over the body can not move". They were severely tortured, "beaten with land thunderbolts, burned with incense and fire, had their pussies burned, and had their breasts cut with small knives" [17]. Under severe torture, Duan Liangbi confessed that Li Wenlin, Jin Wanbang, Liu

Enemy, Zhou Coronation, Ma Ming, etc. "were the leaders of the AB group, and confessed that there were a large number of AB groups in the Red Army School". General Xiao Ke recalled in 1982 that "even after half a century, we cannot help but sigh miserably. We "people who have been here before" also find it unbearable to look back." [18]

The night of December 7 to 12, in just five days, Li Shaojiu and other sitting in Futian, vigorously anti-purge, captured more than 120 "AB Group", dozens of key criminals, has executed more than 40 people [19], of which Li Shaojiu in the not yet departed to the Dongguan before the execution of 25 people personally arranged. Li Shaojiu and other cruel actions finally triggered December 12, 1930 shocked the Soviet Union "Futian Incident".

The outbreak of the Futian Incident, resulting in a serious crisis within the Jiangxi Soviet Union, Mao Zedong's reputation is extremely damaged, Mao personally, without shame, on December 20, 1930, drafted (General Frontier Committee in reply to a letter of defense) to justify their own actions. In this letter of defense, Mao insisted that "purge AB group" are well-founded. He said: the Red Army in the "AB Group" statements of key criminals "many parties to prove that the provincial line committee in the province of Jiangxi AB Group, the provincial headquarters, Duan Liangbi, Li Baifang, Xie Hanchang for the first of its". Mao identified Duan Liangbi as the first offender of the "AB Group" is solid evidence, he said: "If Duan, Li, Jin, Xie, etc., is a loyal revolutionary comrades, even if they are temporarily aggrieved, there will always be a day of redress of grievances, why should they make false confessions and frame other comrades? Other people can still make false confessions, Duan, Li, Xie so responsible for the Provincial Executive Committee and Director of the Military Political Department, why can it?" [20] Mao knew that Duan and so on will be designated as "AB Corps" all rely on torture to force confessions, but no word on torture to force confessions to criticize, but accuse Duan and so on can not be for the revolution for a moment to be aggrieved, but can not be for the revolution to be aggrieved, it must be the heart of the ghosts. According to Mao's logic, as long as Duan Liangbi and others admitted to being the head of the "AB Tuan", it could be proved that they were the real "AB Tuan"-Mao's logic and way of thinking became the basis for the future Mao's logic and way of thinking became the conventional thinking of the ultra-leftist trial and purge, and was the most important ideological root of the repeated and

unending practice of forcing confessions. In this way of thinking, Mao's insistence on "purging the AB group" was not only not wrong, but on the contrary a great contribution to the revolution. He said, "The AB group has set up in the Red Army the AB group's commander-in-chief, the commander-in-chief, the head of the army division, five regular riots, and made a good riot flag, if it is not harshly extinguished, I am afraid that the Red Army has long since ceased to exist." Mao claimed that the Futian Incident had brought out "the original form of rebellion" and called for a resolute suppression of the Incident [21].

Mao was justified in his belief that he was the symbol of the Red Army and the Party, that Mao was the center of the base area, and that he was the representative of the Comintern in China [22], and that to oppose Mao was to be an "AB group," and that all those killed were counterrevolutionaries, and that there was nothing to be ashamed of! In Mao's eyes, as long as the goal is noble - to extinguish the "AB" is to defend the revolution - it doesn't matter if the means are harsh. In the midst of the Great Terror, the personal authority of the General Front Committee and Mao was fully established, and Mao became the Lenin of the Jiangxi Soviet in the midst of the Great Terror!

### Revolutionary Terror and Purification of the New Society

Did Mao Zedong have another purpose in indulging in the "fight against the AB"? In other words, did Mao have another purpose, namely, to rebuild a new society in the base area through the Great Terror?

Analyzing all the information, after the 1920s, Mao Zedong had become a true believer in the Marxist theory of class struggle, and Mao's leadership in opening up the Jiangxi Revolutionary Base itself had the obvious purpose of creating a new proletarian society, and the first and foremost prerequisite for the creation of such a new society was the destruction of the old world. According to this ideological logic, the representatives and symbols of the old world - the landlords and gentry and the intellectuals dependent on them - would inevitably become the objects of revolution, and

the fight for the workers and peasants and the elimination of the counter-revolution of the landlords and gentry would then become two sides of the same coin.

Under Mao Zedong's leadership, the Gannan base area in 1930 had developed considerably and was about to be connected with the base area in western Fujian. After a few years of operation, the shape of the new society had been roughly formed, with the main feature that most of the landowners in the base area had fled or had been purged, but a relatively large number of rich peasants and Communists of landed wealth origin were still living and working there. After 1930, the main goal of the new social transformation was to focus on the political and social life. After 1930, the main goal of the new social reform was to focus on the political and social life of the party by cracking down on the remnants of the landed rich and their children, including the purging of the party's intellectual members who came from landed rich families.

In the "Purge of the AB Groups", members of the Party of the landed rich were the first to be eliminated, which demonstrated the "purifying" nature of this struggle.

Within the CCP, Mao Zedong had long been known for his anti-dogmatic and anti-extreme leftist views, which had won him the support of the whole party.

In the early 1930s, however, this was not the case with Mao, whose extreme leftism was in some ways comparable to that of the Comintern, especially in its approach to the rich peasants.

In June 1930, Mao presided over the formulation of the Resolution on the Problem of the Rich Peasants. In June 1930, Mao presided over the formulation of the Resolution on the Problem of the Rich Peasants, which emphasized the principle of dividing the land into plots of land by "extracting more to make up for the less, and extracting the fat to reduce the thin," but Mao's attitude toward the rich peasants was no different from that of the Comintern, and was even more drastic. Mao fiercely attacked the rich peasants, declaring that "the exploitation of the rich peasants is even more

cruel than that of the landlords" and that "this class has always been counter-revolutionary". Mao even targeted the rich middle peasants who did not rent out their land or hire labor, calling them "the third kind of rich peasants" and calling for "resolute sponsorship of the masses to confiscate their land and abolish their debts". What's more, Mao actually invented the concept of "rich-peasant communists" and regarded all comrades in favor of the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of China's "confiscation of the land of the gentry and landowners" as the "rich-peasant element of the Party", demanding that they be "removed" from the Party. He demanded that they be "scrubbed out" of the Party, and that "the rich peasants and all those who follow the rich peasant line be unconditionally expelled from the Party" [23].

In this way, Mao Zedong's decision to launch the "purge of the AB group" was indeed multi-purpose, as the suppression of the Red Army and the Party organization in western Gansu was not only to eliminate the centrifugal forces of the organization, but also to clear the obstacles within the Party in order to carry out Mao's ideals of transforming the society. In Mao's world, repression was linked to "purification," the final goal of which was the establishment of a new world under Mao's domination.

Where does Mao's ideological logic come from? On the level of "purification," Mao was influenced by Marxist theories of class struggle and violent revolution, and especially by the experience of the October Revolution in Russia, when on January 24, 1928, Mao himself wrote a couplet for the inaugural meeting of the government of the workers, peasants, and soldiers in Suichuan County, which reads: "In the old days you exploited the workers and peasants. exploited the workers and peasants, good is good, profit in profit; to this day, I slaughtered the soil inferior, afraid or not, knife on knife." [24] If we look at the level of "repression" that cleansed the Party of opposition, we cannot find any direct evidence that Mao was influenced by the Soviet experience, which was still in the process of being developed: in the late twenties and early thirties Stalin's struggle against Trotsky had not yet reached the stage of physical elimination, and the Great Purge was launched in later years by Stalin. The Great Purge was still a few years in the future.

The judgment that can be drawn is that Mao's internal purges basically stemmed from the experience he gained in fighting for the country, and in this regard, Mao seemed to be more influenced by the experience of the peasant rebellions of the past generations and the "Water Margin", or it was simply the product of Mao's self-realization. In this way, Mao created for the first time in the international communist movement a model for applying the method of struggle against the enemy to the Party, and in this sense, the "Purge of the AB Groups" was original.

After the Zunyi Conference, Mao Zedong returned to the core of the Red Army and the Party, and in the new situation, the conflicts within the Party and the military were still very prominent, but Mao changed his strategy, and he no longer used the extreme method of "Purging the AB Groups" to solve the conflicts within the Party and the base areas. Had Mao realized and corrected his past mistakes? The reality may not be so simple. Indeed, in his speech at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1945, Mao said, "The purges have taken an extremely painful path. Counter-revolution should be opposed. When the Party was not mature, it took a detour on this issue and made mistakes." [25] However, Mao never gave a detailed explanation or "self-criticism" of his relationship with the "Purging of the AB Groups". The "Purging of the AB Group" was not only recognized, but the Futian Incident was also treated as an iron case of "counter-revolutionary riot", and could not be vindicated for a long time. Nevertheless, after Mao came to power, he really did not engage in the physical elimination of the "Fighting the AB Groups" within the Party anymore.

The real reason for this was that Mao Zedong had already taken control of the CCP Central Committee, and he no longer needed to resort to extreme measures to maintain his authority as leader, as he had the legitimacy to command the whole Party. 1935 saw Mao occupying a central position in the CCP Central Committee leadership, and in 1938 Mao was recognized by the Comintern as the leader of the CCP. As Mao's position within the Party strengthened, his ideas and opinions became an important part of the CCP's ideological system of justification, and Mao thus gained the legitimacy of the Party's ideology. Nowadays, revolutionary terror against the party takes the form of deterrence more often and resorts less often to outright violence. In general, revolutionary terror was used only as an adjunct to complement Mao's political education. In later years, Mao Zedong, the master of revolutionary tactics, was able to control the revolutionary terror

machine with ease, and like a Chinese herbalist preparing a prescription, he knew how to adjust the weights of these two aspects according to the needs of reality, and under Mao's manipulation, the revolutionary terror machine had acquired a certain "intelligence. In 1944, Mao decisively announced the suspension of the rescue campaign in Yan'an and the base areas - a campaign that had led many old Party members in the base areas to mistakenly believe that there was going to be another "Purging of the AB Groups" type of purges, but they were wrong, and Mao had no intention of, and was unwilling to, repeat the struggles of those years. When Mao's goal was basically realized, the revolutionary terror machine against the Party immediately stopped working. With the support and assistance of Liu Shaoqi, Mao mastered a new method: through the institutional mechanism established in the trial-and-rescue campaign, he used the party apparatus to cleanse the Communist Party, thus keeping the party in a constant state of "purification".

In this way, the "purge of the AB group" of the early 1930s has become extinct. From the Yan'an period onwards, Mao kept reiterating that "not a single one should be killed, and most of them should not be captured", but after all, Mao could not forget the tense years of "purging the AB group" in full swing, and he still made a decision on the "purging of the AB group". Mao still made his own "criticism and inheritance" of that year's "purge of the AB Corps"-suspending physical extermination within the Party while preserving and carrying forward the revolutionary tradition of mass purges, and from then on suppression and "purification" had a new form. From then on, suppression and "purification" took on a new form, and were closely integrated with the Party's institutional measures of scrutinizing and purging, so that the Rescue Movement was followed by the Anti-Rightist Movement and the Cultural Revolution.

Annotation:

[1] The "Purging of the AB Groups" campaign in the Jiangxi Soviet area went through two stages: the first stage, from the February 7 Conference in 1930 to January 1931; and the second stage, from April 1931 to the end of 1931, in which the "Purging of the AB Groups" campaign was carried out. In the first phase, from October 1930 to January of the following year, Mao Zedong and his General Front Committee of the Red Army played a leading role in the "fight against the AB". According to preliminary statistics, during this stage, the Red First Army alone had 4,500 officers and soldiers killed, and by October 1930, the Special Committee of West Jiangxi had eliminated more than 1,000

members of the "AB Group," a number that did not include the number of members of the Party and governmental organizations who were killed in the base area after that. The Central Delegation headed by Ren Bishi and the General Front Committee of the Red Army led by Mao Zedong presided over the second phase of the "purge of the AB Tuan" in the Jiangxi Soviet area, and the targets of the killings were mainly the cadres of the Red Army in southwest Gansan who took part in the Futian Incident, as well as cadres of the local authorities in southwest Gansan, and the exact number of deaths is not known. Sources: I. Mao Zedong: A Letter to the General Front Committee (December 20, 1930), in Political Institute of the Communist Army: Reference Materials for Teaching the History of the CCP, vol. 14 (Beijing: Political Institute of the Communist Army, 1985), p. 634; II. Xiao Ke on the Lustration Campaign in the Early Period of China's Soviet Area, in Chinese Revolutionary Museum: Research Materials on the History of the Party, No. 5, 1982; III. Jiangxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China in the Soviet Area (May 1932), in Jiangxi Provincial Archives and the Party History Teaching and Research Department of the Party School of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, Selected Historical Materials of the Central Revolutionary Base Areas (中央革命根据地史料选编), first volume (Nanchang: Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 1983), pp. 477-78, 480; iv. Problems, in Selected Historical Materials of the Central Revolutionary Roots, Upper Volume, p. 631; v. Liao Gailong said on September 23, 1981, "The Red First Front Army at that time had but 30,000 or 40,000 men in the Soviet area, and two purges before and after it engaged more than 6,000, half of whom were killed, that is to say, one out of ten Reds was killed, and almost all of them were cadres ". Liao Gailong again quoted Mao Zedong on December 10, 1980, "Chairman Mao said that we killed 4,500 people, but we saved 40,000 Red Army." Quoted in Party History Data Collection Committee of the CPC Central Committee and the Party History Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, Newsletter of Party History Data (1981 compilation) (Beijing: Press of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, 1982), pp. 89, 144.

[2] Gong Chu, *Memoirs of General Gong Chu* (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Monthly, 1978), pp. 171, 205-207, 348, 357.

[3] Resolution of the Front Committee on the Expulsion of Jiang Hanbo from the Party (April 4, 1930), in *Selected Historical Materials of the Central Revolutionary Base Areas*, supra, pp. 576-77.

[4] Front Committee Circular No. 1 (February 16, 1930), in *Selected Historical Materials of the Central Revolutionary Base Areas*, middle volume, p. 173.

[5] [6] [8] Selected Historical Materials of the Central Revolutionary Bases, lower volume, pp. 634-35; 646; 648-49; 110.

[7] Selected Historical Materials of the Central Revolutionary Base Areas (中央革命根据地史料选编), upper volume, pp. 626, 631.

[9] Documentation Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong's Chronicle (1893-1949), upper volume (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House, People's Publishing House, 1993), p. 319. See also Dai Xiangqing and Luo Huilan, The Beginnings and End of the AB Troupe and the Futian Incident (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Publishing House, 1994), p. 93.

[10] [20] [21] Same as note [1] Mao Zedong: A Letter of Reply from the General Front Committee

[11] Huang Kecheng in His Own Words (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1994), pp. 100-101.

[12] Ganxi Executive Committee: Circular Xizi No. 7 (October 21, 1930), cited in Chen Yongfa: A Review of the Early CCP Purges - The AB Tuan Case, Collected Works of the Institute of Modern History of the Academia Sinica, Vol. 17, No. 1 (June 1988), p. 203

[13] Mao Zedong: a letter in reply from the General Front Committee emphasized that "the Second Plenary Session is mainly against the February 7th Conference, and the expulsion of Liu Shiqi is against the February 7th Conference and against Mao Zedong."

[14] See note [2] Gong Chu, p. 353; however, according to a 1987 investigation by the Party History Office of Jishui County, Li Wenlin's father was a well-to-do middle peasant and had died in May 1927 after a long illness. See Investigation of Li Wenlin's Wrongful Death, CCP Jiangxi Party History Collection Committee, CCP Jiangxi Party History Research Office, Jiangxi Party History Materials, 1st series, p. 326. [15] Li Wenlin's father was a wealthy farmer and died in May 1927, according to a 1987 investigation by the CCP Jishui County Party History Office.

[15] Li Wenlin was secretly arrested by the General Front Committee at the end of November 1930, and Xiang Ying, who was released after taking office as secretary of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Union, was sent in February 1931 to work for the Wantai Hedong Anti-Repression Committee. After the arrival of the Central Committee delegation led by Ren Bishi, who overruled Xiang Ying's decision, Li Wenlin was arrested again in July 1931, and on May 30, 1932, Li Wenlin was executed as the "chief offender of the AB Group", and by 1987 had not yet been rehabilitated.[16] Cited in the

article, Li Wenlin was arrested by the General Front Committee at the end of November 1930, when he was released as secretary of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Union.

[16] Cited in note 9, Dai Xiangqing and Luo Huilan, p. 98.

[17] Provincial Executive Committee Emergency Circular No. 9 (Dec. 15, 1930), cited above, p. 105.

[18] See note [1] Xiao Ke on the early purges in the Chinese Soviet area.

[19] Zeng Shan, Manifesto for the Futian Incident (January 14, 1931), cited in Note [9] Dai Xiangqing and Luo Huilan, pp. 105-106

[22] In 1931, Mao Zedong said this to Tu Zuochao, a radio technical cadre who had returned from the Soviet Union, see Tu Zuochao, "The Fire I Had with Chairman Mao," *Hundred Years of Tide*, No. 5, 1999, pp. 25-27.

[23] The Problem of the Rich Peasants-Resolution of the Joint Meeting of the Front Committee and the Minxi Special Committee in June 1930, in *Selected Historical Materials of the Central Revolutionary Base Areas*, vol. 2, pp. 398-99, 400, 402, 404, 410, 413.

[24] Quoted in Yu Boryu and Xia Daohan, *Studies on the Revolutionary Bases of Jinggangshan* (Nanchang: Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 1987), p. 124.

[25] See Room I of the Party History Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, *Explanation of Certain Problems in the History of the Communist Party of China* (the first volume) (Beijing: CPC History Press, 1991), p. 121.